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This thesis develops it theory that explains why special operations 
succeed. Th e theory is important because s uccessful special operati ons defy 
conventional wisdom. Special operations forces are us uall y numerically 
inferior to the enemy and generally these fo rces are attacking fortified 
positions. According to Cui Von Clausewit:.o: , both of these fac tors s hould spell 
defeat, and yet, time and again •. these missions succeed. T his thesis presents 
eight historical cases and demonstrates how certa in principles of special 
operations ca n be comb in ed to achieve rdati-ve superiori t y. Relative su periorit y 
• is the condition that exists when a smaller furce ga ins a decisive advantage o ver 
it larger or well d efended enemy. It is how special operations forces achieve 
this decisive ad vantage th at exp la ins their success. In essence, special 
operations forces gain that a dvantage when they have a simple plan, carefully 
concealed, real istically rehearsed and executed with surprise, speed and 
purpose . This advantage is tenuous however, and is su bject to the frictions o f 
war. Through the use of a Relative Superiority Graph , this thesis demonstrates 
h o w, historically, that a dvantage has been mainta ined and in the conclusions 
proposes mission "profiles" that reduce the frictions of w.u and hasten the 
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I. THE THEORY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
A. INTRODUcnON 
In the realm of military literature, there is much written on the theory of 
war, ranging from Hennan Kahn's thinking about the unthinkable, on the 
nuclear end of the. spectrum, to Liddel Harfs indirect warfal1! on the 
conven tional end. There are theories of war escalation and war termination, 
theories of revolution and countenevolution, and theories of insurgency and 
counterinsurgency. There a re general air power and sea power theories, and 
more specific theories on strategic bombing and amphibious warfare. 
Now here, however, is there a theory of special operations. l 
Why is a theory of special operations important? A successful special 
operation mission defies conventional wisdom by using a small fo rce to defeat 
a much I,uger or well entrenched opponent. This thesis develops a theory of 
special operations which explains why this phenomenon occurs. I win 
I For theories on warfare see the following: on nuclear war, Herman Kahn's, Qn 
Thermonuclear War (Princeton, 1960); on war escaJation/tennination, Fred Charles 
Ikle, Every War Must End, (New York, 1991 ); theories of revolution and 
counterrevolution, Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (St.anford, 1982); 
insurgency and counterinsurgency, Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and 
Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgency Conflicts (Rand, 1970), and Larry E. 
Cable, Conflicts of Myth: The Development of American CounterinsuJgency Doctrine 
and the Vietnam War (New York, 1986); air power theory, Guilio Douhet, The 
Command of the Air (New York. 1942); sea power theory, Alfred Thayer Mahan, The 
In fluence of Sea I'ower Upon History 1660-1783 (Boston, 1890); strategic bombing, Lee 
Kennett, A History of Strategic Bombing (New York, 1982); theory of amphibious 
warfare, Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The u.s. Marines and Amphibious War: 
Its Theory and Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, 1951). 
demonstrate that through the use of certain principles of special operations, a • 
small force can achieve relah''lIe superion'ty over the enemy,2 R£lative 
superiority can be defined as a condition that exists when an attacking force, 
generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well defended 
enemy, Once reiati1Jc superiority is achieved, the attacking force is no longer 
at a disadvantage and has 'the initiative to exploit the enemy's weaknesses and 
secure victory. Although gaining relative supen'ority doesn't guarantee success 
- it is necessary for success, If we can determine, prior to an operation, the 
best way to achieve relative superiority, then we can tailor special operation's 
planning and preparation to improve our chances of victory, Through the use 
of eight case studies I will show how the theory can be applied in combat 
operations. 
B. THE SCOPE OF mE TIIESIS 
To develop a theory of special operations I had to first limit the scope of 
the problem, This required developing the following refined definition of a 
special operation mission: 
2 Relative superiority, as it applies to the theory of special operations, should not 
be confused with Clausewitz's relative superiority, which is defined by the 






A special operation is cond ucted by forces specially tra in ed, equipped, 
and supported for a sp ecifi c target whose destnlction, eli mination, or in 
the case of hostages, the rescue o f, is a politica l or m ili tary imperative.l 
This definition is not consistent with o fficial Joint Doctrine which b roadly 
defines sped ill operations to include psychologica l operations, civi l affairs and 
reconnaissance. The eight com bat operations, analyzed to ide ntify the 
principles of special op erations and to develop the theory, aTe closely aligned 
to what Joint Pub 3·05 defi nes as a d irect action mission. Un like a direct action 
mission, however, these eight special operations were always on a strategic or 
operatio nal level and h ad the advantage of virtu ally unlimited resources and 
nati onal level in tellige nce! The refined defini tion also im plies that special 
o perations can be conducted by "non-special operations" personnel, such as 
those airman who conducted Dolittle's raid on Tokyo or the subm arin ers 
] The Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (currently promulgated as TE ST PU B 
JO INT PUB 3-05) defines Special Operations as, "Operations conducted by speciall y 
organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, 
political, econom ic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in 
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during 
peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independent or in coordination w ith 
operations of conventional, non-special operations forces . Politico-m ilitary 
considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or 
low visibili ty techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations di ffe r 
from conventio na l operations in the degree of phys ical and political risk, o perational 
techniques, modes of employment, independence from friendly support, and 
depen de nce on deta iled operational intelligence and indigenous assets." 
• Joint I'ob 3-05 stil tes that direct action mi<isions arc "designed to achieve specific, 
weB defined, and often time-sensitive results or strategic, operational, or critical 
tactical significance." They invol ve attacks 011 critical targets, interdictions or critical 
Line of Communications, location, capture, of recovery of personnel or nl.lteriaJ or the 
se izure, destruction, or neutralization of critical faciliti es. 
involved in the raid on the German battleship TIRPITZ. Although I believe • 
the Theory of Special Operations, as presented in this thesis, is applicable 
across the spectrum of special operations, as defined by Joint Pub 3-05, it was 
developed solely frum those missions contained within. All usage of the term 
special operations, henceforth, will adhere to this refined definition. 
c. WHY ARE SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIQUi'..""? 
All special operations are conducted against fortified positions, whether 
that position be a battleship surrounded by antitorpedo net (the British midget 
submarine raid on the TIRPITZ), a mountain retreat guarded by Italian troops 
(Skorzeny's rescue of Mussolini), a POW camp (Ranger raid on Cabanatuan, 
U.S. Special Forces raid on Son Tay) ora hijacked airliner (Gennan antiterrorist • 
unit (GSG.9) hostage rescue in Mogadishi). These fortified positions reflect 
situations involving defensive warfare on the part of the enemy. 
Carl von Clausewitz in his book On War noted: 
The defensive fonn of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offense.~ 
[It) contributes resisting power, the ability to preserve and protect oneself. 
Thus, the defense generally has a negative <lim, that of resisting the 
enemy's wiIl ... if we are to mount an offensive to impose our will, we 
must develop enough force to overcome the inherent superiority of the 
enemy's defense! 
5 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War edited and translated by Michael Howard and 
reler Pacet (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) 358. 
, Department of the Navy, FMI-'M 1 1989, 24. 
• 
Clause witz's theory of war states that to defeat "the stronger form of w.ufare" 
an Arm y's best weapon is superior numbers. 
In O/is sCllse superiority ofllumbers admittedly is the most important factor 
ill the outcome of a ll ellgllgement, so long as it is great enough to 
counterbal ance all other contributing circumstances. 1t thus follows tllat 
as "mlll! troops as possibll' silO /lid be brought illfo the engagemellt at tile 
.lecisiVl' poinf.? 
No soldier would argue't he benefit of superior numbers, but if it w ere "the 
most important fa ctoI," how could 69 German commilndos d eleat a Belgian 
force of 750 soldiers protected b y the largest, most extensive fortress of its time 
-- the fort at Eben Emad? How can a special operation's force that has the 
d isadvantage o f attacking the stronger form of warfare an d has inferior 
n umbers ga in rdative superiorit y o ver the enemy? To understilnd this paradox, 
• is to u nderstand special opera tions. 
D. RELATIVE S UPERIORITY 
Rell/ tivl'SIIf!l! r iority is a co ncept crucial 10 the Theory of Special O perations. 
The value of u nderstanding relative superiority lies in the concept's a bility to 
illustrate w hat pos itive fo rces influence the success of a mission, a n d e q ually 
important, to see how the frictions of war affect the achievemen t o f that goal. 
This section will define the thre(' basic properties of rdative sliperiority and 
describe how those properties are revealed in combat. 
, Ibid., Clausewitz, 194. (Emphasis ad ded) 
• 
Relative superiority is the pillOlal moment in an engagement. For example, 
in WWIJ when the Gennan's attacked the Belgium fort at Eben EmaeJ, they 
achieved a decisive advantage over the enemy, relative superiority, within five 
minutes of the initial engagement by using gliders and shape charges to gain 
surprise, and speed to subdue the enemy quickly. Although the Belgians 
fought for another 24'hours, the battle hinged on the first few moments and the 
outcome of the engagement virtually assured. 
In some cases, the pivotal moment comes before actual combaL In 1943, 
the British modified an old destroyer, the HMS CAMPBELTOWN, filled it with 
four and a quarter tons of explosives, covered it with annor plating. sailed it 
across the channel and rammed it into the Gennan held dry dock at SL Nazaire, 
France. This action rendered the dry dock useless for the remainder of the war. • 
Although the Gennan defenses surrounding SL Nazaire were the heaviest on 
the Atlantic, once the CAMPBELTOWN managed to reach the outer harbor of 
the port (two miles from the dry dock), the Gennans could not stop her. At 
this point, which was prior to actual hostilities, relative superiority was 
achieved. The point at which relative superiority is achieved is also frequently 
the point of greatest risk. Like defenses around a target, the closer the 
attacking force gets, the tougher the defenses become. However, once you 
overcome the last obstacle the probability of success strongly outweighs the 




Once relative superiority is achieved, it must be sus tained in order to 
guaran tee victory. In an effort to rescue the IWian dictator, Benito Mussolini, 
SS Captain O tto Skorzeny conducted il glider assault on an Italia n s tronghold 
on lop of G ran Sasso peak in the Apennines mountains. Within four mi nutes 
of landing, Skorzeny had stonned the hotel h ideout and had M ussoli n i !n his 
custody. At this point he achieved relative superiority, however, before the 
mission was s uccessful, Skatteny still had to ext ract M ussolini from the 
m ountain to p a nd ensure the dictator's safe return to Rome. This in te ri m 
period between grabbi ng Mussolini and mission completion, requi red 
sllstain in g relntive superiority. This was accomplished through b oldness on 
Skorzeny's part and by reinforcing the small commando fo rce with 
conventiona.! troops. 
T he ability to sustain relative superiority frequently requires the 
intervention of the moral factors (courage, intellect, boldm .. >ss, and 
persevera nce). For example, during World War II, Lieutenant Luigi Durand d e 
Iii Penne, an Italian frogmiln, clandestinely e n tered Alexandria Ha rbor aboa rd 
a m anned torpedo. He and his second diver overcame an antisubmarine net, 
depth charge,;, p icket boats, pier security and an antitorpedo net to reach the 
British battleship HMS VALIANT. All that was left to do was place his 
explosives on the hull and the mission would be successful. Unfortunately, as 
De la Penne dove the manned torpedo under the VAU ANT, the s ubmersible 
gained ballast and sank into the mud and De la Penne's second diver lost 
consciousness and floated to the surface. Although physically exhausted from 
the long dive and freezing from the cold water seeping into hi!l dry suit, De Iii 
I'enne spent the next forty minutes moving the torpedo into position under the 
VALIANT. Only through this tremendous perseverance ilnd courage (two of 
the four moral factors) was Ve la Penne able to sustain relative superiority and 
complete the mission. 
If relative superiority is lost, it is difficult to regain. When the 
CAMPHELTOWN rammed the dry dock at St. Nazaire, the plan called for 
eighty commandos aboard to disembark and destroy a variety of ta£gets around 
the port facility. Although the commandos achieved a distinct tactical 
advantage when they rammed the dry dock and surprised the Gennans; as they 
attempted to destroy their targets ashore, German sililors and soldiers • 
intervened slowing the commandos progress. After thirty minutes ashore, the 
CAMPBEL TOWN commandos were overwhelmed by German reinforcements 
and lost relative superiority. The engagement lilsted another two hours, but the 
British, because of their numerical inferiority, were never able to regain the 
advantage. Eventually the commandos were forced to surrender. An inherent 
weakness in special forces is their lack of firepower relative to a large 
conventional force. Consequently when they lose relative superiority, they lose 
the initiative, and the stronger form of warfare generally prevails. 
The key to a special operations mission is to gain relative superiority early 





will of the e nemy and chance ilnd uncertainty, the frictions o f war, will ('(feet 
the outcome. In each of the eight case studies, the co.ncept of relative 
superiority will be portrayed through the use of a Relative Su periority Graph. 
The graph illustrates how achieving relative superion"ty is affected by the 
positive and negative factors of war. Additionally, the graph p rovid es iI. yisual 
demo nstration of the three properties of relative superiority: the pivotal 
moment can be seen ilS a dramatic rise in the Probability of Mission 
Completion; sustaining relative superiority is iI. grOlduilil rise from the pivotal 
moment to Mission Completion; and iI. decisive drop i n the Probability of 
Mission Completion shows a loss of relative superiority. Figure 1·1 is a 
representative Relative Superiority Graph. 
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The X4axis is Time, the Y-axis is Probability of Mission Completion. The 
intersection of the axis is the Point of Vulnerability (PV). The Point of 
Vulnerability is defined, as the point in a mission when the attacking force 
reaches the enemy's first line of defenses. At this point, the frictions of war 
(chance, uncertainty and the will of the enemy) will begin to impinge upon the 
success of the engagement This Point of Vulnerability is somewhat arbitrary, 
and the exact location can be debated. Is it when the gliders launch from the 








Is it whe n the midget submarines enter Norwegian w att!I"S, o r when they first 
encou nter German defenses? Although the frictions of ~war" can effect a 
mission even in the planning phase, I have elected to define the Point of 
Vulnerability as an aspect of the engagement phase. 
The Area of Vulnerability (A V) is a function of mission completio~ over 
time. The longer it takes to reach relative superiority the greater will be the 
Area of Vulnerabili ty, and hence the greater the impact of the fri ctions of war. 
The graph also shows the critical events leading up to relative superiority and 
when the mission w as completed. 
Although there are factors in war over which we have little control, the 
Theory of Special O perations shows that tht!re are six principles, which can be 
"controlled," and have an effect on relative superiority. 
E. TIlE SIX PRINl.'lPLFS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
The six principles of s peciaJ operations presented in this section -
simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose •. were derived 
from an analysis of eight historical cases.8 T hese principles d ominated every 
successful mission. If one of these principles were overlooked, disregarded or 
8 Initially, the cases were compared to the United States Army's nPrinciples of 
Wac" as defined in the Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. After careful 
examination of these cases some of the nPrindples of Wac" were eliminated or 
modified to more accurately reflect their relationship to a speciaJ operation. The 
Army's principles include; Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, 
Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity. 
11 
bypassed, there was invariably a failure of some magnitude. It is these 
principles that allowed special operations forces to achieve ref~tive superiority. 
Can large forces use these principles to gain relative superiority? No! RJ!iative 
superiority is strictly the purview of small forces. This is not to imply that 
large forces cannot gain some element of surprise or use speed to achieve. their 
goals, but. ga.ining relative superiority requires proper integration all six 
principles. By virtue of their size, it is difficult for large forces to develop a 
simple plan, keep their movements concealed, conduct detailed full dress 
rehear.oals (down to the individual soldiers level), gain tactical surprise and 
speed on target, and motivate all the soldiers in the unit to a single goal. 
Clausewitz states the obvious when he says, "The greater the magnitude of any 
event, the wider the range of forces and circumstances that effect it.'" Large • 
forces are more susceptible to the frictions of war. The Principles of Special 
Operations work, because they seek to reduce warfare to its simplest level, and 
thereby limit the negative effects of chance and uncertainty. 
To achieve relative superiority, the practitioner of special operations must 
take account of the principles in the three phases of an operation; planning, 
preparation, and execution. Each principle is interconnected and relies on the 
others for support. For example, if a plan is not simple, it will be difficult to 
conceal the operation's intent, and even more difficult to rehearse. And, if the 





operation is difficult to conceal and rehearse, i t will b e near impossible to 
execute with surprise, speed and purpose. 
fhe Holloway Commission's Rescue Mission Report which reviewed the 
failed attempt to rescue hostage from Teheran in 1980, shows how the 
principles of simplicity, sl!(:urity ,IOU repetition are reloited. The rescue mi,ssion 
was a borted w hen, due to unforseen circumstances, there were immfficient 
helkopters to continue the oper<ltion. The report noted, however, that by 
adding additional helicopters it w ould have increased the level of difficulty 
w hich "wo uld (have) ni$u lt(ed) in an unnecessary increase in the O PSEC 
risk." ID The report contin ued: 
OPSEC considerations mitigated against such a (full scale] reheillsal and, 
while the review group recognized the inherent risk in bringing all the 
forces together in the western US training sill', the possible security 
disadvantages uf such a reh earsal seem to b e outweighed by th e 
advantag es to be gained .... 11 
The correlation between simplicity, securi ty, and repetition is clear; if a p la n 
is complex it will require extraordinary security, and an overabundance of 
securi ty h inders effective preparation. 
In the preparatiun p hase, proper security and constant repetition have a 
direct impact on the attacking force's ability to gain surprise and speed in the 
execution phase. Clausewitz in his discussion on surpri se says, that "Surprise 
l~ T he H olloway Commission, Rescue Mission Report August 1980, 58. 
II Ibid., 59. 
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will never be achieved under lax conditions (poor !;ecurity( and conduct. n12 • 
Good security ensures that conditions, in the preparation phase, remain Mtight" 
to prevent the enemy from gaining a disastrous advantage. 
Constant repetition, as manifested in training and premission rehearsals, 
is the link between the principle of simplicity in the planning phase, a~d the 
principles of surprise and speed in the execution phase. For example, UCol 
Herbert Zehnder, the pilot of the HH-3 who flew from Thailand to Son Tay, 
North Vietnam had the difficult task of landing in the POW camp's small 
courtyard. It was considered essential to make this "controlled crash" in the 
courtyard in order to gain a few seconds of surprise. Initially, this maneuver 
was considered too difficult, but after hundreds of flying hours and a dozen 
rehearsals the difficult landing became easier and surprise was achieved. • 
Constant repetition made the task of landing in a confined area easier and 
thereby improved the opportunity for gaining surprise. 
Const.ant. realistic rehearsals will improve the attacking force's ability to 
quickly execute the mission, particularly under combat conditions. John 
Lorimer, a crewman on the midget submarine which damaged the battleship 
TIRPITZ said, "If you are going to do anything dangerous, the best way to 
accomplish it is to train, train, train, so that in the excitement of the situation 





you do the th ing automatically.~u Repetition, by i ts very nat ure, im proves 
speed on target 
The last of the six principles is purpose. A sense of purpose, namely the 
understanding of the mission' s objectives and a personal commitment to see 
tho!'!e objectives achieved, is vi tal to achieving relative SUI1eriority. Although 
the principle of purpose is must apparent in the execution phase, all the phases 
must focus on the purpose of the mission. Knowing the purpose of the 
mission will reduce the extraneous objectives, isolate the intelligence required, 
tailor OPSEC requirements, focus the rehearsals, and in combat,. ensure the 
efforts of the commander or individual soldier are centered on what is 
importan t - the mission. 
All of the previous examp les illustrate the relationship between t he 
plann ing, preparation, and execution phases of a m ission and demonstrat~ the 
synergistic nature of the six principles of special o perations. The Special 
Operation 's Model shown in Figure 1-2 depicts the Principles of Special 
Operations as an inverted pyramid. 
JJ Thomas Gallager, The X-Craft Raid (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 
1969), 20. 
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A Ihnl*lplan, car.fUltyao-*l,~1y Mel ....... t1caltr~ 
MCI ..... _d with _prlM .• peed"'" pur~. 
THE SPECIAL OPERATION'S MODEL 
Figure 1-2.. 
The blocks within the pyramid can be "constructed" to achieve relative 
superiority. Although gaining relative superiority oller the enemy is essential to 
success -- it is not u guarantee. The success of the mission, like the inverted 
pyramid, is precariously balanced on a slender apex. It requires the moral 
factor.; of courage, intellect, boldness and perseverance to support the pyramid 
and prevent the frictions of war from toppling it and causing defeat. 111i5 
model is not u preScription for success on the battlefield, it is only a tool to help 







the principles of special operations and rel.ative superiority. This modeJ also 
reflects the Theory of Special Operations. It graphically represents the idea 
that Special Operations Forces succeed, in spite of their numerical inferiority, 
when they are able to gain relative superiority through the use of a simple plan, 
Gleefully com:ealed, repeatedly and l'i'aJistically rehearsed, and execu ted with 
surprise, speed and purpose. Failure resul ts when the fri ctions of w ar 
overcome the moral factors. Now let's define the six principles and 
demonstrate how they are manifested in combat. 
1. SIMPUCITY 
Simplicity is the m ust crucial, and yet sometimes the most diffic ul t 
principle, with which to comply. How does one make a plan si mple? There 
are three elements of simplicity critical to success: limiting the number of 
objectives; good intelligence; and innovation. 
The political o r military situation dictates the strategic or ope rational 
objectives of the mission, but the planners generally have the latitude to 
determine the tactical objectives as long as the two objectives coincide. 
Therefore it is essential to limit the number of tactical objectives to only those 
that are vital. Foe example, at the out<;et of wwn, Hitler ordered German 
commandos to seize the Belgium fort at Eben Emael to prevent the fo rt's 75mm 
and 120mm guns from destroying the nearby bridges and engaging the 
advancing German Panzer Division. Although there were twenty casemates 
(each with two to three guns) the Germans attacked only nine casemates. The 
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remaining eleven casemates were aimed south and not a threat to the norlhem 
• bridges or the Panzers. 
Conversely, while planning for the raid on St. Nazaire the British 
identified the Nonnandie dry dock as the "principle objective" with the South 
Lock gates and any accessible U-boats as the secondary and tertiary targets. I' 
However, as plannin'g progressed the total number of major targets grew to 
eleven. By increasing the number of objectives from three to eleven the assault 
force was required to add 50 more soldiers and over 200 naval support 
personnel. Additionally, ten extra assault craft were added, more training was 
required and the tactics had to be modified to accommodate these changes. 
limiting the objectives to only what is essential focuses the training, limits the 
number of personnel required, reduces the time on target and decreases the • 
number of "moving parts." 
Good intelligence is a second element which is needed to develop 
a simple plan. Good intelligence simplifies a plan by reducing the unknown 
factors and the number of variables that must be considered. While preparing 
to rescue hostage from the Entebbe airport,.. Israeli intelligence personnel were 
able to determine the number of termrisL<; and Ugandan guards, their 
weaponry. and their general disposition. This infonnation allowed the 
14 The Controller of His Britannic Majesty's Stationery Office, Combined 
Operations: The Official StOry of the Commandos (New York: The MacMillan 





commander of the raid force, BGEN Shomron, to reduce the size of his force 
to only what was necessary. This dramatically improved command a nd control 
and was essential to success. Prior to the raid on the fortress at Eben Emael, 
the Germans obtained engineering plans that provi de a detailed descrip tion of 
the fort's emergency exits. If eve n a small portion of the 750 Belgians i,nside 
the fort escaped, they could overwhelm the small Gennan force. Armed with 
this knowledge the glidermen, u pon landing.. quickly destroyed the emergency 
exits and eliminated the Belgian's COIIpabili ty to counterattack. 
There will, however, always b e "gaps" in the intelligencl:!. The 
midgd submarine crew w hich attacked the German battleship TIRPITZ did not 
know how far the anti torpedo net extended below the water. At Son Tay, the 
raiders did not know exactly how m any POW~ there were, or how many enemy 
guards were inside the camp. In both cases the operators heeded the words of 
Clausewitz: 
Many intelligence reports i n war are contradictory; even more are fa1se 
and most are uncertain. What one can reasonably ask of an officer is that 
h I:! should possess a standard of judgement. •. H e should be guided by the 
laws of probability. I ~ 
The subm ari ne crew was prepared to cut through the net ~assumjng" 
that it extended to the seabed 120 fl:! et down. Intelligence ana1ysts studying the 
Son Tay camp projected the number ofPOWs and guards based on the numbl:!r 
15 Ibid., Clausl:!witz, 183. (Emphasis added) 
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and size of the buildings. Both units built their plan a round what was 
reasonable to expect. 
The third element that contributes to simplicity is innovation. 
Innovation simplifies a plan by helping to avoid or eliminate obstacles which 
would otherwise compromise surprise and/or complicate the rapid execu~on of 
the mission. Innovation is normally manifested in new technology, but it is 
also the application of unconventional tactics. The fort at Eben Emael was 
thirty miles from the German border. If surprise were compromised the 
Belgians would have had ample time to destroy the bridges crucial to the 
German advance. Airborne troops were unable to carry the heavy ordnance 
needed to destroy the casemates and parachute delivery would have produced 
too wide a troop dispersion. Hitler ordered General Kurt Student to develop • 
a gliderborne assault force to seize the fort. Although gliders were not a new 
technology, it was the first use of gliders during combat and surprised the 
Belgians long enough to allow the Germans to destroy the guns covering the 
bridges. 
While training for the raid on the Son Tay prisoner of war camp in 
North Viebtam, Army Special Forces personnel had difficulty engaging target'! 
at night. Even under the best of circumstances "the accuracy of firing at night 
was roughly 35 percent."I" Improving the accuracy was considered crucial to 
I/o liGen Leroy J. Manor interviewed by Dr. John Parton and Major Dick 





the rapid execution of the mission. Within a week of iden tifying the p roblem 
S pecial Forces personnel found a commercially avail.ab le 10':"" light scope and 
the accuracy rose to 95%. 
In every case either new techno logy or innovative tactics were used 
to assist the assault element in reachi ng the objective and then q uickly and 
effectively eliminati'ng the enemy. Gliders, midget submarines, manned 
torpedoes, Forward Looking Infared (FUR) equipped C-130E, and modified 
destroyers were all new or innovative technology specially designed or 
config u red to defeat enemy defenses and achieve surprise. Shape charges, Oren 
guns, special demolitions, low light scopes, flashbang grenades, and night 
vision devices (NVOs) were paramount to achieving speed on targeL 
Although the three elements of simplicity h.ilve their greatest im p.ilct 
d uri ng the execution phase, they must be identified e.ilrly to help cr.ilft the pl.iln 
.ilnd make it .ilS simple .ilS possible. 
2. SECURnY 
The purpose of "tight" security is to prevent the enemy from gai ning 
unfair .ildvantage through foreknowledge of the impending .ilttack. 
However, the nature of special operations is to atta.ck .iI fortified position. 11 
n.iltur.illly follows, whether in war time or pe.ilce, th.ilt the enemy is "prepared" 
for an .iltt.ilck. Therefore it is not so much the impending mission th.ilt must be 
conce.illed, but the timing and to a lesser degree the me.ilns of insertion. For 
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example, the students who seized the American Embassy in Teheran were • 
expecting the_United States to attempt a rescue. They had covered the open 
area with long wooden stakes to prevent the landing of helicopter or airborne 
forces. The battJeship TIRPl'IZ, although securely nestled 60 miles up the 
Soroy Sound in Norway was protected with antisubmarine nets, antito~edo 
nets and antiswimmer devices to counter any subsurface attack. The four 
terrorists aboard Lufthansa Flight LUtSt knew that both Germany and Israel 
had counterterrorist units capable of quickly assaulting an airliner. The 
terrorists were anned with automatic weapons and grenades and could easily 
have prevented GSG-9 from entering the Boeing 737. In most of the historical 
cases the enemy personnel at the targets were adequately prepared to defend 
themselves against just the type of attack that occurred. Nevertheless, the • 
assaull .. were mainly successful. Why? Security prevented the enemy from 
knowing the time, and in some cases, the method of the attack. Security, 
although frequently pervasive on the part of the special forces personnel, did 
not prevent the enemy from preparing for an assault. Good special operations 
succeed in spite of defensive preparation on the part of the enemy. Security, 
however, is not a trivial matter. Security should be as tight as possible, 
provided it does not unduly impede the preparation or execution of the 
operation. Security is important in achieving relative superiority because it 
prevent .. the enemy from gaining an unexpected advantage. A prevailing reason 





what defenses the enemy has prepared. A failed security effort mood result in 
the enemy p reparing .ill surprise of his own and subsequently preempting the 
attack or reducing the speed on target,. both of which would dramatically 
reduce the possibili ty o f achievi ng rdative superiority. 
3. REPETITION 
Routine, apart fro m its sheer inevitability, also contains one positive 
advantage. Constant practice le.illds to brisk, precise, and relialJle 
leadership, reducing natural friction and easing the working of the 
machine. In short routine will be more frequent and indispensable, the 
lower the level of action .11 
Clausewitz 
In the p reparatio n phase, repetition, like routine, is indispensable in 
elimi nating the barriers to success. When the Air Force Task Group, involved 
in the Son Tay raid. fir.; i attempted to fly the UH-1H in formation with the C-
130, they found fl ying in such a tight formation so diffkult that it was not 
within t he "capability of the average Army aviator." After hundreds of hours 
of fl ying the same profile, however, "the tactics of drafting with the ... UII-HI 
[were] p roven and [could bel applied in future plans.Hl~ 
General Joshua Shani, the lead C-130 pilot on the Entebbe raid had 
only one opportunity to rehearse his short field landing prior to the mission, 
17 Ibid., Cl ausewi tz, 153. 
M Commander JCS Joint Contingency Task Group, Re port on The Son 'lay 
Prisoner of War Rescue O pera tio n Part I 1970, E-61, F.-54. 
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but to Shani it was not an issue, he said, "I had done hundreds of short field 
• landings, they are part of basic training .. .it was routine."I ' 
Certain combat units, such as counterterrorist teams, strategjc 
bombers, SEAl. Delivery Vehicle Teams, perform standard mission profiles as 
a "matter of routine." This routine hones those tactical skills to such a d,egree 
that it allows quick reaction to a threat (provided that threat fits within the 
standard scenario for which the unit has been practicing.) Most special 
operations, however, vary enough from the standard scenario that new 
equipment and tactics must be brought to bear on the problem. When this 
occurs it is essential to conduct at least one, preferably two, full dress 
rehearsals prior to the mission. The plan that sounded "simple" on paper must 
now be put to the test. 
• The need for a full dress rehearsal is borne out time and again by 
those missions (or aspects of missions) that failed during the rehearsal or were 
not rehearsed and failed during the actual mission. For example, while 
rehearsing for the rdid on St. Nazaire, dozens of British commandos were 
"killed" by the Home Guard force when they tried to come ashore from motor 
launches. Although individual off load training was conducted numerous 
times without incident; when the commandos tried to "put it all together" at a 
night time rehearsal, they found landing all the troops at once was significantly 
I' General Joshua Shani inteIViewed by CDR William McRaven, Tape recording. 





more difficull T his was presumed to be an isob .ted training incident and it 
was assumed ihid duri ng the real operation the commandos would ~ma ke do.~ 
On the actual raid 169 men were killed, most coming ashore from the moior 
JaunchE's. 
The British had 18 months to prepare for the attack on the ~rman 
battleship TlRPITZ. The mission called for the smail dry submen;ibles, the X-
Craft.. to be towed for eight days across the North Atlantic by conve ntional 
sub marines. Towing was particularly taxing on the crews and therefore was 
only conducted for short durations during the rehearsals. On the actual towing 
operAtion the manila tow line broke and one X-craft sank w ith the loss of all 
.. board and one other was disabled beyond repair. Ad miral Godfrey Place 
(Commanding Officer of X.7) cummented, "If only we had tuwed the buats IX-
Crdft] for the fu ll eight days we might have known that the manila lines would 
break.20 Repetition hones individual and unit skills, w hile full dress 
rehearsals unmask weaknesses in the plan, but both are essential to success nn 
tht> battlefield. 
:w RADM Godfrey Place, ve, interviewed by CDR William McRaven, Tape 
recording, Sherborne, Durset, England, 18 June 1992. There were two types of line 
used; manila and nylon. Because the manila line had not been tested for the full 
eight days there was no way of knowing it would part und er actual conditions. 
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4. SUKPRlSE 
• The Doctrine for Joint Special Operatiuns states that surprise is the 
ability to "Strike the enemy at a time or place, or in a manner, for which he is 
unprepared."21 Yet. in all the special operations examined, the enemy was 
entirely prepared to counter an offensive action. For example, at the B~lgian 
fortress of Eben Emael antiaircraft guns were positioned on top of the fort to 
prevent an airborne assault; the port facility of St. Nazaire was ringed with 
shore batteries and spotlights to prevent British ships from sailing undetected 
up the Loire river, the German battleship TlRPlTZ and the British battleships 
HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH and HMS VALIANT were surrounded by 
antisubmarine and antitorpedo nets; North Vietnam had one of the densest air 
defense system in the world; Benito Mussolini was guarded by 250 Italian • 
soldier.>, the POWs in Cabanatuan by 225 Japanese; and the airport at Entebbe, 
Uganda was surrounded by 100 Ugandan soldiers with two battalions close by. 
The enemy, in each of these cases, was prepared to prevent an assault on their 
position and yet, surprise was achieved in all instances. 
Special operations forces do not generally have the luxury of 
attacking the enemy when, or where, he is unprepared. Such fOKes must attack 
in spite of enemy preparation. Surprise means catching the enemy off guard. 
This subtle difference is not mere semantics. Like two boxers in a ring, each 





is prepared to parry the other fig hter's punches, b ut even w ith prepa ration, 
punches are landed. In a spedal operation :o;urprise is gained through 
dect!ption, timing, and taki ng advantage of the enemy's vulnerabilities. 
Deception, when it works, either redirects the enemy's attention 
away from the attacking force, or delays the enemy's response long enough for 
surpri se to be gilined at the crucial moment. For example, during the raid o n 
Son Tay, the Navy's Carrier T ask Force 77, conducted a three carrier 
diversionary strike which ~served to deny the enemy the option of 
concentrating his attention (on the) true and primary mission."1l This 
diversion was highly successful and allowed the helibome raid force to 
penetrate North Vietnam's ai r defense and land undetected in the POW camp. 
Dect! ption that redirects attention can b e risky, and when it fails to gain the 
appropriale rcsponsl?, it is usually disastrous. At St. Nazaire, the Royal Air 
Force was ordered to bomb the port: city to redirect the German's attention 
away from the small armada of boats snealdng up the Loire river. 
Unfortunately, the air raid served only to heighten the German's alert posture 
and make complete surprise unattainable. 
Although redireded deception worked well for the Son Tay raiders, 
in special operations, deception is best used to delay action by the enemy. For 
example, when the Israelis assaulted Entebbe airport,. they used a Mercedes 
22 Ibid., Report on Son Tay POW Rescue Operation iv. 
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sedan, similar to the one driven by Ugandan dignitaries, to momentarily delay • 
action by the Ugandan guards. When Skorzeny landed at Gran Sasso to rescue 
Mussolini, he brought along a high ranking Italian general. Skorzeny believed 
that the Italian general's "mere presence would probably serve to create certain 
confusion ... a sort of hesitation which would prevent them form. res~sting 
immediately or from 'assassinating the Duce."2J Skorzeny's assumption proved 
correct and the additional confusion provided Skorzeny time to reach 
Mussolini. As several of the cases demonstrate, deception can be a useful tool 
in gaining surprise, but over reliance on deception should be avoided, and it 
is usually better to delay the enemy's reaction than to divert his attention. 
The time of attack is a key factor in gaining surprise. Most attacking 
forces prefer to assault a target at night,. primarily because darkness provides • 
cover, but also, because at night time the enemy is tired, less vigil and more 
susceptible to surprise. Hut nighttime frequently increases altemess and each 
mission should consider the ramifications of a night assault. Several of the 
most successful special operations were conducted in daytime and achieved a 
high degree of surprise. Skon:eny, for example, landed at Gran Sasso at two 
o'clock in the afternoon. He knew that the Italian guards would just have 
finished lunch and would be resting afterwards. The Germans who attacked 
F.ben Emael landed at first light. The morning light provided the gliders 
2J Otto Skorzeny, Skorzeny's Secret Missions trans. Jacques Le Clercq, (New 





illumination to land, ilnd many of the Belgian gun crews were still in the 
nearby town. The midget sub mari nes that destroyed Ule TIRPITZ also attacked 
in the morning. British intelligence had infonned the submariners that the 
TIRPITZ' s sonar equipment would be "down" fo r repair duri ng the morning 
of the attack. In special operations the enemy will be prep'ired; the question 
is, when will he be 'least- prepared and what time of day most benefi ts the 
attack ing force. 
Every defense has a weak point. Gaining surprise means exploiting 
such weakness. Although the North Vietnamese had the most extensive air 
defense network in Asia, Air Force Intelligence was able to find a fi ve minute 
gap in the radar's rotation cycle. This allowed the C-130 and helicopters 
inserting the Son Tay raiders, to enter undetected into North Vietnam. 
A similar problem was encountered by the British during WWII. 
The Royal Air Force had made counUess attempts to sink the b atUeship 
TlRPITZ from the a ir. The battleship, which was anchored in Kaa Fjord, 
Norway, w as proteded by a ntiaircraft batteries and the shi p's self-protection 
included sixteen 4.1 inch, sixteen 37mm and eighty 20mm antiaircraft guns. 
Additionally, m ost of the ship was encased in armor 12 inches thick, however, 
the weak poin t of the vessel was its thinly covered keel. It was here, at the 
"soft underbelly" that the British chose to attack. Surprise was gained by two 
midget submarines (X-6 and X-7) when they penetrated the German defenses 
and dropped their explosives. In the case of the TIRPITZ, weakness in defense 
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was a relative term. The Gennans did have several antisubmarine/anti torpedo 
defenses, however, compared to their antiaircraft defenses, the submarine 
defenses were considerably weaker. 
Many tacticians consider the principle of surprise to be the most 
important factor in a successful special operation. They mistaken1y believ~ that 
it is surprise which glves them the decisive advantage over the enemy, as if to 
say that by merely catching the enemy unprepared, the attacking force could 
win. This is not the case. Surprise is useless and indeed unachievable without 
the other principles. What good would it do to surprise the enemy, only to be 
ill equipped to fight him? Rl!iative superiority is gained only through the 
correct application of all the principles. Surprise is essential, but it should not 
• 
be viewed in a vacuum. It is only valuable as part of the ~complete pyramid" • 
of principles. 
5. SPEED 
In a special operation's mission, the concept of speed is simple. Get 
to your objective as fast as possible. Any delay will expand your Area of 
Vulnerability and decrease your opportunity to achieve relative supen·ority. 
Reet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1·3 states, "As with all things in 
war, speed is relative."u This statement implies that sp~ed is related to the 





enemy's ability to react. If the enemy isn't reacting to your attack" then you 
have more time to spare. This may be true in conventional or large scale 
warfare, w here the forces on il b attlefield maneuver and adjust to certain 
tactical advances, but in special operations, the enemy is in il defensive position 
ilnd his only desire is to counter your attack. Therefore, the enemy's w ill to 
resist is a given, and his abili ty to react,. iI. constant. Consequently, over time, 
the frictions of war, work only against the special operati on's fon:es and not the 
enemy. It is essential, therefore, to move as quickly as possible regardless of 
the enemy's reaction. 
For example, in the two cases involving submarine attacks, the 
British X-Crilft raid on the T1RPITZ ilnd the It.al ian milnned torped o attack on 
the British Fleet in Alexandria, the attacking forces were completely clandestine 
in their approach. The enem y was unaware of their presence, and therefore no t 
trying to ~counter the wi W of the attacking force. Nonetheless, speed was not 
relative, it b ecame a critical factor in mission success. The X-Craft midget 
submarines, w hich had transitted the North Atlantic two days earlier, began to 
have catastrophic failures in thei r electrical and b allast systems. As each 
minute passed, the ballast and tri m of the midget submarine became 
increasingly worse, causing the X-Craft to list 15 degrees to port. Time became 
such a factor that the submarine commander, Lt. Cameron decided not to 
clandestinely cut through the antitorpedo net, bu t instead surfaced and m ade 
a mad dash for the TIRI'ITZ. This action was taken at great risk to the 
31 
mission's success, but Cameron dearly realized that time, not the Gennans, was 
now his worst enemy. 
The Italian frogmen, who entered Alexandria harbor on manned 
torpedoes were constantly exposed to the cold water. They knew, that even if 
the enemy didn't discover them, the forces of nature and physical ex~rtion 
would overcome them. As he dosed in on the Hritish battleship HMS 
VALIANT, I.ieutenant Durand de 1a Penne recalled, "I am tormented by 
thirst...1 cannot continue working from the extreme fatigue and for the 
breathlessnl2'!ls."2.1 He knl2'W th .. t "Spl2'ed was I2'Ssl2'ntial ... [if he was forced to 
surface from faligul2') the alarm would be given, depth charges would be 
droppl2'd, and [the] operation ... would be doomed to failure."lJ; But, because De 
la Penne worked quickly, he was not discovered until after surfacing. Hours • 
later the warhead from the manned torpedo exploded, and the HMS VALIANT 
s.;mk in Alexandria harbor. In both of these cases, 
the enl2'my was not a factor, but time still worked against a successful outcome. 
Most special operations involvl2'S direct,. and in most cases immediate, 
contact with the enemy, where minutes and seconds spell the difference 
between success and failure. Of the successful missions I analyzed onJy one, 
25 Luigi Durand de la Penne, Report un Operation G.A.3.: The Attack on HMS 
Valiant translated by LCDR Paolo Gianetli, Italian Navy. 
2i Juilo Valerio Borghese, Sea Devils translated by James C1eugh, (Chicago: Henty 





the St. Nazaire raid, took longer than thi rty minutes to achieve relah"ve 
superiority from the Point of Vulnerability. In most of the o~er cases, relative 
superiority was achieved in [ille minutes and the missions wen> completed in 
thirty minutes.v 
In orderla gain surprise and speed, special forces are generally .small 
and lightly armed, and · therefore, are unable to sustain action against a 
wnventiunal enemy for long periods of time. The raid on 5t. Nazaire 
ill ustrates the problems that arise when special forces attempt to prolong the 
engagement. When the number of objectives at S1. Nazaire increased from 
three to eleven, the operation required additional time ashore for the 
commandos to destroy these targets. In a Draft Memorand um to the Chiefs of 
Staff on O peration ~Chariol • the Combined Operations' adviso r stated that in 
order to achieve all the objectives, "The whole force ... [would require] a 
maxim um period ashore of 2 hours."13 What advantages the commandos 
gained in surprise, they lost in execution, by actually planning an upt!cation that 
took two hours of sustained action. This required their lightly armed, and in 
some cases unarmed, force to fight against a heavily armed German Hak 
Brigade of 300 soldiers. Clausewitz warns, "the more restricted the strength the 
:I'l There were some cases, i.e. the raid on Cabanatuan POW camp, the Son Tay 
raid and Skorzeny's rescue of Mussolini, where the mission was not over until the 
return trip was completed. 
13 Most Secret Memorandum by the Advisor on Comb ined Operations, Draft 
Memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff: Operation "Chariot." 
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more resbided the goals must be; further, the more restricted the strength, the 
more limited the duration. H29 Also during this two hour period, the eighteen 
motor launches (M.L.s), which had delivered the commandos to St. Nazaire, 
were exposed to withering shore fire and within ninety minutes almost all of 
the M.L.s were destroyed. Had the commandos struck quickly and exln;lcted,. 
there Probability of Mission Completion would have dramatically increased. 
Speed is a function of time, not as some imply, a relative fador that 
is effected by the enemy's will to resist. As I wil1 demonstrate later, relative 
superiority can be gained, despite the effort·,! of the enemy, primarily because 
the attacking force moves with such speed, that the enemy's reaction is not an 
factor. 
6. PURPOSE 
Purpose is understanding and then executing the prime objective of 
the mission regardless of emerging obstacles or opportunities. First, the 
purpose must be clearly defined by the mission statement; rescue the POWs, 
destroy the dry dock, sink the batt1eship, etc. This mission statement should 
be crafted to ensure that in the heat of batt1e (the execution phase), no matter 
what else happens, the individual soldier understands the primary objective. 
For example, during the X-Craft raid on the batt1eship TIRPITZ, the midget 








submarine X-6 was suffering from major equipment casua1ties (bruken attack 
periscope, flooded port side charge, leaky main casing, and a fifteen degree 
port list) and the commander, Lt. Don Cameron, had to make the decision 
whether or not to attack. It was conreivable that by attacking and failing, he 
could com promise the success of the other two X-Craft also assigned to attack 
the TIRPITZ,lO After menWly I't'viewing the purpOl.e of his mission, as 
defined by his operational orders, Cameron made the decision to attack. His 
orders were clear. If the X-Craft was sti ll under power and equipped with at 
least one side chilrge, then Cameron was directed to complete the mission. 
During the assault on the British Heet in Alexandria Harbor duri ng 
WWlI, Italian frogmen, G unner Captain Vincenzo Martelluta and his swim 
partner Seaman Mario Marino, positioned their manned torpedo underneath a 
large British cruiser before realizing that it was the wrong target Although 
Marte llota and Marino had riskt'd their lives avoiding picket boats, depth 
charges and pier security, and sinking the cruiser would have been acceptable, 
it w as not the vessel they were assigned to attack. Martellota subsequently 
backed away from the ship and continued on. Eventually the Italians reached 
their assigned target,. a large oil tanker. By following their orders, Martellota 
and Marino not only sank a large tanker, but severely damaged a destroyer tied 
X-IO commanded by Ll Ken Hudspeth was assigned to attack the 
SCHARNHORST, a Gennan cruiser located just a nrile from the TIRPITZ. H udspe th 
found himself in similar mechanical difficulty, but his orde rs clearly forbid him to 
attack if it could compromise the destruction of the primary target - the TIRPITZ. 
along side. In both the British and Italian cases, the men had dearly defined 
orders which directed their actions in the heat of battle an.d focused their 
efforts on what was important. 
The second aspect of the principle of purpose, is personal 
commitment. LtCol Henry Mucci who commanded the 6th Ranger Battalion 
and rescued 512 roWs from a Japanese death camp understood the need for 
personal commitment. Before the operation he told his Rangers, 
You had better get down on your knees and pray! Damn it .•. don't fake 
it! I mean ... PRAY. And, I want you to swear an oath before God ... 
Swear you'll die fighting rather than let any harm come to those I~OWS!31 
Similarly, General Joshua Shani, the air commander at Entebbe 
stated several years after the raid, ~We were absolutely committed to seeing the 
task completed ... We were fighting for Israel.~J2 
The principle of purpose must not b e confused with a moral factor. 
The moral factors exist outside the controllable boundaries of the inverted 
pyramid (as shown in Figure 1-2), that is, moral factors cannot be planned for 
or anticipated; the purpose of the mission must be thoroughly understood 
beforehand, and the men must be inspired with a sense of personal dedication 
that knows no Iimitations.33 SS Captain Otto Skorzeny once said, "When a 
.11 Forrest B. Johnson, Hour of Redemption: The Ranger Raid on Cabanatuan (New 
York: Manor Books Tnc., 1978), 171. 
12 Ibid., Shani interview. 
)3 Moral Factors is a Clausewitzian term which refers to soldierly virtues; in 







man is moved by pure enthusi.iIISm .md by the conviction that he is risking his 
lift' in oil noble cause " . hI! p rovides the essential dements fur success."14 In 
an age of high technology 3.nd ~Jedi Knight'!" we often overlook the need for 
personal involvement,. but we do so al our own risk. As Clausewitz warned, 
"Theorists are apt to look on fighting in the abstract as a bial of strength 
without emotion entering' into it. This is one of a th ousand errors which they 
quite consciously commit because they have no idea of the implications."JIi 
The principles of special operations defined above are not merely a 
derivativl! of the Army's Principles of War. They represent unique elements 
of w arf,lIfe thilt only small fo rces possess and can employ effectively. The next 
section describes the methodology used to develop these principles, and 
dem onstrates that these princip les are valid. 
F. CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
To further explain the theory of special operations, I will present eight 
historkal cases and provide an analysis of each. The cases span the entire 
spectrum of special operations from global conventional war to peacetime 
engagement. They include missions conducted by United States, British, 
Gennan, Israeli, and Italian forces, and executed from the sea, air and land. M y 
~ O tto Skorzeny, Skorzt'ny's St'cret Mission 24. 
J5 Ibid., Clausewitz, 138. 
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approach to multiple mission analysis was fostered by the British military • 
strategist D.H. Liddell Hart, who said: 
The method in recent generations has been to select one or two 
campaigns, and to study them exhaustively as a means of professional 
training and as the foundation of military theory. But with such a limited 
basis the continual changes in military means from war to war carry the 
danger that our outlook will be narrow and the lessons fallacious.~ 
Although eight cases is not the basis for "absolute" information, it is sufficient 
to demonstrate the validity of the theory and show the relationship between 
relatillc superiority and the Principles of Special Operations. 
This methodology, that is, the use of mission analysis to support a 
hypothesis, is certainly not new .- even within the field of special operations. 
Edward Luttwak, Steven Canby, and David Thomas wrote A Systematic Review 
of "Commando" (Special) Operations 1939-1980. This work reviews nine case • 
studies, but extracts primarily organizational rules and planning and training 
methods. The review addresses the operational aspects of special operations 
"only parenthetically."37 
An integral part of my thesis was to conduct interviews with key 
participants, and, when possible, visit the actual sites where the operations 
occurred. In seven of the eight cases pf'l>sented, the Mussolini event being the 
exception, I was able to interview personnel intimately involved with the 
JI; B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy 2nd ed., (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 4. 






mission. :lII This was unquestionably the most rewarding aspect of my work. 
These individuals provided personal insight into the success or fai lure of the 
mission and helped me fonnu late my theory in a clear, concise manner. They 
also verified facts, corrected documentary errors, provided origi nal 
documentati on and photos, and in many cases, edited my roug h d rafts. \yhere 
I could not confinn a salient fact by interview or offi cial report, I ensured th at 
at least three secondary sources were in agreement on the poinL It is from this 
origjnaJ research that the Principles ofSpeciaJ Operations, which subsequently 
led to the understanding o f relative superiority and the development of the 
theury, were derived. 
Each of the cases is divided into six sections which in clude the following: 
the background, which provides the military or political justification for the 
o peration; the objective to include a detailed look at the target and the enem y 
order of battle; the commandos, a biography of the units (when available ) and 
key personnel w ho led the missions; the training or prelim inary events; the 
mission, including a description of the events during the engagement; and an 
analysis of the operation. 
38 Although I was unable to interview any of the com mandos who participated 
in the Mussolini event; I did visit Gran Sasso where Mussolini was held prisoner and 
reviewed in depth Lieutenant Colonel Otto Skorzeny's original (German version) 
summary of the event (National Archives Record 338). In two other cases, the German 
(GSG-9) rescue of hostages from Mogadishi and the U.S. attempt to rescue hostages 
from Teheran, I interviewed participants, but owing to time constraints, was unable 
to provide .ill written account. 
The analysis begins with an essay on the outcome of the mission, which • 
is followed by a series of questions designed to flesh out the merit of the plan 
and it"! subsequent execution. These questions are as follows. Were the 
objectives worth the risk? Risk in this context applies not only to loss of 
human lives, but loss of military or political advantage. If the ris~ are 
considered valid, was the plan developed to achieve maximum superiority over 
the enemy and minimize the risk to the assault force? If the plan was sound, 
was the mission executed in accordance with the plan, and if not, what 
extenuating circumstances dictated the outcome of the operation? Finally, what 
modifications to the plan, and the execution, could have improved the final 
results? The analysis also includes a Relative Superiority Graph followed by 
an examination of the six Principles of Special Operations. 
• The next eight chapters will present the case studies discussed above in 
great detail. The analysis of these cases will show that relative supen·ority, 
although an abstract concept,. does exist and that the Theory of Special 





II. "IHE GERMAN ATTA'-."K O N llIE FORTRESS AT EBEN EMAEI., 
BELGIUM - 10 MAY 1940 
A. BACKGROUND 
In January 1933, Adolf Hitler was appointed ChilDcellor of Germany. H is 
rise to power was fueled by the promise to avenge the defeat of World War I 
and the humiliating Treaty of Versailles. Dy 1935 HiUer had completely 
rejected the Armistice o f 1918 which limited Gennan ilrms production. He 
began to build the most powerful Army in Europe and by the late 1930s there 
was l i ttle d oubt the G erman Army was preparing for war. 
The small country of Belgium had long been considered il primary axis for 
a ('..erman invasion into France. Before World War I, the Chief of the German 
Crl-neral Staff, Count Alfred von Schlieffen developed a plan cil11ing for the 
encircle men t o f France by two avenues of approach, through the Swiss Alps 
and across Belgi um. Little had changed during the interwar year.; to warrant 
a maj or modi fication to the German's ftSc hlieffen Plan. ft The French and 
Belgia ns were keenly aware of their geographical predicament, however, post 
\¥WI cutbacks sign ificimtly reduced the size and effectiveness of both armies 
a nd fostered a reliance on defe nsive warfare. This defensive m entality was 







Figure 2-1. The Importance of Fort Eben Emael in Relation to- the 







The Maginot Line was a system of fortifications built along the eastern 
• French border in the 1930s. It extended from Switzerland to Belgium. The 
Belgian' s constructed a similar defensive perimeter along the Albert Canal. 
The linchpin of their fortifications was the largest single fort of its day, Eben 
Emael. Between the Albert Canal and the Maginot Line stood the m~ssive 
Ardennes forest, a seemingly impregnable obstacle fur an advancing Army. 
With these fortifications in place the french and British positioned their 
Armies to take advantage of the only logical German avenues of approach. 
The German Commander in Chief, General Walther von Brauchitsch and 
his Chief of Staff General Halder both felt that a German advance must 
outflank the Maginot Line and concentrate the Schwerpunkt (point of the 
spear) of the attack north of the impassable Ardennes Forest. This wou1d take • 
the bulk of the German Army through Holland then Belgium. A smaller, but 
relatively strong force would attempt to negotiate the Ardennes and cross the 
Meuse River between Givet and Sedan in eastern France. Although this was 
the ~predicable" approach, Brauchitsch and Halder were counting on surprise 
and the superior German forces to rout the enemy. 
This plan met with exception al criticism from two prominent German 
generals, Erich von Manstein (Chief of Staff, Army Group ~ A~ ) and Heinz 
Guderian (XIX Panzer Corps Commander). Guderian proposed driving three 
Panser Corps through the Ardennes across the Meuse and deep into the heart 
.. • 
• 
of France. This would allow the Germans to F1ank the Allied forces w ho were 
expecting the main thrust to come across Belgium. 
Before the attack could succeed, however, the French mobile forces, along 
with their British allies, had to be decisively engaged in battle elsewhere, 
so that they could not swiftly intervene in the developing attack in the 
south. In essence the trick was to entice the Bri tish and French m ain 
body into advancing to give battle in Belgi um, where Gennan 
conventional infa!ltry divisions stiffe ned by a few armored divisio ns 
would tie them down.1 
The Allies were not prepared to commit forces to the north unless the 
Germans violated Belgian neutrality, and only then if they were certain it was 
the main German assault. Hitler quickJy accepted the Guderian P1an realizing 
that its geni us lay in the boldness and surprise with which German i1 rmor 
would be deployed. 
• In order to ensure the Allies committed forces to the north the Germans 
had to move swiftly through Holland and into Belgium. This requ ired crossing 
the Albert Cilnill and moving two Panser Corps through Belgium to engilge the 
British Expeditionary Force and the French First Army. Before the Germans 
could get deep into Belgium they had to cross fifteen miles of Hollilnd and the 
Albert Cilnill. The canal could only be crossed by three bridges at Veldwezelt, 
Vroenhoven, and Canne. Although the entire campaign hinged on securing th e 
bridges, the defenses surrounding them "were not considered to pose a 
problem. There were several dropping zones for parachutists [and gliders) 
I Charles F_ Kirkpatrick, "Simple Deceptions Payoff;' World War II July 1991, 44. 
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close by from which assault parties could quickly overcome the Belgian army 
• defences covering the crossings.n2 The real problem was Fort Eben Emael. 
Even if the bridges were captured by German paratroopers or glidemten, the 
guns at Eben Emael could still destroy the bridges from afar and prevent any 
opportunity for the Panzers to quickly stonn Belgium. 
On 27 October 1939, General Kurt Student, Commander of the 7th Flieger 
(Airborne) Division was summoned to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin by 
Adolf Hitler. Studl!nt had developed the concept of ~three-dimensional" 
warfare in which airborne troops could be inserted behind the lines, and using 
surprise and speed, attack the enemy where he was least prepared. Hitler 
viewed Students concept as a new ~secret weapon."J 
Hitler outlined a concept to seize the forl at Eben Emael using gliders to • 
land troops atop the earthen structure and destroy the guns protecting the canal 
bridges. He directed Student to review his plan and return the following day 
with an answer. Student was an accomplished glider pilot and had been 
conducting tests using troop carrying gliders to insert his airborne personnel. 
The following day Student returned and told the Fuhrer that the mission was 
possible provided it was done at daylight or morning twilight. Hitler accepted 
Students concept and ordered him to "take Fort Eben Emael!" 
Z Anthony Farrar-HockJey, Student. (New York: Ballantine Books Inc., 1973), 66. 
1 "Student and the Capture of Crete," Strategy and Tactics of the Great 
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B. FORTRFSS EBEN EMAEL 
The small town of Eben Emael is located just inside the border separating 
Belgium and Holland. The fort, which takes its name from the town, was 
completed in 1935. It is situated on the Albert Canal adjacent to the river 
Meuse just three miles south of the city of Maastricht At the junction where 
the fort is constructed, the walls of the canal rise 200 feet from the water level 
to the top of the ridge. From the top of the fort the defender.. could see miles 
into the German countryside as well as the three bridges at Canne, Vroenhoven 
and Veldwezelt 








The fort itself is roughly diamond shaped with the tip facing north, the 
east wall along the Albert Canal and the west wall (fortified with a 450 yard 
long anti-lank moat) bordered by the Geer River. The diml:!nsions of the fort 
measured 1,100 yards north to south by 800 yards at its widest point. On top 
of the fortress were ten casemates, five operational cupolas and two dummy 
cupolas. Along the wall of the canal were two additional casemates. The 
casemates and cupolas were similar in construction to the tUI'I'ets of a baH1eship 
wi th guns protruding from apertures in either a 12 inch thick steel dome or a 
concrete blockhouse. Each fighting position housed a crew of 16 to 30 
depending o n the size and number of guns. 'I11e main batteries at casemate 26, 
18, and 12 each had three 75mm guns. These guns provided the primary 
protection for the ouUying towns and the three canal bridges. Cilsement 9 and 
cupolas 23 and 31 housed twin 75mm guns. Cupola 24 contained twin 120mm 
g uns the largest at Eben Emael. These guns were capable of ranging 12 miles. 
The remaining casemates and cupoJas housed twin 75mm guns and 
M itrailleuse machine gur:tS which provided additional anti-infantry defense of 
the fortress. There were five 60mm anti-aircraft batteries situated around 
casemate 30. The one defensive shortfall of Eben EmaeJ was the lack of 
fighting trenches and mines on top ofthe fort. The re were, however, five rows 
of barbed wire stnmg in strategic postions. Outside the surface of the fort ... 
there were rows and rows of barbed wire, steel hedgehogs and mine fields but 
the grassy top lay vulnerable. 
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Figure 2-5. Cupola 24 Showing 120mm Gum. Note Spot Where Shaped 








Below the s urface, guns were three levels which provided support for the 
fort's main mission. The top level consisted of the machinery for operating the 
massive guns and the protective steel doors for preventing entry into the belly 
of the forl The second level contained a small infirmary, ammunition storage, 
six 175-hp electric generators that provided all the forts power, a 
communications center, and the command post. The fhirdlevel housed the 
barracks for the fort' s personnel. The entire complex was designed with the 
guns in mind . Ammunition hoisL<; serviced the guns directly, stairs and 
elevators were constructed to allow ammo bearers ease of movement, air 
cond itioning and heating units ensured the troops maintained adequate living 
co nditions throughout the year. The entire forl was crisscrossed with five miles 
of tunnels linking every major gun and support system. The only exterior 
entrance into the fort lay on the southwest side away fro m the canal. 
The troops that manned the guns rotated duty throughout the month. 
Those personneJ "off duty" were confined to that area around the village of 
Eben Emael. If they wer~ needed in an emergency an alarm would be sounded 
by firing three blank rounds from one of the casemates. On the day of the 
German attack the fort had an authorized strength of 1200 officers and men, 
however, owing to leave, illness, or out of area training the total compliment 
of the fort included only Ifl officers, 62 non-commissioned officers and 570 











• c.. STORM DETACHMENT Kcx:H - ASSAULT FORCE GRANfn.; 
• 
• 
In 1935, the German High Command began training its first paratroopers 
and several months later established the first parachute battalion. In 1938, 
Luftwaffe General Ku rt Student was given command of the airborne forces and 
quickly began to dev.elop a large scale parachute capability within the German 
Air Force. Soon he had established Fliegerdivision 7 (the 7th Air Division) and 
also received command of Luft1 and-Division 22 (22nd Airborne Division ). ' 
These forces included not only parachutes, but all air and ground supp ort 
necessary to accomplish large scale airborne operations. 
After accepting Hitler's o rder to seize Eben Emael and the nearby b ridges, 
General Student assigned Hauptmann (Captain) S. A. Koch and his 1st 
Company Flieger-Jaeger Regiment One to conduct the mission. This assault 
force officially activated on 2 November 1~39 and assumed the name 
Sturmabteilung Koch (Koch Storm Detachment). The detachment consisted of 
one company of parachutist (soon to receive the name "g1idermen~), one 
pl atoon of parachute qualified engineers (these men were eventually tasked 
with taking Eben Emael), a transport group of JV-52 aircraft,. and over forty 
gliders with pilots and ground crews. 
4 In an effort to conceal the existence of the airborne forces the 7th Air 
Division was assigned to the Wehrmacht but was controlled by the Luftwaffe. 
All the forces that participated in the assault were German Air l<'orce. 
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From these forces Koch divided the detachment into four assault elements. 
The force assigned to assault Eben Emaelwas codenamed nGranite" and 
commanded by Lieutenant Rudolf Witzig. It consisted of 2 officers, 11 glider 
pilots, and 72 enlistedmen. The element tasked with capturing the bridge at 
Vroenhover was codenamed nConcrete~ and commanded by l.ieutenant Schacht 
It consisted of 5 officers including Captain Koch and a small command 
element, 11 gliders and pilots, and 94 enlistedmen. The third elements was 
codenamed "Steel~ and was ordered to seize the bridge at Veldwezelt 
Commanded by Lieutenant Altmann it had only one officer, 10 gliders and 
pilots, and 89 enlisted. The last element was codenamed ~Iron" and 
commanded by Lieutenant Schaechter. Schaechter had one more officer, q 
gliders and pilots, 79 enlisted. 
At the outset of the operation General Student made every effort to 
conceal the existence of the detachment "The whole premise behind the 
operation was that any leak in security could compromise the mission, and the 
only way for this mission to be successful was to achieve total surprise."s 
They trained at Hildesheim, near Hanover, and took the dubious title of 
ExperimenW Section Friedrichshafen. As the detachment moved to other 
locations for training they were often renamed. lieutenant Witzig's engineer 
platoon once received the title Airport Construction Platoon. The soldiers were 
~ Rudolf Witzig. interviewed by CDR William H. McRaven, 26 June 1992, 






not allowed to send personal mail or make calls unless cleared throug h Koch. 
S ergea nt Helmut Wenzel the senior enlisted man in Witzig's p latoon recalled: 
We couldn't go into bars, but we couJd go into movies. However, w e had 
to have a guard. Usually by the time the movie was over, the g uards had 
lost interest and gone home [Iaughing} ... Also we d idn't wear insignia and 
we had other names. Once we ran into some girls we knew and the 
wh ole unit had to be transferred.' 
Each man w as also required to sign the following statement: 
I am aware that I shall risk sentence of death should I, by intent or 
carelessness, make known to another person by spoken word 
illustration anything concerning the base at which I am serving. 7 
Witzig's Engineer Platoon had served together for over a year before this 
mission was conceived. Almost all of the men participated in the Polish 
Campaign, but had only seen limited action. "They were honorable m en, · 
• Sergeant W enzel recalled, "but they were all a little crazy.oS 
• 
When-Witzig fi rst reported to the platoon he w as not well received. nThey 
were undisciplined and I was not popu1ar because I changed the standards ."9 
Witzig kept h is professional distance from the men. Occasionally he would 
have a beer w ith his soldiers, but he never let them get to close. "They never 
, Helmut Wenzel, intelViewed by CDR William H. McRaven, 24 June 1992, 
translated b y L t. Colin J. Kilrain, Tape recording.. Celie, Germany. 
7 Ibid., Mrazek, 47. 
S Ibid., WenzeL 
9 Ibid., Witzig. 
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called me by my first name or used informal language."10 Most of the men 
expected to be discharged upon return from Poland, but soon found out that 
their war was just beginning. 
The key to a successful mission clearly lay in the ability of the Luftwaffe 
to deliver Witzig's Combat Engineers to Eben Emael undetected. Sin~e the 
early 1930s Germany had -been involved preparing its youth for a future war 
on the European continent. A large part of this effort was devoted to 
encouraging the sport of gliding. All across Germany young men and women 
began learning to fly. This created a sizeable "pool" of talented pilot .. , fostered 
competition and improved the capabilities of existing gliders. In 1933, Dr. 
Alexander Lippisch developed a large glider capable of carrying heavy loads 
• 
of meteorological equipment. Although the glider did not "soar" as the smaller • 
sport gliders, it was able to maintain a gradual glide path from its release 
point. The Luftwaffe soon saw the military application for this glider and 
recruited the Deutsche Forschungsansta1t FuerSegelflug (DFS) aircraft company 
to build a prototype. By 1939 they had produced the DFS 230. This glider was 
to have a pivotal role in the operation. 
The DFS 230 was approximately 37 feet long, had a wing span of 72 feet,. 
and was almost nine feet high at its maximum point. It was capable of being 






weighed 1,896 lbs and could carry tl!n combat loaded troops for a total loaded 
weight of 4,630 Ibs. It was armed with II single flexible 7.92 mm Machine G un 
(MG) 15 and two fixed 7.92 mm MG34. 
Koch had been given a free hand in planning and training for Eben Emael 
and it became readily apparent to him that the DFS 230, al though an 
exceptionally capable glider, w as difficult for novice glider pilots to fly. He 
"recruited" several internationally recognized glider pilots to assist in the 
training and execution of the mission. The more novice Luftwaffe glider pilots 
would be used to assault the bridges, where the approach was easier and the 
landing zone was larger. The seasoned sport pilots would take Witzig's men 
to the top of Fort Eben Emae!. Witzig.. who is not a man who doles out praise 
quickly said emphatically, "These pilOts were the best!~ ll 
This infusion of experienced civilian pilots created quite a rift between 
the seasoned veterans and the novice Luftwaffe pilot'i. The civilians failed to 
confonn to the usual military discipline and constantly berated the less 
experienced "rank conscious" Luftwaffe. This became a recurring problem for 
Koch and one that he never fully solved. The morale and esprit de corps that 
was evident in the glidermen and Luftwaffe was almost non~existent in the 
civilian pilots. However, since the pilots would land with the glidermen, Koch 
11 Ibid., Witzig. 
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integrated them into the assault element insuring they participated in the • 
planning and training.u 
D. RUDOLF WITZIG - GRANITE FORCE COMMANDER 
Rudolf Witzig was born on 14 August 1916 and at the age of twenty.three 
was placed in charge. of the Pioneer (Engineer) platoon tasked with assaulting 
Eben Emael. He was young and inexperienced and most of the platoon 
sergeants were older than him. Witzig was not well liked by the platoon. He 
was a strict disciplinarian and the platoon members, even by Sergeant Wenzel's 
account were "bandits" and although disciplined when they fought, were 
undisciplined as a matter of routine. 
The officer Witzig relieved had allowed the platoon to become lazy . 
Witzig set out to change that attitude. Wenzel said later, when referring to his 
platoon leader, "different people have different leadership styles and people's 
personalities sometimes clash. But it is wrong for a soldier to say something 
negative about another soldier.,ll 
12 James Lucus, Storming Eagles,; German Airborne Forces in World War 
~ (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1988) 20. Lucus all udes to the fact that 
the landing area of Eben Emael was "very small" and therefore required 
exceptional pilots. Although the area is relatively small compared to a 
conventional glider landing strip, it was well within the capability of the 
average pilot. Compared to the landing area atop Gran Sasso, where Mussolini 
was rescued, Eben Emael was massive. 






Witzig w as fi nn in his belid ,--------------, 
that an o ffi cer should be 
"reaso nable" in his approach to 
his men. He should have 
"good nerves .. . be fi t ... be 
fai thful...Iike women, but not 
be a whoremonger ••• [and above 
all) be totally convinced that 
the operation is necessary for 
the people and the unit."I. 
Witzig believed in "meticulous 
p lanning and practice,,15 . 
While intervi ewing h im, 
Witzig remarked that the 
reason the Americans failed in 
Iran (referring to the Desert 
One disaster) was because the 
mission "wasn't rehearsed enough."l' 




Although Witzig is often described as a martinet, (a rigid, military 
disciplinarian) he had the highest regard for his enlisted men. The Germans 
had very few officers compared to the allies. Witzig commented that,. "Attacks 
led by enlisted men would have been led by officers in other countries. This 
was allowed because our enlisted men were so good."17 Witzig stresse~ that 
he gave individual squad leaders a great deal of responsibility and the freedom 
to develop their own plans. 
Witzig was an officer with tremendous determination. During the attack 
Witzig's glider crashed and he commandeered another one and arrived at the 
battIe late. Referring to this incident,. Wenzel remarked, "It was a testament to 
Witzig's personality that he was able to get back to the fight. "18 This 
determination carried Witzig through the remainder of the war. The following • 
year, on 21 May 1941, Witzig parachuted into Crete where despite being 
outnumbered three to one, the Germans defeated the allies and took Crete. 
Although severely wounded at Crete, Witzig recovered and in November 1942 
fought in North Africa. In 1943 the 21st Parachute Engim~er Regiment was 
formed under the command of Major Witzig and was sent to Russia and 
subsequently saw action at Kovno, Lithuania and VUna, Poland. In 1944, 
17 Ibid. 




Witzig commanded the 18th Parachute Regiment and fought in France, 
Belgium, and Holland eventually surrendering in April 1945. 
A fter the war he transferred to the German Army (the engineers were 
Luftwaffe) and rose to the rank of colonel, eventually becoming d irector of the 
Engineer School in Munich. He retired from that assignment and still lives in 
M unich. His decorations 'i nc1ude the Knights Cross with Oak Leaves. 
F.. TRAINING 
On 3 November 1939, Captain Koch received orders for his company to 
make preparations to seize and hold the fort at Eben Emael and the three 
b ridges at Vroenhoven, Veldwezelt and Canoe until German ground fo rces 
arrived. The basic plan had already been conceived by General Student and 
approved by Hitler. On order the company would depart Cologne from two 
airfields at Ostheim and Hutzweilerhof. Separated into four groups 
(codenamed Iron, Granite, Concrete, Steel) they would be transported in gJiders 
towed by j U.52s to a release point approximately 20 kilometers from their 
objectiVe!;. At an altitude of approximately 5,500 feet the gliders w ould be 
released and proceed to their targets. Upon arrival at Eben Emael, Witrig's 
Engineer Platoon would destroy the guns that covered the approaches to the 
three bridges and with the help of Stuka dive bombers attempt to keep the 
Belgium defenders sealed inside until reinforcements arrived. As Witzig 
viewed the mission he had three objectives: 
" 
The first objective was to take out the machine guns on the surface 
so we could go in safely. The second objective was to take out the 
casemates and the third [objective) was to SUroiveP9 
The three bridges would be seized by Koch's other elements and the explosive 
charges, designed to halt a German advance, rendered inoperable. 
In order to seize the fort there were two phases of the operation that had 
to be rehearsed in excruciating detail, the glider insertion and the actions at the 
objective. After managing to obtain the requisite number of glider pilots, Koch 
with the help of Heiner Langer a world class glider pilot, set out to teach all 
the pilots the intricacies of the DFS 230. The pilots spent months learning to 
fly with an empty load and then with a full load. All of gear in the glider had 
to be tightly secured and the troops, who straddled a narrow center aisle bench, 
• 
found that even the smallest item could become a hazard as the glider "rode~ • 
the shifting air currents. Historically, there is some debate as to whether 
Koch's men actually conducted rehearsals in the gliders. Charles Kirkpatrick 
writing foe World War II magazine noted that, 
Neither [Koch nor Witzig] attached much importance to having their men 
actually fly in gliders and make landings in full scale rehearsals. Flying 
in gliders was inherently dangerous and could easily lead to training 
accidents that would diminish the force available for the mission.20 
19 Ibid., Witzig. 





r his, however, is not the cas~ . Both Witzig and Wenzel confinned the fact 
t ha t th e y rehear:c;e d with the gliders. Witzi g re c all e d : 
We practiced most of the time in parts, hut we did fly twice with the full 
equipment to ensure that everybody knew exactly how the landing would 
go and to overcome the fear of flying in the gJiders; and to make sure 
everybody felt secure abuut of the mission.2l 
None of the pilots, even the experienced ones, had spent much tim e 
landing on unprepared runways. Initially, it was found that the gliders 
required too much space to effectively land atop Eben Emael. Koch contacted 
the DFS Institute and they modified the DFS 230 with a hand break that 
extended below the plywood frame and d ug into the ground as the glider 
touched down. Hanna Reitsch, one of Gennany's most renown aviatrix who 
had set the w oman 's world record for sustained fli ght,. was called upon to test 
the device. On her first attempt,. she was almost knocked unconscious as the 
b rake dug -in to the ground causing the glider to come to a jarring stop. T he 
device was later modified to allow the glider to stop quickJy b ut w ith sufficient 
control. 
Most of the experienced civilian pilots were able to m aster the DFS 230 
quickly, and immediately transitioned to solo flying. However, the Luftwaffe 
pilots had the advantage of being qualified in both formation and night flyi ng, 
something the civilians had never practiced. Formation or "daisy chain" flying 
required the gliders to be tied together and towed by a single aircraft. 
21 Ibid., Witzig. 
Eventually, however, the flight plan called for a one on one ratio of Ju-52s to • 
DFS 230s. On D-Day the tow planes and gliders took off in sequence one after 
the other. ~By March (1940) these glider pilots could take off into the night, 
maneuver into formation, and when cast off from the tow plane land on an 
unfamiliar field. "Z2 
During most of the training Storm Detachment Koch remained near 
Hildesheim or on the Czech border away from civilian or military observation. 
In January 1940 the gliders that were to be used in the mission were sent via 
enclosed truck to their departure airfields near Cologne. Several security 
measures were taken to conceal the arrival of the gliders and the nature of the 
training that was to continue in Cologne. A large cyclone fence was 
constructed around the glider hangers and straw mats were hung from the top • 
to prevent people from seeing inside. Guards were posted and conducted 24 
hour patrols around the compound. On the day the gliders were to be taken 
from the trucks and reassembled, 45 smoke generators were initiated creating 
a cloud over the entire airfield, "Local newspapers,commenting on the incident 
passed it off as an engineer unit exercise designed to provide experience at 
setting off smoke screens destined to protect Dusseldorf in case of air raid.~23 
22. Ibid Mrazek p. 53. 
23. Ibid,60. 
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As the g lid er training progressed, Koch worked with the assault elements 
to ensure they were fully prepared to conduct their ground missions. T here 
were three objectives at Eben Fmael that had to be neutralized in order for the 
Fort to be rendered ineffective; the artillery which covered the b ridges, the 
machine guns a nd anti-tank gun that protected the Fort itself, and the anti-
ai rcraft guns that could engage the gliders and would prevent the Sluka dive 
bombers from properly supporting Witzig's platoon. Witzig thought the 
intelligence on the fort was excellent: 
We had fly over pictures, but of course at that time the detail wasn't as 
good as today. Bul I had a picture and could tell where al1 the cupolas 
were, but I couldn't see where the machines guns were, on top of the 
casemates. I had to look at the casemates and cupolas and think,. ' Where 
would they put the machine guns?' and I had to estimate where w e 
needed to land and how to set up defensive positions.u 
• These aerial photos helped determine that the steel cupolas atop the Fort 
• 
were essential for observing fire from the artillery. Destroying the cupolas 
would "blind" the observers and render the artillery fire ineffective. 
Additionally, the Luftwaffe had obtained blueprints from a German 
subcontractor who helped build the fort.25 This provided the assault elements 
with the exact location of the large guns and their fieJds of fire. A table top 
model of both the fort and bridges were constructed. This small model was the 
2A Ibid ., Witzig. 
25 Russell Miller, "The Storming of Eben EmaeI/ The Commandos World 
~ (Alexandria, Va: Time-Life Rooks, 1981), 10 . 
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only reconstruction available to the glidermen, but according to the model • 
maker's son: 
The whole thing ended up in a rather super size "SANKASTELMODELL", 
(sandbox model), buiH up in a schools Gymnasium .•• often paratroopers as 
well as pioneers came to do intensive practical "on the spot training" _.one 
even could walk on top respectively through the artificial landscape built 
up in this last large scale hall-model.2h 
Wherever this room-sized model ended up, neither Witzig nor Wenzel ever saw 
it. 
Practical training began small but quickly developed into detailed 
rehearsals. While practicing at Hildesheim airfield: 
Everything was laid out as things were at Eben Emael. We had markers 
set up and with the exact distances between them. This way the pilots 
and crew leaders could orient themselves. I would go to each man and 
point out his objectives, 'This is yours, this is yours and this is yours.<27 
Witzig sent some of his engineers to school during the workup period to 
improve their demolition skills and presumably their understanding of artillery 
and anti-aircraft weapons systems. In February, the remainder of the men from 
"Granite" went to German Sudentenland to work against Czechoslovak 
casemates and cupolas. These defenses were similar to the fortifications at 
U; Information received in a letter from Dr. Gunther Reibhorn of Salzburg 
to Colonel James Mrazek author of The Fall of Eben Emael. Dr. Reibhorn's 
father was part of the map making team that produced the models and maps 
for Eben Emael. Dr. Reibhom reported that apparently Witzig's assault 
element was never aware of the super size model and only relied on the table 
model for planning. 







Eben Emael, but "more difficult".23 The engineers and pilots practiced 
assaulting the casemates and using flamethrowers, banga1o~ torpedoes, light 
explosives, and their entire inventury of rifles, machine pistols, and pistols. 
Even the physical training revolved around the mission. Witzig recalled later, 
Hit [physical training] was very demanding and J. tried not to concentrate on 
soccer and things like that, b ut on climbing with full gear and running with 
simulated charges. It was tactically oriented."z, 
The one aspect of 
the training that was 
not fully rehearsed was 
the use of the new 
"hohlladung" or hollow 
( shape ) charge. 
Discovered in 1888 by 
Charles Munroe, the 
shape charge allows 
conventional explosives 





upon detonation. This generates a tremendous peneb'ating capability and 
allows a relatively small amount of explosives to have a large effect on both 
steel and concrete. A 50 Kg charge was capable of peneb'ating both the 6 inch 
steel cupolas and the concrete reinforced casemates. The pressure created by 
the explosion would generally blow a one by one foot hole in the objective and 
kill everyone inside. ' The 'shape charges came in two sizes; a 50 Kg which was 
a two piece charge (each half came with a leather handle) that required 
assembly on the target (it could be done in seconds), and a 12.5 Kg which was 
used primarily against smaller targets. Unfortunately, due to the sensitive 
nature of this new explosive (it was being used as a primer for Hitler's atomic 
bomb) Witzig was the only man allowed to see the charge detonated before the 
mission. He was concerned about s&:urity: 
They [the gJidermen} didn't need to know about the charge. They just 
needed . to know exactly what their missions were and trust the charge. 
Most frogmen who attack ships with mines don't know about [how 
strong} the charge is. They just know it will work.3Il 
By March the platoon had finalized the plan for destroying Eben Emael. 
Each squad, composed of seven to eightglidermen, had a primary objective and 
a s&:ondary target in the event all eleven gliders failed to reach the Fort. No 
detail was left to chance. From March to May the platoon continued to train. 
Several times during the training the Detachment was put on alert. The 









in each case the order to stand down came soon after. By May 1940 Witzig's 
men were more than ready and anxiously waiting the moment to attack Eben 
Emael. 
F. 10 MAY 1940 - TIlE ASSAm.T 
On 1 May 1940, Granite element.. now under the cover name of No. 17 
Reserve Squadron, was moved to the airfield at Ostheim, there final 
preparations were made for the assaultl ] At no time during the training h ad 
any of Koch's or Witzig's men been told the name of the objective. ftThey 
knew that [they] were going to do an attack against a difficult target, but they 
didn' t know exactly where or when the attack would be."J2 Only the element 
leaders were privy to that information. On 9 May 1940 at Z130 the troops were 
assemb led on the runway and the sealed orders were opened. The men were 
informed that the objective was a fort in the 8elgium defense system. 
Departure time was 0325 10 May. In the next few hours the ground crews 
began positioning the Ju 52s and the DFS 230s. ]bere was one Ju 52 fur each 
glider. 
At approximately 0300 the glidennen loaded their planes and began taking 
o ff. Even with all the preparation the launches did not go well, but eventuaJly t-
ail the glid ers were airborne with the last glider, containing Witzig, in the air 
31 James Lucas, Kommando (New York: Sl Martins Press, 1985), 56. 
32 Ibid., Witzig. 
71 
at 0335. The flight from Ostheim to Eben Emael took exactly 50 minutes as the 
gliders rose to an altitude of 8,500 feet. On the ground German forces lit 
bonfires to guide the Ju 52s to the release point just northwest of Aachen, 
Germany. 
Shortly into the flight. Witzig's glider broke free from his tow plane :when 
the Ju 52 pilot banked abruptly to avoid colliding with another glider. With 
only 3000 feet of altitude the glider had no chance of making the fort. Witzig 
ordered the pilot to "land on the east side of the Rhine so [he] wouldn't have 
to cross any bridges. dJ Turning the glider back towards Cologne, the pilot 
managed to land the plane in a field just four miles outside of Cologne. Witzig 
rushed to the nearest village commandeered a vehicle and returned to Ostheim. 
In the meantime the remaining ten gliders continued on toward Eben Emael. • 
Minutes after Witzig's glider broke free, the glider containing the second squad 
received the order to unhitch. The pilot initially refused to obey realizing that 
he was only at 1600 meters. The Ju 52 tried to shake the DFS 230 loose and 
eventually forced the glider pilot to release. With Eben Emael 25 miles away 
the plane would be forced to land short. The last nine gliders proceeded ahead 
unaware that two of their eleven squads were not in the formation. At 0410 
(much earlier than planned owing to a strong tail wind) the gliders reached 






the planes were not sufficiently high to reach the fort, made the decision to 
continue un unHl an altitude of 8,500 feet could be reached. T his requi red 
entering into Dutch airspace and drawing the attenti on of Dutch anti-aircraft 
guns. Nevertheless, the squadron continued on for another ten minute~ and 
released the gliders. 
Earlier that morning at 0030 the Belgians at fort Eben Emael had been 
alerted to the movement of G erman troops toward the horder. The commander 
uf the l'orl, Major Jottrand, received a telephone call and was at his position 
wi thin minutes of the alert. Standard procedure called for cupula thirty-one" 
to fire twenty blank rounds every thirty seconds. This was Ute signal to titOSE' 
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soldiers living in town to return to the Fort immediately. Additionally, it 
signalled those troops assigned to defend the bridges to muster at their posts. 
For some unknown reason the gun crew for cupola thirty-one did not arrive 
until 0330. In the interim, it became dear to Jottrand that this was not a false 
alarm. He could hear heavy anti-aircraft fire coming from Maastricht. His 
oniers called for him to evacuate the barracks just outside the main entrance 
to the Fort, move all the bedding supplies into the interior and destroy the 
building so it did not obstruct the gun crews view of their targets. In order to 
carry out this directive Jottrand had to use his gun crews to move the supplies 
and place the demolition. This significantly impacted on the crews ability to 
prepare their guns. Consequently, it was not until 0325 that casemate twenty-
three began firing warning rounds to alert the countryside. This did not overly • 
concern Major Jottrand because he knew German ground troops would have 
to cross the Dutch border before the fighting actually began and this would 
allow ample time for he and his crews to get into position. In order to make 
the guns ready for firing _the crews were required to clean the rust preventing 
cosmoline from the barrels and bring the ammunition from its storage point to 
the breech. At 0400 Jottrand received word that 30 to 50 airplanes were headed 
in the direction of Maastricht. 34 Moments later his own men reported, 
34 The glider assault on Eben Emael was the first event during Operation 
"Yellow" (Fall Gelb), the Blitzkrieg into Belgium. Roger Edwards, German 
Airborne Troops (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1974) states that the 





"Airplanes are overhead! Their engines have stopped! They stand almost 
motionless in the a ir!"lS 
High above the fort the gliders were making their final approach: 
Objective 29 [anti-ai[(:raft gun positionJ was under thl;! command of a very 
determined young lieutenant who, alerted to the gliders' approach by the 
sentry, reacted swiftly and ordered his men to open fire.36 
8elgians as the offensive began. 
lS Ibid ., Mrazek,. 83. 
:Ii Ibid ., Lucas, Kommand o 64. 
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The gliders took heavy anti-aircraft fire and although several of the gliders • 
were shredded by the 60mm rounds, no one had been injured. The glider 
carry Squad I dove steeply to avoid the anti-aircraft fire now coming from the 
fort. The pilot leveled out touched down and braked to a crunching stop 
leaving the plane a wreck but safely on the ground. The squad, I~d by 
Sergeant Neidermeier, had the responsibility for destroying casemate 18. After 
scrambling to get out of the wreckage Neidermeier ran to casemate 18. With 
the assistance of private Drucks he placed his 50 Kg shape charge in the center 
of the concrete structure, pulled the fuse and quickly extracted. The charge 
blew the turret to pieces killing the two Belgians inside. Meanwhile two other 
members of Squad I placed a 12.5 Kg charge just below the other 75mm gun. 
The explosion lifted the gun off its stand and killed two of the twenty-one men 
inside or directly below the casemate. The wounded tried to retreat,. but 
Niedermeier and two squad members went through the breech where the gun 
had been and killed two more Belgians. The remaining SUMVOrs escaped but 
most were severely wounded or flash burned. Neidermeier donned a gas mask 
and pulled one of the wounded Belgians outside away from the caustic smoke 
filled interior. The task completed Neidermeier placed an aircraft marking 
panel on the outside of the casemate to inform the Luftwaffe that the area was 
secure. Squad I remained inside casemate 18 when Belgian artillery from a 





T he glider containing Squad II, led by Sergeant M aier, never made the 
Fod It had been erroneously released early and landed near Duren in 
Germany. The squad commandeered a truck and drove toward Canne. They 
reached the bridge only to find that the Belgians had destroyed it. Sergeant 
M aier was killed attempting to cross the downed bridge, but Corporal "Po 
Meier continued on eventually arrivi ng at the town of Eben Emael. Although 
he tried several times, Meier was never able to li nk up with the other squads 
at the Forl The other members of Sq uad II who remained at Canoe eventually 
captured 121 Belgian prisoners, but as Wenzel recalls, ~before the squad would 
release the prisoners [to the German guards] they asked for a recei pt. so they 
could p rove what they had done."l? 
Squad III led by Sergeant Arendt was assigned to destroy casemate 
twelve. The glider containing the squad released from the tow plane and made 
a perfect approach. As the glider breezed over the fort the Belgians began to 
open fire. The tracers were high and the pilot landed the DFS 230 just 30 yards 
east o f the objective. Arendt and his men hurried from the glider and charged 
the casemate. To their su rprise there were no Belgians oul .. ide or inside the 
massive 75mm gun turreL The barrels, which were still filled with cosmoline 
appeared never to have been fired. The s quad had trouble affixing the 50 Kg 
shape charge to the gun so they elected to place the smaller 12.5 Kg charge at 
J7 Ibi d., Wenzel. 
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the rotating base. They pulled the fuse and ran. As it tumed out there were • 
several 8elgian soldiers inside. They were completely unaware of the Germans 
presence. 
The results of the explosion were similar to Squad I's. The blast tore the 
gun from its mount crushing a Belgian soldier and wounding several others. 
Smoke and fire engulfed the chamber fueled by propellent stacked inside. The 
Germans fired their machine pistols through the opening then cautiously 
proceeded into the interior. Some of the wounded Belgians had been 
evacuated by their comrades, but Arendt found three soldiers left behind. 
These men were pulled to the surface. 
Arendt continued to move further into the recesses of the Fort. Following 
voices that led to an elevator shaft, he dropped a 3 Kg charge down the shaft • 
and either severely wounded or killed those Belgians below. Arendt proceeded 
down a nearby stairwell till he arrived at another level. A steel door prevented 
his incursion into the center of the "'ort so he retumed to the surface. Squad 
III remained topside ensuring that no Belgians attempted to breakout. Belgian 
post operation rep0rl<; showed that only one of the 12 man gun crew had 
survived the assault uninjured. 
Squad IV was led by Sergeant Wenzel and was assigned casemate 
nineteen. The casemate was cut into the side of a hill with four gun openings 
on the face of the casemate pointing toward the northwest. On top of the 




as the glider landed it was taken under machine gun fire by the Belgians in the 
cupola. The squad attacked the Belgians forcing the machine gunners inside 
to dose the steel observation doors from which they were firing. Wenzel 
dropped a 3 Kg charge down the observation periscope that protruded from the 
cupola. The explosion rocked the cupola, but the Belgians continued firing. 
Wenzel then placed a 50 Kg charge on top of the cupola, but the resulting 
expl osion did not go high order and failed to penetrate the 6 inch steeJ dome. 
Nevertheless the explosion did render the cupola inoperable and the blast 
forced the Belgians to retreat into the lower level. Wenzel moved down from 
the top of the hill until he was even with the gun openings. He placed another 
50 Kg charge on the casemate. This time it blew a large hole through the 
concrete and killed or wounded everyone inside. Wenzel elected to position 
his men b eside the now abandoned casemate and await fu rther orders. It had 
b een fifteen minutes since Squad Iv had landed. 
Squad V Jed by Sergeant Haug landed and immediately assaulted 
casemate hventy-three. The charge dislodged the gun mounts and reduced the 
rate of fire, but it failed to prevent the gun from firing altogether. Haug and 
his men subsequently attacked casemate thi rty (although this was not part of 
the plan). The explosion killed at least two Belgians but again failed to 
completely neutralize the guns. Throughout Squad V's assaults they were 
receiving heavy fire from a storage shed located behveen casemate thirty and 
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cupola twenty_four.311 At the 
same time that Haug was 
assaulting his objectives he 
noticed Squad VIII was in 
trouble receiving effective fire 
from the hanger and casemate 
thirty-one. Haug and some of 
Squad VIII's men attacked the 
hanger but were repelled and 
lost two dead and several 
wounded. About that time 
Belgian artillery fire from a 
nearby battery began to rain in 
on the fort. Haug and his 
squad took cover in a nearby 
ditch. Several times they 
attempted to withdrawal to a 
safer position but were 
:IS Witzig said later that this small structure was visible on the aerial 
photos, but it was not determined until after the assault that it was just a 






immediately taken under fire. Squad V remained in the ditch until lOiter that 
evt!Oing when they sJipped out under cover of darkness. 
The glider carrying Sergeant Harlos' Squad VI was hit several times by 
anti-aircraft fire. The pilot was foreed to land in a field of concertina wire 
bringing the airplane to a janing stop. The squad had diffi culty exiting the 
glider and breaking into open ground owing to the thick barbed wire the 
Belgians had placed around the northern end of the Fort. When they reached 
their objective, cupola fourteen, they found another squad had already 
destroyed it. As it turned out the objective was a false cupola. Where the 
cupola had been, however, there was a machine gun emplacement d ug into the 
earth. Hados decided to place a 50 Kg charge in the hole and detonate. The 
resulting explosion blew a hole into the inner fortress causing a cave in of 
concrete and earth. His task complete, Harlos established a machine gun 
position to prevent reinforcements from coming across either the canal or the 
moat. During the remainder of the day Squad VI engaged severa] Belgian 
troop movements and kept the north end secure. 
Sergeant Heineman's Squad VII was tasked with destroying cupola 
sixteen at the north end of the fortress. It was not until they arrived and placed 
their explosive on the cupola that they realized it was a d ummy e mplace menL 





The glider carrying Squad VIII had made a harrowing a pproach to the 
Fort. In an effort to avoid the anti-aircraft fice the pilot had cume in below the 
east wall next to the Calla1 and pulled up at the last minute to settle down just 
thirty yards from casemate thirty-one. Led by Sergeant Unger, the squad came 
under immediate fire from the hanger and casemate thirty-one. Part Qf the 
squad, with help from Squad V, attacked the hanger while Unger and two men 
ran to the casemate and placed their 50 Kg charge. After pulling the fuse 
Unger placed another 12.5 Kg charge on a nearby fortress exit destroying the 
steel doors and sealing the Belgians escape route to the surface. 
Althoug h the Belgians at casemate thirty-one were warned of the attack 
thirty minutes before Unger landed they were unable to get the guns ready for 
action. The door to the ammunition locker was locked and no one could find 
the keys. After the locker was opened the elevator which carried the ammo to 
the gun failed to function, so only a limited amount of 75mm rounds could be 
carried to the breech. As the Chief of the Section loaded the first round in the 
chamber Unger's 50 Kg charge detonated killing two and wounding several 
others. 
Next Unger moved to destroy the cupola on top of the casemate. The 50 
Kg charge appeared to do little damage to the steel dome, but in actuality the 
penetrating force of the explosion completely destroyed the inner workings of 
the 75 mm guns rendering them totally inoperable. The squad was then 
directed to move north to Wenzel's position. As they attempted to extract from 
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their position they received heavy machine gun and incoming artillery fire. 
Unger was lcil1ed and only three men managed to reach Wenzel's position. 
The glider carry Squad IX received substantial anti·aircraft fire and flak 
but still managed to land within 60 yards of their objective at casemate 
thirteen. l.ike Squad VI they also landed in a jungle ofbarlJed wire and l?egan 
receiving ineffective fire from the hanger. Germans from the other squads 
managed to subdue the Belgians in the hanger allowing Squad IX to exit their 
glider and move to casemate thirteen. l.ed by Sergeant Neuhaus, the squad 
assaulted the target using flamethrowers to push back the Belgians manning 
the machine guns inside the casemate. After an unsuccessful attempt to place 
a 12.5 Kg charge over the machine guns, Neuhaus placed a 50 Kg charge on the 
steel door leading to the interior of the casemate. The resulting explosion blew 
the door inward and destroyed the supporting wall. Neuhaus stepped in and 
found the Belgians crumpled on the floor in shock.. His task completed he set 
up a defensive position and sent a runner to find Witzig and report their 
results.39 
Squad X led by Sergeant Huebel had originally been assigned as a resetve 
force. After landing Huebel received orders from Wenzel to attack casemate 
twenty-six. This had been Squad II's target but their glider never arrived at 
Eben Emael. Huebel and one other squad member assaulted the obsetvation 






dome p lacing a 12.5 Kg charge on top. The resulting explosion either killed or 
wou nded the Clew manning the gun for no further firing occurred for the 
remainder of the operation. By this time all the squads had completed their 
mission, Wenzel slated later, "Our main objective was to takeout the guns thai 
could destroy the b ridges and that mission was accomplished in the first fifteen 
minutes."4U Now ali that remained was to ensure that the Belgians did not 
mount a counteraHack before infantry from the German 4th Armored Division 
arrived. Wenzel contacted Captain Koch via radio and informed him the fort 
was under German control. Pre-planned bomber support began to arrive 
almost as soon as the glidermen were completed: 
We didn't have radio contact with any of the other groups, only with 
Captain Koch. So we laid panels on top of the cupolas to let the [Stuka] 
pilots know we had them." 
With the German positions marked by panels, the Stukas began dropping 
bombs against some of the Belgians still putting up resistance. Also within the 
hour, more ammunition was air dropped to Wenzel and his men. 
With Witzig still stranded in Germany, command of the detachment was 
suppose to fall to the next senior officer Lieutenant Delica. DeJica however 
was a Luftwaffe communications officer with no ground experience. He had 
been assigned to the detachment to coordinate air support from the Stuka dive 
W ibid., Wenzel. 
i J Ibid.,Witzig. 
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bombers.42 Consequently, the major tactical decisions implemented in the • 
first two hours were all the work of Wenzel. 
At approximately 0630, two hours after the assault had begun, Witzig 
arrived landing in dose proximity to casemate nineteen. Witzig had managed 
to requisition another tow plane and get his glider airborne arriving lat~, but 
much to the delight of -his detachment The initial plan called for the 
glidermen to hold the fort for approximately four hours until the infantry 
arrived. By noon, however, it was apparent the commandos would have to 
defend their position for quite a while longer. 
Throughout the remainder of the day the Belgians called in artillery from 
a nearby fort hoping to force the Germans off the exterior of Eben Emael. 
Some of the squads remained inside the bombed out casemates protecting • 
themselves from incoming rounds and trying to ensure that the Belgians did 
not gain access to the top of the fort through the openings in the casemates. 
Other Germans took up defensive positions on the outside periodically 
engaging Belgian troops that had managed to surface or that had been in the 
topside hangers and barracks. Squad III under Sergeant Ardent pursued the 
Belgians into the fort destroying exterior access routes as he went The 
Belgians attempted several counterattacks, but a lack of infantry weapons 
(grenades, assault rifles, and squad machine guns) and infantry tactics (all the 
42 Ibid., Lucas, 23. Lucas reports that Lieutenant Delica had communications 





Belgians were artillerymen) proved no match for Ihe Germans. An infantry 
unit of 40 m~n from a near-by post (commanded by Captain Wakeman) was 
called in at 1030 to attempt to extricate the Germans. The Stuka's curtailed the 
Belgian' s enthusiasm by bombing the infantrymen at each attempted attack. 
By 1300 the Belgians had repaired casemate four and it began to open fi re on 
the glidennen. Witzig ordered Sergeant Harlos' squad to silence the guns by 
placing a 12.5 Kg ch arge against the embrasure. The tactic proved effective and 
casemate four stopped firing. 
In the meantime the commander of Eben Emael, Major Jottrand, contacted 
the post at Wanek approximately three miles away. He ordered a force of 233 
men led by Lieutenant Levaque to attack the Germans, however every time the 
Belgians began their march from Wonck to Eben Emael they were bombed by 
Stukas. Consequently, by the time the troops reached the fort they were in no 
condition to fight, having sustained over 50% casualties. The other infantry 
force which was still at the fort was never able to link up with Lavaque. At 
1745 Lavaque attempted to take a small force of eight men and attack casemate 
twelve. The glidennen spotted the force attempting to reach the casemate and 
pinned them down with machine gun fire. Soon aftelWards, the Stukas began 
pounding the Belgian position and after an hour Lavaque retreated back to the 
fort's entrance. 
At 2000, Major Jottrand decided to mount a counterattack of his own. He 
m ustered 60 men and planned to sneak to the surface through an emergency 
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exiL Unbeknownst to the Belgians the Germans had already discovered the 
• exit and just as Jottrand's men were approaching the surface the Germans 
detonated another charge. The blast left a gaping hole in the fort. Jottrand 
realizing he had lost the element of surprise elected to stay inside and fortify 
his position to prevent Gennan incursion into the interior. 
Throughout the remainder of the early evening the Germans came under 
constant, but ineffective fire, from various Belgian positions. Witzig decided 
to consolidate his position, nI puJled my forces back in anticipation of a 
counterattack on the northend."o It was then that Witzig realized that 
casemate seventeen, which was positioned alongside the Albert Canal, could 
still engage advancing German infantry." Although the glidermen tried three 
times to destroy the guns they were unsuccessful each time. Wenzel said later, • 
"We tried to lower charges down on a rope, but the gun kept firing.~45 
At 2030 Jottrand issued defensive orders for the fort. Throughout the 
night incoming artillery from both Belgian and German batteries along with 
periodic explosions from Witzig's men kept the defenders of Eben Emael in a 
constant state of fear. The men inside the fort were afraid that the Germans 
would breech the makeshift defenses they had erected. The interior of the fort 
43 Ibid., Witzig. 
44 Casemate seventeen wasn't a primary objective because it couldn't 
destroy the bridges, but it couJd fire in the general direction of the advancing 
troops, so Witzig wanted the casemate silenced. 





was in shambles. The explosions had cut off power to many areas. There w as 
minimal lighting. no air conditioning or heat, and smoke permeated the 
majority of the spaces. All of these conditions added to the Belgians 
apprehensions. Additionally, ~the Belgians didn't know how many G ermans 
there were Ion the surface of the fort]."t6 
Throughout the night,. Witzig's men continued to assault those casemates 
and cupolas that were still harassing the Germans. By morning the fort was 
virtually out of commission although Stukas continued to bomb the heavy guns 
until approximately 1200 that afternoon. At 0830 Wi\:7ig was officially relieved 
by elements of the 151st Infantry Regiment. He buried his six dead and 
departed Eben Emael at approximately 0930. At 1215 Major Jottrand sent 
Captain Vamecq to meet with the Germans and arrange a surrender of the fort. 
Before Vamecq could discuss details of the surrender Belgians from inside 
Eben Emael came pouring out their arms raised in defeaL At exactly 1227, 
Jottrand offi cially surrendered the fortress at r.oen Emae!. The Belgians had 
lost 25 killed and 63 wounded and the Germans had destroyed ten of the 
seventeen casemates and cupolas. Before they surrendered the Relgians 
destroyed casemate thi rty-three and the 120mm guns thus leaving only five 
operational defenses. 









There is little debate that the assault on Eben Emael was one of the 
most decisive victories in the history of special operations. Sixty-nine German 
glidermen engaged and soundly defeated a Belgian force ten times their size 
proteeted by the largest fort of its day. It is the best example in modem times 








Were the objectives worth the risk? Hitler felt it was absolulely 
necessary to check the Anglo-French forces in Belgium and Northern France b y 
cunvincing them that the main German attack was coming through Hollan d 
across the Albert Canal and down from the north. In order for this deception 
to work, the Germans had to get two Corps (Schmidfs 39th Panzer and 
Hoepner 16th Panzer) into Belgium as soon as possible. The failure to check 
the Anglo-French forces would allow those units to reinforce the French Ninth 
and Second Armies which were guarding the axis of the real main assault 
coming through the Ardennes. The only access into Belgium was across the 
Albert Canal. Securing the three bridges guarded by the fortress at .Eben Emad 
were Ute key to German success in that region. Had the bridges fallen and 
Eben Emael suntived the glidermen's attack; the Belgians could have delayed 
the German advance long enough for the Anglo-French forces in the north to 
see the plan unfold and reallocate their forces accordingly. Consequently, there 
should be no question that destroying the fort was necessary and the risks 
worth the effort 
Was the plan developed to maximize superiority over the enemy and 
minimize the risk lo the assault force? In the case of Eben Emael it is 
reasunable to ask if the Luftwaffe alone could have rendered the fo rl 
inoperable -- thereby minimizing Ule risk to ground forces? Discounting the 
three bridges, which had to be seized quickly by ground forces to defuse the 
explosives, could Sluka dive bombers have destroyed the fort's guns which 
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threatened the German armored advance? As the case study shows the Stuka's • 
were very successful at deterring the Belgian infantry from reinforcing and 
counterattacking the glidennen, however they had liH:le effect on the steel and 
reinforced concrete casemates and cupolas. The defenses had been designed 
to withstand aerial bombing both in the way they were built and whe~ they 
were positioned. Casemate thirty-three withstood over twenty-four hours of 
constant bombing before the guns eventually failed. It was the introduction 
of the hollow charges which were able to penetrate the hardened gun positions 
that made the fort vulnerable. Additionally, speed in destroying the guns was 
essential. Had the glidermen failed to render the guns inoperable within the 
first half hour the Belgians could have fired on their own bridges halting the 
German advance.47 No other force offered the advantage of surprise, speed, • 
and destructive capability as did the gJidermen. 
Was the mission executed according to plan and if not what 
extenuating circumstances dictated the outcome? The plan to seize Eben Emael 
did not change much from its original inception. It was rehearsed in various 
forms from November 1939 to May 1940 and with a few notable exceptions it 
was executed exactly as planned As mentioned neither Lt. Witzig nor Sergeant 
Maier's squad arrived with the other elements. However, the plan had foreseen 
such contingencies. Witzig's role was command and control. When he failed 
47. Although not well documented cupola twenty-three fired upon an 




to arrive, Wenzel ably took over. Later Wenzel remarked, hThe officers had 
trained all of the men so well Utat the officers were expendable.~48 The plan 
also called for one squad in reserve. When Maier's squad failed to arrive, 
Wenzel ordered Sergeant Huebel to attack casemate twenty-six. Resupply and 
dose air support were both coordinated ahead of time and were instru~ental 
in allowing the glidennen to sustain their positions and prevent Belgian 
counterattacks. 
The raid appears to have been executed as planned and within the 
scope of possible contingencies. The only shortfalls were the element's failure 
to destroy casemate seventeen and the apparent lack of coordination on the 
glider launch. Although casemate seventeen had heen targeted as an objective 
for Squad VI, the casemate was not in a position to destroy the bridges - only 
harass the German infa ntry. Therefore, failing to render it inoperable did not 
impinge on the initial success of the mission. Nonetheless it was a target, and 
no viab le plan was devised to render it inoperable. 
A full scale glider launch was never conducted for fear of 
compromising the operation. Ilad Koch been able to secure a discrete landing 
field he should have conducted at least one launch sequence involving all 42 
gliders and accompanying tow planes. 
48 Ibid., Mrazek,. 115. 
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What modifications could have improved the outcome? Considering • 
the magnitude of the problem and the fact that all the primary objectives were 
destroyed within twenty minutes; it is doubtful that any modifications to the 
plan would have improved upon success. 
2. Relati.ve Superiority 
The assault on Eben Emael may be the best representation of relative 
superiority in modern day special operations. The attacking force was 
numerically inferior-outnumbered ten to one. The fortifications surrounding 
Eben Emael were some of the finest of their day. And yet, a small, lightly 
equipped force, destroyed the fort's main batteries in twenty minutes and 
eventually compelled the fort's commander to surrender the entire garrison. 
Figure 2-24 shows that the attacking force became vulnerable as they • 
began their final approach onto the fort. The machine guns tasked with anti~ 
aircraft duty actually hit six of the nine gliders as they descended. The 
German's vulnerability was minimized by surprise and the ProbabiHty of 
Mission Completion curve rose sharply as each glider made its landing. With 
all the gliders on the ground relative superiority was achieved, that is - a 
condition existed where the Gennans had a decisive advantage over the 
Belgians. T he German's Probability of Mission Completion strongly 
outweighed their probability of failure. On the graph this is shown as a 
significant rise above the Relative Superiority Line. The Belgians didn't realize 




to infantry attack. Even with no one manning the casemates, it would have 
been difficu1t for a conventional force to destroy the thick concrete bunkers. 
With the 50 Kg shape charges, however, all the German glidermen had to do 
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Clearly the gJidermen were vulnerable between achieving relntive slIperiority 
and mission completion, however, by using pre-rehearsed tactics and moving 
quickly, they were able to subdue the machine gunners in the casemates and 
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place their charges. Within fifteen minutes of landing all the primary • 
casemates that threatened the three bridges were destroyed. 
Even if we define mission completion as the surrender of the fortress 
and extend the graph out 24 hours; the additional Area of Vulnerability would 
be negligible owing to the close air support provided by the t-itukas and the 
bomber's ability to suppress any Belgian counterattack. 
Could a large conventional force have achieved the same results? 
No. The fort was designed to repel ground forces, both armored and infantry. 
Had the Germans attempted a conventional assault they may have been able 
to destroy the fortress, but not before the Belgian guns destroyed the bridges. 
A parachute assault would not have been pOSSible for a large force, for the 
same reasons it was discounted for a small force -- the parachutists would be • 
too widely dispersed and couldn't carry enough ordnance. And, although the 
surface of Eben Emael was sufficient to handle nine gliders, a large gliderborne 
force would not have had enough room to land. 
In the end, relative superiority was achieved so qukkly and was so 
dominant, that the Belgians could not have prevented the Germans from 
completing their mission. In the next section we will see how adhering to the 
Principles of Special Operations allowed the Germans to gain relati11e 




3. Principles of Special Operation 
Although Hitler i!; ofren admonished for his lack of strategic and 
tactical acumen, his plan for seizing the fort at Eben Emael was brilliant both 
in its strategic vision and tactical simplicity. Prior to the assault no one ~ou1d 
have believed that Eben EmaeJ could be taken, much less by so small a force. 
In 1938, Lieutenant Albert Torreele toured the fortress, and later as the Belgian 
Attache to the United States stated: 
An officer member of the garrison of the fort led us to many of the outer 
defences and showed what each was intended for. We w ent to the walls 
and looked over countless rows of barbed wire. He led us to the only 
door on the surface set deep in concrete. It appeared like the heavy steel 
door of a bank vault From here infantry in reserve would issue to repel 
any enemy fortunate enough to get by the tough ground defences. He 
took us deep into the interior and we trudged many miles to the end of 
the tunnels, visiting the crews and the guns of emplacements we had seen 
on the surface .. .I got the impression of tremendous power and first rate 
efficiency. I was convinced nothing could happen.u 
The problem of seizing the forl seemed insurmountable. But, by limiting the 
objectives, using good intelligence, and innovative tactics and technology the 
Germans were ab le to simplify the problem significantly. 
Witzig.. who "developed the specifics of the plan,· knew that only 
ce rtain casemates or cupolas had guns capable of reaching and destroying the 
three bridges -- and this was Hitler's main concem.SOI Other casemates could 
49 Ibid., Mrazek, 31-32. (Emphasis added) 
SD Ibid., Witzig. 
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still lob 75mm rounds on the advancing infantry regiment and Panzer division, 
but by attempting to destroy all nineteen casemates and cupolas, Witzig would 
have to either increase the size of his assault and glider force or give each 
squad multiple targets. The assault on Eben Emael already required Witzig's 
entire engineer platoon. Consequently, additional forces would have to come 
from outside the platoon, and to break unit integrity, on a mission this critical, 
was considered unacceptable. Giving each squad an additional target would 
also have significantly complicated the operations. As it was, each squad, 
which had seven or eight men, carried two 50 Kg shaped charges, two 12.5 Kg 
shaped charges, three bangalore torpedoes, a flame thrower and a host of other 
ordnance and assault equipment -- all for one casemate or cupola.51 Adding 
one more target to each squad would have complicated the command and • 
control, required additional fire and movement training... and increased the 
number of gliders to handle the added weight of twice the ordnance. 52 After 
consultation with Koch, Witzig chose to forego some of the smaller casemates 
and concentrate on the real threat. 
§1 Sergeant Harlos and Squad VI were the only ones who had two targets; 
cupola fourteen, which turned out to be a false target, and casemate seventeen 
which was positioned along the Albert Canal. 
52 During an interview with Helmut Wenzel he stated that some of the DFS 
230 gliders were over their maximum take-off weight of 4630 lbs. This he 





Intelligence for th e operation helped simplify the plan by 
reduci ng the number of unknown factors. Witzig knew exactly how mally 
casemates and cupolas there w ere -- and where they were located. He knew the 
dimensions of the landing area and what surface obstacles could impede a 
gHder assaulL He had blueprints that showed the inside of the fortress and the 
emergency exits used for conducting a counterattack. All of this intelligence 
allowed Witzig to plan his training around a realistic scenario: the demolition 
training was against casemates that resembled Eben Emael's bunkers; the 
g liders learned to land in an area comparable to the surface of the fort; and 
even the physical training (running the exact distances, climbing the casemate 
w alls) was bClsed on intelligence provided to Witzig. 
Innovation p layed a major role in simplifying the plan to assault 
Eben Emael. Although the surface of bben Emael had a large enough "drop 
zone" for a s mall number of troops, the Germans, after conducting several test 
drops concl uded that the platoon would be too widely dispersed to be effective. 
Additionally, parachutisl .. could not carry enough ordnance and the sound of 
propeller driven jump aircraft would have compromised surprise. 
Although gJ iders had been around for quite some time, they had 
never been used in actual combal Their unique capability to land troops and 
their equipment within fifteen to thirty yards of the target was an undeniable 
advantage owed to new technolob'Y' The DFS 230 was newly designed and 
modified specifically to meet the demands of landing on a grassy strip. Even 
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today there are very few air insertion techniques that can deliver ten men and • 
their equipment with that level of accuracy. 
The most Significant technological innovation was, of course, the 
shape charge. This was the first time this explosive device had ever been used 
in combat. The shape charge'S ability to penetrate both the six inch thick steel 
cupolas and the reinforced concrete of the casemates was unquestionably the 
single most important factor in the success of the mission. Within the first 
twenty minutes the glidermen had destroyed casemates 18, 12, 19, 13, 26, and 
partially immobilized casemate 30. Additionally, they destroyed cupolas 14, 16, 
(false cupolas) 23, and 31. The Belgians were so shinned by the swiftness with 
which their defenses were incapacitated that they never recovered. The 
glidermen continued to inflict severe damage on additional cupolas and • 
machine gun embrasures with both the 50 Kg and 12.5 Kg shape charges. 
The more difficult a plan is the longer it will take to execute, 
consequently the greater the Area of Vulnerability. By limiting the objectives 
and using good intelligence and innovation to overcome the obstacles - a plan 
can be reduced to its simplest terms. And, a simple plan is the base upon 
which rests the remainder of the operation. 
h. Security 
The German's operational security throughout the planning and 
preparation for the assault on Eben Emael was extensive -- but not overbearing. 





assauH element leaders (the officers) were told the exact name and location of 
the objectives. Security was considered paramount to achieving s urprise. 
Assault Force Granite changed it .. name each time it moved to a new location. 
The troops were given cover stories and cover names. Guards were assigned 
to each unit to ensure no Hinadvertent" information was divulged. Letters were 
censured by Major Koch' s staff. In the last days prior to the assault, all 
personnel were restricted to the base and when necessary transported in 
covered furniture vans to hide their presence. An operational deception plan 
placed phoney news stories in local papers to conceal the gJidermen's activities 
and special units set off smoke makers to hide the force from aerial 
observation. But even with all this production, the operational security never 
inhibited proper preparation. With only one exception, a full scale launch of 
all 42 gliders, all phases of the mission were rehearsed again and again. 
It is important for security personnel to understand what aspects 
of the miss ion absolutely have to be concealed. This allows operational 
security to be more effective and less restrictive - overall. Even with all the 
German's operational security, the Hell:,'ians at Eben Emael w ere prepared to 
halt an attack, even a gliderbome attack - albeit not effectively. 
The "Phoney War" had been brewing since 1939, with 
anticipation of a German full scale attack into Belgium and Holland. The days 
preceding 10 May, the fort at Eben Emael had several false alarms and all the 
soldiers in the fort were recalled to their stations. The Belgians realized that 
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the Germans might attack at any moment. They were just not worried because • 
the fort seemed indestructible - particularly to an airborne assault. The surface 
of the fort had barbed wire, anti-aircraft guns, a tank moat, and infantry 
fighting positions. Had the Germans attempted a parachute drop; the 
parachutist'! would have been cut to pieces. So it was important for opera~onal 
security to hide the glidednsertion method and, of course, essential to conceal 
the time of the assault. Although it was important to conceal the name of the 
unit, the personnel involved, and the demolition training on the casemates; had 
any of this information leaked out, it is doubtful it would have dramatically 
affected the outcome of the mission. Even if the Belgians had found out about 
the glider training it is arguable whether they would have altered the surface 
defenses of the fort. Why should they? What could gliderbome infantry forces • 
expect to achieve against concrete casemates and steel cupolas surrounded by 
machine guns and barbed wire? Even if the Belgians had learned about the 
shaped charges, it is doubtful that they could have developed countermeasures 
to protect the casemates. It was the timing of the mission that was most crucial 
to conceal. Had the Belgians known the time of the attack,. they could easily 
have prevented the Gennans from succeeding - even with the ineffective 
surface defenses. A couple of wen manned machine guns could have held the 
glidermen at bay and prevented them from ever gaining relative superiority. 
Consequently, operational security must understand the nature of a special 
operation mission; that is, it is the method of insertion and the timing that are 
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the most crucial. The fact that a mission is pending should be concealed _ but 
not at the expense of proper preparation. 
At first the plan didn't look good. I thought 'we've really got~n 
ourselves into it this time: But, as we practiced more and more on the 
bunkers, it became apparent it would work.53 
Sergeant Helmut Wenzel 
On 3 November 1939, Koch received his mission orders. From 
November until May, Stonn Detachment Koch, which induded Witzig's 
Granite Force, prepared for the assault on Eben Emael. Although some of this 
time was spent recruiting glider pilots and sending Witzig's engineers to 
advanced demolition school; at least four months time was used in d irect 
preparation for the attack. Witzig was known as a detail man, and during the 
planning and preparation phase he ensured no detail was left unaddressed. 
The glider pilots, both Luftwaffe and the more skilled Hcivilian" pilots, flew 
dozens of flight profiles that corresponded to the landing on Eben Emael. At 
first these flights were done without full loads, but eventually all Witzig's 
engineers and their equipment were placed in the DFS 230 and "flew many, 
many times."n Before 10 May, every pilot could take-off at night, fly the 
53 Ibid., Wenzel. 
54 Ibid., Wenzel. 
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profile, and land on a grassy surface within 15 to 30 yards of their target 
Witzig even ensured that all the glider pilots were capable of using the 
weapons and shape charges carried by the engineer.>. 
While the pilots were flying, the engineers were conducting 
mock drills; first in a large field with nothing but markers to signify the 
casemates, and then on actual casemates and cupolas on the Czech and Polish 
borders. Witzig's men conducted hundreds of partial drills and at least two 
full dress rehearsals with the gliders and full equipment The only aspect of 
the mission the Germans didn't conduct was a full glider launch of the entire 
Storm Detachment Koch. This would have entailed tow launching all 42 
gliders involved in both the assault on Eben Emael and the three bridges. It 
was decided that rehearsing the launch could have compromised security, so • 
the idea was abandoned. Unfortunately, having practiced only in individual 
elements, when it came time to orchestrate the entire launch sequence, the 
logistic problem suddenly became clear. Although Witzig's group launched 
without difficulty, the remaining gliders were several minutes late taking off 
when the tow planes and gliders began to ~stack" up. This time delay cost 
precious minutes and was responsible for the failure of Assault Force "Iron" to 
gain surprise at Canne, subsequently resulting in the bridge's destmction and 
the loss of several German lives.55 Repetition as manifested in realistic 
55 Assault Force Iron, under the command of Lieutenant Schaechter was 
tasked with capturing the Canne bridge intact The Belgians had wired the 
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rehearsals is the litmus test o f simplicity. Concepts that seem easy on paper, 
may in fact be diffi cult in practice. Consequently, it is imperative that all 
facets of an operation be rehearsed prior to the mission. 
d. Surprise 
Most historians view the raid on Eben Emael as a classic exa,mple 
of employing surprise to gain a tactical advantage over the enemy. They sight 
Belgian unpreparedness to defend against a glider assault as the main reason 
for the Fort's demise. It is interesting to note just how p repared the lJelgians 
were and what elements of surprise really contributed to the Gennan's success. 
On May 10th at 0030 the local Belgian command headquarters at 
liege notified the fort at Eben Emael of Gennan movement across th e Dutch 
border. It had been the third alert that month and received an unenthusiastic 
response by the troops stationed in the nearby town. Nonetheless most of the 
available Belgian defenders were at their posts by 0300. At 0315, one hour 
before the gliders appeared in the sky, lieutenant l.ongdoz reported his crews 
were manning the four pairs of multiple-mount anti-aircraft guns. At 
approximately 0400 Belgian outposts reported inbound aircraft at an altitude of 
4-5000 feel 
bridge with explosives and when Schaechter's assault force failed to gain 
surprise and then had difficulty exiting his gliders -- the Relgians destroyed the 
bridge. Assault Force Iron lost four dead and six seriously wounded. 
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As the gliders released from the tow planes at 0415 many of the • 
Belgian gun crews stood dumbfounded as the silent aircraft descended on to 
the fort. There was a momentary delay before the anti-aircraft and light 
machine guns began firing, nevertheless six of the nine gliders were hit by 
gunfire although none were seriously damaged. As the gliders landed, most 
were immediately taken under fire by machine guns from the cupolas or the 
nearby hanger. Although there were no built in defenses against glider assault 
(such as triangular steel anti-tank obstacles) the surface of the fort was ringed 
with barbed wire (which many of the gliders landed in) and fighting positions 
to counter enemy infantry troops. There is no doubt that the 8elgians were 
surprised by the glider assault, however I would argue that they were 
unprepared to deal with the situation. 
• The real surprise was not the manner in which the ('..ermans 
inserted rather it was the swift employment of the 50 Kg shaped charges that 
completely caught the Belgians unprepared. Although the casemates were 
constructed to withstand both enemy artillery and aerial bombardment, the 
shaped charge was new technology and there were no countermeasures 
available. To the Belgian defenders the gliders and their German commandos 
presented an insignificant threat provided the Belgians could retreat into the 
sanctity of the hardened fortress. From their steel cupolas they could employ 
overlapping fields of fire to decimate any infantry on the surface of the fort. 





they were not prepared to deal with was the sudden and complete destruction 
of their fortified casemates and cupolas. This was the real surprise! 
The ch ief problem which Witzig's group would face was time. Although 
there wo uld be no declaration of war to warn the Belgian authorities and 
although it was anticipated that the noiseless approach of the gliders 
swooping out of the d awn sky would give the attackers the advantage of 
surprise, this would give the attackers at the most 60 minutes. Thereafter, 
the enemy's growing strength both inside and outside the fort would 
come into play,50 
It was 0425 when the first glider landed atop the fortress at Ebtm 
Emael. Within the first 20 minutes all squads had reported back to Wenzel that 
their missions were complete -- well before the allotted 60 minutes. Had the 
glide rmen extracted from the fort at that moment they stiH would have 
achieved their major objective of destroying the main guns covering the 
bridges at Canne, Vroenhoven and Veldweze1t. The "special operations" aspect 
of the mission was complete. However, the original plan called for Witzig to 
hold the fort for four hours until relieved by the Engineer Battalion of the 151st 
Infantry Regiment. Consequently, he was prepared to "go conventional " 
immediately foHowing accomplishment of the main objective. His men, under 
the guidance of Wenzel, dug in and positioned themselves to repel Belgian 
counterattacks. Even with preparations for an extended stay, p roblems b egan 
to arise as the glidermen were forced to hold the fort longer than planned. 
;6 Ibid., Lucus, Storming Eagles 21. 
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Special operations forces by virtue of their insertion methods are • 
generally unable to sustain operations for an extended period. Whether by 
glider, parachute, or C·130 aircraft commandos are limited in their firepower 
by what they can carry. Speed is essential to minimize time on target and 
maximize available resources. Witzig's company had the advantage of ~eing 
within range of continuous air support, a luxury not normally available to most 
"behind the lines" operations. Nevertheless as time passed several 
counterattacks were attempted firstby Captain Wakeman and his forty Belgians 
then by Lieutenant Lavaque and his reinforced company from Wonck. 
Additionally, Major Jottrand tried several times to extricate the glidermen from 
the surface of his fort. Without Luftwaffe support Witzig would not have been 
able to receive ammunition resupply nor the fire support he dearly needed to • 
accomp1ish the holding action. 
Even with this prolonged action their can be little doubt that the 
first several minutes dictated the outcome of the entire mission. Witzig spent 
six months of training to ensure every aspect of the initial phase, from 
departing the glider, to assembling the shaped charge, to reporting the results 
was completed as quickly as possible. Unfortunately for the Belgians - his 





We had been cooped up for months and had been transformed into 
killers. Everything we had done was in preparation for this hour ... There 
was unyielding determination in each man's eyl!S. Those who are our 
friends, are our strong loyal friends; those who are our enemies will find 
us unyielding enemies. With this feeling we could seurch out the devil in 
heUr 
The principle of purpose is always viewed from two directions; 
the purpose of the mission as stated in the operation order and the "sense of 
p urpose" or personal commitment that each soldier brings to the battle. First, 
the individual soldira must understand the purpose of the mission so that" if 
required, he can react without supervision ." knowing that his actions are 
consistent with the mission directive. As Wenzel said later, "They {the troops] 
must be able to recognize the situation and act accordingly.n5~ This ability to 
act -accordingly" requires the plan to be dearly articulated to the troops. In the 
case of Eben Emael the individual soldier had a simple task:_ exit the glider, 
place the charge on the casemate, pull the fuse, extract and then survive until 
relief arrives - that was it! Understanding the purpose of his individual 
mission was easy. However, understanding the overall picture, while being 
counterattacked by the Belgians, also needed to be simple. Fortunately, it was. 
When Witzig failed to arrive to control the actions at the objective, Wenzel 
57 Ibid., Mrazek, 62, 65. Attributed to Corporal M. Wilhelm AIefs of Squad 
Seven. (Emphasis added) 
5~ Ibid., Wenzel. 
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quickly took command. He knew exactly what had to be done. He notified • 
Koch that the_casemates were destroyed and then consolidated his forces and 
set up defensive positions. Wenzel had a dear understanding of where all the 
squads were, even though he could not see them from his position. When it 
became apparent that Max Maiers squad did not arrive, Wenzel q~ickly 
redirected an available squad to destroy Maier's assigned target. Wenzel could 
also visualize the Relgian's situation and was prepared to counter theirefforls; 
which he did successfully several times. Although Wenzel became the "hero 
of Eben Emael;" the purpose of the mission was so dearly understood by most,. 
if not all the participants, that any of the soldiers probably could have 
commanded the actions at the fort. 
There are countless reasons to be personally committed to a • 
mission. But,. whether the commitment is for God, country, or self; there must 
be a sense of purpose instilled into each soldier. It may never be needed if the 
operation goes according to plan, but when the frictions of war are at their 
peak and the enemy is threatening to repel the attack __ that's when a sense of 
purpose is absolutely necessary. There are several examples of this sense of 
purpose during the assault on hben Emael. To RudoU Witzig.. a sense of 
purpose was instilled through the knowledge that Hitler had personally 
planned and directed the operation and that Witzig, as the mission commander, 
was responsible for its outcome. Witzig was so committed to the purpose, that 




another tow plane and arrived at Eben Emael three hours later - in the middle 
of the battle. Wenzel, although shot in the head by a sniper (a scar w hich he 
sti ll bears today) continued to direct his portion of the operation. After 
destroyi ng casemate twelve, Sergeant Arendt,.. leader of Squad III, seized upon 
the opportunity to enter the fortress. Without regard for his own li~e, he 
p roceeded deep into the fort dropping 3 Kg charges as he went. This act o f 
boldness frightened the Belgians so badly that they reconsidered any attempts 
to counterattack through that opening. The Germans were "merciless" in their 
attack .59 While, according to Witzig, "[the Belgians) didn't have the fighting 
courage."OG Without a sense of purpose it will be difficult to overcome the 
"stronger form of warfare." In the case of the assault on Eben Emael the 
Germans had purpose and the Belgians apparent1y did not. 
59 Ibid., Wenzel. 
611 Ibid., Witzig. 
IlL THE ITALIAN MANNED TORPEDO ArrACK AGAINST 
• THE BRITISH AT ALEXANDRIA, EGYYf -19 DECEMBER 1941 
A. BACKGROUND 
On 10 June 1940, Germany invaded France, and Italy subsequently 
de clared war on France and Britain. In the Mediterranean Sea the British had 
secured vital ports at Gibraltar, Malta, and Alexandria. From these ports the 
British Fleet controlled key lines of supply betwee n Europe and North Africa. 
In March 1941, the Italian Navy lost three cruisers to the British in the Battle 
of Cape Malapan. Until they could build more ships, the Italians had to limit 
their naval activities to convoy escort duty. In the meantime, the British ruled 
the Mediterranean and there seemed to be little the Italians could do . 
• Mussolini knew that the key to success in the Mediterranean meant restoring Italian naval power. With control of the Mediterranean "beleaguered Malta 
would fall like a ripe plum. Erwin Rommel's flying squadrons in North Africa 
would be sure of a flow of supplies and the small British Army [in Egypt] 
would wither for lack of the same."J The assault on the British Fleet took 
many forms including aerial bombing from the Italian Air Force and German 
U-Boat attacks. The greatest success achieved by the Axis, however, came from 
an un1ikely source, Italian frogmen. 
J Bruce Wilkinson, By Sea and By Stealth (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., • 
1956),39. 
• 
In 1938, the fl edgling Italian First Light Flotilla was tasked with 
interdicting British shipping at sea and in port. This mission was to become 
the focus of the ItaJian frogmen for the next three years. By the end of the war 
the Italians had sunk over 265,000 tones of British shipping. The most famous 
of these operations occurred on 19 December 1941, when six Italian ~ivers 
riding manned torpedoes entered Alexandria Harbor in Egypt and sank two 
British battleships, HMS VALIANT and HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH, the tanker 
SAGONA, and badly damaged the cruiser HMS JERVIS. The attack on 
Alexandria was one of the most successful special operations, of any kind, 
during World War II and shows the value of well executed undenvater 
o~rations. 
Even before World War II, the Italians had a history of naval commando 
operations, but it was one mission in particular that inspired two young naval 
engineers to develop the manned torpedo that would be so successful in the 
Mediterranean. In October 1918 two Italians in a 65 foot torpedo patrol boat 
travelled from Venice to mouth of Pola Harbor and attached mines to the vessel 
VIRIHUS UNrnS. The following day the mines exploded and the vessel sank 
in place. Years later, the lessons of this success inspired two young naval 
engineers, Teseo Tesei and Elios Toschi, to develop the manned torpedo. 
Toschi described the "new weapon system~ as follows: 
The new weapon is in size and shape very similar to a torpedo but it is 
in reality a miniature submarine with entirely novel features, el ectrical 
propulsion and a steering wheel similar to that of an aeroplane. The 
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innovation of greatest interest is the point that the crew, instead of • 
remaining enclosed and more or less helpless in the interior, keep outside 
the structure.2 
In 1935, plans for the manned torpedo were sent to the Naval Ministry 
and two prototypes were authorized. Thirty mechanics from the Submarine 
Weapons Station at La Spezia spent several months constructing the torpedoes 
and by January 1936 the prototypes were ready for testing. The tests were 
conducted under the watchful eye of Admiral Falangola of the Naval Ministry 
who after observing the demonstration authorized further testing and 
construction of additional torpedoes. By the years end a small cadre of manned 
torpedo pilots assembled at La Spezia and began training with the new 
weapon. 
This concept of attacking ships in port was well received by the Italian • 
Naval Staff, if not the entire Navy, and in addition to the manned torpedoes, 
high speed motor boats loaded with explosives were developed for the same 
purpose. The motorboats, the brainchild of the Italian General of Aviation 
Duke Amedeo of Aosta, were originally wooden framed with a waterproof 
canvas cover. The engine was horizontally aligned to allow the maximum 
space in the bow for the placement of explosives. The pilot of the motorboat 
would guide the craft on a collision course with the target ship and at the last 
moment jump off and attempt to escape. The pilot had a float which kept him 
2 J. Valerio Borghese, Sea llivils trans. James Cleugh (Chicago: Henry Regnery 





above the water during the explosion. In 1938, these high speed m olor boats 
along with the manned torpedoes were placed under the command of 
Commander Paolo Aloisi and designated the First Light Flotilla. 
In 1939, as the possibility of war loomed greater, the Naval Staff ordered 
the production of 12 manned torpedoes and recruited more volunteers tc? pilot 
these secret weapons. The recruitment and subsequent training proceeded 
slowly at fi rst, for although the Naval Staff supported the initiative, some 
elements within the Italian Navy were suspicious of this new organization and 
helped only reluctantly. Nevertheless, by January 1940 the first launch of a 
manned to rpedo from a submarine was conducted in the Gulf of La S pezia 
from the Italian submarine AMETISTA. In command of the AMEfISTA was 
Commander J. Valerio Borghese. Borghese later became commander of the 
SCIRE and was a prominent player in operations with the Italian frogmen. 
During the exercise the AMETISTA surfaced with the deck just slightly awash. 
Three manned torpedoes launched over the side and the divers proceeded 
submerged into the entrance of the harbor. Once inside the harbor they 
"attacked" the Italian vessel QUARTO, exited the harbor and began their return 
to the submarine. 'While returning to the submarine the frogmen tried a new 
rendezvous and docking system which used short wave underwater sig nals to 
guide the manned torpedoes back to the AME'11STA. Although the rendezvous 
with the submarine was completed, the short wave docking system proved 
unsuccessful. This, however, made no difference, for a decision was made that 
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preel uded the need to use the rendezvous system. There would be no more • 
rendezvouses._ From that moment onward the Italians planned their operations 
based on a one-way insertion by the manned torpedoes. This provided the 
maximum standoff distance for the parent submarine and allowed the divers 
to use all their energy for the insertion and engagement. Escape cam~ only 
after completing the mission and required the frogmen to swim to land and 
linkup with agent<; or partisans. The success of the exercise added momentum 
to the weapons program and subsequently new prototypes were developed and 
the older manned torpedoes were upgraded. The First Light Flotilla was soon 
ready for war. 
B. ALEXANDRIA HARBOR, EGYPT 
Alexandria Harbor is located in Egypt on the west side of the Nile Delta. 
During World War II the British occupied the harbor using it -as their primary 
operating base in the eastern Mediterranean. The harbor was almost fully 
enclosed by a long quaywall which extended from the old fort batteries on the 
northern peninsula across the entrance to the southern flank. The channel 
leading into the harbor was on the southern end and access was controlled by 
use of an antisubmarine net. The net was only opened when authorized 
vessels were entering. Intelligence reports transmitted to the Italians at ta 
Speria noted the following fixed and mobile defenses: 
(a) minefield 20 miles NW of harbour; (b) line of 'lobster-pots' arranged 





line of d etector cables closer in; (d) groups of 'lobster-pots' in known 
positions; (e) net barriers relatively easy to force; (f) advanced observation 
li ne beyond minefield. 3 
"Lobster pots" were smalI explo~ives devices that detonated on command. 
From the northern battery a line of these devices extended out in a w esterly 
direction for 2000 yards. 
Inside the harbor the British battleships and cruisers were on a wartime alert 
status and watch standen;. were constantly cautioned about the possibility of 
saboteurs. The threat of saboteurs, although real, was not considered a serious 
~ Ufficio StorieD Della Marina Militare, I Mew D'Assalto translated by I.CDR 
Paolo Gianetti, (Rome: Ufficio StorieD Della Marina Militare, 1991), 117. 
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threat to the heavily armored battleships which lay anchored in the middle of • 
the harbor. The night of the operation there Were two battleships in port, the 
HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH and the HMS VALIANT. Both ships were of the 
QUEEN ELIZABETH class and crewed by approximately 1184 officers and men. 
The QUEEN ELIZABETH commissioned on October 16,1913 was 643 feet long, 
104 feet wide, had a draft of 35 feet and displaced 35,000 tons fully loaded. The 
battleship had four shafts driven by Parson's geared turbines which propelled 
it in excess of 24 knots and gave it a combat radius of 4,400 miles. Topside the 
QUEEN ELIZABETH was equipped eight 15 inch guns mounted two apiece on 
two turrets forward and aft; eight 6 inch guns all mounted forward of the 
midsection; eight 4 inch anti-aircraft guns; four 3 pounders, five machine guns, 
ten Lewis aircraft machine gUDS; four aircraft and twenty 4.5 inch guns as • 
secondary armament. 
To protect against air, surface and subsurface attack the QUEEN 
ELIZABETH was one of the most heavily armored ships of its time. On the 
waterline there was 13 inches of armor plating surrounding the ship with other 
critical areas i.e. torpedo rooms, gunhouses, battery storage rooms all having 
from 4 to 11 inches of armor plating. On deck there was between 1 and 3 
inches of armor to protect from aerial bombardment. Unfortunately for the 
British the flat bottom of the battleship was virtual1y unprotected and offered 
a well exposed target for the Italian frogmen. The VALIANT was was virtually 




all the high value targets were anti torpedo nel'i. Erected in a circle 30 yards 
from the vessels, these nets were made of steel mesh suspended by large buoys 
and hung: down to a depth of 40 feet. Designed to keep air dropped torpedoes 
from hitting the ships, these nets could be circumvented by the Italian frogmen 
either by cutting them or going over or under them. 
Also in port the evening of 19 December was the French batUeship 
LORRAINE and several smaller British cruisers and tankers. The Italian 
frogmen also had to contend with countless small boats motoring from pier to 
shi p as a part of the normal in port routine. The security surrounding the port 
was extensive, but the Italians had learned their lessons from several previous 
operations and were prepared to make the attack on Alexandria a success . 
C. TENTH UGHI' FLOTILLA 
With-the advent of war in the Mediterranean the Italian Navy quickly 
began to increase it" number of manned torpedoes and high speed boats with 
the idea of attacking the British Navy where they anchored. To man these new 
weapons the Navy established a recruiting and training program at the 
Training Centre of Sea l'ioneers at Leghorn near the Italian Naval Academy. 
All the men chosen for the Hrst light Aotilla were volunteers. At the training 
cente r they were screened to ensure they met the correct physical and Hmoral" 
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standards necessary to join this unique outfil4 Each man's moral standards 
were accessed to be good only after an extensive search into the individuals 
background. This search included a financial background check,. a review of 
the applicant., family hiStory, and a look into recent romantic involvements that 
might impact his ability to function under stress. After a thorough che~k the 
applicant was required to be interviewed by the commanding officer of the 
training center to gauge ~his spirit,. ideas, stamina and mental formation."5 In 
addition to this 5icreening process each applicant received physical training and 
extensive instruction in use of the undelWater breathing apparatus. Spartaco 
Schergat one of the Italians who would later participate in the attack on 
Alexandria thought the six month class was going to teach him to be a 
"frogman."b H e was surprised when he got to Leghorn for training: 
They tricked me! Instead of swimming with flippers they taught me to 
use the Belloni Aqualung. They made me walk on the bottom for four 
hours carrying a big heavy drum to simulate a bomb.' 
4 When the war started the Italian Navy recognized the need for more "assault 
swimmers" and attempted to recruit nationally ranked athletes from the Italian 
Swimmers' League. Unfortunately most of the world class swimmers had already 
been conSCripted by the Army. Consequently, the First Light Aotina bypassed normal 
procedure and became a "joint" venture with swimmers from the Navy, Army and 
Alpine Corps. 
5 Ibid., Borghese, 32. 
(; Schergat was under the impression that frogmen only used fins and swam on 
the surface. 
7 Spartaco Schergat. interviewed by CDR William H. McRaven, 4 November 1992, 








If the volunteer passed all the 
physical and academic 
examinations and met the 
subjective criteria of the 
commanding officers then he 
was assigned to one of the 
s pecial branches, either 
manned torpedoes or high 
speed motor boats. The 
diver's training continued for 
a year until he could master 
his assault weapon. 
T he Italians 
exceptionally strict about 
secrecy. No member of the 
First Light Aotilla was ever to 
Figure 3-2. Italian "Frogman" Wearing the 
reveal the nalure of his work Belloni Aqualung and Dry SaiL (Royal 
Submarine Museum) 
to anyon e outside his 
immediate supervisors. This rule extended to those other men within the First 
Light flotilla who were not intimately involved with a members work. 
Commander Borghese in his book Sea Devils makes it clear that this was not 
an easy undertaking for most Italians: 
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When one considers the extent to which most Italians feel a 
communicative urge, to show that they are well informed and to boast, 
one can realize what exceptional qualities were required in these young 
men; for it is sometimes easier to get an Italian to lay down his life than 
to make the sacrifice of holding his tongue.8 
Between 1936 and 1940 the Italian engineers at La Spezia developed 
several prototypes and production model submersibles, manned torp~does, 
motorboats and ancillary equipment that was to be used by the first Ught 
Flotilla. These included the following: 
• 
• The SCL (Slow Speed Torpedo) human torpedo. This was an improved 
version of the original manned torpedo. It was 6.7 meters long and 
manned by two divers. Maximum speed was 2.5 m.p.h. with a range of 
10 nautical miles and a submersion depth of 30 meters. The SCt was 
propelled by a battery powered motor and the pilot maintained buoyancy 
through forward and aft trim tanks. The tanks were blown dry with air 
from bottles positioned in the midsection. The pilot steered the torpedo 
using a magnetic compass and a depth gauge, both luminescent. The 
warhead, contained in the bow, was 300 kg. of explosive. In the • 
midsection behind the second diver was a tool chest containing net 
cutters, air net lifters, clamps for attaching the explosives, and plenty of 
line.--
• The modified touring motorboat MTM. This was an explosive motorboat 
(E-Boat) which was 5.2 meters long and 1.9 meters wide. It was powered 
by an AHa Romeo engine and had a speed of 32 m.p.h. The bow 
contained 300 kg. of explosives which separated upon impact with the 
target and then detonated hydrostatical at a prearranged depth. 
• The light touring motorboat MTB. This motorboat was similar in 
construction to the MTM but was small enough to fit inside the chambers 
aboard the transport submarines. 
• The torpedo touring motorboat MTSM. This craft was designed to attack 
ships at sea. It was larger than the MTM with a length of 7 meters and 
a width of 2.3 meters. The MTSM was propelled by two Alia Romeo 
8 Ibid., Borghese, 33. 
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engines and contained a torpedo launch tube situated aft. When fired the 
torpedo does a 180 degree tum passing underneath the MTSM and then 
begins to pursue it.<; target. It had a crew of two. 
The midget submarine CA. This was a 12 ton dry submarine crewed by 
two men. It held two 450mm torpedoes and was later modified to carry 
eight 100 kg. charges. The CA2, a later version, was part of an operation 
to attack United States ships in New York harbor. The defeat of Italy in 
1943 canceled the mission. 
• The CB was a larger version (30 tons) of the CA with a crew of four and 
an increased .range. The CBs were used extensively in the Black Sea and 
were responsible for sinking three Soviet Submarines. 
In addition to the inventory of submersibles and motorboal<; the Italians 
developed diving rigs and explosives to augment the diver's "bag of tricks.~ 
These innovations included the following: 
An underwater breathing apparatus which used two high pressure oxygen 
bottles and was good for six hours underwater. The oxygen travelled 
from the botOes into a rubber breathing bag and then through a reduction 
regulator to the diver. The diver expelled air into a canister of soda lime 
which eliminated the carbon dioxide and allowed the oxygen to be 
recycled into the breathing bags for further consumption. 
• A rubber dry suit whi ch covered the diver from neck to toe leaving only 
the head and hands exposed. Underneath the dry suit the divers wore 
thick underwear. The suit was called a "Belloni suie after its designer 
Commander Belloni. 
• The Leech. The Leech or Bug was a 2 kg. time fused explosive charge that 
attached to the hull of a ship by means of air-cushion pressure. A free 
swimming "assault swimmer" could carry five of these charges around his 
waist. 
The Limpet. This explOSive charge was 4.5 kg. which was clamped to the 
hull and detonated by a "space fuse." The "space fuse" had a small 
propeller which activated the detonator only after the ship got underway 
and attained a speed of (ive knol<;, 
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By August 1940, while training for some of the frogmen was just 
• beginning, the First Light Flotilla received its first mission; sink the aircraft 
carrier ARK ROYAl, and the battleships QUEEN ELIZAB£fH and VALIANT 
in port at Alexandria. The submarine lRIDE was chosen to be the delivery 
platform for the mission. The plan was for the IRIDE, which was not .fitted 
with deck chambers, to sail from La Spezia to the vicinity of Tobruk. Outside 
Tobruk the submarine was to rendezvous with a support vessel carrying four 
SLC manned torpedoes. The torpedoes would be lashed to the deck and the 
IRIDE would transit to a point four miles outside Alexandria.9 There the 
manned torpedoes wou1d be launched to conduct their mission. 
The IRIDE arrived outside Tobruk on the moming of 21 August. During 
the afternoon of that day British bombers returning from a mission noticed the • 
support vessels in the isolated waters. The next day the support vessels 
transferred the torpedoes to the IRIDE. As the submarine was beginning to 
conduct a test dive to check the lashing of the torpedoes, three British torpedo 
carrying aircraft bombed and sank the IRIDE in 15 meters of water. After the 
aircraft departed twenty hours of salvage operations ensued. Eventually the 
Italians succeeded in rescuing twenty members of the submarine crew along 
, The manned torpedoes were only pressure tested to 30 meters, consequently the 
submarine lride was required to. transit from Tobruk to Alexandria at that depth. 
This relatively shallow depth made the submarine easier to detect from the air . 
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with some of the embarked frogmen. The first attempt to attack the Briti sh had 
ended in disaster, b ut it was not to be the last misfortune. 
The loss of the IRIDE was due, in part, to the requirement for the 
torpedoes to be transferred and then lashed on deck. Consequently, two 
submarines the GONDAR and the SCIRE were fitted with three chambers, one 
forward and two aft. These chambers were specially designed to carry the 
torpedoes. Once alterations were completed the GONDA R received o rders to 
renew the attack on Alexandria. The SCIRE also received orders to conduct a 
simultaneous attack on the British Navy at Gibralta r . 
(KoyaJ Submarine Museum) 
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GONDAR arrived outside Alexandria on 29 September 1940. Soon after 
arriving the submarine received orders to return to La Spezia, the British Navy 
had departed Alexandria. While returning to Italy GONDAR was spotted by 
British warships and subsequently sank after 12 hours of hide and seek. 
Although most of the crew survived several key members of the First Light 
Flotilla were captured including Elios Toschi one of the original founders of 
the organization. The SCIRE meanwhile had arrived at Gibraltar only to 
receive similar orders to return to Italy. The British had sailed frum Gibraltar 
as well. 
On 15 October 1940 the Tenth Light Flotilla, which had been a department 
under the First Light Flotilla was formed as a separate organization under the 
• 
command of Commander Belloni. It retained its cover as a Subaquatic • 
Research Center for the study of problems of human life under water. 
Later in October the SCIRE returned to Gibraltar and launched three 
manned torpedoes which successfully penetrated British defenses. 
Unfortunately, the divers experienced trouble with their torpedoes. Petty 
Officer Emilio Bianchi, one of the divers recalled later. 
The defenses at Gibraltar were vel)' simple. We got through nets with no 
problem.. but then there was an explosion inside the pig [manned 
torpedo). The gases that came out of the batteries caught fire. Operation 
BG2 (the attack on Gibraltar] was a fiasco, but it was useful because it 
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allowed our technical staff to understand what went wrong in the pig and 
fix i l lO 
One of the three swim pairs was captured, but the other four men escaped 
to Spain and returned to La Spezia. Rianchi and his officer I.uigi Durand de 
Iii Penne escaped and would later spearhead the attack against Alexandria. 
Unfortunately for the Italians, the British were now fully aware ~f the 
capabilities of the HaJian divers,ll On 25 May 1941, the SCIRE made its third 
attempt against Gibraltar. Again the manned torped oes penetrated the harbor 
but fo und no warships at anchor. Mechanical difficulties prevented the crews 
from achieving any success once in the harbor and all three swim pairs were 
required to scuttl e their torpedoes and escape to Spain. Nevertheless, no 
personnel were lost and the Italians viewed this experience as "realistic" 
training for the divers. Over the next three years, however, the Italians 
conducted seven operations against Gibraltar with a high degree of success: 
At the cost of three men killed and three captured, Italian naval assault 
units sank or damaged fourteen Allied ships of a total tonnage of 73,000. 
The constant threat of silent attack in the night demanded tens of 
thousands of hours of vigilance by Naval and Anny personneLL2 
LO Emilio Bianchi, letter to CDR William H. McRaven of 22 May 1993, translated 
by LCDR Paolo Gianelti. 
II Spartacu Shergal was apparently unaware thai the British had gathered 
extensive infonnation on the capabilities of the manned torpedoes. During the 
interview he stated that one of the reasons the attack on Alexandria was so "easy" was 
that the British had no idea the Italians had such a weapon. The British, in fact, k new 
quiet a bit about the Italian "pigs." 
12. Frank Goldsworthy in the Sunday Express 25 1)ecember 1949 quoted in Valerio 
Borghese, Sea Devils Chicago 1954. 
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Later that summer in July 1941, the Italians had their grf':atest setback • 
since forming the First Light Aotilla. The operation was against the British 
FJeet at Malta. The plan called for a combined force of two manned torpedoes 
and nine Explosive Boats (E-Boats). One manned torpedo, piloted by 
Lieutenant Teseo Tesei, was to destroy the steel net barriers that hung pelow 
the Sant'Elmo bridge and protected the entrance to the harbor. Once the 
barrier was destroyed the E-Roats, which had been transported to the target 
area aboard the Italian destroyer DIANA, would speed into the harbor and 
attack the fleel The other manned torpedo was assigned to attack nested 
British submarines in an adjacent harbor. All of these attacks would be 
proceeded by air raids designed to divert British attention. 
At the scheduled time the manned torpedoes and E-Boats werf': launched • 
from their respective platfonns. Unfortunately for the Italians, the British radar 
operators spotted the unidentified launch craft and tracked the E-Roats from 
the beginning of their mission. The British alerted their four main batteries 
guarding the harbor. At 0430 Tesei reached the net barrier and remained with 
his torpedo while he detonated the warhead. A letter found after the operation 
revealed that he committed suicide, in his words: 
[to 1 attain the highest of all honors - that of giving my life for my King 
and my flag. This is the supreme desire of a soldier, the most sublime 
joy he can experience .. ,u 
13 William G. Schofield and P.J. Carisella, Frogmen: First Rattles (Boston: 
Branden Publishing Company, 1987), 97. 
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The E-Boats began their assault only to be caught in British crossfire from the 
defensive batteries. All nine E-Boats were destroyed. As the launch platforms 
attempted to escape they were attacked by British air and destroyed. The 
remaining manned torpedo had mechanical difficulties and the crew was later 
captured. By the end of the Malta operation 15 Italians wen! killed 18 captured 
and all the manned torpedoes, E-BoaL<; and support platforms had been 
destroyed. 
The Malta operation was destined to fail from the beginning; the plan was 
too complicated, intelligenct! was inadequate, the rehearsals were only partially 
successfuJ and the execution phase lacked surprise and spet!d. Borghese, who 
was not directly involved in the operation, identified these problems early in 
the preparation p hase. He commented that the combined operation had 
assumed ~a nl:!W, more extl:!nded and complex aspecl .. the idea of employing .•. 
weapons so different in nature [tolJ)I:!does and E-Boats] ... was an extremely 
hazardous one. na Additionally, the intel1igence was "very sketchy •.. it was 
incredible but true [the Italians] had no agent at Malta who could furnish .•• 
intenigence.~L5 The rehearsals for the mission, which were executed near 
Malta over a seven day period, resulted in several damaged and sunken b 
Boats. Following these rehearsals Vittorio Moccagatta the commander of the 
,. Ibid., 101, 102. 
15 Ibid., Borghese, 98. 
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10th Light Flotilla wrote in his diary, "I was never a believer in bad luck but • 
now 1 had 99 reasons out of a 100 for believing in it."16 To make matters 
worse, during the execution phase, the "diversionary" air raid had inadvertently 
alerted the British which subsequently led to the detection of the approaching 
E-Boats. Nevertheless, the Italians continued to aggressively pursue the ~ritish 
and finally achieved their first success in Gibraltar on 21 September 1941. 
Launching from the submarine SCIRE three manned torpedoes entered 
Gibraltar and sank three vessels; the naval tanker DENBY DALE (15,893 tons), 
the British motorship DURHAM (10,900 tons) and the British tanker FIONA 
SHELL (2444 tons). The crews scuttled their torpedoes and diving rigs and 
swam to Spain where they met Italian agent'> and were returned to La Spezia. 
This success marked the culmination of intensive modifications to the manned • 
torpedoes which now constituted "an absolutely efficient and trustworthy 
weapon, capable of achieving the most brilliant success in war."I' Three 
months later the opportunity to achieve that "brilliant success" presented itself 
at Alexandria. The men who volunteered for Alexandria did so with the 
understanding that their success could change the balance of naval power in 
the Mediterranean. Alexandria,. however, was unlike Gibraltar. There was no 
16 Ibid., 100. 
17 Ibid., 129. Statement of Lieutenant Berotzzi as~igned to the Underwater 
Weapons Board at La Spezia who was instrumental in designing and modifying the 
manned torpedoes. 
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place to find refuge and volunteering meant agreeing to a one-way trip with 
the best results ending in imprisonment. 
D. PREUMINARY EVENTS 
Since the beginning of the war the Italians had placed considerable effort 
into sinking the firitish Fleet at Alexandria. Italian bombers made rolltin~ runs 
against the port facility, but with no success. The heavy British air defense and 
the long flight time from Italy made this a dangerous and expensive 
proposition for the Italian Air Force. With the formation of the First Light 
flotilla the Navy took the lead in attempting to destroy the British Fleet.. 
however, after the disaster with the IRIDE in August 1940 it was over a year 
before a another mission was attempted. The Italians literally went "b ack to 
the drawing board" and modified the transport submarines and manned 
torpedoes - to minimize their detectability and improve their range and 
reliability. 
In the {aU of 1941 the Tenth Light Flotilla asked for volunteers for a "one 
way nUssiOn."l~ A dozen men volunteered but those who were eventually 
chosen included; Durand de la Penne and Bianchi, Captain Antonio Marceglia 
and his diver Petty Officer Spartaco Schergat and Captain Vincenzo Martellotta 
and his Petty Officer diver Mario Marino. There were also two spare crews in 
the event one of the primary divers became ill or was injured in training. Most 
I S Ibid., Schergat. 
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of the men had been members of the Tenth for some time, but Spartaco • 
Schergat who was working at the Italian Naval Academy when he volunteered 
had no previous combat experience or training with the torpedoes.n 
Over the next several 
months the mission was 
planned out in detail 
and the training of the 
crews continued 
unabated week after 
week. Commander 
Borghese was assigned 
to lead the operation 
and later remembered 
how they approached 
the planning and 
training: 
Submarine Museum) 
19 By the time the Alexandria operation began, Schergat had been part of the 
reserve crew on one previous mission to Gibraltar, but the primary crews launched 






This kind of operation, if it were to have any decent chance of success, 
had to be thought out to the last detail; the whole of an extensive 
organization had to be got ready; there were a thousand details to be 
studied and put into p ractice: from the collection of hydrographic and 
meteorological data to intelligence as to enemy vigilance; from the taking 
of aerial photographs of the harbour, to the ilITangement of safe and 
extremely rapid channels of radio liaison with the submarine, so that the 
latter could be informed, immediatdy before the operators were dropped 
as to the number and disposition of units on the night of the operatio n; 
from the determination of suitable ciphers to getting materials ready for 
action; from composition of the series or operational orders to the training 
of operators so as to bring them to the maximum of physical efficiency by 
the pre-arranged day; from the study of navigation and the best routes o f 
approaches for the submarine and those for the forcing of the harbour by 
the pilots, to research on new devices for causing the enemy maximum 
damage should the occasion arise;. .. nothing was to be left to cI"Ulce~ all 
impulsiveness was to be lu!ld in check; OIl the COIItrary~ everyt/ti1rg was to 
be cooUy aiiadaWl arul every l«/mical and ingenious resmnr:.e was to be 
exploitd to tlu! fvIlest extent possible. 20 
While agents in Alexandria fed the Italian Navy information about the 
harbor patrols, reaction forces and net defenses; aerial photos showed the 
physical layout of the port includ ing the locations of piers, pilings, mooring 
buoys, and gun emplacements. From this collection of intelligence the Tenth 
light Aotilla was able to reconstruct the exact route and distances that would 
be travelled by the manned torpedoes. Exercises were conducted in the La 
Spezia operating area that duplicated the mission profile. Schergat recalled 
later: 
20 Ibid., Borghese, 135. (Emphasis added) 
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We did some very specific training for the mission in Alexandria. One • 
day Commander Borghese ordered an exercise. We left the port and 
traveled many miles in a profile that resembled Alexandria. We sailed to 
La Spezia. [The manned torpedoes] entered port and attacked the ship at 
anchor. At the time we didn't know the reason for that particular training 
- Borghese told us about that later.l 1 
As the training continued and the intelligence picture became dear a plan 
was finali zed and forwarded to the Supermarina in Rome. The SCIRE cafrying 
three manned torpedoes would leave La. Spezia and sail to the island of Leros. 
The five crews and technicians would be flown to Leros and link up with the 
submarine. This allowed the crews some additional time to plan and conduct 
physical training. The SCIRE would depart: Leros and sail directly to 
Alexandria arriving at a point approximately 1000 meters from the northem 
battery. The lWian Air Force would conduct a diversionary bombing raid both 
• the night before and the night of the mission. Once on station the SCIRE would receive final intelligence on the position of the British ships in port. 
This information would be passed to the torpedo crews just prior to launch. 
Upon launch the three manned torpedoes would proceed to their assigned 
targets, place their ordnance, scutUe their torpedoes and diving equipment and 
swim to shore. Once ashore the crews would attempt to find a small boat and 
sail ten miles out to sea to rendezvous with the submarine ZAFFRO. This 
escape and evasion plan was quite weak and Bianchi later said, "We knew that 
21 Ibid., Schergat. 
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even in the best case there was no chance to avoid capture. There was an 
escape plan. but it was just for psychological comfort."1.2 
The Supennarina approved the plan and after two more months of 
mission specific training the manned torpedo crews of the Tenth Light Flotilla 
were prepared to attack Alexan dria Harbor. De 1a Penoe and his mefl: were 
anxious to begin the operation. He later recalled: 
We knew it was to be a dangerous mission because this was the third 
attempt for a submarine to go into Alexandria. But, we felt,. the third time 
never failsP 
Eo THE ATIACK ON ALEXANDRIA 
On 3 December 1941, the SCIRE departed La Spezia on a "routine" p atrol; 
hee oblong chambers were empty. Soon after leaving port the sun set and the 
SCIRE came to all stop approximately three miles out from the harbor. A small 
vessel CaJJre along side and transferred three manned torpedoes, hull numbers 
221,222, and 223. The torpedoes had just been refurbished at San Bartolomeo 
and were in exceUent condition. The torpedo crews eased the submersibles 
into their chambers and gave them one final inspection. That evening after all 
the equipment was checked and double checked the torpedo crews left the 
SCIRE and returned to port aboard the small vessel which had brought them 
22 Ibid., Bianchi. 
23 tuigi Durand de la Penne, tapped interviewed by P. J. Carisella, in Frogman's 
First Battles (Boston: Branden Publishing Company, 1987), April 1975, 179. 
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out. They would rendezvous with the submarine in six days on the island of • 
Leros. 
The SCIRE began the initial leg of her transit by hugging the coast line 
to avoid the Italian minefields and then proceeded around Sicily and into the 
open sea. As scheduled, six daYs later, after only a single enemy enco,unter, 
SCIRE reached teros and entered Port Lago. Although Lago was under Axis 
control, Borghese took every precaution to maintain secrecy. A cover story was 
circulated implying that the SCIRE was a submarine from another command 
damaged while on patrol and in need of repair. Huge tarpaulins were placed 
over the transport chambers ostensibly to protect ship repair personnel from 
the weather. Additionally, "technicians~ arrived from La Spezia to help with 
repairs. These were, in fact engineers from La Spezia who conducted the final • 
inspection on the torpedoes. 
On 10 December, the five crews left Italy. They had been on pre-mission 
leave and Bianchi recalled later, ~When we left Italy my thoughts at first went 
to my family, but then those thoughts vanished, because we had many things 
to do. ~24 They arrived at Port Lago and were placed aboard the transport 
vessel ASMARA. De la Penne and his men spent the next three days making 
final preparations and reviewing the intelligence that came in daily from agents 
in Alexandria and from Italian aerial reconnaissance. The Commander of the 




Tenth Light Aotilla, Commander Ernesto Forza, had been sent to Athens to 
coordinare intelligence, overhead photography, provide weather reports and 
maintain radio contact with the SCIRE throughout the operation. On the 13th 
Admiral Biancheri, Commander-in-Chief of the Agean Naval Sector arrived in 
Leras and wanted Borghese to conduct one final rehearsal prior to getting 
underway for Alexandria: Borghese refused, citing his orders which gave him 
fuIl authori ty to conduct the operation as he saw fiL The Admiral was 
"disappointed," and chastised Borghese for not wanting to train until the last 
possible m inute. 
On 14 December, the SCIKE departed Leros and proceeded on course 
towards Alexandria. Borghese, remembering the plight of the lRIDE and 
GON DAR remained submerged almost the entire transit, surfacing only at 
night in order to recharge batteries. The final aerial reconnaissance flight was 
conducted on the 18th and the intelligence was forwarded via coded message 
to Borghese. The SCIKE had stayed in constant contact with Forsa who was in 
KomI:! and then Athens, coordinating aerial overflights and providing updated 
intelligence. Schergat remembered, ~Commander Forsa rad ioed us before 
entering port (at Alexandria]. lIe told us how many ships were in port and 
which onl:!s we were supposed to attack."25 The message also congratulated 
25 Ibid., Schergat. 
139 
Petty Officer Bianchi, who was a new father! Everyone agreed that this was a 
good sign. 
Later that evening as the SCIRE approached the designated manned 
torpedo launch point Borghese ordered "all quiet" and brought the submarine 
to 60 feet. At this depth he would hopefully avoid the moored minefiel~s. At 
1840 the SCIRE arrived at its launch point, approximately 1.3 miles by 356 
degrees from the Ras el Tin Lighthouse on the northern end of the harbor. 
Borghese surfaced to "outcrop level" (transport chambers submerged) came out 
of the conning tower and surveyed his surroundings.26 Borghese reported: 
• 
The weather was perfect.: it was pitch-dark; the sea very smooth and the 
sky unclouded. Alexandria was right ahead of me,· very close. I 
identified some of its characteristic buildings and determined my 
position; to my great satisfaction I found that we were within a meter of 
the pre-arranged point. 27 • 
Navigating from Leros was no easy feat. The SCIRE had travelled over 
1700 miles through enemy patrolled waters; she had encountered a severe storm 
on the 16th that forced her to stay submerged well beyond the normal limits 
of the crew; and with constant enemy air and sea patrols the navigator had few 
opportunities to get a day time fix. But through all this, including the final 16 
26 Most reports indicate that the Scire had planned to come to ~outcrop" level. In 
the interview with Schergat, however, he implied that Borghese had to bring the 
conning tower above the surface because the hatch, which was normally used by the 
divers to reach the manned torpedoes, was broken and consequently Borghese no 
choice but to partially surface. 
27 Ibid., Borghese, 144. 
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hours completely submerged, Borghese brought the submarine to within one 
meter of the launch point. 
Sagona. 
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At approximately 2100, the resewe crews went on deck (which was fully 
submerged). Equipped in full dive gear, it was their task to open the cylinder 
doors. This was a physically exhausting job and would have reduced the 
efficiency of the operational crews had they been required to undertake this 
endeavor. Once the chamber doors were open the operational crews, wh", were 
fully suited up, arrived to take command of their torpedoes. One by one the 
manned torpedoes eased away from the SCIRE and headed slowly toward the 
entrance of the harbor. The launch went exceedingly smooth, Bianchi recalled, 
"I felt a sense of satisfaction, because everything was going so well. It seemed 
like an exercise."28 Borghese monitored their departure on the submarines 
hydrophones and when he concluded they were safely on their way, he 
submerged. 
An interesting side note. During the launch process one of the resewe 
crewmen (also the diving medical officer) drowned when he overexerted 
himself opening the chamber doors. This was not noticed for several minutes 
and when the doctor was brought aboard there was no sign of life. Borghese 
injected a phial of stimulant into the doctors chest and then began artificial 
respiration. At the same time he issued orders for the SCIRE to depart the 
immediate vicinity on a reciprocal course. Unfortunately, the doctor had left 
the chamber door ajar and the submarine was taking on water making it 






difficult to maintain trim. As soon as the submarines was out of range of the 
lighthouse, Borghese surfaced and dosed the chamber door. Miraculously, 
after three and a half hours the doctor began to breath again. By the time the 
SCIRE arrived back in Leros the doctor was out of medical danger. Several 
days later the SCIRE returned to La Spezia after covering 3500 miles in 27, d ays. 
The three manned torpedoes departed the submarine and proceeded 
together on the surface toward the anti-submarine gate at the southend of the 
harbor. They had travelled approximately two miles when lJe la Penne ordered 
the torpedoes to stop. Barely 500 yards from the Ras el Tin Lighthouse, the 
frogmen decided to take a break. The men broke out their rations and De la 
Penne passed out small bottles of cognac. "Things [had] been going to easy/ 
he later reported so he decided to "relax a bit before going in."Z9 After 
finishing the meal they continued on to the harbor's entrance. An 
antisubmarine net was strung across the gap and could only be opened by 
operators on the quaywall. 
The divers trimmed the torpedoes so that only their heads were e xposed 
above the surface. As they approached the entrance De la Penne reported: 
We saw some people at the end of the pier and heard them talking; one 
of them was walking about with a lighted oil-lamp. We also saw a large 
motorboat cruising in silence off the pier and dropping depth charges. 
These charges were a nuisance to us. lO 
29 Ibid., Carisella, 127. 
JO Ibid., I Mezzi D' Assalto 118. 
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Although the divers were prepared to cut the nets or if necessary attempt to 
~climb~ over them this was a risky proposition in light of the guards patrolling 
the quaywall. As good fortune would have it the gate opened up to allow three 
British destroyers to proceed through. Schergat remembered the incident well: 
We noticed the entrance lights were on, but we couldn't see the destroyers 
because we were just at surface level. As we approached the entrance the 
water became rough and we knew ships were entering. They created a 
wave which pushed us apart ... we got separated and each man [manned 
torpedo crew] went towaro his destination.l1 
De la Penne and Bianchi cruised into the harbor their heads barely visible. 
As they maneuvered toward their target. the VALIANT, De la Penne passed 
two anchored destroyen; and the French battleship LORRAINE. Realizing that 
a larger target lay ahead, he continued onward unslowed by the prospect of a 
• 
certain success. At approximately 0219 De la renne reached the antitorpedo net • 
surrounding the VALIANT. Bianchi stated later. 
It was not difficu1t to distinguish the huge shape of the VALIANT. As 
we arrived at 50 meters from the ship we found as expected an 
obstruction net. I saw that we could physically pass between the two 
buoys supporting the net. But because we were so close to the ship I 
suggested to De la Penne that we pass under the net. He decided to check 
it out and left the pig and dove down. He came back and said we would 
pass over the buoys. I didn't agree, but he said he was tired and his dry 
suit was leaking.32 
11 Ibid., Schergat. 
32 Ibid., Bianchi. Passing under the antitorpedo net would have required cutting 





De la Penne's dry suit had been leaking since departing the SCIRE and the 
cold w ater was beginning to sap his strength, so instead of taking time to 
submerge and cut the net De la Penne elected to go over the top.ll Once 
inside the nl't hl' was 50 meters from the VALIANT. He drove the torpl'do 
slowly into the side of the ship bumping his way down to the keeL For some 
unexplained reason the torpl'du took on water and began to sink quickly. Dc 
., ' The BeHoni suit was made of light rubber and according La Schergat freq uently 
broke at the wrists and neck. He confirmed that this is what happened to D e la 
Penne's dry suiL 
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la Penne and Bianchi rode the torpedo to the bottom of the harbor, 17 meters • 
below the surface. The two divers, realizing that they were not directly under 
the VALIANT, struggled to move the torpedo toward the British battleship. 
The effort was exhausting and Bianchi began to feel faint 
I was going to go up to the surface, get some fresh air and return ~nd 
continue my work. At that moment I don't remember what happened. 
When I regained consciousness I was floating near the ship and 
illuminated. I thought my surfacing had caused a lot of noise, so I took 
off my aqualung [which didn't work) and sunk it Then I headed for a 
nearby buoy.)t 
Moments later, De la renne realized that Bianchi was not with the torpedo. 
Leaving the submersible, De ta Penne surfaced to find his second diver. After 
a brief look around, with no success, De la Penne returned to the torpedo. 
Grabbing the bow of the torpedo, De la Penne began dragging it • 
underneath the battleship: 
Speed was essential, because I was so weak and not able to last much 
longer ... the pig is moving a few centimeters; I cannot distinguish the 
compass due to the mud clouds that I raised while working. My mask is 
dim and I cannot see anything anymore ••. During the operation I flood the 
mask. I try to eliminate the water from inside but it is impossible. I 
must drink it . .At that moment it seems that I cannot continue working 
because of the extreme fatigue and for the breathlessness. I go to the 
surface. The target nearness gave me strength; I am not worned about the 
bomb, but only for the thought of not being able to reach the hull.3S 
34 Ibid., Bianchi. 




For the next 40 minutes De la Penne pulled the torpedo inch by inch until he 
had positioned it direct1y under the keel, in the middle of the ship. He was 
now completely exhausted. He set the timers on the charge and swam to the 
surface. Almost immediately he was spotted by pier security and fired upon 
with an automatic weapon. The sentry directed him back to the VAL.IANT 
where he climbed out of the water onto the mooring buoy only to fi nd Bianchi 
hidi ng in the shadows. Bianchi had fainted and the buoyancy in his dry suit 
had propelled him to the surface. Once on the surface he regai ned 
consciousness and hid on the buoy so as not to alert the British. At 0330 a 
motorboat picked up the two Italians from the buoy and a guard escorted them 
to the VALIANT. They were briefly interrogated aboard the ship and then 
taken to the base security hut near the Ras el Tin lighthouse. The officer in 
charge of the interrogation reported the following actions: 
Early that same morning (18 December) I was sleeping peacefully in a 
pension in Alexandria when the telephone rang and J was summoned 
immediately to Ras el Tin; a cae was on its way to fetch me. Two Italian 
frogmen had been caught sitting on the bow buoy of the VALIANT and 
had been sent across from the other side of the harbour for interrogation 
by RAL's interpreter. What questions were to be asked? An attack by 
saboteurs had been expected for some time, and the harbour entrance was 
protected by heavy nets and explosive charges. We wanted to know 
(1) Had they completed their missions? 
(2) Were they alone? 
(3) How did they get into the harbour? 
They strenuously denied the first two questions and said they had got into 
di fficulties outside the harbour and had to abandon their equipment and swim 
ashore. Of course we did not believe them and J rang the battleships and 
suggested they should drag chain bottom lines to try and dislodge any limpets. 
They were already doing this and C in C (Commander in Chief Alexandria) 
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ordered them (De la Penne and Bianchi) to be returned to VALIANT where • 
they were put below on the lowest deck in the fore part of the ship.JIi 
Aboard the VALIANT their British escorts "behaved very nkely" and gave 
them rum and cigarettes. It was only then, when De la Penne spotted the ships 
name embroidered on the escorts shirt that he knew he was aboard the 
VAUANT. At 0550, with ten minutes remaining until the charg~ was 
scheduled to explode, De la Penne asked to see the Captain. "I told him that 
in a few minutes his ship would blow up, that there was nothing he could do 
about it and that,. if he wished, he could still get his crew into a place of 
safety.Ml? The Captain demanded to know where the bomb was located. 
When De la Penne refused to answer he was placed, once agciin, in the fonvard 
hold, this time without Bianchi and without escorts. 
At approximately 0600 the charge beneath the VALIANT detonated lifting 
the battleship out of the water and severely damaging the port side. The ship 
immediately settled on the bottom and began to list to port. All the electricity 
went out and the room De la Penne was in began to fill with smoke. After 
several attempts he final forced his way out a hatch and climbed up to the 
main deck. After a few minutes, he found the Captain and demanded to know 
the whereabouts of Bianchi. Moments later the charge beneath the QUEEN 
~. Report on the events of 18 December 1941 by the HMS ~ Anti-Submarine 
Officer 14th Destroyer Aotilla, p. 33. 





ELIZABETH exploded sending oil and debris skyward soaking all those on the 
deck of the VALIANT. De la Penne was sent b ack to the hold, but afte r thirty 
minutes he was escorted up to the Officer's Mess where he found Bianchi. The 
two were held in the Mess for a short while then transferred by motorboat 
back to the security hut at Ras el Tin Lighthouse-. lly that evening they were 
both in a POW camp in Alexandria . 
The second crew consisted of Engineer Captain Antonio Marceglia and 
Seaman Spartaco Schergat whose target was initially the HMS EAGLE. After 
losing sight of De la renne at the harbor's entrance the second crew came 
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under attacks by "precautionary depth charges" which were being dropped ZOO • 
to 500 yards away. The explosive force caused strong contractions in the divers 
legs and felt "as though (the manned torpedoes) had crashed against some 
metallic obstacle."3/! It bothered the two divers, "but not too much.")'! 
Nevertheless the second crew followed the British ships on through the 
entrance only to have three other destroyers almost run them over half an hour 
later. After evading the ships, Marceglia returned to his preplanned course and 
proceeded onward. During the planning phase Marceglia had decided to plot 
a course which would parallel the shore allowing the background lights to 
silhouette the vessels at anchor. 
The EAGI.E was a large target and within minutes the second crew 
spotted what they thought was their objective. They did not know until later • 
that the ship was in fact the QUEEN ELIZABETH. They closed rapidly and 
had no problem negotiating the antitorpedo net. At approximately 0230 they 
were within striking distance of the largest batUeship in the British Fleet. 
Schergat recalled later: 
We entered the anti torpedo net which was approximately 50 or 60 meters 
from the QUEEN ELIZABETH. Marceglia took the "pig" in at 90 degrees 
perpendicular to the ship. We dropped to five or six meters going 
forward and we hit the hull. This was quiet a difficult phase. We tried 
to hit the ammunition deposits, but we ended up under the engines.COl 
J3 Ibid., Borghese, 152. Post Operation Report of Marceglia. 






Once securely underneath the vessel Marceglia pumped out a small amount of 
ballast water and buoyed up underneath the ship. Schergat w:'t off the torpedo 
and secured a loop-line from the port bilge keel to the starboard bilge keel. 
Marceglia disconnected the warhead from the bow of the torpedo and attached 
it to the line which was hanging four feet below the hull. He set the fu~e and 
the two divers remounted the torpedo, ballasted to neutral and returned to the 
surface. The time was 0315. 
As the torpedo surfaced, a roving patrol spotted the exhaust b ubbles and 
shined a light on their positio n. The two Italians remained motionless and 
averted their stare to prevent any reflection from the glass in their mask. The 
patrol moved on and the second crew continued its extraction. The escape and 
evasion plan called for the divers to make for shore, destroy their torpedo and 
eqUipment, and attempt to find a boat from which to rendezvous with the 
Italian submarine ZAFFRO. Marceglia and Schergat executed their extraction 
according to the p lan, reaching shore by 0430. Unfortunately while posing as 
""rench sailors they were picked up and eventually captured by the Briti sh. It 
was only then that the two dlvers realized that the ship they had sunk was the 
QUEEN ELIZABETH not the aircraft carrier HMS EAGLE as they had 
originally thought In his post operation report submitted upon release from 
prison, Marceglia reported: 
As you can see, Sir, our performance had nothing heroic about it; its 
success was due solely to the preparations made, the specially favorable 
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conditions under which it took place and above all the determination to 
succeed at all costs." 
The third crew consisted of Gunner Captain Vincenzo Martellotta and 
Seaman Mario Marino. They had been ordered to attack the tanker SAGONA. 
After attaching their demolitions, the crew was to release floating incendiary 
mines which would explode after the SAGONA to light the oil on fire. It was 
hoped the fire would spread throughout the harbor and destroy several other 
ships. In port at the time were 12 loaded tankers with a total weight of 
120,000. Although Martellotta understood the need to destroy the oilers before 
leaving the SCIRE he complained to Borghese about not getting a chance to 
sink a combatant. Borghese subsequently modified the ord.ers to allow 
Martellotta to attack the HMS EAGLE if it was in port. 
Like the other two crews Martellotta and Marino approached the harbor 
entrance while being subjected to constant depth charges. In an effort to lessen 
the pain the two divers "ducked in such a way as to lie low in the water, but 
with heart, lungs and head above the surface."~ As the British destroyers 
entered the harbor their wake threw the tiny submersible against a mooring 
buoy used to secure the antisubmarine net. After pushing off from the buoy 
Martellotta followed the second destroyer through the entrance passing within 
41 Ibid., Borghese, 153. Post Operation Report of Marceglia. 






20 yards of the small guardship which was dropping the depth charges. The 
time was 0030. 
Martellotta and 
Marino were 
inside the harbor and 
began to search for the 
aircraft carner. In the 
course of their search 
the two divers spotted a 
large vessel w hat they 
believed to be a the 
EAGLE. After taking a 
bearing on the center 
stack,. Martellotta dove 
the torpedo and came 
up underneath the 
vessel. It was only then 
that he realized that it 
was not the EAGLE or even a batUeship, but a much smaller cruiser. Adhering 
to his prescribed orders, Martellotta backed off and reluctantly returned to the 
surface. As he broached the surface a sentry on the cruiser flashed his light on 
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the divers position. The two Italians remained motionless for several moments • 
and eventually the sentry returned to his patrol. 
By this time the cold water and the pure oxygen from their diving rigs 
were beginning to have an adverse effect on Martellotta. He began to vomit 
and was unable to keep his mouthpiece securely between his lips. Fortu~ately 
upon surfacing the two divers spotted their assigned target - the SAGONA, a 
16,.000 ton tanker. Unable to submerge because of his illness, Martellotta 
drove the torpedo on the surface positioning it aft of the tanker underneath the 
stern.4l He reported later: 
I went toward the stem of the oil tanker and ordered Marino to go under 
the hull and establish a connection nearest to the bilge keel. He tried at 
first, but (the torpedo] was too lighL I put on more ballast and Marino 
tried again. This time he succeeded .. J told him to take off the head,. start 
the fuse, and bring the charge to the other end of the connection. Marino • 
carried out my orders exactly ... f made SUIe the fuses were started.4f 
At 0255 Marino set the timer for three hours and pulled the fuse. After Marino 
surfaced the two divers remounted the torpedo and proceeded to set the 
incendiary mines around the tanker, this being done they headed toward the 
shore. 
Once the two divers reached the shore they destroyed their diving rigs, set 
the destruction device on the torpedo and entered the city. Unfortunately for 
43 According to Schergat,.. Martellotta was supposed to hit the tanker amidships 
where the oil was held. The resulting explosion would rupture the tanker and then 
the oil could be ignited by incendiary bombs. 





the Italians they were stopped at a control point and arrested by Egyptian 
police. Eventually they were turned over lothe British and spent the rest of 
the war in a POW camp in Cairo. 
By 0600 the charges beneath the targets began to detonate and within a 
few minutes the six Italian divers had sunk two battleships, a tankt;r and 
seriously damaged the destroyer JERVIS, which was alongside the SAGONA. 
T he VALlAN'l ' suffered severe internal d amages and had an 80 foot gash in her 
side. Three boiler compartments aboard the QUEEN ELIZABETH were 
destroyed and her hull tom open. It wa<; severa.1 months before either ship was 
repaired and the extent of damages was such that neither vessel ever 
contributed to the war effort again. On 23 Apri11942 Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill spoke before a secret session of the HOllse of Commons and reported 
the following: 
On the early morning of December 19 half a dozen Italians in unusual 
diving suits were captured floundering about in the harbour of 
Alexandria. Extreme precautions have been taken for some time past 
against the varieties of human torpedo or one-man submarine entering 
our harbours. Not only are nets and other obstructions used but 
underwater charges are exploded at frequent irregular intervals in the 
fairway. None the less these men had penetrated the harbour. Four hours 
later explosion occurred in the bottoms of the VALIANT and the QUEEN 
ELIZABETH produced by limpet bombs fixed with extra ordinary courage 
and ingenuity, the effect of which was to blow large holes in the bottoms 
of both ships and to flood several compartments, thus putting them both 
out of action for many months. One ship will soon be ready again, the 
other is still in the floating dock at Alexandria, a constant target for 
enemy air attack. Thus we no longer have any battle squadron in the 
Mediterranean. BARHAM [is] gone and now VALIANT and QUEEN 
ELIZABETH are completely out of action. Both these ships floated on an 
even keel, they looked all right from the air. The enemy were for some 
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time unaware of the success of their attack, and it is only now that I feel • 
it possible to make this disclosure to the House even in the strictness of 
a Secret Session.-6 
As it turns out the Italians were aware of the damage they had done to the 
British Heet, nevertheless they did not pursue their advantage in the 
Mediterranean. With overwhelming naval power the supply lines to R~mmel 
would have been assured and the "occupation of Egypt would only have been 
a question of time, bringing with it incalculable consequences for the outcome 
of the war.""; Barghese was bitter throughout the war placing the blame for 
"losing this opportunity" squarely at the feet of the German High Command 
who refused to provide fuel to the Italian Navy and "again displayed its 
underestimation of sea power in the general conduct of the war and in 
particular of the importance of the Mediterranean in the general picture of the • 
entire conflict~47 The lost opportunity not withstanding. the attack on the 
British Fleet at Alexandria was strategically the most important and successful 
operation of the war for the Italian Navy. Luigi Durand de la Penne and his 
five teammates received the Italian Gold Medal for gallantry (Medal of Honor 
equivalent), the only time in Italian history all participants of an operation 
were so decorated. 
o Winston Churchill in a secret session of the House of Commons on 23 April 
1942. 
46 Ibid., Borghese, 158 . 






1. Critiq ue 
W ere the objectives warth the risks? Th e IWian Navy although 
beaten badly in the months prior to the attack on Alexandria was in the process 
of commissioning three new battleships, DORIA, VrrTORIO VENETO, and 
UTIORIO. The British had also suffered several naval defeats with the Joss 
of the aircraft carrier ARK ROYAL and battleship BARtlAM in November 1941. 
If the Italians could destroy the remaining two battleships QUEEN 
ELIZABETH and VALIANf, they along with thl! Germans could d ominate th e 
Mediterranean. As it stood, however, even with their numerical superiority, the 
Italian fleet was insuffi cient to challenge the Rritish in the Easlern 
M editerranean. With the British still controlling the vital sea lanes, the Italians 
had to struggle to resupply Rommel's forces in North Africa. By using the 
manned torpedoes to conduct underwater guerrilla warfare, the Italians were 
able to make maximum USf': of their maritime resources. With the destruction 
of two battleships and a destroyer, the Italians had an opportunity to control 
the maritime playing field and propagandize on the "weakness" of the British. 
Unfortunately, they did neither. Nevertheless, considering only six men and 
three torpedoes were used to destroy the targets; the objectives were 
undeniab ly worth the risk. 
Was the pft:m developed tv maximize superiority over the enemy and 
minimize the risk to the assault force? The development of the manned 
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torpedoes was a technological revolution in undenvater warfare. It allowed the 
• Italians to plan around the conventional submarine defenses that protected the 
capital ships and by-pass the picket boats which were specifically designed to 
stop frogmen and divers. Superb operational intelligence allowed the planners 
to tailor the rehearsals for the mission and thereby ensure the manned torpedo 
crews were properly prepared to overcome most of the obstacles. Although the 
plan maximized the possibility that the batt1eships would be destroyed, it did 
not minimize the risk to the divers. Unlike the attacks on Gibraltar, in which 
the divers could hit the target and swim to "neutral" Spain, there was little 
chance the divers would retum from a trip deep in enemy territory. The 
SCIRE, which would have provided the best extraction platform, departed 
immediately after launching the torpedoes. This reduced the submarines • 
vulnerability, but certainly did not help the manned torpedo crews. There was 
an escape and evasion plan, but it was not well thoughout and the divers did 
not truly expect to retum.48 Although this one~way trip may seem 
unacceptable by todays standards, by eliminating the extraction phase, the 
Italians were able to maximize their combat effectiveness, e.g. the torpedo's 
battery power, the air in their Belloni rig. and their physical endurance; all of 
which were instrumental to success. 
43 The divers had been given British pounds to use as currency while in Cairo. 
Unfortunately for the Italians, the Egyptians were still using local currency and as 
soon as the divers attempted to buy something. they were arrested by the police . 
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Was the mission executed according to the plan and if not what 
extenuating circumsw-nce dictated the outcome? With some minor exceptions, 
the plan was executed exactly as rehearsed. Schergat said later, "From my point 
of view, the mission looked just like further training."49 There were, however, 
several problems which arose that typify the frictions of war. De la Pe~e lost 
his second diver, Bianchi, when the petty officer fainted and floawd to the 
surface. Two of the three manned torpedoes took on too much ballast and sank 
to the bottom of the harbor. One of the officer, Martellotta, got violently ill 
and had to direct the actions of his torpedo from the surface. All of tht!se 
incidents are extenuating circumstances, but that is the nature of war. 
Regardless of how well the planning and preparation phases go, the 
environment of ~warn is quantifiably different from the environment of 
preparing for war. But, by being specially trained, equipped and supported for 
a speci fic mission; special forct!s personnel can reduce those frictions to the 
bare minimum and then overcome them with courage, boldness, perseverance 
and intellect ~- the moral factors. 
What modifications could hillie improved the outcome of the mission? 
The success of the mission speaks for itself, however, it is conceivable that had 
a more thorough Escape and Evasion Plan been arranged, two of the crews 
might have escaped. By preposition an agent and small boat ouLside the 
49 Ibid., Scht!rgat. 
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harbor, the evading crews could have quickly linked up and sailed away from • 
the scene before the demolitions exploded. Apparently, this was never 
addressed. The Italians did have an agent positioned inside Cairo who was 
suppose to assist the divers in their escape, but the Italian's, being unfamiliarty 
with the city and unable to speak the language, had little chance of reaching 
this individua1. This part of the plan notwithstanding.. the operation was 
extremely well planned and coordinated and there are very few modifications 
that could have improved the outcome. 
2. Relative Superiority 
Operations that rely entirely on stealth for the successful 
accomplishment of their mission have inherent weaknesses, however, they have 
one overwhelming advantage. As long as the attacking force remains concealed • 
they are not subject to the will of the enemy. Therefore their chance of success 
is immediately better than fifty percent because the inherent superiority of the 
defense, that is actively denying the attack, or as Oausewitz says "parrying the 
blow· of the attacker is lost. r.o The attacking force has the advantage of 
initiative -- choosing when and where he wants to attack, and if planned 
correctly, the force will attack at the weakest point in the defense. 
Consequently if the will of enemy is not a factor, this means that only the 
frictions of war, i.e. chance and uncertainty, will affect the outcome of the 
r.o Ibid., Clausewitz, 357. 
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mission. Clearly the frictions of war can be detrimental to success, b ut through 
g ood preparation and strong moral factors, the frictions can bl! Wmanaged. n The 
inherent problem with special operations, whkh rely entirely on steal th, is 
obvious. Once that concealment is compromised, the mission has li ttle or no 
chance of success. 
THE ITALIAN MANNED TORPEDO ATTACK ON ALEXANDRIA 
RELIJIVE SUPERIORITY GRAPH 
PAOIlABa./TY 
.. 
....... _ """ 
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Figure 3-9. Italian Manned Torpedo Attack Against Alexandria 
Harbor - 19 December 1941. 
Figure 3-9 represents a composite graph of al1 three manned torpedo 
operations. Although there were some differences in the individual profile s, 
basically all three torpedoes reached the critical points at approximately the 
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same orne. At midnight on 19 December 1941, all three torpedoes entered the • 
harbor and -passed by the antisubmarine net. This was the Point of 
Vulnerability, but because the British did not know the torpedoes were in the 
harbor, the Italians began with relative superiority, albeit not very decisive. As 
the manned torpedoes continued into the harbor circumventing the picke~ boats 
and pier security, their Probability of Mission Completion marginally 
improved. Their decisive advantage came when they penetrated the 
anti torpedo nets. After this point;. there were no other defenses that could 
prevent them from successfully fulfilling their mission. However, as the graph 
depicts, there was still an Area of Vulnerability even after overcoming the 
anti torpedo nel Had the Italians been detected, (for instance when Bianchi 
floated to the surface) the British crews could have dropped concussion • 
grenades and possibly stopped the attack. Fortunately for the Italians, they 
were able to set their charges before the British detected them. Three hours 
later the charges exploded and the mission was complete. 
3. The Principles of Special Operations 
This mission had severa] advantages not normally associated 
with a specia.l operation. Although the target was clearly strategic, with the 
balance of the naval forces in the Mediterranean mnging on the mission 
success, the execution was almost an extension of routine training and wartime 
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operations. T he SCIRE under Borghese's command had previously conducted 
three missions which paralleled the attack on Alexandria. De la Penne and 
Bianchi were also veterans of a previous attempt to attack the British at 
Gibraltar. This experience helped mold the approach the Italians took in 
planning and prepilring for Alexandria. 
The lessons of the d isaster at Malta convinced Horghese, who 
was the overall mission commander, not to create a "complex" plan of 
operation.5 1 Barghest! limited the objectives by reducing the forces assigned 
to attack Alexandria. He could just as easily have incorporated another three 
manned torpedoes and several E-Boats to "overload" British defenses and 
ensure the Italians of some success. Additionally, although each manned 
torpedo had only one warhead, it was possible, and often rehearsed, for each 
crew to hit multiple target placing the smaller limpet mi nes on as man y slUps 
as feasible. Borghese chose to avoid both Ihese pitfalls and limit each manned 
lorpedo to one target and one target only with "all other targets consisting of 
a ctive war units to be ignored."52 Although not involved in the p lanning, 
Bianchi recognized the need to limit the number of targets. He said later, "In 
limiting the attack to one objective [per crew] the commander considered 
Sl Borghese was critical of the Malta plan before its execution. He cited the 
"extended and complex" nature of the operation as a major reason for its failure. 
Using n ine E-Boats and six support craft in conjunction with manned torpedoes was 
a recipe for disaster. 
52 Ibid., Borghese, 154. 
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having the offensive power increased. ~53 Even attacking one target became 
• difficult. In each of the three cases the frogmen were able to execute their 
assigned tasks, but only after overcoming significant physical problems 
(vomiting. unconsciousness, headaches) and equipment failures (dry suit leak. . , 
flooded torpedoes). Had the mission called for more than one target per dive 
pair it is unlikely the divers would have had the physical or technical resources 
to complete it. Also, for multiple targets the fuses on the charges would have 
been set for more time -- to allow the divers time to attack their other targets 
and escape. Arguably this may have allowed the British to find the charges or 
move the vessels from their anchorage (in De la Penne's case moving the vessel 
would have prevented any damage to the VALIANT.) In either case, limiting 
the objectives dearly simplified the plan and allowed maximum effort to be • 
applied against the primary targets. 
Borghese knew the value of accurate intelligence and he 
consistently used it throughout the operation to reduce the unknown variables 
and improve the diver's chance of success. Knowing the physical limitations 
of divers exposed to cold water, Borghese insisted on getting his submarine as 
close to the harbor entrance as possible. IWian agents in Alexandria provided 
the 10th Light Flotilla with a clear picture of the British defenses and in 
particular the minefields off the coast. Borghese wrote later. 




I had therefore decided that as soon as we reached a depth of 400 meters 
(which would probably be where the minefield started), we would 
proceed a~ a depth of not less than 60 meters, since T assumed that the 
mines, even if they were anti-submarine, would be located at a higher 
level.54 
This infonnation eventually allowed the SCIRE to maneuver to a point only 1.3 
miles from the entrance of the harbor. So dose, in fact, that after launchi.r.g the 
torpedoes, De la Penne stopped his assault crews for a sip of cognac and a tin 
of food. 
The torped o crews wen~ also provid ed the latest human 
intelligence and aerial reconnaissance photos to allow them to plot courses and 
find the simplest approach to the target. Bocghcse noted during the 
prep.ration phase that the divers desks: 
... w ere covered with aerial photographs and m aps, •.• daily examined under 
a magnifyi ng glass and annotated from the latest intelligence and air 
reconnaissance reports; those harbours, with their m oles, obstacles, 
wharfs, ..docks, mooring places and defences, were no mysteries to the 
pilots, who perfectly knew thei r configuration, orientation and depths, so 
that they, astride the ' pig', could make their way about them at night just 
as easily as a man in his own room.55 
The accurate intelligence had simplified the problem of negotiating minefields 
and navigating in an enemy harbor. Alexandria harbor was 3500 miles from 
Italy. It was ringed with antiaircraft guns and s upported by Spitfires from the 
Royal Air Force. It seemed impenetrable (rom the air. On the uther hand, the 
so Ibid., I Mezzi D' Assaltu 117. rost Operation Report of Commander Borghese. 
5S Ibid., Borghese, 53. 
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Italian Navy, who had almost no presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, posed • 
no significant threat to the over ZOO vessels (merchant and warships) that tied 
up in Alexandria. The only major fear the British had were from submarines 
and saboteurs, and extensive precautions were taken to overcome both these 
possibilities. Until the establishment of the 10th Light Flotilla an,d the 
subsequent innovations that followed i.e. the manned torpedoes, diving rigs, 
limpet mines, Belloni dry suits and submarine transport chambers, the 
difficulty of penetrating the static defenses of Alexandria were not worth the 
risk in human lives or equipmenl5~ These innovations allowed the Italians 
to recon!>ider the possibility of a direct assault. 
The most significant tactical innovation was the use of 
"disposable" torpedoes. Having to plan for only a one-way trip meant • 
enhanced time on target for the divers and reduced the threat envelope for the 
submarine SCIRE. Obviously one-way trips have their draw backs to the 
individual operator, but from a mission accomplishment standpoint they 
improve the possibility of success by reducing the ~extraction" variables. 
The technological innovations allowed the divers to completely 
by-pass the British defen!>es. The small visual Signature of the manned torpedo 
provided the Italians a host of tactical advantages. It allowed them to surface 
56 The po!>!>ibility of using a conventional submarine to penetrate the harbor was 
remote, particularly in light of the shallow depth of water inside Alexandria. 
Additionally, once inside the harbor the submarine would have to fire torpedoes to 
attack its target thereby immediately condemning itself to destruction. 
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u nobserved and ride out the depth charges. T hey were able to navigate around 
the harbor undetected by ballasti ng the submersible just under the surface. 
These actions would not have been possible with either a midget-submarine 
or a conventional submarine. The ease of handling the torpedo also allowed 
the crews to "climb over" antitorpedo nelc; and allowed De la Penne to 
physically move his flooded machine to a position under the VALIANT' s keel. 
Innovation simplified the assault plan by eliminating the defensive threats 
posed by the nets and d epth charges and it was without q uestioD the dominant 
factor in the success of the mission. 
b. Security 
The raid on Alexandria again demonstrates how the importance 
of security was not a function of hiding the intent of the mission, but the 
ti ming and the insertion means. By December 1941 Bri tish Intelligence was 
full y aware that the Italians had manned submersibles capable of penetrating 
their harbors. The second Italian attack on Gibraltar had provided the British 
with o ne torpedo and its crew. The attack on Malta had also resulted in the 
capture o f Italian frogmen. And, the sinking of the GONDOR resulted in the 
capture o f Elios Toschi the designer of the original manned torpedo. With all 
this information the Briti sh unquestionably knew the kind of operations they 
could expect from the 10th Light Aotilla. As Winston Churchill later said in 
his speech to the House of Commons, "Extreme precautions had (sic] been 
taken for some time past against the varieties of human torpedo or one-man 
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submarines entering our harbours.~ ;7 Even with all these precautions, • 
however, the Italians still managed to sneak in and destroy the fleet. 
The security employed by the Italians was tight but not 
overbearing. It did not prevent Borghese from asking for volunteers among all 
the members of the 10th Light Flotilla, nor did it prevent the crews. from 
conducting several full mission profiles in and around La Spezia harbor, 
although in both cases it is believed that the actual target was not made known 
to the general participants. 
Horghese was, however, cognizant of the need to conceal the 
timing of the operation. Upon departing La Spezia for the final voyage, he 
ensured that the SCIRE's transport chambers were visibly empty and he did 
not load the manned torpedoes until he was out of sight of the harbor. He • 
took these actions to convince possible onlookers that the SCIRE was out for 
just another routine operation. Horghese kept up pretenses when he arrived in 
Leros. While in port he had the transport chambers covered to reduce 
speculation about the submarines mission, and he refused an Admiral's order 
to conduct another exercise for fear of compromising the impending mission. 
Borghese also understood that all things being equal, operational 
needs were more important than security. Throughout the mission he 
maintained radio contact with Athens and Rome. Although interception of the 
57 Ibid., Churchill's Report to the House of Commons. 
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message traffic could have compromised the mission, Borghese obviously feH 
the need for updated intelligence outweighed that concern. In the end Italian 
secu ri ty was instrumental in preventing the enemy from gaining an "unfair" 
advantage by knowing the timing of the mission. A good special operation 
wilt succeed in spite of the enemy's attempt to fortify his position, p~vided 
securi ty prevents the enemy from knowing when and how the attack is coming. 
In the case of the Italian's attack on Alexandria, security achieved its aims. 
Co Repetition 
The principle of repetition as it applies to the attack on 
Alexandria can be viewed both in the macro and micro sense of the word. The 
manned torpedoes of the 10th Light flotilla had a very limited role; that is to 
conduct attacks on ships in port. Every mission profile was similar: launch 
from the 5ubmarinei transit to the objective; cut through the nets; place the 
charge and wi thdraw. Beca use of this narrowly defined role every training 
exercise added to the b ase of knowledge of the operator regardless of what 
specific mission he would eventually undertake. If one considers that each of 
the six divers had been onboard the 10th Light FJotiUa an average of 18 months 
(De la Penne and Bianchi almost two years) during which time they had been 
diving a minimum of two times a week; then each man had over 150 dives. In 
addition to this fact,. three of the divers (De la Penne, Bianchi, and Marceglia) 
had previo usly conducted wartime ntissions and all of the divers at one time 
or another had been designated reserve crews and undergone a complete 
169 
mission workup. So, in the macro sense the only aspect of the Alexandria 
mission that had not been rehearsed well over 100 times were the exact courses 
to be driven. 
The operational and reserve crews for the Alexandria mission 
were assembled during September 1941 to begin mission specific traini~g. It 
was during this preparation that the crews conducted exact profiles of the 
Alexandria mission. Gorghese reported that this training: 
... became highly intensified, this being the key to secure the greatest 
possible efficiency in the men and materials composing the urut. The 
pilots of the human torpedoes, ... travelled to La Spezia twice a week and 
were there dropped off from a boat or, in all-around tests, from one of the 
transport submarines, and then performed a complete assault exercise. 
naturally at night; this consisted of getting near the harbour, negotiating 
the net-defenses, advancing stealthily within the haroour, approaching the 
• 
target, attacking the hull, applying the warhead -and, finally, • 
withdrawing.!;!! 
Although exact numbers are not available, Spartaco Schergat indicates that a 
total of ten full mission profiles were conducted by all three crews and the 
reserves. Other limited dives concentrated on specific aspects of the mission, 
such as net cutting or charge emplacement. In the end, however, it was 
repetition that provided the divers familiarity with their machine and their 
environment. The training became so routine that Schergat later remarked, 
se Get footnote from Gorghese. 
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~8eing in Alexandria or l.a Spezia was the same. For me it didn' t make any 
difference."s~ 
The raid on Alexandria presents a broader view of the princip le 
of repetition. It shows that repetition must be measured both in terms o f 
experience and mission specific training. Special operations forces t~at are 
m ulti-dimensional will require more rehearsals and consequently more time 
during the preparation phase than a unit whose sole mission encompasses this 
training on a daily basis.oo However, no amount of experience should forego 
the need to conduct a minimum of two full dress rehearsals prior to the 
mission. 
Unlike other special operations, in an underwater attack surprise 
is not only necessary · - it is essential. As illustrated in the Relative Superiority 
Graph, special operations forces that attack underwater have the advantage of 
being relatively superior to the enemy throughout the engagemen t - so long 
as they remain concealed. Owing to their inherent lack of speed and firepower, 
however, once surprise is compromised, underwater attackers have liHle 
59 Jbid., Schergat. 
toO' This statement is not intended to denounce the need for Special Operation's 
Forces that are fle xible enoug h to respond to a variety of threats. It is obvious, 
howeve r, that units will perfonn better when they can focus their efforts on one 
mission area. T he need for repetition in the preparation phase will also be reduced 
if the eve nt is one for which the unit consistently trains. 
171 
opportunity to escape. Although many commanders may find this risk 
• unacceptable, experience shows that these· type of operations are mostly 
successful. During World War II the Italians sank over 260,000 tons of 
shipping and lost only a dozen men, while the British had similar success both 
in the European and Japanese theater.'1 The reason for this paradox is t~at for 
divers or submersibles to remain concealed is relatively easy - up to a certain 
point. Alexandria was a huge harbor with approximately 200 vessels anchored 
out and war time conditions called for all vessels to be at "darken ship." 
Consequently, a small black submersible, even on the surface of the water, 
would have been detected only by chance. However, once the manned 
torpedoes got within close proximity of the target, the chance of detection was 
greatly increased. This is true of all underwater attacks. The fatigue of the • 
divers, the vigilance of the crew, the uncertainty of the situation combine to 
make the actions at the objective exceedingly difficult. This is why relative 
superiority remains only marginal until the Italians actually overcome the final 
obstacle -- the anti torpedo net. Beyond the antitorpedo net the British were 
least prepared to defend themselves and now the Italians had all the 
advantages. 
" The British used both manned torpedoes (chariots) and midget submarines (X-
Craft) with great success against the C..ennan battleship TIRPITZ in Norway and the 






The antisub01arine/antitorpedo defenses at Alexandria also shows 
that, contrary to the accepted definition of ' s u rprise, the enemy is usually 
prepared for an attack.i2 To be effective, special operations forces must either 
attack the enemy when he is off guard or, as in the Italian's case, elude the 
enemy entirely. But, to assume that the enemy is unprepared to coun~r our 
attack is fOOlhardy and might lead to overconfidence on the part of the attacker. 
It is the nature of defensive warfare to be prepared for an attack. 
COJlSe'l uently, if the attacker is compromised, the enemy will be able to react 
r.ilp idly and the attackers only hope for success lies in quickly achieving his 
objective. 
Underwater attacks are rarely characterized by speed. A quick 
review of the Relative Superiority Graph shows that it took the manned 
torpedoes over two hours from the Point of Vulnerability until they reached the 
antitorpedo net. Throughout this timl! thl!y Wl!rl! subjl!ct to the frictions of war 
and by moving slowly and methodically thl!y only incrl!ast!d their Area of 
Vulnerability. However, as long as the wilJ of the enemy is not infri nging on 
the relati1!e superiority of the attacker, then speed is not essential - although 
still desirable. Speed becomes essential when the attacker begins to lose 
relative superiority. Two of the torpedo crews reached their objectives and 
62 Test Pub: Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations Joint Staff, 1990, 
E-5. 
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calmly proceeded to attach the explosives and depart. De la Penne, however, • 
reached his target and immediately began to have difficulties: his torpedo sank 
to the bottom; he lost his second diver; his dry suit filled with cold water, and 
he was fatigued to the point of exhaustion. As he said in his post operation 
report,. at that point -- speed was essential. De la Penne was rapidly losir:tg his 
advantage and knew that if he didn't act quickly "the operation ... would be 
doomed to failure." ' l The closer an attacker gets to the objective the greater 
the risk. Consequently, speed is still important to minimize the attacker's 
vulnerability and improve the Probability of Mission Completion. 
f.~ 
Commander Borghese, who was overall in charge of the attack 
on Alexandria, insured that the puzpose of the mission was well defined and • 
that the divers were personally committed to achieving their Objectives. 
This was a straightforward mission without any complicated 
command and control issues, therefore, defining the goals and objectives - the 
purpose -- was relatively easy. Each manned torpedo had only one warhead 
and consequently, only one target. Therefore it was essential not to waste the 
warhead and the effort on an undesirable objective. Borghese ordered 
Martellotta and Marino to attack the aircraft carrier HMS EAGLE -- if she were 
in port,. and if not, to attack the tanker SAGONA. Once inside the hamor, 




however, the pair accidently attacked a cruiser. Fortunately, before they could 
detach the warhead, they realized it was not their target,. and as Borghese notes, 
"with great reluctance, in obedience to orders received, abandoned the 
attack."M Their orders were clear; they understood the purpose of the mission. 
They were not to waste their effort on a small cruiser, but instead seek out a 
large r target, which they .eventually found and destroyed. The type of men 
w ho volunteered for the 10th Light Flotilla were typical of spedal fo rces 
personnel everywhere. They were a combination of adventurer and p atriot. 
T hey understood the risks involved in penetrating the enemy's harbor and 
fu lly accepted the consequences. They did so out of a love for excitement and 
the understanding that their missions were important to the country. Teso 
Tesei, who, at Malta, detonated his torpedo underneath himself in order to 
achi eve his objective, use to say: 
... whether we sink any ships or not doesn't matter much; what does matter 
is that we should be able to blow up with our craft under the very noses 
of the enemy: we should thus have shown our sons and Italy's future 
generations at the price of what sacrifice we live up to our ideals and how 
success is to be achieved. 65 
Although Tesei, who died three months earlier, did not partici pate in the 
Alexandria attack his ~ inspiration" was apparent in the attitudes of the 
Alexandria crews. All six divers knew they would be either captured or kill ed, 
6-1 Ibid., Borghese, 155. 
65 Ibid., Borghese, 97. (Emphasis added) 
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and yet Borghese says the difficulties and dangers merely wincreased their • 
determination."" This personal commitmentto see the mission completed, at 
any cost, is as Tesei said, how success is achieved. 
• 
66 Ibid., 142. 
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IV. OPERATION CHAlUOT 
THE BRITISH COMMANDO RAID O N ST. NAZAJRE, FRANCE 
27-28 MARCH 1942 
A.. BACKGROUND 
In July 1940 Winston Churchill established the Combined Operations 
Command and appointed Admir.al of the Fleet Lord Roger J.B. Keyes as its first 
commander. The organization was tasked with planning and conducting raids 
against the Germans. Lord Keyes was given command of the Special Service 
Brigades and parachute troops along with the landing craft to transport them. 
It was his responsibility to organize and train this new amphibious strike force 
called Commandos. 1 
One year later after only limited success, Keyes was replaced b y Lord 
Louis Mountbatten. In the months immediately following Mountbatten ' s 
appoinbnent the commandos of Combined Operations conducted several major 
raids, most notably harassing attacks against the Germans at Lofoten Island and 
Vaagso i n Norway. 
The planners at Combined Operations had looked at the French port 
faci lity of st. Nazaire several times. Nestled six miles up the River Loire on 
the Atlantic coast it contained the largest dry dock on the Atlantic as well as 
I Lord Roger J.B. Keyes, Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations (New 
York: Macmillan Company, 1943), 10. 
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fourteen submarine pens. The initial studies discounted the port as a viable • 
target because, 
The difficulties they thought were insurmountable. The shoal waters in 
the approaches were unnavigable, the ships would be unlikely to survive 
the long sea passage (250 miles from Falmouth England) without 
detection, and the raiding force would have to be impossibly large, 
perhaps 300 men, to destroy the targets envisioned? 
As the war continued several events began to alter the decision to attack 
Sl Nazaire. The raids conducted by the British from 1941 to early 1942 had 
met with only limited success and had failed to significantly impact the 
German war effort in the Atlantic. In May of 1941 the British sunk the Gennan 
battleship BISMARCK, but by early 1942 Hitler had completed construction of 
her sister ship the TIRPITZ and sailed her to safe harbor in Kaafjord, Norway. 
The Germans planned to use the 45,500 ton TIRPITZ in conjunction with • 
the battle cruise rs SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU, the cruiser PRI NZ 
EUGEN and the pocket battleships SCHEER and LUTZOW to attack and 
destroy the British Merchant Navy in the North Sea. The TIRPITZ became the 
focus of the Royal Navy's attention and the primary reason for the raid on St. 
Nazaire. In 1942 Winston Churchill wrote: 
The whole strategy of the war turns at this period to this ship, which is 
holding four times the number of British capital ships paralysed, to say 
~ David Mason, The Raid on St. Nazaire (New York: Ballantine Books Inc., 1970), 
10. 
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nothing of the two new American battleships retained in the Atlantic. I 
regard the matter as of the highest urgency and importance.3 
In the safety of the fjords the TTRPITZ could strike at "will against both 
British and Russian merchants convoys as well as stifle an Allied landing in 
Norway. The Admiralty made every effort to lure the TlRI'ITZ fro m her lai r 
in attempts to destroy the giant battleship. 
As these efforts failed, concern grew stronger that Ute TlRPITZ might 
break out into the Atlantic through the straits of Dover or around Scotland. 
Once in the Atlantic the TIRPITZ with the sup port of the German Navy and 
the dominance of Hitler's U-Boats could wreak havoc on the Royal Heet. The 
long-tenn success of this endeavor, however, rested in the capability of the 
TIRPITZ to receive proper maintenance and repair. Already the battleship was 
suffering from lack of proper maintenance including defects in her ~gun 
mountings. and fire control systems, boilers and main turbines, and various 
electrical insta1lation" all requiring maintenance if she were to remain b attle 
worthy. 4 The British knew there was only one port in the Atlantic that could 
provide these necessary services - the French port of st. Nazaire. 
J Thomas Gallagher, The X·Craft Raid (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
Inc., 1971), 11. 
4 David Brown, Tirpitz the Floating Fortress (London: Anns and Annour Press, 
1977), 26. 
179 
B. ST. NAZAIREI FRANCE 
St. Nazaire was a French port city of 50,000 situated on the banks of the 
River Loire six miles inland from where the river met the Atlantic. At the 
north end of the port was the Penhouet Basin. The basin which could hold 
ships up to 10,000 tons could be reached through either the Normand,ie dry 
dock or the St. N azaire Hasin. 
The Normandie dry dock, or as the French called it the FROME LOUIS 
JOUBERT, was over 1,100 feet in length and was originally built to house the 
liner NORMANDIE. It was the primary target for the raid force. The two 
caissons (situated on the north and south end) which sealed the dry dock were 
each 167 feet long by 54 feet high and 35 feet thick. Destroying these caissons 
would flood the dry dock from the River Loire and render it unusable. The St. 
Nazaire Basin housed nine completed submarine pens with five under 






t 'igure 4-1. The Port City at ~t. Nazaire, trance LICea 1':141. In me 
Foreground is the Avant Port Which Leads into the St. Nazaire and I'enhouet 
Basins. In the Background is the Normandie Dry Dock. (Imperial War 
Museum) 
Although the St. Nazaire Basin CQuid be accessed from the east side 
ugh the Old Entrance, most of the traffic came through the newly 
c structed deep water entrance, a canal 350 yards long at the south end of the 
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Figure 4-2. Normandie Dry Dock As Viewed from the 






basin. T his main entrance connected the 5t. Nazai re Basin with the outer 
harbor or Avant Porl The canal contained a series of four Jocks that kept the 
basin free from the tide. 
Other important features of the facility included four underground fuel 
storage containers at the north end adjacent to the Nonnandie Dry Dock; the 
Old Mole pier, which rose 25 feet above the water and was situil ted south of 
the Old Entrance; and the Old Town Area, a small commercial and residential 
section adjoining the Old Mole pier. These vast array of maintenance and 
support facilities meant that ttonly Brest and Lorient rivaled the importance of 
St. Nazaire as a German naval base for enemy forces engaged in the Battle of 
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Figure 
Gun Positions Located at the Front and Rear of the Pier. (Authors Photo, 
1992) 
the Atlantic." S Consequently both the German coastal and port defenses were 
formidable. Four 105 mm howitzers guarded the entrance to Charpentiers 
Channel, the main estuary leading from the Atlantic to Sf. Nazaire. Once in the 
channel, vessels could be engaged by twenty-eight different 170 mm or 70 mm 
coastal batteries. In addition the 280th Naval Artillery Battalion that 
commanded the guns also had a rail mounted 240 mm gun. The final approach 
was ringed with ten 20 mm guns, four 37 mm guns and six large searchlights 
S The Controller of His Britannic Majesty's Stationery Office, Combined 
Operations The Official StOry of the Commandos (New York: The Macmillan 








w hich ensured incoming ships were well illuminated to detennine their 
identity. 
Defenses inside the harbor were equally form idable. They included one 
20 mm gun with an accompanying 40 mm gun at the south end of the Avant 
PorL As a vessel proceeded up the river it could be engaged by two more 
37mm guns; one at the north end of the Avant Port and other at the base of the 
Old Mole . The Old Mole also had a 20 mm gun positioned midway down its 
length and a searchlight at the far east end. 
The Normandie dry dock was surrounded by four 20 mm guns and two 
37 mm guns. Additionally, the Germans had placed an anti-torpedo net at the 
entrance to the dock. All of these port defenses were wmplemented by four 
harbor defense boats and over twenty mobile guns mounted on lorries or 
trucks and manned by three battalions of the NavaJ Flak Brigade. 
C. THE COMMANDOS 
In June of 1940 there were no personnel in the British Army trained or 
equipped for raiding opl!rations. All available troops were being used for the 
defense of the British Isles. When the idea of amphibious guerrilla warfare 
was proposed to Churchill, he quickly embraced thl! concept and ordered the 
formation of the Commandos. The term commando was derived from the 
Afrikaans word meaning military unit. During the British war with the South 
Africans, Lord IGtchner, after dispersing the main Africaaner Army, found 
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himself fighting individual units which used guerrilla tactics to inflict severe • 
damage on the British Army. The Boer Dutch called these units commandos. 
The prospective British commandos were selected frum the Special Service 
Battalions. All trainees went through a twelve week basic selection course. 
This training included cliff assaults, close quarter combat with rifles, ~njves 
and garrotes, assault courses, survival training, river crossings, and live fire 
exercises. Strong emphasis was placed on both perfecting amphibious raiding 
skills and having the confidence and initiative to use those skills when 
confronted with a difficult situation: 
To get in and out of a small boat in all kinds of weather, to swim-if 
necessary in full equipment with firearms held above the water, to be 
familiar with all the portable weapons of the soldier from the rifle and 
the tommy gun to the three-inch mortar and the anti-tank rifle, to be able 
to carry and use explosives, to hunt tanks, and their crew -- here are some • 
of the things a Commando soldier must learn •.• he must master his mind 
as well as his body and become not only a specially trained soldier but 
a trained individual soldier. In other words, self-reliance and seIf-
confidence ... It is not for them to await orders from their officer or N.C.O. 
They must do the sensible, obvious thing just because it is the sensible, 
obvious thing.' 
The commando training conducted at Achnacarry, Scotland rivals present 
day selection courses in combat skills training and exceeds today's regimen in 
discipline and realism. During the war over forty trainees were killed, most 
in live fire exercises. After graduation the commandos received the coveted 




continued . Weekly marches exceeding 50 miles were routine. "One troop 
marched in fighting order 63 miles in 23 hours and 10 m inutes covering the 
first 33 miles in eight hours dead."7 
Team work was constantly emphasized. During basic training groups of 
eig ht men were required to carry an eight inch log around on their sho,ulder; 
exercises like "Me and My Pal~ were conducted to emphasis the need for pairs 
of men to overcome obstacles together. Because the primary focus of these 
commandos w as amphibious guerrilla warfare, much of their time was spent 
learning to insert from the water and fight at night These skills were to prove 
particularly useful to the men of No. 2 Commando. 
No. 2 Commando was establish ed in March 1941 from components of No. 
3 Independent Company. Some of the soldiers already had limited combat 
experience in Norway includ in g the Commanding Officer lieutenant Colonel 
A. C. Newman. The outfit was absorb~d into the Special Service Battalion for 
a short time but then reconstituted when the size of raiding parties was 
downsized . Newman chose his men based on brains and common sense; there 
were school masters, business executives, bank clerks, and salesman. His 
emphasis lay clearly on intelligence and not on muscle . This should not imply 
Ulat these men were unfit. On the contrary, Newman ensured his men were at 
peak physical efficiency. They conducted record breaking marches, spent most 
7 Ibid., 7. 
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of their time in the field and continually improved on the infantry skills they • 
had learned at Achnacarry. Newman also ensured they spent ample time at 
sea, much to the chagrin of Lord Mountbatten, who initially had difficulty 
accepting the idea of solruer-sailors. 
From the time it was reconstituted, until the beginning of the SL N~re 
raid, No. 2 Commando relocated several times. The personnel started in 
Devonshire where they conducted long marches in the country and then spent 
time with the 5th Destroyer Flotilla getting their sea legs. In the summer of 
1941 No.2 Commando returned to Ayr, Scotland for cliff assault training and 
small boat handling. Early in 1942 Newman took the unit to the Outer 
Hebrides to practice amphibious guerrilla warfare in a cold, wet environment. 
Throughout these training sessions Newman continued to stress the • 
fundamentals of good soldiering "affection for [one's] unit, fighting spirit,.. 
ruscipline, bearing and integrity." 8 
No.2 Commando would eventually comprise the bulk of the assault force 
for the raid on St. Nazaire. There were, however, also personnel from No.1, 
No.3, No.4, No.5, No.9, and No. 12 Commando all of whom provided men 
for the demolition teams. In all 44 officers and 224 enlisted soldiers 
participated. Their amphibious counterparts in the raid were men from the 
Royal Navy. The Navy would crew 18 craft and supply 62 officers and 291 




enlisted.9 These 18 craft were instrumental to the success of the operation . 
Their combat specifications are as follows: 
IIMS CAMPBELTOWN formerly the United States destroyer USS 
BUCHANAN was modified to resemble a German MOWE-class destroyer. Her 
four funnels were reduced to two racked-back stacks. The CAMPBELTO WN 
was armour plated around the b ridge (1/4 inch plate designed to withstand 20 
mm rounds) and amidships to protect the command os. Her draft was reduced 
from 14 ft to 12 ft. (This w as necessary in order to negotiate the shallow waters 
around the entrance to St. Nazaire) The three 4-inch ~,.uns, torpedo tubes, depth 
charges, and depth charge throwers were all removed leaving only a 12 pounder 
light automatic high ang le gun forward, a single 50 calibre on each bridge 
wing. four 20 mm Oerlikons positioned midships and two more 20 mm guns 
mounted in echelon on the aft deck. Lastly twenty-four MK VII dep th charges 
(4000 Ib s of explosive weight each, 4 1/4 tons total) w ere enclosed into steel 
tanks, placed over the forward fuel compartments and encased in cement. The 
twenty-four depth charges were linked together with cordtex, a waterproof 
detonation cord, and primed with an eight hour delay fuse. There was some 
speculation that two 2 1/2 hour fuses were also employed as back-up, but this 
cannot be substantiated. With all the modifications the maximum speed 
9 These figures do not include the personnel from the destroyer escorls HMS 
ATIIERSTONE, TYNEDALE, Cleveland, and 8ROCKLE58Y, nor the submarine HMS 
Sturgeon which were not directly involved in the raid . 
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available was approximately 20 knots. The embarked personnel included 
• seventy-five Royal Navy and eighty commandos. 
Motor Gun Boat 314. I.ength 110 Ft wiUt three 850 hp supercharged 
engines capable of twenty-six knots. Armament included a 3 lb Vickers 
forward (120 rds/min), Rolls Royce 2 Ib gun aft, two twin 1/2 inch ma,chine 
guns amidships. The crew consisted of twenty-six men plus Lieutenant 
Colonel Newman, commander No.2 Commando, and Commander R. E. D. 
Ryder, commander of the naval surface forces. 
Motor Torpedo Boat 74. Length 68 Ft with Utree Isotta-Fraschini engines 
capable of forty-Utree knots fully loaded. This particular hull however had 
frequent engine problems and alternated between seven knots and forty knots. 
Armament included two 21 inch torpedo tubes and two 20 mm Oerlikon • 
cannons. The torpedo tubes were remounted forward and special time delay 
torpedoes with 1800 lb warheads were incorporated. The crew consisted of ten 
Torpedo Motor Launches. There were four of these boats including hull 
numbers 270, 160, 156, and 177. Length 112 feet with two 650hp gas engines 
capable of speeds up to eighteen knots. Two 500 gallon fuel tanks were added 
to increase Ute range from 600 to 1000 miles. Armament included two 18 inch 
torpedo tubes and two 20 mm Oerlikon guns. Each TML was crewed by two 
or three officers and ten enlisted. 
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Motor Launches. There were twelve of these boats including hull 
numbers 192, 262, 267, 268, 298, 306, 307, 341, 443, 446, 447, and 457. Each ML 
carried a crew of ten and fifteen commandos. They had the same characteristics 
as the T MLs without the 18 inch tubes. 
O. LTCOL A.c. NEWMAN AND CDR R.E-D. RYDER 
The man with the most effect on the oub:ome o f the raid was lieutenant 
Colonel A. C. Newman, commanding officer of No.2 Commando. Newman 
w as a Territorial Army officer who had spent the sixteen years before the war 
serving in the Territorial Army, 4th Battalion of the Essex Regiment. In civilian 
li fe he was a building contractor and at the age of 38 was married with several 
children. 
• Whe n the war broke out Newman was called to active duty and assigned 
as the commanding officer of No.2 Commando which was one of twelve 
commando units forming the Special Service Brigade. An avid boxer and 
rugby player, he earned the troops respect through hard work, discipline and 
a desire to make them the best commandos in the Brigade. 
"Newman had a warm outgoing personality and everybody liked him." 10 
He could, however, be very stubborn and direct when it came to getting the 
task a<:oomplished. During Newman's first meeting with l.ord Mountbatten, 
10 Eric de la Torre, interviewed by CDR Rill McRaven, Tape recording, London, 
19 June 1992. 
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Newman requested his men be allowed to spend time at sea with the destroyer 
• squadron to gain experience. Mountbatten dismissed the idea encouraging 
Newman to leave the sailing to sailors. Newman refused to back down. He 
protested to Mountbatten that sailing would be a large part of any amphibious 
operation and that it was necessary to get his commandos familiar with ,life at 
sea. Mountbatten continued to resist the idea "suggesting rather unkindly that 
perhaps Newman wanted to train his men to be seasick like genUemen .... ~ 
Newman fired back without hesitation, "The aim is to train them not to be 
seasick at all."l1 Newman's persistence paid off and Mountbatten agreed to 
support his requesl 
Although Newman had seen some limited action in Norway, it could not 
have prepared him for the bloody engagement at 5t. Nazaire. Nonetheless, • 
throughout the chaotic struggle for survival that characterized the raid, 
Newman remained poised, optimistic and frequently interjected his dry sense 
of humor to calm the troops. At one point when the chance of escape from Sl 
Nazaire was virtually hopeless, Newman ordered the remaining seventy men 
to break up and attempt to make their way to Spain. They would have to evade 
the Germans in town and push through to the open country side. Unshaken 
by their dilemma Newman looked up and pronounced, "Irs a lovely moonlight 




night for it." 12 Newman was captured hours after this incident and 
imprisoned for three years in a Ct:!rman PO W camp. For his actions al SL 
Nazaire he received the Victoria Cross. 
Commander R. E. D. Ryder was placed in command of the naval forces 
assigned to support the commandos in their raid on St. Nazaire. At thirty-four 
years old, Ryder was an exceptionally experienced sailor. He had served with 
the Royal Submarine force during his early years in the Navy taking leave 
once to sail a ketch from China to England. After Ute outbreak of war he 
received command of a Navy "Q" Ship. The "Q" Ships plied the waters of the 
Mediterranean disguised as merchant vessels. Their mission was to attract 
German V-Boats. As the V-Boat approachl!d, the "Q" Ships would d rop their 
exterior screens and open fire with a battery of guns. Although the program 
as a whole was successful, Commander Ryder'S "Q" Ship was sunk by two U-
Boals on its first outing. Ryder survived at sea for four days clinging to a piece 
of wood before he was rescued. 
Ryder was later given command of two more vessels, a frigate and a 
transport ship, the PRINCE PHILIPPE. Unfortunately for Ryder, the PRINCE 
PHILIPPE was rammed and sunk off Scotland. After losing his second ship, 
Ryder understandably fell from favor with the Admiralty. He was 
U Peter Young, Commando (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), 100. 
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subsequently assigned as the Southern Command naval advisor for anti-
invasion plans. 
When the need arose for an officer to command the naval raid forces 
Ryder was the obvious choice. His experience coupled with his availability 
were perfectly suited for the mission. Ryder was the consummate profess,ional. 
One of the commandos who knew him well described him as: 
An old style Naval Captain who leads a sort of lonely life. Doesn't really 
mix with people. Completely different character to Colonel Newman. 
Ryder was very reserved, a very shy man. He was never at ease with the 
ordinary chap. But he was the sort of officer you would follow anywhere. 
You could trust him. He was a chap who would never let you downY 
For his actions at Sf. Nazaire, Ryder also received the Victoria Cross. 
lord louis Mountbatten, although not involved in the raid, was the 
• 
Commander of Combined Operations Command and therefore had some direct • 
impact on the planning decisions that were made. Mountbatten was one of 
the most well liked and respected men in England. "His father was a Hessian 
prince and his mother a granddaughter of Queen Victoria, making him kin to 
half the crowned heads of Europe." l~ Yet for all his royalty Mountbatten had 
the common touch. He started his naval career as a cadet and worked his way 
up through the officer ranks. During the war he commanded a destroyer 
squadron and eventually was assigned to head Combined Operations. 
13 Ibid., De 1a Torre. 




The commandos liked Mountbatt~n's style. He personally wouJd inspect 
the troops before each major operation giving them a pep talk and e nsuring 
they had all the resources they required.1s When shortfalls in equipment or 
assets came to his attention, Mountbatten would use his influence with 
Churchill or his cousin, the King. to resolve them quickly. This was done often 
at the expense of other naval commanders, and although it displeased his peers 
greatly it endeared him to the commandos. 
Mountbatten's most significant impact on the raid was his determinatio n, 
at any cost, to see it succeed. He felt that by denying St. Nazaire' s repair 
facilities to the TIRPITZ the commandos could alter the course of the naval war 
in the Atlantic. Mountbal:ten refused to acknowledge any possibility of defeat. 
Mountbatten was intimately involved in the planning phase of the raid and 
frequently overruled tactical objections by both Ryder and Newman. In two 
incidenL .. he called in experts to rebut both men and substantiate his position. 
In ~trospect Mountbatten's decisions were both corred 
It w as apparent from the beginning that this operation was exceptionally 
risky and that the odds for success were slim: 
15 Although Mountbatten was well known for his premission pep talks, 
interviews with several of the raiders from SL Nazaire indicates that contrary to 
legend Moun tbatten did not have the opportunity to inspect the troops prior to their 
raid. 
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During planning, a senior Naval officer had warned Mountbatten: 'We • 
may lose every man: With a slight grimace, Mountbatten had agreed, but 
added, 'If they do the job, we've got to accept that.'16 
I'.. TRAINING 
It was exactly one month from the time Ryder and Newman receive4 their 
first briefing on SL Nazaire to the commencement of the operation. During 
this time several changes occurred in the plan but the basic scheme remained 
the same. On 26 March 1942, No.2 Commando and certain elements from 
1,3,4,5,9, and 12 Commando would sail via a surreptitious route from Falmouth,. 
England to the entrance of Charpentiers Channel on the French coast arriving 
at 23:00 hrs on the 27 March. 
Twenty vessels including the HMS CAMPBELTOWN and escorts • 
ATHERSTONE and TYNEDALE would rendezvous with the submarine HMS 
STURGEON. Using the submarine as a landmark,. they would take their final 
bearing to St. Nazaire. The escorts would return to England leaving the small 
boats and the CAMPBELTOWN to negotiate the heavily defended estuary into 
the port. At 22;00 hrs on the 27th, the Royal Air Fort:e would t:onduct an air raid 
on St. Nazaire. The air raid was intended as a diversion and to draw the dual 
purpose guns away from the approaching vessels. 
Hi Ibid., Miller, 37. 
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00(:(' in the inner harbor th e CAMI'B ELTOWN loaded with 4 1/4 tons of 
explosives (with an eight hour time fuse) would ram the southern caisson of 
the Normandie dry dock. On board were eighty commandos who would 
d isembark across the caisson and destroy, with explosives, other vital targets. 
T hese targets included the winding house, pumping house, north caisso~ and 
German gun positions. 
These eighty commandos wouJd be divided into demolition, protection, 
assault, and headquarters elements. Each demolition man had to carry 95 Ibs 
of explosive, consequently it was necessary to assign certain troops the sale role 
of party protection. 
A t the same time the CAMPBEL TOWN rammed the dry dock,. the 180 
commandos embarked on eleven motor launches would land at either the O ld 
M ole pier or the Old Entrance and conduct similar demolition raids. From the 
Old Entrance the commandos were assigned the Penhouet basin swing bridge, 
the Old Entrance lock gates and key German gun positions. The commandus 
disembarking at the Old Mole were to destroy the Main Entrance lock gates, 
the power station and German gun positions. 
Upon completion of their missions, but no longer than two hours later, all 
commandos would return to the Old Mole reembark the motor l aunches and 
torpedo motor launches and return to England. After all commandos were 
retrieved MTB 74 would fire her time delayed torpedoes at the Old Entrance 
and retract. Ryder later reported in the post operation report: 
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We all hoped to get well in undetected and then hoped to bluff the 
enemy for just sufficient time to achieve our object. We had to realize, 
however, that though we might get in unseen and by bluff, there was no 
question of employing these on the way out. For this purpose we hoped 
that smoke would helpY 
One officer at Combined Operations Headquarters when hearing the plan 
remarked, "Anyone who even thinks of doing such a thing deserv~s the 
Distinguished Service Onler." 18 
The preparation for the raid, although time limited, was thorough. The 
man in charge of the demolition teams was a reserve officer, Captain William 
Pritchard. Pritchard had been instrumental in developing the plan for 
destroying St. Nazaire. While on leave in 1941, he visited his father who was 
the dock master at Cardiff, England. Lteol Robert Montgomery, the second 
• 
officer-in-charge of the demolition teams, recalled Pritchard's conversation • 
upon his return: 
While he was there the Germans bombed the dock. He came back (off 
leave) and said, 'You cannot put the dock out of operation by bombing it. 
The warehouses were burned, Cardiff was plastered, it looked absolutely 
awful, but with 48 hours the dock was operating as a dock again. The 
only way to demolish a dock is to place the charges in the vital spots:19 
So Pritchard and Montgomery put together a plan for destroying docks, 
this was under the assumption that the Germans might invade and the British 
17 St. Nazaire Raid, Report by Naval Force Commander, London, 1942. 
IS Ibid., Young, 92. 
l~ LtCol Robert Montgomery, interviewed by CDR Bill McRaven, Mere 





would b e focc::ed to destroy their own facilities. The p lan was forwarded to the 
Transportati,o" Department of the War Office and subsequently shelved. When 
the St. Nazaire mission was being considered, someone in the War Office 
remembered Pritchard's plan, and he and Montgomery were subsequently 
sum moned to tr.rin and lead the demolition parties. 
In civilian life Pritchard was a dockyard engineer, but his active duty time 
was spent as a Royal Engineer with the Territorial Army. During the Dunkirk 
evacuation Pritchard, assigned to the British Expeditionary Force, won the 
M ilitary Cross for thwarting a German advance by blowing up a bridge while 
under heavy enemy fire. 
Pritchard gathered ninety commandos from other units supposedly for a 
training course in explosives. He taught them the all about demolitions, 
showed them how a dock functions and how it could be rendered useless. At 
the end of February, the demolition teams separated and some went with 
Pritchanl to the docks at Cardiff, while the others went with Montgomery to 
southhampton. These ports closely resembled the sl Nazaire facility, with the 
King George V Dock at southhampton being very similar to the Normandie 
dry dock. Pritchard and Montgomery conducted countless drills at 
South hampton and Cardiff. They ensured each team, while loaded with a full 
complement of explosives, cou1d move to their assigned target'! in day or night 
and destroy them in minimal time. 
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In another part of England, the assault and protection parties from No.2 
• Commando were being assembled. Newman insisted each man be in the peak 
of physical condition. Consequently the troops conducted daily marches and 
physical training. "Every one of them knew that when the time came to put 
their training into operation sheer physical fitness could make ~l the 
difference between survival and failure. o2O Newman also continued to insist 
his troops put to sea to get accustomed to life on a motor launch. On one 
cruise to the Scilly Isles all the men aboard got severely sea sick. Newman 
even went so far as to send his troops to a local slaughterhouse and hospital 
emergency room to prepare them for the sight of blood. 
Up until now the specifics of the mission had been kept a secret from the 
troops, but on 18 March, Newman laid out the plan in detail and the training • 
continued at an accelerated pace: 
... every stage of the operation was separated out and analyzed, every 
movement plotted in fine detail. However daring the nature of the raid, 
however debonair and carefree the soldiers and sailors who went on it 
the only hope of success lay, ultimately, in the detailed thoroughness with 
which it was planned.21 
A scale model of St. Nazaire was constructed from overhead photos and 
the details of the facility were ingrained into each man's head. Special 
recognition signals were assigned and the commandos were issued rubber 
:w Ibid., Mason, 43. 




soled shoes to reduce noise and make the Gennans more distinctive. A ssault 
and protection parties developed special load bearing equipment to maximize 
the amount of ammunition they could carry. It appeared the only detail the 
commandos could not plan for was the will of the enemy. 
fWD weeks before the mission overhead photos revealed four new cpastal 
defense guns in the middle of the dock. fhe decision was m ade to add an 
additional thirty commandos to the force. 
With time getting short a full dress rehearsal was planned at the 
Vevonport dockyard under the guise of a an exercise to test the dockyard 
d efenses. The Devonport security forces were augmented by the local Home 
Guard and practically everything went wrong. later Lance Corporal Eric de la 
Torre recalled, "After doing the dress rehearsal it didn't seem like we would 
cume out alive.·22 
Significant to note was the difficulty thc motor launches had in coming 
alung sid~ a jetty and landing commandos in the glare of the searchlight 
Although the record shows this was of great concern, no measures were taken 
to allevi ate the problem. The failure tu address this problem was to have 
disastrous r~sults un the succ~ss uf the mission and the lives of the men who 
attempted it. 
22 Ibid., Eric de la Torre . 
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F. THE RAID ON ST. NAZAIRE 
On 26 March 1942, "in accordance with the Operational Orders for 
'Chariot': the 10th A!S Striking Force sailed from Falmouth at 1400126. M.Ls 
were sailed in advance so as to form up outside."Zl It was the first time the 
entire force had been assembled. The weather was good for the launch with 
a slight swell rolling over the port quarter. 
The cruising order was in three columns: the port and starboard columns 
consisted of the motor launches, and the midships column of the two 
Hunt class destroyers, "CAMPBELTOWN," and the motor torpedo boat in 
tow.24 
The transit on the 26th was without incident. On the morning of the 27th 
the weather was clear with visibility unrestricted. At 0720, the TYNEDALE 
spotted a ('.-erman submarine at 4,000 yards and open fired causing the 
submarine to crash dive. Initially it was believed that the submarine had sunk. 
Nevertheless, Commander Ryder was concerned the submarine had 
communicated it's sighting to the mainland before it disappeared. It was not 
un61 after the war that it was discovered the submarine had survived and in 
fact relayed by radio that three destroyers and ten motor launches were sighted 
at 0720 moving in a westerly direction. 
The German's believed these British ships were conducting mine laying 
operations and never associated them with a possible raid on St. Nazaire. 
13 Ibid., St. Nazaire Raid, Section B, Narrative Report on Operation 'Chariot.' 







Ryder made the decision to continue on with the mission. As the day 
continue d it became increasingly difficult for the flotilla to evade Fnmch 
trawlers. These trawlers were known to be manned by Vichy French or have 
German soldiers ahoard. At midday two trawlers were spotted d osing the 
flotilla from different positions. Hoth vessds Wi:!re stuppi:!d, searched a-':ld the 
crews b rought aboard the escorts. After a brief discussion the trawlers were 
sunk. 
'J 'he remainder of the afternoon was uneventful and the flotilla continued 
at eight knot" to effect ito;; rendezvous with the HMS STURGEON. At 18:30 hrs 
one of the motor launches reported engine trouble. Ryder decided to leave a 
torpedo ML behind to assist the disabled vessel and have the main flotina 
continue on as scheduled. When it became apparent that the disabled vessel 
wa.'i unable to be repaired, the crew and commandos transferred to the Torpedo 
ML and eventually rejoined the flotilla. 
At 20:00 hrs the headquarters element of Ryder and Newman transferred 
from the ATHERSTONE to the MGB. At 22:00 hrs, after sailing for thirty-three 
hours and over 450 miles the flotilla reached the rendezvous point. Upon 
receiving the final bearing the escorts were released and the flotilla began to 
proceeding up the outer right bank of the estuary. 
At midnight the flotilla could see anti-aircraft guns firing at the incoming 
bombers. Owing to security, the Royal Air Force was never told the reason for 
the bombing raid. Their orders were to bomb only if the dOl'kyard targets were 
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visible from the air. This was to reduce civilian casualties. Unfortunately, • 
when the airplanes arrived the low clouds prevented them from identifying 
their targets. Consequently, the raid was very short and the bombers returned 
home. The commandos knew that the lack of bomber support was going to 
impact their ability to get in undetected. Sergeant Dick Bradley had pl~nned 
on a continuous bombing attack throughout the commando raid, later he 
commented: 
We thought things have gone wrong. We haven't got the air raid we 
should be having. Anybody whose been in an air raid knows what 
muddle there is in the town. We reckoned that we would be there doing 
our demolitions and out before anyone realized what happened.:'S 
Instead of creating a diversion with a sustained air raid, this bombing effort 
only succeeded in waking the Germans and peaking their interest in other 
possible British attacks. 
Captain Mecke, Commanding Officer of the Naval Flak Brigade guarding 
Sl Nazaire became increasingly suspicious of the limited air raid. At midnight 
he signalled all Wehrmacht command posts with the following message, "The 
conduct of the enemy aircraft is inexplicable and indicates suspicion of 
parachute landings." u; 
Meanwhile the flotilla had entered the estuary and was proceeding as 
scheduled. Soon after entering the outside of the channel the 
25 Dick Bradley, intetviewed by CDR Bill McRaven, London, June 19, 1992. 
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CAMPBELTOWN ran aground. After a few minutes she pulled free only to 
g round again moments later. Oo(;e again she broke free and was able to 
conti nued on unabated. By 0030 the entire flotilla was into deeper water and 
entering the outer approaches o f the port. At this time, Lieutenant Tibbets, the 
officer in charge of the o rdnance aboard the CAMPBELTOWN activated the 
eight hour time fuse. Interestingly enough only a few people aboard the 
CAMPBEL TOWN knew of the demolitions existence. 
Soon thereafter the German coastal radar picked up the inbound vessels. 
CarL M ecke was informed by his command post and he subsequenUy ordered 
all unit'> to "Beware Landing." The time was 01:20 hrs. Two minutes later the 
flotilla was chalhmged by flashing light from a shore battery. The official post 
operatio n report stated the following. 
During this time we made our bogus identity to the shore signal station 
at No.3_battery and signalled in German that we were 'proceeding up 
harbour in accordance with instruction: On receipt of this signal some of 
the searchlights switched out but we were then called up from the South 
entrance and passed a similar message. While this was in progress 
however the force was fired on by light flak from one position so we 
made the signal for'a vessel considering herself to be fired on by friendly 
forces: This stopped him for a bit. At this time we must have been 
recognized as definitely hostile as we were suddenly fired on heavily and 
the action became general. It is difficult to describe the full fury of the 
attack that was let loose on both sides, the air became one mass o f red 
and gnoen tracer travelling in all directions, most of it going over.27 
Aboard the CAMPRELTOWN, Commander Beattie ordered the bogus 
German ensign pulled down and the white British ensign hoisted up. From the 
tr. Ibid., St. Nazaire Raid, Section B. 3. 
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shore came fire from all the coastal defense guns including 75 mm, 150 mm, 170 
• mm, 6. inch howitzers, Oerlikons and BoforS.t'ortunately, the darkness and 
distance from shore precluded accurate fire except by the dose in 20 mm and 
37 mm guns. All the British vessels returned fire and sailed virtually 
unscathed through the blanket of rounds. Initial casualties includ~d the 
CAMPBElTOWN coxswain and quartermaster who were killed on the bridge. 
At this point the flotilla had reached the east Jetty. Anchored off to their 
starboard was the German ship SPERRBRECKER which commenced firing as 
the vessels approached. A gunner aboard the British MGB raked the ship with 
counter fire and promptly silenced the German batteries. 
With the MGB leading the way the CAMPBELTOWN headed straight for 
the Normandie dry dock at eighteen knots. At the last second the MGB veered • 
away and the CAMPBELTOWN struck Ute souUtem caisson of the dry dock at 
exactly 0134, only four minutes later than initially planned. "The main 
objective of the raid had been achieved before a single Commando soldier had 
set foot ashore."ZlI The force of the collision crushed the bow of the 
CAMPBEL TOWN for thirty-six feet and drove her up onto Ute caisson a full 
twelve inches into the steel gate. 
ZlI Ibid, Young, 98. 
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The commandos aboard the destroyer came under immediate fire as they 
struggled to disembark and begin their missions. lieutenant Stewart Chant 
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down iron ladders and rope the first group of twelve commandos attempted to • 
silence the guns in the immediate vicinity of the dry dock.. Their first victims 
were Gennans manning a light gun in a sandbagged nest. After this was 
extinguished the commandos assaulted a concrete bunker containing a 37 mm 
gun. Although four commandos were wounded in the fight the British had 
established a perimeter around the insertion point. 
With a perimeter set,. Chant and his demolition crew of four sergeants 
moved down a long flight of stairs into the pump house. Their task was to 
destroy the pumps which raised and lowered the water level in the dry dock. 
Chant and his men placed 150 Ibs of explosives around the pumps and set a 
ninety second time fuse. They immediately returned topside and waited for 
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the explosion. As they mustered up outside the pump house Bob Montgomery 
showed up to oversee the operation and ordered the men to move further away: 
It was lucky he did so for a few seconds later there was a deafening 
explosion and the large blocks of concrete protecting the building from 
air raids damage flew up into the air and crashed down on the quayside 
w here w e had just been standing.2'J 
After the initial charge had detonated, Chant and his men returned to the 
pump house and finished the remainder of his task with sledge hammers and 
incendiaries. 
Lieutenant Christopher Smalley and four NCO's were assigned the task 
of d estroying the southern caisson winding house which operated the lock 
gates. This mission was accomplished and the winding house destroyed almost 
simullilneously with the pump house. 
• T w o additional demolition teams commanded by J.ieutenant Purdon and 
• 
Lieutenanf:.Brett both of No. 12 Commando moved up the west side of the dry 
dock to the northern winding house. They were supported by ten surviving 
members of the assault party that had cleared the initial entry point. As they 
moved the 500 yards from the southern caisson to the northern caisson, the 
assauH team had to clear an enemy trench and suppress heavy fire from a 
nearby German stronghol d. In the process, Brett was wounded and was 
replaced by Lieutenant Burtenshaw and some of his men. 
2' Stuart Chant-Sempill, St. Nazaire Commando (Navato, CA: l~residjo Press, 
1985), 43. 
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Upon reaching the northern winding house, Purdon's men smashed in the • 
door and set the charges. Several commandos were wounded by advancing 
German troops and effective fire from nearby ships moored in the Penhouet 
Basin. Meanwhile Burtenshaw found he was unable to enter the northern 
caisson through the locked steel hatch door and elected to lower twelve, 18 lb 
charges over the north side of the caisson. This entire time he and his men 
were receiving 20 mm fire from the Penhouet Basin ships. After tieing off the 
explosives to a nearby guard rail: 
Burtenshaw realizing they must at least silence the ships lying inside the 
dry-dock, south of the caisson, took several men with him along the wall, 
firing their pistols down into a tanker undergoing refit. . More effective 
was the rush by two of the protection squad firing their tommies as they 
ran down the ship's steep gangplank. When Germans appeared on the 
west dockside, Bob Burtenshaw-still humming 'There'll -always be an 
England .. : ran at them firing his pistol, despite his wounds. The • 
Germans scattered, but the Lieutenant and a corporal were killed.iII) 
Although the assault and demolition crews sustained heavy casualties, all 
the targets in the dry dock area had been destroyed as planned. 
In the meantime Newman and his command element had come ashore at 
the Old Entrance. They were attempting to locate the building they had 
designated as their command headquarters. As they arrived at the proper 
location (just adjacent to the swing bridge at the Old Entrance) Newman 
J() James Ladd, Commandos and Rangers of World War II (London: David and 
Charles Publishers, 1978),47. 
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captured two German soldiers who informed h im that his headquarters 
building was in fact the Wehm13cht's headquarters building. 
Newman intended to capture the Germans inside the building, but came 
under intense fire from several ships in thl:! St. Nazaire basin. Newman was 
soon joined by Troop Sergeant-Major Haines who had come ashore from Lt. 
Rodier's ML. Equipped with a 2-inch mortar, Haines was able to quiet the 
g uns in the basin, but almost immediately thereafter another group of German 
sailors e ngaged the commandos with machine guns. Again 1-laioes returned 
fi re with a Bren gun and silenced the sailors. Newman returned to the task of 
securing the headquarters building and after a few well placed hand grenades 
was in command of the facili ty. 
At the other end of the St. Nazaire harbor the motor launches had 
coincided their assaull<; with the ramming of the CAMPBELTOWN. Their 
fonnation sailing into the harbor had been two lines abreast just to the rear of 
the CAMPBELTOWN. T he port line broke off and attempted to land 
commandos at the Old Mole while the starboard line continued on to the Old 
Entrance. 
The port line motor launches were lead by Lt. Invin's Torpedo ML. It 
carried no commandos and was assigned only to escort the other MLs and 
attack targets of opportunity. Invin continued on past the Old Mole. His boat 
was eventually hit by a shell and the steering mechanism damaged. Soon after 
he retreated back to the open sea. 
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Immediately following Irwin was Lt Platt whose embarked commandos • 
had the mission of attacking the gun positions on the Old Mole and seizing the 
area between the Old Mole and the southern entrance to the St. Nazaire Basin. 
As Platt approached the Old Mole his ML ran aground and came under fire 
from the shore. His boat was set ablaze and he gave the order to aband?n the 
craft. The commandos attempted to swim the 300 yards to shore, but the 
weight of their clothes and equipment caused many to drown. Twelve of the 
commandos and four of the ML's crew were killed or drowned in the river. 
The lead ML in the starboard line, having seen Platfs predicament, managed 
to rescue the remaining survivors. 
Behind Platt's ML came Lt Collier with the two demolition teams 
embarked including Captain Pritchard, the explosives expert who had trained • 
the commandos. Collier weaved around Platt's stalled ML and started off-
loading his commandos at the Old Mole steps. One of the Navy men Len Ball 
~was firing up his gun ... enjoying himself and exhorting (to the commandos) 
come on you Limeys. ,,31 The fire was so intense that only three men managed 
to disembark. Collier pulled away and after several minutes attempted to land 
once again. Collier was unaware at this point that Platt was beached, and in 
fact, believed had successfully off loaded his commandos. After 
accomplishing his mission Collier returned to his loiter point in the middle of 





the river. The Germ ans continued to pepper the small boat. Lance Corporal 
de la Torre who had gotten ashore and then returned with a wounded 
commando remembered that 
Shells were coming inside one end of the ML and coming out the othe r. 
There were bodies lying all around the mess deck .. " cut loose a Carley 
float and jumped in after it...bullel .. were hitting all around us.n 
Next in sequence was Lt. Wallis who was carrying a small demolitions 
team with orders to destroy the centcallock gate of the main entrance. Wallis 
came in at eighteen knol" and missed the Old Mole landing.. beaching the ML 
momentarily. The Germans on the pier began tOSSing grenades at the boat and 
engaged the craft with small arms fire. The commandos aboard attempted to 
suppress the fire, but eventually Wallis was forced to withdraw. 
The three remaining MLs under the command of Lieutenants Horlock, 
Henderson, and Falconar were all driven off by heavy enemy fire as they 
approached the Old Mole. None of their commandos were landed. T he end 
result was that of the six MLs, only Collier succeeded in landing any troops. 
At the Old Entrance, Lt Boyd commanding the Torpedo Ml, had broken 
off from the starboard column as planned to make room for the commandos to 
land. His orders were to provide cover fire for the troop carrying M Ls and 
attack targets of opportunity. As Boyd ran between the Old Entrance and the 
Old Mole he came under intense fire which disabled his engines for ten 
J2 Ibid. 
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minutes. As soon as they were repaired, Boyd proceeded to Platt's burning ML • 
and recovered the remaining SUrviVOIS from that craft. Boyd began to head 
towan! mid-stream but stopped to pick up three more commandos from the 
river. In the process his ML was hit again and severa] men aboard were killed. 
Boyd eventually managed to extract and headed to the open ocean under.a hail 
of shells from coastal defenses. 
Following Boyd was Lt. Stephens with an embarked commando assault 
elemenL Stephen's ML was hit and severely damaged before it reached the 
Old Entrance. Out of control the ML crashed into the East Jetty and Stephens 
on!ered the craft abandoned. Some of the men made it to rafts whiJe others 
attempted to swim ashore. Only five of the commandos survived; four of 
whom were captured immediately. The other commando, Captain Bum made • 
it ashore and with the help of an enlisted crew member reached his objective 
(two gun towers 3/4 mile away at the northern end of the submarine pens). 
During the excursion Burn and the enlisted man killed two Gennans and 
captured four others. Burn unfortunately found the gun towers empty so he 
decided to set fire to the control room with incendiary grenades. 
The next two Mls commanded by Lieutenants Burt and Beart overshot the 
Old Entrance landing. By the time they swung around to try again the Old 
Entrance was covered with Germans. Burt landed his troops on the north side 
of the Old Entrance but several were killed instantly. Burt extracted into 




MI. was eventually destroyed as he drifted downstream. The few remaining 
survivors m ade it into rafts and were eventually captured. 
At the same time, Beart was again attempting to land at the Old Enhance. 
As the M L nosed in, heavy fire from the St. Nazaire basin killed Beart and 
several commandos. The remaining commandos fought ashore momentarily 
and then struggled back -to the M L The MI., however, was soon set ablaze. 
The commandos and crew abandoned ship and attempted to take rafts or swim 
ashore. Eventually all but three of the twelve commandos were shot or 
d rowned. 
During the ten minutes that it took for Burl and Bearl to reapproach the 
Old Entrance three other MLs had attempted to land. The first of the three, 
commanded by Lt Tillie, was hit and immediately burst into fl ames. Fifteen 
of the seventeen commandos aboard were killed and most of the crew. 
The second MI., commanded by Lt Fenton, was also hit and failed to land 
any troops. Jt maneuvered to midstream and continued to fight at a distance, 
eventually withdrawing to the open ocean. The third ML was commanded by 
Lieutenant Rodier. He managed to successfully negotiate the heavy fire and 
land his commandos. O ne of the commandos, Sergeant Dick Bradley 
remembered: 
We had a perfect landing. It couldn't have been nicer. We got oft~ tied 
the thing up as cool as if nothing had happened.J3 
33 Ibid., Dick Bradley . 
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Rodier then returned to the CAMPBELTOWN to assist in the removal of 
her remaining crew, including the commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander 
Beattie. After embarking fifty men Rodier, began to move downstream. His 
ML was soon hit by fire from the 75 mm coasta.1 defense guns. Rodier was 
killed and the ML eventually destro}'i!d: 
Most of the men on board, including all the officers of the 
CAMPBEL TOWN except Beattie and one other man, were killed or died 
in the water, and the few survivors were picked up at about 9.30am by a 
German patrol boat. J4 
The last boat in the starboard column was a torpedo ML commanded by 
Sub-Lieutenant Nock. Like the other torpedo MLs, Nock was assigned to draw 
fire and provide support to the MLs. Nock had the additional mission of 
• 
helping to off-load the CAMPBELTOWN's crew, but he never got the chance. • 
Nock managed to subdue some of the fire from ashore but was eventually hit 
and his boat lost. 
In the first sixty minutes of the battle over half the assault force including 
eight TMliMLs had been hit or destro}'i!d. The river Loire was burning from 
the oil and debris of damaged MLs. Everywhere German defense guns 
pounded away at targets in the water and ashore. Smoke from the explosions 
at the pump and winding house lingered over the city and searchlights darted 
from point-to-point chasing real and "imaginary" commandos. 




Back on shore the commandos from Collier's MI. had succeeded in getting 
away from the Old Mole and were proceeding to their target Those 
commandos consisted of Lieurenant Walton's demolition team, Captain 
Pritchard's roving demulition team and 2nd Lieutenant Watson's protection 
team. These elements were directed to destroy the bridge over the, main 
entrance to the SL Nazaire basin. 
Walton's party was hit almost immediately after departing the Old Moll!. 
Walton was wounded and the team separated in the action. Walton eventually 
died after attempting to lay his explosives at the dock gate. The explosives 
never detonated . 
Watson's team rendezvoused with the members of Newman's 
headquarters element and the remains of Walton's team. He made several 
attempts to reach the m ain entrance bridge but was turned away by heavy fire 
from an armored tanker moored in the basin. Eventually a runner from 
headquarte rs ordered them to return to Newman's location. 
Pritchard's roving demolition team managed to reach the bridge, but 
dected to leave that target for Walton and destroy two ships tied up at the 
quay wall instead. Slipping over the side of the quay wall, the commandos 
p laced their charges below the water line and sneaked away. Moments later 
the demolitions detonated and the ships sank. Pritchard and Corporal 
Maclagan departed the basin in search for other target ... Pritchard later died 
as a result of wounds received sometime in the action. 
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Having completed their missions, commandos from the CAMPBELTOWN 
were beginning to assemble at the headquarters building. Newman decided 
that most of the objectives had been achieved and it was time to withdraw. 
Unfortunately, the Verey pistol needed to fire the withdraw signal had gone 
down with Sergeant Moss, Ute No.2 Commando Regimental Sergeant ~ajor, 
while he was aboard one of the MLs. Consequently, Newman sent Lance 
Corporal Hanington to retrieve Captain Roy's blocking force and other 
elements that were positioned in the vicinity. Eventually Newman had seventy 
officers and men at his location. It was then that he learned that withdraw was 
impossible owing to the fate of the MLs. Chant later recalled, "Colonel 
Newman told us, "This is where we walk home. All the boats have been 
blown up or have gone back."35 
Several escape options were discussed, but Newman's final plan called for 
the men to split up and attempt to make their way through town and 
eventually to the Spanish frontier. "He ordered them not to surrender until all 
their ammunition had been used up, and not to surrender at aU if they could 
help it." J6 
The commandos left the headquarters building as a group and attempted 
to move from the Old Town Area across the bridge over the main entrance and 
35 Ibid., Young, 100. 






Nazaire. (Author's Photo, 1992) 
into the city of Sl Nazaire. They encountered heavy resistance and several 
men fell wounded or dead. Upon reaching the bridge Troop Sergeant M ajor 
Haines laid down a base of fire and the remaining commandos dashed across, 
fi ring as they moved. Upon reaching the town of Sl Nazaire the group split 
up. Roy and twenty men went into a home and waited for a while. Soon they 
decided to depart and met Lieutenant Hopwood and ten of his men. Together 
the group was eventually captured when it sought refuge in a police station. 
Newman's group went from house to house encountering Gennans at 
every turn eventually ending up in an air raid shelter. Not long after a German 
party arrived. Newman, out of ammunition and with sevecaJ wounded men, 
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surrendered. By the end of the evening all the commandos that had departed • 
the headquarters building were either dead or captured. 
Back on the river Loire, seven MLs managed to make it out of the harbor. 
Lt. Henderson, who had been forced to withdraw from the Old Mole, was the 
first to reach the open ocean. His boat was separated from the remaini~g six. 
At approximately 0545 Henderson's ML came under attack from a German 
Destroyer, the JAGUAR. The British fired every available weapon inflicting 
serious casualties on the Germans. Refusing to surrender the British fought 
until all but a few survivors remained. Eventually however the ML was 
overpowered by the heavily armed destroyer and forced to surrender. The post 
operation report read, "Surrendered after unequal fight and many casualties 
including CO. killt!d."37 The remaining men were brought aboard the • 
German destroyer and given prompt medical attention. Those that survived 
were later transferred to a POW camp. 
Three other MLs (Irwin, Fenton, Falconar) and Ryder's MGB managed to 
escape the river Loire and rendezvoused with the ATHERSTONE and 
TI'NEDALE. The dead and wounded were transferred and Irwin, Falconar and 
Ryder's boats were scuttled. At 07:30 hrs, a German Heinkel 111 appeared and 
sank Fenton's abandoned ML, but elected not to attack the escorts. 
37 Ibid., St. Nazaire Raid, Section C, Summary of Narrativt! of the M.L., 2 . 
222 • 
• 
Ten minutes later an RAF fighter arrived to provide air cover and was met 
by a German Junker 88. The air to air combat ended in a. mid-air collision 
killing both pilots. Later the RAF sent additional air support. to cover the 
return trip and the Navy added two additional destroyers, the CLEVELAND 
and the BROCKLESBY, to the convoy. 
The remaining three MLs commanded by Horlock, Wallis and Boyd also 
escaped the coastal defense guns but failed to rendezvous with the 
ATHERSTONE and 'IYNDAlE. The three boats were attacked several times 
from the air, nevertheless managed to return unharmed back to Falmouth. 
At approximately 1030 Saturday, 28 March, the four and a quarter tons of 
explosives aboard the CAMPBELTOWN detonated destroying the southern 
caisson and rendering the dry dock unusable. Aboard the CAMPBELTOWN 
at the time of the explosion were dozens of German officers and enlisted who 
were apparently looting the vessel of all its liquor and candy bars. 
Montgomery later recalled the incident: 
There is a lovely little story of Sam Beattie (Commanding Officer of the 
CAMPBELTOWN) being interrogated and the German chap saying,.'Surely 
you did n't think that a silly little boat like that ramming the caisson 
would smash it up?' and then the detonation went "whoom" and all the 
windows blew out, and Sam said, 'No we dido't.'lS 
Reports indicated that as many as 200 people were killed when the charges 
ignited. "The remains of torsos, detached limbs, bits of flesh, and daubs of 
3S Ibid., Robert Montgomery. 
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blood hideously adorned the dock for several days, sticking to walls, resting • 
on rooftops, and staining the ground." 3. 
The Gennans were thrown into a state of panic and began firing at 
imaginary commandos. By the afternoon some order was being restored, when 
at 1600 the first time delayed torpedo fired from Wynn's TML exploded .at the 
Old Entrance. This was followed on hour later by a second explosion from the 
number two torpedo. Again panic ensued and by the following morning 
another forty two french civilians and Germans had been kiUed by "friendJy 
fire." 
The casualties on the British side included 169 dead and 200 captured out 
of the 611 who participated. The primary goal of destroying the Normandie 
dry dock was achieved. The British often refer to St. Nazaire as the "Greatest • 
Raid of All," but in retrospect,.. how successful was this mission? What could 
have been done to improve the survivability of the men and the effectiveness 
of the raid? 






I thought it was a very good plan. but I thought all of us wou1d be killed. 
When you saw where all the [German] guns were, you thought, well, were 
not going to come out alive.oW 
In wartime the success of an operation is judged almost solely on the 
achievement of the objectives. The cost in lives, although regrettab le, lies 
within the realm of the necessary. In the case of S1. Nazaire the destruction of 
the dry dock was the primary objective and from a strategic/operational 
perspective the objective was achieved -- however at the cost of 169 dead and 
over 200 imprisoned. 
Were the objectives worth the risk? No! The TIRPITZ dearly was a 
formidable threat and warranted every effort to sink her. Denying the 
battleship -access to main tenance facilities in the Atlantic, however, would not 
and did not precluded her from operating in the North Sea against allied 
convoys b ound for Russia, and this was her pri mary mission. Hitler was 
obsessed with cutting the vital Anglo-Russian convoy link that supplied 
Russian forces at Murmansk. IJy January 1942, (three months before Sl 
Nazaire) all available German ships, including the TIRPITZ, were stationed in 
Norway for this express purpose. Not only did the Norwegian fjords provide 
excellent protection for the TlRPITZ, but the port city of Foettenfjord near 
40 Ibid., Eric de la Torre. 
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Trondheim was able to conduct a complete refit of the battleship beginning in • 
October 1942. 41 This obviated the need for the TlRPITZ to seek repairs 
elsewhere. 
Additionally, the Royal Air Force kept constant aerial surveillance 
on the TIRPrrZ and actually hoped the ship would sail south so it co~ld be 
attacked by bombers -- the fate to which it eventually succumbed. 
Was the plan developed to maximize superiority over the enemy and 
minimize the risk to the assauUforce? Even if we accept the rationale for the 
raid, the merit of the plan warrants questioning. Early in the establishment of 
the Combined Operations Command the idea of conducting a raid on St. 
Nazaire was dismissed owing to the shallow waters of the Loire, the heavy 
coastal and port defenses, and the anticipated size of the assault force.u Even • 
after the initial plan was formulated there was disagreement about the tactics 
to destroy the dry dock. Interesting enough, the most successful aspect of the 
mission, the CAMPBEL TOWN operation, was not considered the best approach. 
Commander Ryder in a memorandum entitled "Considerations of the 
41 Al though Trondheim was not comparable to st. Nazaire 
as a maintenance facility, all the necessary repair work was 
completed in a matter of months staggering the tasks so that 
the battleship was never completely immobilized. 
U The initial estimate on the size of the force was 300 men. Operation 
Chariot required 611 soldiers and sailors. 
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Advantages and Disadvantages of Using or Not Using an F.xpendable 
Destroyer" stated, 
1 think the destroyer would certainly hazard the element of surprise and 
would be plastered by all the coastal batteries at ranges of one to two 
miles and generally speaking block ships have always failed really to get 
into the cort."ect position ... As a means of destroyi ng the lock gate, I prefer 
the idea of firing 8 torpedoes at it to the idea of trying to blow it up from 
the bows of a destroyer.4l 
In retrospect:,. Ryder may have been correct. The CAMP81::LTOWN mission, 
although successful, may in [act have jeopardized the element of surprise for 
the rest of the flotilla. The real question is, was it necessary to have 18 assault 
craft and 257 commandos to do the mission? 
After I spent several hours on the ground at St. Nazaire, it was d ear 
to me that the decision to attack several targets instead of just the dry dock was 
• fatal1y flawed. Once that decision was made, however, the tactical plan to 
• 
implement that decision was the best possible one for the situation. Had the 
commandos gotten ashore as planned, at the Old Mole and the Old Entrance, 
the outcom e could have been different. The air raid was scheduled to continue 
through out the commando assault. This would have created chaos within the 
city allowing the British to slip in undisturbed, as they almost did anyway. 
Once ashore the commandos were relying on massing combat power quickly 
H Commander Robert Ryder, Considerations of the Advantages and 
Uisadvantages of Using or Not Using an Expendable Destroyer Undated, but 
believed to be part of the minutes from a meeting held at Combined 
Operations Ileadquarters on Thursday, 26 February 1942. 
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and using the assault teams to subdue the Germans until the objectives were • 
destroyed. There would have been casualties, however, the plan clearly made 
every effort to minimize losses. 
Was the mission executed according to the plan and if not what 
ext.enuating circumstances dictated the outcome? Once the missio~ was 
launched it adhered very closely to the original plan until the enemy situation 
forced the support craft to withdraw and the commandos ashore to scatter. The 
Germans from the new town area quickly reinforced those Flak Brigade 
personnel in the dry dock area. The British lost fire superiority when they 
were forced to slow down the assault. Additionally, because the British were 
divided into assault, protection and demolition teams, some of the commandos 
ashore were only lightly armed and didn't stand a chance against the better • 
armed German troops. One other aspect of the German defenses that received 
only scant consideration in the planning, was the armed sailors aboard the 
vessels in port. When the fire fight began many of these sailors took up guns 
and killed severa] of the commandos, as well as disrupted the commando's 
ability to move to their assigned objectives. These actions by the Germans 
disrupted the entire flow of the assault and subsequently undermined the 
success of the operation. 
What modifications could have imtmroed the outcome? There are two 
approaches which would have improved the outcome. The CAMPBELTOWN 
could have rammed the dry dock, offloaded her commandos and picked them 
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up within 20 minutes by high speed boat. This would have accomplished the 
primary mission and reduced the loss of life. Or, as Ryder suggested, use a 
motor torpedo boat to attack the dry dock. Unfortunately, this second option 
would have only damaged the dry dock temporarily. In order to render the dry 
dock completely inoperable, the commandos had to get ashore and en~er the 
pump house and windin-g house. Still, the ashore missions could also have 
been accomplished with a minimum of personnel. 
The mission of the Combined Operations Command was to "be offensive." 
In that respect Sl Na7.aire was an attempt to take the fight to the enemy. 
Irrespective of the reasons, an assault force was assembled and a plan was 
formulated to destroy the dock yard area. Let's now examine where was 
relative superiority achieved and how the Principles of Special Operations were 
used to improve the Probability of Mission Completion. 
2. Reb.ti.ve Superiority 
Special operation forces, because of their limited sustainability and 
requirement fur either quick egress or rapid reinforcement from conventional 
forces, m ust achieve relative superiority quickly. By increasing the number of 
primary objectives the British essentially were attempting m ulti ple 
I"ngagement.<; in a single area of operation and therefore, were required to 
achieve relative superiority several times in order for the overall operation to 
succeed. Relative superiority, instead of becoming a "point in time" became 
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several points in time and therefore the speed of execution was decreased and 
the opportunity for failure was dramatically increased. 
The British did gain relative superiority when the CAMPBEL TOWN 
struck the dry dock and owing to the concealed nature of the 4 1/4 tons of 
demolition, were able to sustain that relative superiority until the or~nance 
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Figure 4-11 shows that the Point of Vulnerability occurred when the 
CAMPBELTOWN and the rest of the flotilla entered the mouth of the Loire 
River. It was here, along the COilst line, that the Germans had positioned their 
batteries to engage enemy ships. Although the crossing the Atlantic was not 
without risk, the flotilla had the destroyers ATHERSTONE and TYNEDALE for 
protection. It was not until the flotilla left the safety of the destroyer escorts 
that the success of the mission hinged on avoiding the German defenses. From 
midnight on 27 March, until thirty minutes after, the CAMPBEL TOWN was in 
an Area of Vulnerability. The ship had to cross the shallow waters to avoid the 
coastal batteries. If she had run aground the mission would have failed. 
Fortu nately, the hull modifications reduced her draft and the shoal waters 
caused only momentary delays. At 0030 hours the entire flotilla entered deep 
water. It was at this point that the CAMPBELTOWN achieved relative 
superiority. With the CAMPBELTOWN's improved speed, modified hull, 
armor plating and hold full of demolition, the British had gained a decisive 
advantage over the Germans protecting the dry dock. The frictions of war now 
affected the Germans more than the British. The Flak Brigade would have to 
react quickly to prevent the CAMPHELTOWN from completing her mission. 
f 'ortunately for the British, and as planned, the close·in harbor defenses were 
inadequate to stop the armor plated "war wagon." At 0134 the 
CAMPBELTOWN struck the dry dock. That morning at 1030 the mission was 
completed when the CAMPBELTOWN exploded destroying the Normandie dry 
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dock. The total Area of Vulnerability for the CAMPHELTOWN portion of the 
raid did not exceed 5% of the mission. It is interesting to compare this aspect 
of the raid, with the failed attempt to land the commandos at the Old Mole and 
Old Entrance. 
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Figure 4-12 graphically illustrates the motor launches attempt to land 
the commandos. From the Point of Vulnerability there is a sharp rise in the 
Probability of Mission Completion. The motor launches were able to use 
surprise and speed to negotiate the shoal waters and enter the harbor 
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undetected. Unfortunately, once they were engaged by the Germans, the thin 
hulled motor launches were ill equipped to withstand the 20mm rounds. Their 
inability to quickly land the commandos caused the Area of Vulnerability to 
expand and eventually made it impossible to gain relutive superiority. After 
two hours most of the motor launches were either destroyed or had retreated 
to open water. 
Had the Rritish achieved relative superiority at each necessary point 
throughout the engagement, they probably could have sustained that 
superiority long enough to place their demolition and destroy the targets. The 
plan, however, did not adequately addressed the withdrawal. Regardless of the 
outcome ashore, relative superiority could not have been maintained duri ng the 
extraction and casualties upon the return would have been high. 
3. '[he Principles of Special Operations 
On paper Operation Chariot sounded relatively sim ple: 
The troops will be divided roughly equally between the destroyer and the 
M.L.s, approximately 15 men going in each M.L. The whole force will 
proceed in company su as to approach St. Nazaire after dark on a 
moonlight night ... On anival the destroyer will ram the outer gate of the 
big lock, and the troops on board will disembark over her b ows, then 
proceeding to caJT)' out their demolition tasks. The remai nder of the force 
will disembark from their M.L.s at selected puints in the dockyard 
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area ... The whole force will withdraw in the M.Ls after a maximum period 
of 2 hours:" 
The staff planners at Combined Operations had succeeded in clearly defining 
the mission objectives; they had gathered extensive intelligence on the port 
facility and the C'~rman defenses, and armed with this knowledge they had 
devised a bold and innovative means of countering most of the obstacles. 
Nevertheless, the plan was not simple. Operation Chariot involved 611 men, 
16 motor launches, the destroyer CAMPBELTOWN, two escort destroyers, the 
TYNEDALE and the ATHERSTONE, and the submarine STURGEON. The 
plan called for the destruction of eleven major targets, using 257 commandos, 
from eight different units, most of who had never met prior 10 the final weeks 
of training. Once ashore at St. Nazaire, the commandos were divided into three 
elements for each target and the destruction of a target relied heavily on all 
three elements doing their assigned tasks, i.e., assault,. _ protection and 
demolition. At anyone point in the operation there cou1d have been fifty 
separate elements (16 MLs, 33 commando elements and a headquarters element) 
all required to act independently during the engagement and then reassemble 
at the designated time for extraction. This "simple plan" was exposed as 
difficu1t at the dress rehearsal (during which most of the commandos did not 
participate), however, the mistakes identified were not corrected and the plan 
'" Most Secret Draft Memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff. Operation 








'Went basically unchanged. What a Specl<l of the principle of simplicity weee 
ignored and what effect did they have on the operation? First, the planners 
failed to limit the objectives. 
In the plan as finally agreed upon, it was decided to make the destruction 
of the lock gates and m echanism of the FROME ECLUSE (Normandie dry 
dock) by H.M.S. · CAM PBELTOWN" the principal objective, while ,the 
destruction, first of the smaller South Lock gates and their installation, 
secondly of other key points such as pumping machinery for the Bassin, 
and thirdly of any accessible U-boats and shipping. were to be subsidiary 
objects in that order of priority.45 
In actuality by the time the plan was completed there were 
eleven primary targets assigned to the commandos. These incl uded: the two 
winding houses at the northern and southern caisson; the northern caisson 
pumping houst'!; the fuel storage tanks to th t'! t'!ast of the dey-dock; the swing 
bridges at the Penhouet basin and the Old Entrance; the lock gates at the Old 
Entrance; and the two bridges and two lock gates at the Main _Entrance. These 
objectives do not include the assault parties targets which consisted of; 
Forty-three guns of 20 mm, 37 mm, and 40 mm calibre ... skillfully 
(positioned) on the jetties at each side of the Avant port, on the Old Mole, 
on the southern caisson of the Normandie dock, and at the northern end 
of the submarine basin. Many of them were stationed on the top of 
concrete block houses, making it difficult to attack and even more 
difficult to shoot at from water level.~ 
<15 Ibi d., Combin e Operations, 72. 
" Ibid., Mason, 61 . 
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By increasing the number of objectives from one to eleven the 
• assault force was required to add 50 more soldiers and over 200 Naval support 
personnel. More importantly, it required ten additional small craft for 
transportation, added training for the demolitions, assault and protection 
elements, and most importantly required a modification of the tactics . . This 
increased scope in the mission compounded the command and control to an 
unmanageable level. Had the planners reduced the objectives to the dry dock 
alone, the commandos would never have needed to set foot ashore. Those 
aboard the CAMPBELTOWN could have rammed the destroyer into the 
southern caisson and extracted by a single h igh speed motor launch. Even if 
the requirement to destroy the pumping house and winding house remained; 
the training, logistics, and implementation would have been much simpler. As • 
we will see, expanding the objective increases the potential for problems in 
other areas and was the overriding factor in the disaster at St Nazaire. 
The intelligence on St Nazaire was superb. The planners had 
aerial photography, blueprints of the dock area, and detailed agent reports 
showing the exact location of all the coastal and harbor defenses.47 Armed 
with this infonnation, the planners developed a scheme to avoid the coastal 
41 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Montgomery, who helped develop the 
demolition plan, stated in an interview with the author that the contractors who 
built the British dry dock King George V, were the same ones who built the 
Nonnandie dry dock. These contractors were interrogated by British 






battt!ries by modifying the CAMPB ElTOWN and sailing her across the shoal 
waters. Once inside the inner ring of defenses, the armor plated old destroyer 
could withstand the 20mm harbor guns. The CAMPHELTOWN mission is an 
excellent example of how intelligence can be used to develop a plan w hich 
avoids or neutralizes the enemy's defensive advantage. As previously s~own, 
the CAMPBEL TOWN gained remtive superiority very early in the opera tion, 
primarily because good intelligence allowed the British to plan around the 
German' s natural defensive superiority, but also, because the British used 
innovation to oven:ome those obstacles. 
Considering the massive size of the NOfm3ndie dry dock and the 
seemingly impenetrable nature of the caissons, the plan for destroying the 
target was excellent. T he Comhined Operation's staff ingenious use of the 
CAMP8ELTOWN is an excellent example of using innovative technology to 
gain relaUve superiority. 
Under normal circumstances an old destroyer with a crew of fifty 
men would have been unable to negotiate the outer banks of the Loire river 
and destroy a heavily defended targeL By significantly modi fying the 
CAMP8ELTOWN the 8ritish were able to reduce the draft from 14 feet to 11 
feet, increase speed from 18 to 20 knots and improve the destroyer's 
survivabili ty by adding quarter inch armour. This allowed the 
CAMPBEL TOWN to steam across the shallow outer banks and s urvive the 
pounding of German harbor defense guns. 
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The most important modification was the addition of 4 1/4 tons 
of high explosives in the CAMPBELTOWN's bow. The demolition experts 
accurately calculated how far the bow would compress upon impact with the 
southern caisson. With this in mind they aITanged the twenty. four depth 
charges to achieve maximum destructive potential. The results were 
impressive. The explosion completely unhinged the caisson sending the 
CAMPBELTOWN and millions of gallons of water into the dry dock. The dock 
remained out of commission for the rest of the war. 
The other technological innovation that had profound effects on 
the outcome of the mission was the modification to Sub·Lieutenant Wynn's 
motor torpedo boat. The torpedo tubes, which were nonnally situated in the 
rear, were remounted on the foc'sle and loaded with special torpedoes 
equipped with 1800 pounds of explosives and a delayed action time fuse. 
Ducing the final stages of the action, Wynn fired his torpedoes at the Old 
Entrance gate and departed. Hours later the torpedoes exploded as planned. 
In addition to these innovations, the commandos gained some 
limited advantage through the use of the Bren submachine gun, which held a 
32 round magazine and had a rate of fire of 500 rounds per minute. With a 
weight of 6.62 pounds and only 30 inches long the Bren allowed the 
commandos to move quickly, and carry more ammunition to sustain their 






guns, but it gave the commandos a decided advantage ovec the individual 
Gennan soldier. 
In retrospect. the plan for SL Nazaire made excellent use of good 
intelligence and innovative technology, however, it was far from simple and as 
the n umber of objectives and the level of participation increased, so ~d the 
level of di ffic ulty. 
b. Security 
Because of a passion for security, they [the bomber pilots] had been told 
nothing of the nature of the raid going in below them, and were flying 
under orders which severely restricted their bombing activity ... As one uf 
them la ter pleaded: 'Why didn't you tell us what was going on in S t. 
Nazaire that ni ght? We would have taken our bombers down to zero 
altitude to help with the landing.~ 
The failure of the bombers to provide continuous cover for the 
landing party resulted in the German's redirecting their attention toward the 
river and eventually detecting and destroying the flotilla. Although this aspect 
of overbearing security was the most glaring, it was not isolated. D uring the 
planning and preparation, only a handful of men knew the details of Operation 
Chariot, and most of these men did not participate in the actual mission. The 
demolition teams trained for months at various docks around England, but 
never kn ew the ultimate goal of their training. Later, Eric de la Tone, one of 
the men in the demolition party, said that each man had "too much" equipment 
4Il Ibid., Mason, 146-149 • 
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nWe could have done a lot more with less. It was a pity too, we'd have been 
much faster. ~~9 Had the demolition parties known ahead of time that they • 
were going to ron 500 yards through a hail of German bullets wearing over 95 
Ibs of equipment, the plan might have been changed - for the better. 
The dress rehearsal that was conducted at Devonport. only 
included a portion of the force, for fear that a full scale rehearsal might reveal 
the intent of the mission. Consequently, the majority of the commandos never 
had an opportunity to off-load from the motor launches on to the mole pier 
under simulated combat conditions. And, the demolition teams, who were not 
included in the rehearsal, never exercised their missions in conjunction with 
the protection and assault parties. In fact, the various units that were involved 
in the raid had little or no contact with each other until just days prior to • 
launch. 
Even during the actual operation Robert Montgomery recalled 
that security continued to remain tight: 
Not many of the crew of the CAMPBELTOWN even knew it (the 4 1/4 
tons of demolition] was down in the hold. And I don't think any of our 
chaps knew. Now you might say that that was for security reasons. But 
it wouldn't have been necessary to have security at that time.so 
( 9 Ibid., Eric de la Torre. 





The "passion for security" that surrounded the raid on St. Nazaire 
proved to be detrimental to success. It prevented effective planning by 
iSOlating personnel who could help identify tactical problems and contribute 
ideas to improve the mission. Overbearing security limited effective 
preparation by reducing the scale of the dress rehearsal, which thereby failed 
to adequately test the plan prior to launch. Keeping the various commando 
and naval units separated also prevented any "cross-.pollination~ of ideas and 
methods which could have improved the execution. Finally, a failure to ~trust 
[the bomber pilots] with at least an outline briefing on the raid" caused the air 
raid deception plan to fail and the element of surprise was lost.s l Security is 
important, b ut not at the expense of good planning, preparation and execution. 
c. Repeti tion 
As I have stated before, large forces are unable use the Pri nciples 
of Specia1 Operations to achieve relative superiority because they cannot fully 
assimilate the principles during planning, preparation or execution. The raid 
on St. Nazaire is an excellent example of this dilemma and how the problem 
of large fOKes impinges on success. 
The plan for Operation Chariot, by virtue of the size of it's 
raiding faKe and complexity of the mission, was not simple. And, the security 
SI Ibid., Mason, 148. 
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surrounding the preparations for the raid was overbearing and limited 
• individual dialogue which could have improved the tacticl;l. Both of these 
factors compounded the problem when it came time for a rehearsal. first, with 
611 men and a host of support platforms, most of which were not colocated, it 
was difficult to organize and then conduct a rehearsal. l'urthermore, once a 
limited rehearsal was arranged, there was concern about the inadvertent 
disclosure of the operation, so many of the key elements did not participate. 
How did this lack of a full dress rehearsal effect the outcome of the mission? 
The mission suffered from two major shortcomings; first, the 
inability of the motor launches to land the commandos quickJy, and secondly, 
a disjointed assault resulting from too many targets and too little unity. Both 
of these problems could have been identified in a full dress rehearsal. Had all • 
the commandos and all the motor launches participated in the rehearsal; it 
would have been apparent that landing in sequence was a slow procedure that 
required modification. Additionally, if during the dress rehearsal all 257 
commandos had gotten ashore, it would have become obvious that ~unity of 
command was a big problem. 052 Directing that many men over a two hour 
period and then attempting to extract under fire, was more than a small 
headquarters element could hope to control. 





Again, owing to the size of the force and concern about security, 
the plan was rehearsed only once. What fe w problems were identified, never 
had the opportunity to be resolved in a simulated environment. The value of 
repeti tion cannot b e overemphasized. Although individual skill training.. i.e., 
demolition placement, small boat handling, and weapons firi ng: was 
exceptionaJly thorough for all phases of the mission; the fail ure to conduct a 
full dress rehearsal prevented the commandos from understanding how these 
individual skills needed to "dovetail " in order to be effective in combat. These 
shortfalls in the preparation phase, eventually surfaced in the executions phase 
with disastrous results. 
The planners of the raid on st. Nazaire suffered from a com mon 
problem among special operations personnel. They equated surprise to relative 
superiority. T hey assumed that gaining the element of surprise would 
immediately provide them with a decisive advantage. In a ground engagement,. 
surprise alone cannot overcome defensive warfare. Surprise is only a prelude 
to a longer battle, and the enemy generally has the advantage the longer the 
battle continues. Had the Combined Operation's Staff approached the raid from 
the position that there would be no surprise, or at best minimum surprise, the 
plan would have been conSiderably different. 
Over reliance on surprise placed the small craft in an untenable 
position. Like submersibles that rely solely on stealth theircollp de main, once 
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compromised, small craft have virtually no protection from the enemy.53 This 
• was particularly true in the case of St. Nazaire, where the target was ringed 
with shore batteries and the only escape route was back to the Atlantic through 
a gauntlet of coastal guns. By overestimating the value of surprise the planners 
falsely assumed that the motor launches could land the commandos an~ then 
somehow loiter until extraction time. Had they planned for no surprise, they 
could have used the speed and agility of the motor torpedo boats to ~outrunn 
the shore batteries and fire on the Old Entrance as well as the dry dock. This 
would have negated the use of the commandos, but it would have improved 
the chances of achieving relative superiority by making better use of the other 
principles of special operations i.e., innovation and speed. 
The CAMPBEL TOWN aspect of the mission did not rely entirely • 
on surprise. The planners knew that the ship "would be an excenent target for 
coastal battery No.3 at a range of 3200 yards.".;t Consequently they planned 
around the defensive strong points and relied on the armor plating to sustain 
the vessel until impact. This proved to be an effective plan, for even when the 
CAMPBEL TOWN was plastered by shore batteries, five minutes from the target 
- she still sailed to victory. 
53 Some of today's small craft have the advantage of speed in excess of 60 
knots, nonetheless, it is still difficult to outrun a fixed or rotary winged alert 
aircraft. 





The importance of the principle of surprise cannot be 
understated, nor however, should it be overestimated. Surprise generally 
provides only a momentary advantage, and although it is usually necessary for 
success -- alone, it is not sufficient for success. 
e.~ 
They should ideally be ashore no longer than 11/2 hours, laniling at 0130 
and reembarking at not later than 0330 hours on 28th March.H 
In a raid, more so than seizing an objective, speed is vitally 
important. The raiding party is at a tremendous disadvantage because it must 
destroy it" objective and escape the danger area before reinforcements arrive. 
At 5t. Nazaire the German defenders numbered apprOximately 300 with a 
reinforcement of 6000 men within a few miles. Trus number does not include 
the sailors aboard the seventeen vessels in the immediate vicinity. 
Those 1:ommandos that got ashore qui1:kly from the 
CAMPBEL TOWN d id an eX1:ellent job of destroying the German gun positions 
and moving to their targets. Unfortunately, they began to be overwhelmed 
within thirty minutes. 
Had all the 257 commandos gotten ashore as planned it is 
conceivable they could have destroyed the small bridges that connected the dty 
>3 Ibid, Mason, 43. 
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of St. N azaire to the dock area and prevented German reinforcements from 
• overrunning their positions. This would have allowed the demolition parties 
time to carry out their assigned tasks and reembark the motor launches. The 
flaw in the plan was the assumption that they could get sufficient combat 
power ashore quickly enough to prevent immediate reinforcement ~y the 
Germans. 
Again the approach used aboard the CAMPBELTOWN was 
simple and well conceived. As soon as the old destroyer impacted the southern 
caisson the commandos stormed ashore. Even with heavy German resistance 
the soldiers were ashore in under five minutes. This eventually led to a 
successful attack of the dry dock targets. 
The same logic was not applied to the soldiers disembarking • 
from the motor launches. The plan called for a staggered landing of the 
commandos at both the Old Mole and the Old Entrance. Sol Even under the 
best of circumstances it would have taken fifteen minutes for the last 
commando to set foot ashore. As it was, the British failed to quickly seize the 
shoreline and eventually were forced off their landing site by overpowering 
Gennan gun fire. 
54 The commandos were fully aware of the off luad problems, but were 
constrained by the lack of good landing sites. The Old Mole and the Old 
Entrance provided the only quick access to the dock area that did not involve 
climbing the quay wall with full equipment. 
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The plan also called for the motor launches to loiter in the river 
for one and a half hours after landing the commandos. This extended time 
window in conjunction with the lack of cover on the river placed the motor 
launches in an impossible position. Of the seventeen boats that participated 
in the operation eight were destroyed in the river. Of these eight motor 
launches four; Piatt,. Stephens, Heart, and Tillie were hit while attempting to 
land the commandos. However, the other four MLs - lnvin, Burt,. Rodier and 
Nock -- were hit while maneuvering in the river, at least two of these boal'l 
being destroyed by coastal d efense guns. 
Therefore, even if the commandos had gotten ashore and isolated 
the objective area, the ninety minutes of loiter time would have allowed the 
Gennans ample opportunity to range and engage the boats with coastal defense 
and naval guns. Even those motor launches that did escape left within sixty 
minutes of the initial engagement and most suffered personnel casualties from 
coastal gunfire. 
This raid provides the best example of differences in the 
application of speed in an operation. When speed was properly used the 
commandos aboard the CAMPBEL TOWN were able to successfully accomplish 
their mission. When the decision was made to add more targets at the expense 
of speed (and simplicity) the plan brokt! down and disaster resulted. 
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f. Purpose 
It had been so impressed upon us, 'You must get to your target,. doesn' t 
matter how many are killed, don't stop to hi!lp anybody, just get to that 
target and lay your charges.'s; 
CPL Eric de la Torre 
No.3 Commando 
In 1942, the British had been atwarwith the Germans for almost 
two years. The British Expeditionary Force had suffered a humiliating defeat 
on the continent and been forced to retreat unceremoniously from Dunkirk. 
At home the British had to endure continuous bombings by the Luftwaffe that 
cost thousand of English lives. Consequently, it was not hard for the raiders of 
St. Nazaire to develop a sense of purpose for this mission. 
Although I have continually faulted the planners for not limiting 
their objectives, at least when the objectives were identified, ..each commando 
knew exactly what was expected of him. There was no dispute over the 
purpose and assigned roles of the individual units. Each unit including the 
demolition, the assault,. the protection, the headquarters, and the naval parties 
understood its objectives and trained extensively, albeit separately, for its 
missions. 
Personal commitment was also not an issue. Captain Robert 
Montgomery, who helped plan the mission, understood the consequences ahead 






of time, ~ I knew I wasn't going to get back," he said.56 Nevertheless, he 
accepted that fact and enthusiastically pressed onward. Corporal Eric de Ja 
To rre thought, "All of us would be killed ... we (weren't( going to come out 
[alive]." Hut even with this premonition, de la Torre concluded, HI wouldn't 
have missed [the raid on St. NazaireJ for the world."57 
As expected, where a sense of purpose was not instilled, the plan 
failed. The p ilots, who for security reasons had not been advised of the plan, 
never developed a sense of purpose for the mission. They flew to St. Nazaire 
d ropped a limited number of bombs, and then, owing to low cloud cover and 
light flak, returned to England. Had the Royal Air Force been informed about 
the raid and understood the need for the air cover; there is no doubt that they 
would have gone to any lengths to support the commandos . 
Without purpose, a plan must be perfect and able to overcome 
the disparity between the will of the enemy and the lack of personal 
commitment on the part of the attacking force. But, as the great Prussian Chief 
of Staff Helmut von Moltke said, "No plan sUJVives first contact with the 
enemy.~ Therefore, a sense of purpose is essential and what limited success the 
commandos did have, can be directly attributed to understanding their tasks 
and being fuHy committed to seeing them completed. 
5& Ibid., Montgomery. 
57 Ibid., De la Torre. 
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In conclusion, the raid on St Nazaire represents the best and worse of • 
special operations planning, preparation and execution. The use of the 
CAMPBEL TOWN to destroy the Normandie dry dock was a stroke of military 
genius. It maximized relative superiority by effectively utilizing all the 
principles of special operations. It was a simple plan with a single obj~ctive 
that made good use of innovation and intelligence. Security prevented the 
enemy from knowing the ship's mission, and, that the old destroyer contained 
4 1/4 tons of demolition. Although a ramming exercise was never conducted, 
the Captain of the CAMPBELTOWN, LCDR Sam Beattie, had thousands of 
steaming hours, thereby repeating the process of sailing in a straight line 
countless times. Surprise was achieved through deceptive signalling and after 
surprise was lost,. time to the target was under five minutes. Finally, the sailors • 
and commandos aboard the ship had a clearly stated purpose with a personal 
commitment to see the mission completed. 
On the other hand, the operation of the MLs and commandos at the Old 
Mole and Old Entrance shows the limitations of a large force. The plan was 
complicated, security was overbearing. rehearsals were inadequate, surprise was 
minimal and basically ineffective, and the speed on target was insufficient In 
the end, only a sense of purpose and the indomitable spirit of the British 




V. OPERATION OAK 
THE RESCUE OF BENITO MUSSQLlNl 
12 SEPTEMBER 1943 
A.. BACKGROUND 
On July 25, 1943, Benito Mussolini, the Fascist dictator who ha~ ruled 
Ilaly since 1922, was dismissed hy King Victor Emmanuel after Italy suffered 
military disasters in North Africa and Greece. Musso!ini was subsequently 
arrested by the Hadoglio government and secretly confined in a prison on La 
Maddalena island. "few weeks later he was moved to a hotel on top of Gran 
Sasso mountain in central Italy. Hitler knew that without Mussolini, Italy 
would soon fall into the outreached hands of the allies. It was essential that 
Mussolini be fOWld quickly and returned to the seat of Italian governmenL 
The Fuhrer ordered his staff to identify the best commando leaders in the 
German Armed Forces and have them report tu him immediately. One of these 
officers was Captain Olto Skorzeny. 
R. OTfO SKORZENY 
Otto Skorzeny was born un June 12, 1908 i.n Vienna, Austria. His father, 
Antun, was a successful engineer who tried to raise his son wilh an 
appreciation for the arts and music. Skurzeny shuwed no interest in cultural 
activitit's, huwt'ver, he did follow his father' s advice and enrolled in the 
Techni.schen Huchschule in Wien (University of Vienna) as an engineering 
student. 
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Skorzeny was not a particularly good student but managed passing grades • 
in those essential subjects needed to graduate. Skorzeny's real passion was 
duelling and he earned a reputation as the finest swordsman in the school. 
Prior to graduating Sko17.eny had engaged in fifteen sabre combats, winning 
each one. In one duel, the opponent's sword sliced Skorzeny's face giving him 
a distinctive scar on his ' left cheek. Later during WWlI, when Skorzeny's 
reputation grew, the allies nicknamed him ~Scarface. · But,. duelling taught 
Skorzeny a valuable lesson. He said later: 
My knowledge of pain, learned with the sabre, taught me not to be afraid 
and just as in duelling when you must concentrate on your enemy's 
cheek, so, too, in war. You cannot waste time on feinting and 
sidestepping. You must decide on your target and go in. I 
Skorzeny eventually graduated from the University of Vienna in 
December 1931. He worked for several engineering firms and then started his 
own company. The year prior to graduating. Skorzeny joined the National 
Socialist Party (Nazis). During post war interrogations Skorzeny admitted his 
early affiliation with the Nazi party, but daimed it was his interest in road 
racing that enticed him into the organization. Each weekend the Nazis held 
road races around Germany and it appears that Skorzeny's passion for racing 
did indeed oUhveigh his interest in politics - initially. 
On February 12, 1938, the Chancellor of Austria under pressure from 
Hitler, signed the Anschluss (union) which paved the way for a Nazi takeover 





of Aus tria. On March 12, 1938, after several attempts by the Austrians to derail 
Hitler's plan, G erman soldiers were sent into Vienna. At a rally of the 
A ustrian Nazi party, the ousted Austrian president attempted to retake the 
royal palace by force. When a lethal confrontation between the Nazis and the 
Austrian army seemed inevitable, SkOIZfo!ny who was attending the, rally, 
intervened and prevented bloodshed. This act of bravado did not go unnoti ced 
by the head of the Austrian 55 Party, Ernst Kaltenbrunner. Kaltenbrunner 
would later recommend Skorzeny to command lhe Fuhrer's special troops. 
A year later when the war broke uut, Skurzeny requested assignment to 
the Luftwaffe, but at 31 years of age he was considered to old for flight 
training. Instead, he was ordered to a communications outfit, but soon received 
a tran!;fer to the Waffen 55. As an officer-cadet 5koI"'t:eny was assigned to the 
Division Reich which wa!; re!;pon!;ible for maintaining all the division's mobile 
equipment, including tanks, wheeled artillery and trucks. 
Skorzeny was constan tly in trouble dnd received several offici al 
reprimands. Once while drinking in a cafe in the Netherland!;, 5 korzeny 
demanded that a portrait of Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands be removed. 
When the cafe owner refused, 5korzeny shot the picture off the wall. The local 
Dutch citizens became furious and Skorzeny was confined to his barracks for 
six weeks. His efforl<; to become an officer seemed in serious jeopardy, 
however, all that was forgotten when Skorzeny captured 57 soldiers while 
fighting in Yugoslavia. He was promptly promoted to lieutenant. 
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When the Germans 
invaded Russia, 
Skorzeny's Division 
Reich suffered heavy 
causalities. Skorzeny 
was wounded in 
December of 1941, when 
shrapnel from an 
artillery shell hit him in 
the head. In January 
1942, he returned to 
Germany to recover 
from hls wounds. 
Several weeks 
after receiving treatment 
for his shrapnel wounds 
and a recuning gall 
bladder problem, 
Skorzeny was assigned 
to the Fifth Panzer Regiment in France. During this tour Skorzeny saw duty 







problem w as so severe that he was discharged from combat duty and sent to 
a repair depot in Herlin. 
That same year Admiral Canaris' Abwehr, the organization within the 
German High Command responsible for covert operations, was falli ng out of 
favor with Hitler. The Fuhrer rightfully suspected that Admiral Canari.s was 
attempting to betray the Reich, consequently Hitler fanned his own commando 
force under the auspices of the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA). The 
branch responsible for the commandos was the AMT VI-S. Skorzeny's old 
friend from the Anschluss days, Ernst KaJtenhrunner, recommended Skorzeny 
be placed in charge of the new unit, and on 20 April 1943, Skor~ny assumed 
command of AMT VI-S and was promoted to Captain. 
In September 1943 Skorzeny and his commandos from AMT VI-S, rescued 
M ussolini from Gran Sasso and Skorzeny was awarded the Knight's Cross to 
the Iron Cross. The rescue was used by the Reich Propaganda Leader, Joseph 
Goebbels, to elevate Skorzeny to the level of national hero. GoebbeJs named 
Skorzeny "the most dangerous man in Europe." Skorzeny was subsequently 
promoted to Major. His exploits during the remainder of the war were almost 
as legendary. 
In October 1944, Skorzeny kidnapped Miki Horthy, the son of the 
Hungarian Regent, Admiral Miklos Horthy. The regent was planning to sign 
an alliance with Russia and Hitler hoped that the regent would reconsider his 
actions, if his son was in Gt!rman hands. When the kidnapping failed to 
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change the regents mind, Skorzeny developed a plan to seize the Citadel on the • 
Burberg,. Horthy's castle. In another show of pure bravado, Skorzeny, 
convinced that the Hungarians would not resist,. drove a column of German 
soldiers directly to the well protected citadel and seized it without a shot being 
fired. 
As the war wound down to its final stages, Skorzeny was tasked with 
organizing a special brigade of English speaking Germans to disrupt allied 
activities in the Ardennes. The Germans, disguised as American soldiers, tried 
to take the Meuse bridehead and hold it until they could be reHeved by 
conventional forces. The attempt fell well short of its main goal, however the 
Germans commandos did create considerable confusion and fear among allied 
units. By the war end, Skorzeny was a divisional Commander and in charge • 
of all special forces in the Third Reich. 
Skorzeny surrendered to the Americans on May IS, 1945, and was tried at 
Dachau for war crimes committed during the Ardennes offensive} He was 
acquitted on September 9,1947, but the Germans forced Skorzeny to stand trial 
as a Nazi. Under mysterious circumstances, Skorzeny escaped from the 
2 The prosecution charged that Skorzeny had violated the Law of Armed Conflict 
when he ordered his men to disguise themselves as American soldiers. Skorzeny's 
defense council argued that this was common practice among the allies as well and 





internment camp at Darmstadt and later surfaced in Argentina.J 
While in Argentina Skorzeny helped recover millions of dollars of Third 
Reich money that had been sent to Juan Peron for nsafe keeping." The money, 
w hich was part of the Bormann treasure was used to establish the Organization 
for the Release of Former SS Members (ODESSA).4 
In 1951 Skorzen y returned to Madrid and under the protection of the 
Spanish government he opened an import export company. He used the 
company as a conduit to move SS Office", from Germany to aU parts of the 
world. He was also heavily involved in supplying money, passports and 
escape routes to the Waffen-55 veterans' association HIAG and the Federation 
of German Soldiers. ODESSA and a similar organization Die Spinne 
cunsumed the remainder of Skorzeny's life. Glenn Infield in his book 
5 k orzeny Hitler's Commando stated: 
The ' feeding and caring' of former 55 members by 5korzeny and his 
associates since the end of the Third Reich has been a marvel of patience, 
intrigue, and meticulous planning, as well as a display of b ruWity and 
J On 27 July 1948 three ~ American" military police arrived at Darmstadt to take 
5korzeny to Nuremburg for a scheduled hearing on the de-nazification trial. The 
German guard intimidated by the "American~ officer released 5korzeny into his 
custody. After the war when Skorzeny was asked where his rescuers stole their 
American uniforms, he responded, "They weren't stolen. They wt!re provided by the 
Americans." (Interview with Otto Skorzeny by Glt!nn Infield in 1973) 
, Martin Hormann was the I-lead of the Party Chancellery and Hitler's private 
secretary. Toward the end of the war Bormann withdrew an estimated $127 million. 
According to Glenn Infield it is widely suspected that Skorzeny helped Kormann ship 
the money in armored trucks to Spain where it was taken by U-Boat to Argentina. 
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terrorism learned under the Fuhrer. Hitler left a legacy of violence to the • 
world; Skorzeny made certain it was preserved.s 
Otto Skorzeny died of cancer in Madrid on July 5, 1975. 
C. JAGDVERBANDE S02 - UIE COMMANIXlS 
On April 20, 1943 Skorzeny reported to the Reich Central Security Office, 
Chief of Political information and was given command of section Amt'VI-S. 
His immediate supervisor was MajorWalter Schellenberg head of Amt VI. The 
first day on board Schellenberg briefed Skorzeny as to his new assignment: 
He told me (Skorzeny) he wanted me to take charge of the schools being 
established to instruct agents of the new unit and to convert an SS 
battalion called Oranienberg into a sabotage and subversive organization 
renamed Jagdverbande 502 (Hunting Group). All orders were verbal. 
Nothing was on paper.6 
Skorzeny quickly found that the lack of dear written directions and a 
convoluted chain of command created considerable confusion. In theory Amt 
VI-S worked for Amt VI, Major Schellenberg. Schellenberg worked for RSHA 
which was headed by Skorzeny's friend Kaltenbrunner; RSHA came under the 
command of the SS. In practice, however, the head of the SS, Heinrich 
Himmler, frequently by-passed the chain and went directly to Skorzeny. 
Additionally, for political reasons the Abwehr, headed by Admiral Canaris, also 
had oversight of the Amt VI-S' operations. Canaris detested the S5 and was 
5 Glenn 8. Infield, 5korzeny Hitler's Commando (New York: Military Heritage 
l'ress, 1981), 230. 
6 Testimony of Otto SkoIZeny at Nuremberg. November 6 1945, taken by 






therefore constantly attempting to tbwartAmt VI-S' efforts to establish it viable 
organization. 
Sko~ny's initiaJ attempts to defi ne his unit's roles and missions and 
procure facil ities and eq uipment for training proved frustrating. He states in 
his autobiography, "I had to wrestle with an infinite number of bureaucrats in 
order to wrench from them the minimum I needed ."7 Eventually, however, 
Skorzeny's tenacity paid off. His first recruit was Karl Radl, an old college 
acq uainlance. He and Radl scoured the Gennan army for the finest personnel 
available, this included men from the Brandenburg Battalion, the Waffen 55, 
and the 5 5 Parachute Batta1ion. HimmJer also directed the Kampf Geschwader 
200, an elite aviation squadron, be assigned directly to Skorzeny to provide 
aircraft for insertion and extraction. The Kampf Geschwader 200 was equipped 
with gliders, piloted V-ls, Storks, and a variety of rltmote controlled b ombs and 
aircraft 
Skorzeny established his commando headquarten; in a small castle at 
J;ri edenthal, near Oranienburg. Here he erected barracks, hangars, a 
gymnasium, installed a drill field and began to devltlop his training regiment 
Skorzeny had always beltn enamored by the British commandos. Using 
recovered documenlo; and information from captured British agents, Skorzeny 
studied the selection, training and employment of Lord Louis Mountbatten's 
7 Otto Skorzeny, Skorzltny's Sltcret Mission (New York: E.P. Dutton, Inc., 1950), 
20. 
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Combined Operations forces. By using a double agent net, Skorzeny was even 
• able to obtain a British silenced pistol and the suppressor for a Sten gun, both 
of which he used in the training of his commandos. Additionally, at the 
prompting of Kaltenbrunner, Skorzeny studied the successful operations of the 
Abwehrs Brandenburg Battalion.3 
In November 1943, Skorzeny finally began to train in earnest, consciously 
avoiding the fact that Germany was losing badly and that the war might end 
any day. '''Too late!' should not figure in the vocabulary of a soldier,n he later 
recalled.9 The training required each commando to be well versed in a number 
of areas: 
Each man was first to be trained thoroughly as an infantryman and an 
engineer; next, he was to gain at least a rudimentary knowledge of rifle 
grenades, field pieces and tanks. Obviously, he was to know how to • 
handle not only a motorcycle and an automobile but also a motorboat and 
a locomotive. (Skorzeny) also encouraged all manner of athletics, 
especially swimming. A course for parachutists was also in prospect.1O 
The commandos spent much of their time exercising against muck Soviet and 
Angio-American targets in the hopes that they would be deployed nbehind the 
lines" in a sabotage role. A certain number of the men also received instruction 
3 Ibid., Testimony of Otto Skorzeny at Nuremburg. While being interrogated at 
Nuremburg Skorzeny stated that he had hoped Kaltenbrunner wouJd provide him 
clear guidance in establishing the commandos. Instead, Kaltenbrunner said, nyou are 
an SS leader. You are supposed to know how to organize and lead such a battalion. 
Use the British commando and the Brandenburg Battalion as an example.n 
9 Ibid., 21. 





in English and Russian for the same purpose. By July 1943 there was little 
doubt that S~orzeny's special unit was in fact the finest trained, best equipped 
and best lead commando outfit in the German Armed Forces. All they needed 
now was an opportunity to pmve it. 
D. Pl.ANNING ANU PirnPAKATIONS 
On July 23, 1943, Otto Skorzeny was relaxing at the Hotel Eden in Berlin 
when he received a message to telephone his headquarters. Over the phone 
Skorzeny's secretary told him that the Fuhrer wa nted to see him and that a 
plane would be waiting for him at Tempelhof airport. 
When Skorzeny arrived at the airport his executive officer, Karl RadI, met 
him with a suitcase and new!'> that Mussolini had been overthrown. But neither 
Skor-Leny Dar Radl "dreamed of associating this event with (Skorzeny's) orders 
to report to G.H.Q.nll Travelling aboard a specially configured J unker 52, 
Skorzeny flew to Hitler's "Wolf's Lair" situated in Rastenburg, East Prussia. 
Skorzeny arrived at the Wolfs Lair at approximately 2000 and was 
immediately escorted to the Tea House, a one story building with two wings 
joined by a covered passageway. Inside the lightly camouflaged building.. 
Skorzeny met five other officers apparently summoned for the same reason. 
Soon afterwards, a Waffen 5S Captain announced that the six men would be 
meeting with the Fuhrer and each man was to give a brief summary of his 
H Ibid., 36. 
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career which would be followed by questions from Hitler. Skorzeny later • 
recalIed: 
At first I thought I must be mistaken. Then an unreasoned fear almost 
swept my legs from under me. In a few moments, for the first time in my 
life, I was to stand in the presence of Adolf Hitler, Fuhrer of Greater 
Germany and Supreme Commander of the German Armed Forces! Talk 
about your surprises, here was one to end them all! Moved as I was, I felt 
sure I would make some unpardonable break or behave like an idiot.12 
Hitler entered the room and was presented to each of the six officers. The 
Fuhrer wanted to know which of the men knew the terraln around Italy. 
Skotzeny replied that he had driven through the countryside from one end to 
the other on his motorcycle. Then addressing all the officers, Hitler asked 
"What do you think of the Italians?" "IDe first five officers responded with an 
obligatory statement about the strength of the axis relationship and how good 
an ally the Italians were. When it was Skorzeny's tum to reply he stated 
firmly, "I - am an Austrian, my Leader, and our attitude toward Italy is 
prejudiced by the happenings in the previous World War and by South 
Hitler dismissed the other officers and ordered Skorzeny to remain. He 
told Skorzeny: 
12 Ibid., 40. 
13 Mussolini Event. Foreign Military Studies. 0-318 (National Archives Record 
Group 338) 24. South Tyrol was annexed during WWl by the Italians and the 




I have a mission of the highest importance for you. Yesterday 
M ussolini, my friend and our loyal partner in the struggle, was 
betrayed by his king and arrested by his own compatriots. Now I 
cannot and will not abandon the greatest of Italians in" his hour of 
peril. For me the Ouce represents the personifi cation of the last of 
the Roman Caesar. Italy, or rather her new government,. will no 
doubt join the enemy camp, but I shall not go back on my word: 
Mussolini must be rescued, and speedily, otherwise they will deliver 
him up to the Allies. I therefore intrust yOll with this mission: its 
successful outcome will be of incalculable bearing upon the 
development of future military operations.!4 
Hitler told Skorzeny that the operation must be ~abso]uteJy secret" and that 
only five people would know the details of the mission. 
14 Ibid., 29. 
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As of that moment, Skorzeny's special group was detached from the 
• Luftwaffe and would report directly to General Kurt Student, commander of 
the XI Parachute Corps. Student was an expert in airborne operations having 
also been instrumental in planning the glider attack on the fortress at Eben 
Emael. Hitler also directed Skorzeny not to discuss the operation wi~ the 
German Embassy in Rome. Hitler believed Field Marshall Albert Kesselring, 
commander of the German Armed Forces in the Mediterranean and his staff, 
"listen(ed) completely to the monarchy ... " and had ~gone soft in the southern 
sun," becoming "half-Italians themselves."15 
After a final word of encouragement from Hitler, Skorzeny was dismissed 
and directed to another room where he met with General Student and the head 
of the GeSlapo and Waffen SS, Reichsfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himm1er. Himm1er • 
gave the two men a brief on the political situation in Italy. When Skorzeny 
began to take notes, Rimmler flew into a rage, reminding Skorzeny that this 
mission was top-secret. 
Himmler was certain that Italy's defection was assured with the transfer 
of government. Italian diplomat'> were currently in Portugal negotiating with 
allied emissaries. The question was not if, but when the government would 
leave the axis camp. Around midnight Himmler departed and Skorzeny and 
Student began to plan the basics of the mission. The first problem was to find 
1, Ibid., Infield, 31. 
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Mussolini. Once EI Duee was iocated, the details of the mission could be 
worked out. In the meantime, Student arranged to have the XI Parachute Corps 
sent to Italy fcum their bast'! in southern France. Skorzeny contacted Radl and 
ordered him to identify 50 commandos and have them prepared to depart for 
Italy tomorrow. When Radl asked for amplifying information, Sko.rzeny 
responded: 
I cannot give you more exact details over the telephone ... tonight no sleep 
for anybody ... have all the trucks ready because we must pick up 
equipment. .. ! am taking fifty men with me, our best men, that is all those 
who can more or less speak Italian .. J shall draw up a list, you do the 
same thing.. and we will talk over whom to chose ... everything must be 
done by five in the moming .• ,16 
An hour later Skorzeny called Radl and gave him a list of equipment he 
wanted prepared prior to the next day's departure. It partially included two 
• machine guns per nine men, tommy guns for all the rest; grenades, tracers, 
rocket launchers, sixty-five pounds of plastic explosives _ (British made), 
detonators, helmets, undenvear, radios, medical supplies, civilian clothes and 
rations for three days. Radl infonned Skorzeny that the troops were in 
Hrebdlion.~ No one wanted to stay behind. Skorzeny directed Radl to 
immediately post the names of those who were going on the mission. This 
way the decision would be quickly finalized and it wou1d minimize the troop's 
discontent. 
16 Ibid., Skorzeny, 48. 
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At three in the morning Skorzeny was shown to his room, a small cabin 
in an air raid shelter. With the excitement of the mission on his mind 
Skorzeny did not sleep. He eventually got out of bed and drew up his last will 
and testament. Later that morning, posing as General Student's aide-de-camp, 
he and Student departed East Prussia and flew to Kome's Pratica di. Mare 
airport landing at approximately 1330. 
From Rome, the two men were driven to Marshal Kesselring's 
headquarters at Frasquati. That evening over dinner Student subtly inquired 
about the possible location of Mussolini. Student was careful not to seem over 
anxious about Kesselring's answer. Kesselring, however, had heard nothing 
and was content to believe that the Italian General Staff was equally in the 
dark about Mussolini's imprisonment. 
Two days later Skorzeny's men arrived with the Xl Parachute Corps and 
established a base camp close to the Pratica di Mare airport. Skorzeny 
informed his men that they were ordered to conduct a very important mission. 
but he gave no specifics. He detailed his senior enlisted men to keep the 
troops in top physical condition and Skorzeny personally inspected all the 
commando's equipment to ensure it was ready for immediate use. After 
providing instructions to his men, Skorzeny and Radl, departed for Frasquati. 
Upon arriving in Frasquati, Radl was informed as to the nature of the mission: 
He showed himself as surprised and stirred as I had been to hear the 
Fuhrer's orders. From the beginning we were agreed on one point; it 







being held prisoner. As for our action, in other words his actual 
libe ration, we did not ever dream ahout it because Zero Hourstill seemed 
to us to be very far oH.u 
Skorzeny was right, Zero Hour was indeed far off. For the next four weeks he 
and Radl made every effort to find Mussolini. All rumors no matter how 
fantastic were investigated. Fortunately for Skorzeny, there were still officials 
within the Italian government who supported the Fascist dictator and were 
willing to come forward with bits of infonnation. On a tip from a fruit vendor, 
Skorzeny and Radllearned that Mussolini had been moved by the carab inieri 
to the island of Panza. lJefore this could be confirmed (which it was later), 
Mussolini was moved again to La Spezia, on the Ligurian coast of Northwest 
Italy. At La Spezia, Mussolini was imprisoned aboard an Italian cruiser. When 
this intelligence was received by the German High Command, Skorzeny was 
ordered to mount an immediate rescue attempt! 
I.uckily we learned next day that the Duce had once more changed 
prisons ... No Doubt at G.H.Q. they imagined nothing was easier than to 
make a man vanish from under the eyes of the crew of a cruiser on war 
footing.18 
After several more unfounded rumors, it was suspected that Mussolini 
had been moved to the naval fortress on Santa Maddalena, a small island north 
of Sardinia. Skorzeny, accompanied by Lieutenant Warger (an Italia n speaking 
17 Ibid.,54. 
18 Ibid., 57. It was later confinned that Mussolini had been aboard the Italian 
cruiser PANTI-IERE and then transferred to Naval Base at La Maddalena under the 
custody of Ad miral Bruno Brivonesi. 
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Gt!rman commando) and Commandt!r Hunaus, the German liaison to the Italian 
Navy, conductt!d a visual reconnaissance of the area by sailing along the coast 
line and into the small port facility. The security in the port,. at the naval fort 
and at near by Villa Weber was heavier than usual. The villa was guarded by 
150 men with a 24 hour police patrol on the surrounding streel'l and ~lleys. 
Additionally, temporary -telephone lines had been installed at the house 
apparently to allow the guard commander in the villa to call for immediate 
reinforcemenl'l. 
The following day, Lieutenant Warger, disguised as a German sailor, 
returned, rented an apartment and reconnoitered the villa and the naval fort. 19 
At night Warger visited the local bars trying to determine if the Italian sailors 
• 
knew where Mussolini was interned. In three days, Warger returned to • 
Skorzeny with a detailed report on the guard routine and exterior gun 
emplacements of the villa and the fori:. By now Skorzeny was convinced that 
Mussolini was indeed held at Villa Weber. 
On August 18, 1943, while Radl began to develop the basic plan for 
rescuing Mussolini from Santa Maddalena, Skorzeny commandeered a Henkel 
111 to conduct an aerial reconnaissance of the fort. After taking off from Rome 
the aircraft made several intermediate stops and then headed for Santa 
19 Italy was stil1 officially an Axis power and had not broken diplomatic ties with 
the Germans. Across the channel from Maddalena, on the island of Sardinia, was a 




Maddalena. Unfortunately, as the Henkel flew out over the Tyrrhenian Sea 
two Hritish fighters appeared and shot down the plane. Skorzeny recalled later 
he, ~was s till taking pictures when the plane suddenly jerked violently and 
started a sharp descenl"ze Miraculously none of the crew was killed and 
Skorzeny suffered only three broken ribs. Within two days he was rescu~d and 
returned to Rome. 
Upon his return, Skorzenywas informed that the Abwehr had determined 
that Mussolini was not on Santa Maddalena, but on Elba. Convinced that the 
Ab wehr's intelligence was wron& Skorzeny asked for, and received, another 
audience with Hitler. The next day Student and Skorzeny flew back to East 
Prussia and upon landing were immediately ushered into to brief Hitler. In 
Hiller's company were Joachim von Ribbentrop, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs; General Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of Staff of the High 
Command; General Alfred Jodi, Chief of the Operations Staff of the High 
Command; Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, Commander in Chief of the German 
Navy; Marshall Hermann Goerin& Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, and 
Himm ler. After receiving an introduction from Student,. Skorzeny was directed 
to state his position. Skorzeny later recalled how nervous hewas to be briefing 
so influe ntial an audience: 
20 Ibid., National Archives Record Group 338, 103. 
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In the beginning I had terrible stage fright; the gian(:es of these eight men • 
so flustered me that I forgot to consult the notes I had prepared during 
my trip from Berlin.21 
Gradually, however, Skorzeny regained his confidence and convinced the 
Fuhrer that Mussolini was not on Elba, but on Santa Maddalena. Using a map 
he had sketched out on the flight to the Wolfs Laic, Skoaeny explain~d his 
plan. It involved the use of a squadron of swift boats and six minesweepers. 
On the minesweepers a companyofSS troops and Skorzeny's fifty commandos 
would be embarked. 
' , ' 
• 
• ) .. coo f \ SA RD 'N"N .. .,,~ 
Figure 5-3. SkOlzeny's Plan to Rescue Mussolini from La Maddalena. 
21 Ibid., Skorzeny, 65. 
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On D~day minus one, the squadron of swift boats, which were nonnally 
based in Sardinia, would make an official· port visit to Maddalena, T he 
minesweepers, with 5S troops and commandos embarked, would cross the 
straits from Corsica and anchor out 1()(){) yards from the fort. The following 
morning at dawn, the SS troops would land and surround the vil1~, cut 
telephone lines, seize the· cannons that guarded the port, destroy several naval 
vessels and act as a blocking force against reinforcemenl .. from the forl. 
Skorzeny and his fifty commandos would march in formation from their 
landing spot directly to the villa. Once at the villa Skorzeny would demand 
the release of Mussolini. Skorzeoy felt that marching his commandos to the 
villa would be an act of such boldness that it "would increase the effectiveness 
of (the) surprise attack."22 Hitler was exceptionally pleased with the plan and 
granted 5korzeny pennission to conduct the mission, however he warned 
Skorzeny, "If the mission is a failure, ... I win fi nd myself obliged to repudiate 
you in public and state that you acted on your own initiative."23 
The mission began exactly as planned. Radl departed for Corsica to direct 
the onload of S5 troops and the swift boats arrived at Maddalena on schedule. 
5korzeny decided to make one last reconnaissance of the port. Dressed as a 
Gennan sailor he and Warger wandered into town and struck up a conversation 
12 Ibid., 69. 
23 Glenn Infield interview with OUo 5korzeny in 5korzeny Hitler's Commando 
36. 
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with a lone carabinieri. Skorzeny weaved the discussion around to MussoHni 
• implying that Duce was dead, at which time the policeman announced with a 
great deal of pride, "Of course Mussolini is not dead! Why I saw him myself 
this morning. I was one of his escorts down to that white ambulance seaplane 
which took him off the island.~24 Skorzeny, realized that the carabinie? was 
telling the truth. He immediately contacted Radl, only to find out that German 
intel1igence had already confirmed Mussolini's departure from La Maddalena. 
Skor.zeny cance]led the operation and returned to Rome. 
The next several weeks bits of information began to arrive at Skorzeny's 
headquarters. Radio messages intercepted by German intelligence pinpointed 
the area where M usso1ini was held:2S 
The report stated that on August 27 Mussolini had been flown from • 
Maddalena to Vigna di Valle on Lake Bracciano then taken by ambulance 
to the village of Assergi. There he boarded a funicular railway which 
took him up the Gran Sasso - where he was hidden in a botel.u; 
Unfortunately for Skorzeny, there was no information on the hotel other than 
a old travel brochure. Prior to serious planning.. Skorzeny knew that he had 
to conduct a reconnaissance of Gran Sasso, but time was getting short The 
situation in Rome was deteriorating daily. On 7 September, General Maxwell 
24 Charles Foley, Commando Extraordinary (New York: Bantam Books, 1979), 43. 
Z5 James I"ucas, Kommando: German Special Forces of World War n, (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1985), 99. It was also learned after the war that Skorzeny and his 
men had captured two carabinieri officers and tortured them until they confirmed the 
intercepted radio report 




Taylor had secretly arrived in IWy to discuss an armistice with the 8adoglio 
government. Italian divisions were withdrawing from the front and 
surrounding the capital city. If the Germans hoped to rescue Mussolini, it had 
to be now. 
E. SPORTI-IOTEL CAMPO IMPF.RATORE - GRAN SASSO 
Sporthotel Campo Imperatore was a 70 room hotel located on top of Gran 
Sasso mountain.. a 6300 foot peak in the Central Apennines range. Situated on 
a small plateau, the hotel was surrounded on the north and east by sevl!ral 
higher peaks which rose to an elevation of 7500 feet. To the south of the hotel 
the plateau dropped off into small narrow valley. The hotel could only be 
reached by taking a funicular railway (tram) fro m the base of Grom Sasso to the 
plateau. The plateau itself was strewn with large and med.ium sized rocks 
which were not visible from the air, but on the ground created a hazard to 
Skorzeny's gliders and somewhat hampered the movement of the commandos. 
Below the mountain to the west lay the valley of L' Aquila w hich extended 
in a southeasterly direction from Temi to Sul mona and was bordered on the 
northeast by Gran Sasso and on the southwest by the Abruzzi mountains. 
In the valley the Italians had positioned carabinieri outposts all along the 
road leading from the town of L'Aquila to the base of Gran Sasso. At the hotel 
there were an estimated 200 Italian soldiers and carabinieri. They were 
commanded by Inspector Giuseppe Gueli, a carabinieri officer.Additionally, a 
high ranking Italian general and his bodyguards were present at the hotel. The 
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Italians had only loosely positioned their troops around the hotel never 
expecting any type of airborne assault. They assumed that the only weak point 
in the mountain defense was at the funicular railway. The Italians who were 
guarding Mussolini, however, were not necessarily loyal to the new Badoglio 
government. Although Skorzeny had no foreknowledge of the Italian soldiers 
political allegiance, their lack of the will to fight, coupled with the surprise and 
speed with whi ch Skorz.eny's commandos assaulted the hotel, proved to be 








F. THE ASSAULT ON GRAN SASSO 
On the morning of 8 September, Skorzeny, Radl and another staff officer 
boarded a German reconnaissance airplane at Pratica di Mare and took off for 
Gran Sasso. In order to maintain security within the German ranks, the pilot 
was informed that the p urpose of the flight was to photograph clandestinely 
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ports on the Adriatic Sea. To conceal this reconnaissance mission from the 
• Italians, Skorzeny ordered the pilot to fly over the Abruzzi mountain range at 
an altitude of 8500 feet, well below the nonnal flight patterns of the Italian Air 
.liorce. 
The aircraft, which was equipped with an automatic camera, began, to set 
up for the photo test run 20 miles west of Gran Sasso. Unfortunately, the 
camera, which was in the belly of the plane, was covered with frost and 
wouldn't advance the film. Skorzeny moved to the rear of the plane and cut 
out a window in the aft gunners turret. Using a hand held camera, which he 
had brought along for just such an emergency, Skorzeny leaned out the aircraft 
with Radl holding his feet. At this altitude, the outside temperature was so 
cold that Skorzeny could only snap a few pictures and then had to retreat back • 
into the aircraft. As the plane rose to clear the mountain range, Skorzeny 
noticed a small biangular shaped meadow that was adjacent to the hotel. This 
he detennined would be the best, and possibly the only place to land his 
commandos. 
The pilot continued on toward the Adriatic. After pretending to 
photograph an Italian port facility, Skorzeny ordered the pilot to return via 
Gran Sasso at an altitude of 21,000 feet. This time Radl was held outside the 
plane and he proceeded to finish the photo reconnaissance. 
On the return trip to Rome, Skorzeny looked out the window and the sky 





allied invasion of Salerno. Three waves of bombers attacked the German 
strongholds around Rome, but upon landing Skorzeny found his headquarters 
still in tact. The Italians had signed the armistice and the Germans now stood 
isolated in the ancient capital. 
Over the next few days, chaos reigned around Rome. General S~dent, 
who had been placed in charge of most German Forces in the area, conducted 
a magnificent series of maneuvers, and managed to stabilize the situation.27 
This effort to secure Gennan positions required Student's full attention and the 
operation to rescue Mussolini was delayed until German reinforcements could 
be brought in from southern Italy. 
In the meantime, Skorzeny made one final attempt to verify Mussolini's 
location. He arranged to have an unwitting German medical officer travel to 
Gran Sasso to determine the hotel's suitability as a malaria clinic. The doctor 
traveled through Italian lines and managed to reach the funicular railway at 
Gran Sasso before he was turned away. Upon his r~turn the doctor told 
Skorzeny that there were a number of carabini~ri outposts all along the road 
from L' Aquila to Gran Sasso and that the funicular railway was heavily 
guarded. The townspeople, with whom the doctor had talked, infonned him 
27 Roger Edwards, German Airborne Troops (New York: Doubleday & Company, 
Inc., 1974), 116. The Second Parachut~ Division and the 3rd Panzer Division were 
made available to General Student to help protect Rome and keep vital 
communication lines open to Gennan division in the south of Italy. 
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that a number of high ranking Italian officers had stayed in l' Aquila and that • 
all the civilians in the Campo Impertore hotel had been dismissed. 
Figure 5-6. Skorzeny's Plan for Rescuing Mussolini from Gran 
Sasso. 
On 10 and 11 September, Skorzeny continued to refine his plan of attack. 
It was clear that an assault up the mountain was not feasible. If the rescue was 





The small patch of grass t hat Skorzeny had spotted on the aerial reconnaissance 
seemed to have potential as a landing site. The idea of conducting a parachute 
operation was also quickly ruled out; the air was too thin and the drop zone 
to small to insert the parachutists. 
Sko17.eny proposed using gliders and landing directly adjacent to the 
hotel. Student,. who had successfully employed gliders at Eben Emae! and was 
a glidet'pi lot himself, dearly knew the risks of attempting to land on a small 
area at high alti tude. Skorzeny recalled: 
After three almost sleepless nights of crisis ... the general was in no mood 
for hare-brained escapades. He sent for two technical officers of the 
Airborne staff, and [I] had to expound the scheme again in detail...23 
The Hexperts" were dead set against the idea and told Student that based on the 
terrain and rarefied air, only 20 percent of the gliders would survive the flight. 
Skorzeny made one final plea, ~There are some things you can't work out with 
a slide rule. That's just w here our experts may be wrong; and the Italians too. 
The safer the enemy feel, the better our chances of catching them unawares."29 
SkoI7.eny also reminded the general that the new DFS 230 gliders were now 
equipped with rocket and parachute brakes. Seeing no other alternative, 
Student reluctantly agreed, setting D-Day for 12 September with a launch time 
that would put Skorzeny overhead the hotel at 0700.30 Student subsequently 
28 Ibid., Foley, 47. 
?;'I Ibid., 48 . 
• lQ A. H. Farrar. Hockley, Student. (New York, Ballantine Books Inc., 1973), 121. 
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directed his staff to arrange for 12 gliders to be transported immediately from 
• southern Prance to Pratica di Mare airport. 
Returning to his headquarters, Skorzeny briefed the plan to Radl. In 
addition to Skorzeny's commandos, a parachute battalion under the command 
of Major Hans Mor would seize the funicular railway at the same tiIJ:te the 
gliders landed at the hotel. The 12 gliders, at nine men per glider, would land 
in preplanned areas with each glider group assigned a particular mission. Only 
twenty-six of the soldiers would be Skorzeny's commandos with the bulk of 
the 108 men from Student's XI Parachute Corps. 
Skorzeny realized that he was confronted by three major obstacles. Hrst, 
his commandos had to overcome the ~ltalian detachment quickly enough to 
prevent Duce's execution." Secondly, Skorzeny's men were "numerically • 
inferior" to the 250 man guard force and thirdly, that guard force was 
"entrenched in the hotel as in a fortress.~Jt To overcome these obstacles, 
Skorzenyand Radl agreed that his commandos had to rusembark the gliders 
and seize Mussolini within three minutes of landing. To some edent their 
numerical inferiority could be offset by the use of the new Paratrooper Rifle 
42, but routing out250 guards from an entrenched position would require some 
thought.J2 Radl finally proposed "convincing" General Ferdinando Solen, a 
JI Ibid., Skorzeny, 86-87. 





high ranking Italian carabinieri that he should accompany the Germans on the 
raid to prevent bloodshed .1l 
Once M ussolini was rescued there were three plans for extracting him. 
The most preferable plan was to move Mussolini from the hotel, down the 
funicular and to L' Aquila airport. From L' Aquila he would be returryed to 
Rome. If the L' Aquila airport was in.ilccessible, a Stork,. short take off and 
landing aircraft, could land in the valley. The third, and least desirable plan, 
was to have Captain Gedach, Students personal pilot, land on top of Gran 
Sasso and embark Mussolini for the return flighl 
The chances of actually succeeding on the mission seemed slim indeed. 
At one point in the planning, as Skorzeny began to calculate the possibility of 
success, Radl interrupted, "My dear Captain, please do not use a table of 
logarithms to evaluate our chance of success. We already know how 
infinitesimal they are. But we also know that we are going to undertake this 
operation at all costs. J4 
On 12 September at U500, Skorzeny and his men departed for Pratica di 
Mare airport. Student who would control the operation, had set up a 
command post from which to direct the action. It was not long before 
lJ Skorzeny had received intelligence that some of General Soleti's men were 
tasked with guarding Mussolini. Skorzeny felt certain that the guards would 
immediately recognize Solcli and that this would cause a momentary delay in their 
decision to fire. 
J4 Ibid., Skorzeny, 87. Emphasis added. 
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problems in the plan started to develop. The gliders, which were set to land • 
early that moming, were delayed until 1100. The Italian General did not arrive 
and Radl was required to go to Rome, find the carabinieri officer and forcibly 
bring him to the ajtport. It was explained to General Soleti that Hitler had 
personally asked for his assistance in this matter, after which the ~neral 
became more accommodating. 
At 1100 the gliders arrived and all preparations were made to launch at 
1300. The commandos and paratroopers loaded their gear and Skorzeny gave 
them a final brief. Pulling out a large map, he plotted all glider ground 
checkpoints, showed key terrain features and briefed individual glider groups 
on their responsibilities. Skorzeny and Soleti would be positioned in the third 
glider. The first two gliders would be used as guide aircraft and, after landing. • 
the commandos aboard would provide cover for Skorzeny as he moved to the 
hotel. Student, who was following the instructions closely, told the pilots that 
under no circumstances were they to conduct a vertical landing. If the terrain 
did not permit a horizontal landing, then the gliders were to abort. 
Toward the end of the brief, allied aircraft suddenly appeared and 
bombed the aitport causing minor runway damage. Fortunately, none of the 
gliders were hit. Shortly before 1300, the commandos and paratroopers loaded 
the aircraft and on signal from Skorzenythe tow planes and their gliders began 
to liftoff. Inside the canvas covered glider the commandos were packed tightly 
between their equipment and each other. The small cellophane windows 
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which bordered the cockpit were too dirty to see out, so only the pilot had any 
idea of the gliders location . 
• 
Figure >7. Skorzenys Glider Path from Rome to Gran Sasso. 
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During the hour long flight to Gran Sasso, Skorzeny periodically came • 
forward to the cockpit to check his bearings. Although the weather was good, 
large cloud banks obscured visibility to the ground making navigation difficult. 
Additionally, the clouds created severe updrafts causing the gJiders to make 
erratic pitching motions. Several minutes into the-flight Skorzeny noticed that 
the two lead tow planes and gliders were missing. He did not know until later 






Pulling a knife from his assault gear, Skorzeny cut a hole in the canvas 
fuselage. This enabled him to look out and judge his location. Below he could 
see the small town of T: Aquila, only minutes by air from Gran Sasso. Major 
Mor and his paratroopers, who had jumped into the valley a hOUf earlier, were 
proceeding to the funicular railway at the base -of the mallotal n. From his 
altitude of 8500 feet, Skorzeny could see the smaU triangular patch of grass that 
he had identified as the landing zone. Unfortunately, what had appeared flat 
and smooth from 21,000 feet was in reality a steep incline covered with small 
to medium boulders. Skorzeny knew that to land horizontally, as ordered was 
impossible. He made up his mind quickly and yelled at the pilot, "Dive -
crash land as near to the hotel as you can!,,)5 
The glider went into a "fantastic tailspin" before the pilot released the 
parachute brake and plowed into the small field, thirty yards from the hotel. 
Skorzeny's men jumped from the mangled glider and immediately proceeded 
toward the hotel. 
Skorzeny had previously ordered the commandos not to shoot less fi red 
upon. This silence added to the element of surprise. Pushing General Soleti 
before him, Skorzeny followed his men toward the hotl!! past an Italian guard 
who stood stunned as the Germans approached. The rear entrance led to a 
radio room where two Italian soldiers sat monitoring communications . 
. 15 Ibid., National Archives Record Group 338, 311 . 
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Skorzeny kicked the chair out from under one of the men and then smashed 
the radio with the butt of his tommy gun. 
The radio room was isolated from the main hotel, so the commandos 
immediately exited and circled around the outside to the main entrance. To get 
to the main entrance quick1y the commandos had to climb a 12 foot terrace 
wall. As Skorzeny was being helped over the wall by one of his NCOs, he saw 
Mussolini peering out a second story window. Skorzeny yelled to Duel', "Get 









By this time other gliders were making their approach. Skorzen y pushed 
his way intu the main entrance only to be confronted by several heavily armed 
carabinieri. As they raised their weapons to fire, General Soleti stepped 
forward and was recognized by the officer in charge. The Italians lowered 
their weapons ;md Skorzeny, without hesitation, continued upstairs to the 
second floor. Upon reachi ng the second floor, Skorzeny ran down the long 
corridor and threw open the door to Mussolini's room. 
M ussolini was surrounded by twu Italian officers. Skorzeny ordered t hem 
against the wall and then with the help of lieutenant Otto Schwerdt, 
Skorzeny's third officer, he ushered the Italians Ollt of the room. Skorzeny 
approached Mussolini and introduced himself, "Duee, the Fuehrer has sent me 
to free yuU.d7 Mussolini hugged Skorzeny and said, ~I knew my friend Adolf 
Hiller would not leave me in the lurch."3/! 
Two of Skorzeny's men suddenly appeared at the window. Unable to 
force their way through the lobby full of carabinieri, they had climbed up the 
lighting rod and were preparing to enter the room from the outside. Within 
three to four minutes of landing Mussolini was securely in German hands. 
l7 Ibid., 315. 
3/! Ibid., 316. 
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Figure 5-10. Glider/Stork Landing Positions on 12 
September 1943. (NPS Art Department Drawn from 






Glider 4, with Radl aboard, had landed and his men were taking up positions 
on the ground floor. Soon aftetwanls gliders 5, 6, and 7 t,:,uched down and 
thos~ commando groups also moved to their assigned positions. Glider 8 was 
not so fortunate. Upon final approach a down draft forced the gJider into the 
side of the mountain where most of the men were killed or critically injured. 
Outside the hotel several shots were fired and Skorzeny realized that the 
situation was deteriorating quick1y. Major Mor's m en had still not made their 
way up the mountain, and without reinforcements, Skatteny and his men wert.' 
severely out numbered. Skorzeny demanded to see the IWian officer in 
charge. Police Inspector Giuseppe eueH arrived within minutes. Skatteny 
gave the Italian sixty seconds to slll'nmder. Cueli left the room momentarily 
and returned with two glasses of wine. ~To the vidor!" he said, and 
surren dered the hotel to the Gennans.~ Within minutes of the surrender, 
Major Mors and his paratroopers arrived at the mountain station. As the 
Germans gained numerical superiority, the Italians became more and more 
cooperative; to the point where Skorzeny allowed most of the carabinieri 
officers to retain their side arms. 
With the situation under control, Skorzeny and Mors reviewed the options 
for returning Mussolini to Rome: 
Both he and I considered that it would be too dangerous to travel 150 
kilometers by road through an area which had not been occupied by 
." Ibid., 316. 
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Cennan troops since the defection of Italy. I had therefore agreed with 
Generalleutnant Student that Plan A should be the sudden coup de main 
against the Italian airfield of L' Aquila di Abruzzi, at the entrance to the 
valley.'" 
Unfortunately Plan A was cancelled when the radio operator could not raise 
Rome to request the transport aircraft be sent to L' Aquila. Plan 8 was 
subsequenUy aborted when the Stork aircraft, which was to land in the valley, 
damaged its landing gear. Finally, it was decided to bring in Captain Gerlach' s 
Stork and land beside the hotel. 
'" Winston G. Ramsey, "It Happened Here: The Rescue of Mussolini," After The 








After several minutes, during which the carabinieri and Gennans cleared 
a makeshift air strip, Gerlach landed his plane. Although the Fieseler 126 
Stork was only built for two passengers, Skorzeny insisted on flying with 
Gerlach .il.od Mussolini. Gerlach argued vehemently against the idea. It would 
endanger the entire mission. Skorzeny realized, however, that Mussolini was 
solely his responsibili ty. He wrote later about the episode: 
Suppose the take-off resulted in catastrophe, my supreme consolation 
could only be to blowout my brains. How could I ever face Hitler to 
announce that my mission had succeeded but Mussolini had died shortly 
after b eing freedr l 
Gerlach relented, ~Wellf for God sake come!"41 After a few mome nts, Gerlach 
got in and started the engines. Mussoli"i crawled into the second seat and 
Skorzeny wedged in behind the dictator. Skorzeny's men and some of the 
carabinieri held the wings and tail section until the engines achieved the 
appropriate revolutions per minute. At the right moment, Gerlach signalled for 
the soldiers to release the aircraft At full power the small plane b umped 
down the rocky slope occasionally cakhing a soft spot in the soil. As the Stork 
reached the edge of the plateau it fell toward the valley below gaining air.>peed 
and eventually leveling out. The rescoe from Gran Sasso was complete. 
4 J Ibid., Skorzeny, 102. 




Mussolini. (Courtesy Imperial War Museum) 
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Student. Student informed Duel' that Hitler was expecting him in Vienna. 
Reluctantly, the Italian dictator boarded a Heinkeln1 for the flight to Austria. 
Skorzeny, who knew that glory, and his wife, awaited him in Vienna, insisted 
that he accompany Mussolini. The last leg of the «,scue a1most turned tragic, 
when the pilot of the Heinkel got lust in the darkness and clouds, and flew 
around aimlessly until midnight before he and his passengers finally landed 
in Vienna. 
Skorzeny che<:ked into the Imperial Hotel. Early that morning a full 
e onel came to Skorzeny's room. He took off his own Knight's Cross to the 
Iron Cross and presented it to Skorzeny. Immediately afterward Hitler called 
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to congratulate Skorzeny: "Today, you have carried out a mission that will go • 
down in history. You have given me back myoid friend Mussolini. I have 
given you the Knight's Cross and promoted you to Strumbannfuhrer 
(major)."'] This officially ended the mission to rescue Benito Mussolini. 
G. ANALYSIS 
1. Critique 
Were the objech'ves worth the risks? Hitler hoped that by rescuing 
Mussolini and returning him to the seat of power, that Italy would return to 
the axis camp. This never occurred and although Mussolini was the puppet 
head of government in northern Italy, he never regained support in Rome. 
Less than two years later, in April 1945, Italian partisans captured and executed • 
MussoJini, hanging his body in the town square in Milan. It is doubtful, after 
reading Skorzeny's post WWII account of the Mussolini Event, that he believed 
that rescuing Mussolini would really make a difference. He notes several times 
in his writing the dissatisfaction of the Italian people towards fascism and 
Ouce. One of the reasons Skorzeny elected not to take M ussolini back to Rome 
via the roadways, was fear of Italian reprisals. 
Nevertheless, the mission was well worth the risk. I'irst, it 
demonstrated that Hitler was prepared to take extraordinary steps to save his 




friends and allies. Secondly, it showed the professionalism of the German 
Armed Forces to conduct such a raid. Thirdly, it may have actual ly foresWl ed 
some Italian resistance in the la .. t two years of the war. Goebbels the Minister 
of I' ropaganda, used the operation to promote German superiority and fea r 
among the allies, both of which appeared to work. The mission also 5.et the 
precedent for future commando operations including, the kidnapping of Miki 
Horthy, the attempts to assassinate Marshall Tilo and General Eisenhower, and 
the deception operations during the Ardennees. Finally, considering that only 
ten men were killed or wounded (in the glider landing), during a time when 
thousands of soldiers were losing their lives daily, the risks appear well 
justified. 
Was the plan developed to maximize superiority over the enemy and 
minimize risk to the assault force? In the Mussolini rescue operation, 
maximizing conventional superiority would not have improved the chances of 
rescuing Mussolini. M assing forces at the base of Gran Sasso would only have 
provided the Italians ample time to kill Mussolini. Gaining relative superiority 
through tht! use of a bold plan was the only viable alternative. The Hotel 
Campo Imperatore was locatt!d at 6300 feet with no approachable avt!nues on 
any side. The use of gliders, although risky, was certainly preferable to 
parachutes. With the drop zone at 6300 feet the parachutists would have 
jumped from a minimum altitude of 6800 feet. A low level drop of this sort 
presents innumerable problems. For instance, the jumpers would have lost the 
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element of surprise by inserting in a propeller driven jump aircraft; the winds 
• at that altitude would have dispersed the jumpers across the drop zone and 
possibly off the mountain. Even at low levels, the jumpers would linger in the 
air for 10 to 15 seconds. Finally, once on the ground the jumpers would have 
to exit their parachutes quickly. In light of the problems of a par~chute 
operation, the use of gliders dearly was the best choice and maximized surprise 
and speed. 
The plan took into account the limited sustainability of Skorzeny's 
glider force by adding Major Mar's parachute battalion. These troops not only 
reinforced Skorzeny's commandos, but provided a large escort force for the 
return overland trip to Rome. 
Even with all these troops, the Italians still could easily have spoiled • 
the rescue. The brilliance of the plan was the use of ~neral Soleti to confuse, 
momentarily, the Italians. This deception was the great equalizer and helped 
Skorzeny minimize the risk to his assault force. 
Was the mission executed according to tlu! plan and if not what 
extenuating circumstances dictated the outcome? The operation was executed 
according to plan with two exceptions. Only nine of the twelve gliders landed 
at Gran Sasso, two were damaged on takeoff and glider number eight crashed 
into the side of the mountain. This did not appear to effect Skorzeny's 
execution of the mission. With Mussolini in Skorzeny's custody and Mors's 
paratroopers reinforcing the commandos, Skorzeny was able to carry out his 
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plan. The real dilemma came when both initial extraction plans fell through. 
Fortunately, the tertiary plan, landing Captain Gerlach's Slork proved 
workable. 
What modifications could have improved the outcome? Even though 
the Stork proved a successful extraction platform, Skorzeny could have di~cted 
Captain Gerlach to land in the valley and consequently reduced the risk of 
taking off from a small plateau. Otherwise, the plan was well conceived and 
well executed. The mission was dominated by security, surprise and speed, but 
relied heavily on the moral qualities of boldness and courage to face down the 
Italians and quickly seize the objective. 
2. Relative Superiority 
The graph of relatilH! superiority (Figure 5-15) shows that Skorzeny 
was able to achieve a decisive advantage over the enemy within m inutes of 
landing. by using gliders to gain surprise and the pI"!sence of General S oleti 
to confuse the Italian guards long enough to reach Mussolini. This is 
particularly impI"!ssive considering there were only nine men in Skorzeny's 
glider, verses 250 Italians guarding Mussolini. Eventually, the other g liders 
arrived to help sustain the advantage, but not until after relative superiority 
was a chieved. Relative superiority was supported throughout the mission by 
the paratroopers and Skorzenys acts of boldness, which were so audacious that 
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Gaining relative superiority did not guarantee mission success. 
Mussolini still had to be returned to Rome, and the first two alternative 
extraction means were overcome byevents. Had Skorzeny attempted to return 
Mussolini to Rome via the overland route, it is conceivable that the Gennans 
could have been intercepted by Italian troops and Mussolini retaken. 
Skorzeny's decision to fly Mussolini off Gran Sasso, via the Stork, 







the tenseness between the Germans and the Italians was immediate ly diffused 
and the Germans were able to return to Rome by vehicle, unhindered by Italian 
intervention. 
The graph shows the Point of Vulnerability to be the glider's fi nal 
approach into Gran Sasso. This was the first line of defenses the Italia~s hild 
against an airborne attack. Prior to this time the glider force was in no danger 
of being engaged by the IWians. Although friction came into play (two g liders 
were damaged on take 0(1), these actions were not imposed by the enemy. 
I'he X~Axis shows a toW time of one hour. T his was the length of 
time between Skorzeny's glider landing and MussoJini's departure in the Slork. 
Conceivably you could extend the time frame to two hours to include the 
return trip from Gran Sasso to Rome. Reaching relativt: superiority only took 
four minutes and sustaining it was fairly easy, consequently the Area o f 
Vulnerabili ty was extremely small. Based on a percentage of time, the Area of 
Vwnerabili ty did not exceed 12% of the entire mission. Although graphically 
this was an ideal mission, the Principles of Special Operations were well 
supported by the moral factors of boldness, courage and intellect. And, the 
frictions of war worked primarily in Skorzeny's favor. Had g liders 1 and 2 
arrived as scheduled, without General Soleti aboard, it is highly probable that 
the Italians would have fought the Germans. Once a firefight began, it is 
doubtful that Skorzeny could have achieved relative superiority. The next 
299 
section will show how the Principles of Spedal Operations contributed to 
gaining relative superiority. 
3. The Principles of Special Operations 
a. Simplicity 
The plan to rescue Mussolini was simple, not necessarily by 
choice, but by circumstances. Nevertheless the three elemenl .. of simplicity 
were present. Skorzeny's only objective was to get Mussolini. Although the 
glider groups had certain responsibilities, i.e. securing the funicular railway, 
sunuunding the hotel, etc., these were ancillary to the main objective. The fact 
that three gliders failed to make the landing and yet the mission was still 
accomplished, supports this argument. 
Mars's paratroopers also had a support role, which was to secure 
the valley and control the base station of the funicular railway. It is arguable 
whether or not this was essential to success.44 It is virtually impossible to 
reach the Hotel Campo Impertore without using the funicular rail, so Mars's 
44 There is considerable debate about who was the actual "hero" of Operation 
Oak. After the mission was completed, Major Mars and General Student both 
complained that Skorzeny's role was overstated and that the real accolades should 
have gone to Mors and his parachute battalion. Clearly Mors played a significant role 
in both the planning and execution of the mission, but it was Skorzeny who 
conducted the aerial reconnaissance, it was Skorzeny who was the first to land at 
Gran Sasso, H was Skorzeny who controlled General Soleti and it was Skorzeny who 
first reached Mussolini. Whether Skorzeny was a "strap hanger" or the "mastermind" 
of the operation is inconsequential. Ultimate success resulted from Skorzeny's actions 







troops could not have conducted the assault from the valley. It was only after 
the mou ntain top was secure that they were able to assist the commandos and 
help sustain relative sUller;ority. Although ancillary or support roles are 
essential in most special operations, they should be held to a minimum to 
reduce the level of command and control. 
Intelligence for the raid was far from ideal, however, Skorzeny 
did have an opportunity to conduct a personal reconnaissance of the target 
prior to execution. Without this aerial reconnaissance, Skorzeny would have 
been limited to a travel brochure and a small scale map of the L' Aquila valley 
area, neither of which could have given him the insight needed to develop a 
simple plan. By seeing for himself the location of the hotel, the triangular 
landing zone, and the funicular railway, Skorzeny crafted the best plan 
possible. Not knowing the floor plan of the Campo Impertore did cost 
Skorzeny a minor delay, however, he made up for this loss by stormi ng the 
main entrance and intimidating the Italians who guarded the hotel. 
As discussed earlier, the use of gliders seemed to be innovative, 
but the alternative options were actually non-existenl General Student, as 
heild of the XI Parachute Division WilS well aware of the limitation of 
parachutists. And, Student had used gliders on several other occasions, (Eben 
Emael, Crete) with reasonilble success. Although Studenfs biography implies 
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he was reluctant to approve a glider assault, he probably realized there were • 
no other viable altematives.4S 
What was innovative and significantly improved the simplicity 
of the plan, was the use of General Soleti to delay the Italians. This ruse 
prevented the Italians from engaging the I:ommandos and thereby reduc~d the 
obstades the commandos -had to overcome. Had the commandos been required 
to fight their way into the hotel, the operation may not have succeeded. 
Although not used, it is worth noting that this was the first deployment of the 
Paratrooper Rifle Model 42, whkh if required would have given the 
commandos a small edge in fire power over the Italians.46 The plan to rescue 
Mussolini used the three elements of simplicity - limited objedives, good 
intelligence, and innovation to reduce the frictions of war and improve the • 
opportunity for success. 
b. Security 
Throughout the operation to locate and rescue Mussolini, all the 
participants were conscious of the need to maintain utmost secrecy. During 
Skorzeny's first meeting with Hitler at the Wolfs Lair, the Fuhrer said, "Your 
mission to free the Duce must be kept particularly secret. I have ordered, and 
4S Ibid., A.H. Farrar-Hockley, 121 . 
... The Paratroop Model 42 was a 7.92 x 57mm gas operated mal:hine gun with a 
20 round magazine, I:ollapsible bi-pod and weighed only 9.93 Ibs. Also used by 
Skorzeny's commandos and the paratroopers was the Schmeisser MY 38 9mm 
Submachine gun which had a 32 round magazine and weighed 9.5Ibs. 
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I give you the order to you expressly, that only a total of five persons may 
know of this plan .~47 Although the number of people privy to the search grew 
larger than five, it was still contained to those who had a need to know. F.ven 
Marshall Kesselring, the theatre commander, was not informed. 
Skorzeny states in his account of the Mussolini Event, that. every 
effort was made to disguise the nature of the mission. There were three levels 
of cover. On the surface, Skorzeny's commandos entered Italy disguised as an 
element of the XI Parachute Division (Skorzeny posed as Studenfs Aide de 
Camp). When this cover was exposed, Student gave Marshall Kesselring 
another story which claimed Skorzeny's men were on a special commando 
mission having nothing to do with Mussolini. This was the ~real" reason for 
the commando's presence. Satisfied with this story, neither Kesselring nor 
Italian spies pursued the issue further. 
A problem arose, however, when Skorzeny needed to access the 
intelligence community without exposing the reason for his questions. Even 
with the assistance of a high ranking German intelligence officer, intelligence 
request" had to be vague. Consequently, Skorzeny and Radl had to sift 
through volumes of information to isolate the location of Mussolini. Even after 
Mussolini was located, Skorzeny had to keep up pretenses. His flight over 
Gran Sasso would have been more productive had he informed the ~rman 
H Ibid., National Archives Record Group 338, 24-29. 
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pilot as to his reconnaissance needs. And, the unwitting doctor who travelled • 
to Gran Sasso, if informed, could have gathered more detailed intelligence on 
the Italian position in the valley. Fortunately, these "minor" inconveniences 
did not effect the outcome of the mission. Security was tight, but not 
pervasive. The Italians, who were fully prepared to ward off an atte~pt to 
rescue Mussolini, did not gain an advantage through lax German security. 
c. Repetition 
There is little historical information on the extent of pre-mission 
rehearsals, however it is doubtful that Skorzeny's men conducted a full dress 
rehearsal prior landing on top of Gran Sasso. The various aspects of the 
mission, in particular, the glider and Stork take-offs and landings and the 
building assaults, were "routine" for both the pilots and the ground troops. It • 
is dangerous to single out this mission as an exception to the theory. Although 
it was indeed successful, there was no enemy resistence. Had there been 
oppostion to the assault; a rehearsal might have made all the difference 
between success and failure. 
d. Surprise 
The Hotel Campo Impertore resb! on a plateau that is no larger 
than four or five acres. On that small parcel of land were approximately 200 
to 250 Italian carabinieri and soldiers. At 1400, Skorzeny's glider approached 




other gliders landed several minutes aftenvards, sailing further up the sloping 
mountain. 
It is almost inconceivable that no Italian soldiers saw the gliders 
before they lAnded. Additionally, Mars's Parachute Battalion had driven 
through L' Aquila valley an hour earlier and had passed through several 
carabinieri outposl'i. The hotel overlooks the entire valley. A troop movement 
of that magnitude would not go unnoticed. Even if the gliders did land 
undetected, Skorzeny had only nine men in glider number 3, and g lider 
number 4 did not arrive until five minutes later. The element of surprise did 
not give Skorzeny an immediate tactical advantage. In the first few minutes 
of the "engagement/ the Il..;r; lians could easily have defended the hotel or 
repelled the Germans with minimal effort. It was after the landing that 
"surprise" was effective. 
Two deceptive actions contributed to the element of surprise. 
First, Skorzeny onlered his men not to fire, unles s fired upon. The Italians 
were .accustomed to Genn.an soldiers and probably viewed most of them as 
allies. By not firing at the Itali.ans, the Gennans prevented unnecessary 
confrontation, and kept their initi.al movements to the hotel quiet. Secondly, 
by the time the first few commandos re.ached the hotel, Gener.al Soleti w.as out 
of the g lider and visible to the c.arabinieri. This surprise appe.ar.ance mentally 
dis.anned the It.ali.ans .and gained precious time for Skorzeny to reach 
Mussolini. 
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The stlVngth of the Italian's defense was the location of the hotel. 
The Campo lmperatore appealVd to be in the perfect defensive position. It was • 
6300 feet above the valley and unapproachable from any direction except by the 
funicular railway, and that was guarded top and bottom by over a hundred 
soldiers and police. It was probably inconceivable to the carabinieri th~t any 
force would attempt an assault from the air, particularly a gliderbome attack 
into such a small landing zone. The Italian's defensive weakness was exploited 
by Skorzeny and allowed him to gain surprise, even if surprise, in a tactical 
sense, was a fleeting proposition. Once on the ground, Skorzeny was able to 
make the most of his situation. 
The Mussolini rescue made use of all three elements of surprise: 
timing.. deception and exploiting the weak poinL"! in the defense. But in the • 
end, it was speed that dominated the moment and helped Skorzeny achieve 
relative superiority. 
e.~ 
Skorzeny planned to reach Mussolini within three to four 
minutes of landing at Gran Sasso. He felt that speed was imperative to ensure 
Mussolini's survival. As soon as the glider came to a stop, the commandos 
were moving for the hotel. Unfortunately, pre~mission intelligence did not 
provide an accurate layout of the hotel and Skorzeny and his men incurred a 
short delay in the communications room. This may have proved to be 
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fortunate, for Skorzeny was able to destroy the radio and prevent the Italians 
from calling for reinforcements. 
Skorzeny soon found the main entrance and b ullied his way past 
the Italian guards stationed in the lobby. Approximately fOUf minute s into the 
mission, Mussolini was in Skorzeny's custody. A minute later, Radl and the 
remaining gIiders began landing and securing their assigned positions. 
Additionally, Mors and his paratroopers were gaining control of the funicular 
railway. All o fthis action transpired within ten to tifteen minules of the initial 
landing. Within thirty to forty minutes, the Italians had surrendered and 
Mussolini was preparing to depart for Rome. Speed not only reduces the Area 
of Vulnerability, it prevents the enemy from raising the level at which relative 
superiority is achieved. But. speed in the face of an uncertain enemy requires 
a compl ete commitment to the purpose of the mission. 
f. Purpose 
When Hitler first met with Skorzeny, the Fuhrer made it clear 
tha t the rescue of "the savior of Italy" was essential to the survival of AxiS.43 
Whether this was the ca se or not is a moot poinl Skorzeny had been ordered 
by "Adolf HiUer, Fuhrer of Greater Germany and Supreme Commander of the 
German Armed Forces,"'~ to save "his friend Mussolini."so Skorzeny was so 
.., Ibid., 25 • 
• ~ Ibid., Skorzeny, 40. 
50 Ibid., National Archives Record Group 338, 25. 
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moved by Hitler's request that it "almost swept (his) legs from under (him).·51 
When he told his executive officer, Radl, that HiUer had personally entrusted • 
him to rescue Mussolini, Radl was awe struck. These were two young officers 
who had just been given the mission of their life, and both knew that failure 
meant,. not only personal and professional shame, but probably death. Radl 
told Skorzeny that if they failed, the two SS Officers "could always share a 
padded cell in one of Himmler's special sanatoria."Sl 
Skorzeny's sense of purpose is evident from the beginning. He 
went to unusual lengths to see the mission succeed. While reconnoitering La 
Maddalena, his plane crashed and Skorzeny broke three ribs. Later, he 
personally conducted reconnaissance of La Maddalena and Gran Sasso, at great 
personal risk. Even after the "experts" stated that it was folly to attempt a • 
glider landing on top of the mountain, Skorzeny convinced General Student 
that it was the only way. Had Skorzeny's sense of purpose been any less 
intense, it is possible the mission may never have begun. General Student,. 
who was a brilliant officer, knew that the possibility of a successful glider 
insertion was slim and that the whole rescue mission rested on the landing's 
success. Risking an elite German commando unit and his finest paratroopers 
for what, by now, was an exercise in futility, was not Student's way of doing 
51 Ibid., Skorzeny, 40. 




business. It took considerable persuasion on Skorzeny's part before Student 
realized "there was no other course.·SJ 
Once the mission was underway, Skorzeny's detennination was 
evident throughout. He crash landed on a small patch of turf covered with 
boulders, and then, with his eight men, proceeded to assault a hotel g~arded 
by over 200 Italians. Skoaeny's sense of purpose, coupled with his 
extraordinary boldness and courage, were without question paramount to the 
success of the mission. 
In condusion, an analysis of the Mussolini rescue clearly demonstrates the 
principles of special operations and their relationship to relative 5UIJeriority, 
however, success was significantly bolstered by the intervention of the moral 
factors and benevolent frictions of war. 
51 Ibid., A.H. Farrar-HockJey, 121 . 
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VI. OPERA nON SOURCE: BRmSH MIDGET SUBMARINE 
A IT ACK ON lHE GERMAN BATIl..ESHIP TIRPITZ _ 22 SEFrEMBER 1943 
A. BACKGROUND 
On March 27, ] 942 British Commandos attacked and destroyed the 
Normandie dry dock at the French port of St. Nazaire. This action was 
undertaken to prevent the German battleship nRPITZ from sailing from her 
anchorage in Norway, into the Atlantic, and then seeking refuge at St. Nazaire. 
The Nonnandie dry dock was the only facility in the Atlantic capable of 
repairing the 53,000 ton vessel and the Germans would not risk exposing the 
TIRPITZ to action without being assured of adequate repair facilities. 
Nonetheless, the TIRPITZ, the sister ship of the Bismarck, still threatened the 
North Sea and held ~four times the number of British capital ships paralyzed, 
to say nothing of the two new American battleships retained in the Atlantic."! 
After the raid on St. Nazaire several plans were fonnulated to sink the 
TIRPITZ in Norway, but by early 1943 Winston Churchill was getting impatient 
and wrote to his Chiefs of Staff General Ismay: 
Have you given up all plans for doing anything to TlRPITZ while she is 
in Trondhjem? We heard a lot of ta1k about it five months ago, which a ll 
petered out. At least four or five plans were under consideration. It 
seems very discreditable that the Italians should show themselves so 
much better at attacking ships in harbour than we do. .. lt is a terrible thing 
I Thomas Gallagher, The X-Craft Raid (New York: Harcourt Brace JovanoviCh. 






to thi nk that this prize should be waiting and no one be able to think of 
a way of winning ill 
Unbeknownst to Churchill, the British Admiralty had been working for 
two years on developing a midget submarine capable of penetrating the 
Norwegian fjords and "winning" the prize. In early May 1941 volunteeno were 
recruited "for special and hazardous duty." These men, including Ueutenant 
Don Cameron who would later participate in Operation SOURCE, were 
instrumen tal in the development and construction of the first operational X· 
Crafl Original ly conceived by Cromwell Varley of Varley Marine Limited, the 
X·Craft midget submarine was constructed by three different ship builders w ho 
independently built the bow, center and tail sections. Twenty other contractors 
were responsible for the internal workings of the craft. This distribution of 
• effort resulted in a submarine whost! "dt!sign was a little unsound in many 
respects".l _ 
• 
The first submarine available for trials was the X-3 built under extrem e 
secrecy and launched on March 19, 1942. Upon completion of X-3s' trials the 
midget submarine was sent by rail to the submariners new base at Port 
Bannatyne, Scotland, subsequently renamed HMS Varbel. In the meantime, 
Z Richard Compton-Hall, Submarine Warfare Monsters and MidgeLo; (Poole 
Dorset, England: 81andford Press, 1985). Attributed to Winston Churchill, 13 February 
1943. 
J Admiral Godfrey I'lace, interviewed by CDR William H. McRaven, of 17 June 
1992, England. 
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additional volunteers were recruited and began to be screened for suitability. • 
They were sent to HMS Dolphin at Gosport, England where they underwent 
six weeks of screening which included physical training. six hour dives in a 
nearby lake and ~theorelical" courses on the X-3 submarine. Most of the men 
were unaware of the nature of the operation or of the involvement of the other 
volunteers. 
In mid-January 1943 six more midget submarines designated X-5 through 
X-10 were delivered. The 12th Submarine Actilla was formed under Captain 
W.E. Banks to coordinate with Rear Admiral Barry, (Rear-Admiral, Submarines) 
on the "'training and material of special weapons'; and to his flotilla X-S-X-10 
were attached, with Bonaventure (Acting Captain P.Q. Roberl'l, R.N.) as their 
depot ship.·4 
The x-s series was larger and better designed than the prototype X-3. It 
was fifty one feet long and weighed thirty-five tons fully loaded. It had an 
external hull diameter of eight and one half feet except directly under the 
periscope where it extended an additional few inches. The internal space was 
significantly shorter and more cramped. It had a diameter of five feet and nine 
inches and the only place a man could stand up was underneath the periscope. 
4 Battle Summary-No. 29, "Attack on 'Tirpitz' by Midget Submarines, (Operation 






fo1gure 6-3. X-Craft Conbo) Room. 
The craft was divided into four compartments. The forward space was the 
battery compartment which provided power for all electrical equipment in the 
X.Craft, including the pumps/lights and main motor. The second compartment 
was the wet/dry chamber and head. This space was used to Jock out the diver 
who would be t.ilsked to cut anti-submarine or anti-torpedo nets. The third 
compartment was the control room. Inside this small space the crew piloted 
the X-Craft by a simple system of wheels and levers that controlled the helm,. 
hydroplanes and main ballast tanks. The control room had two periscopes 







while the X-Craft was surfac::ed, and a slender telescopic attack periscope used 
for submerged operations during daytime. The control room also served as the 
galley where the crew could heat up tin cans or boil a pot of water for tea or 
coffee.s The a ft compartment contained the main motor used for submerged 
propulsion and a London bus engine which normally propelled the X-C~aft on 
the surface but could be used fur submerged operations while at periscope 
depth. Submerged, the naft cruised at two knots with a top speed uf five and 
one half knots. On the !lurface it could make six and a half knots depending 
on sea stale. Being a diesel submarine the X-Craft submerged only when 
absolutely ne<:essary and spent most of night time surfaced to recharge 
b aUe ries. When surfaced the captain would normally trim the craft so that it 
barely protruded above the water. This reduced the visual signature and radar 
cross section and allowed the captain to lie along the casing and conn the craft 
from the surface. This technique, however, was seldom used for a variety of 
reasons.6 
S In a letter from Admiral Place he "admonished" me for assuming that the British 
only drank tea. He said, "Limeys do drink coffee, you know!" 
5 While corresponding with Commander Richard Compton-Hall, the curator of the 
Royal Submarine Museum and a fonner X-Craft commanding officer, he stated that 
the captain would only lie down on the casing when "in extremis." The induction 
mast, which also served as a voicepipe to the Control Room had to be lowered for the 
Captain to talk with the helmsman. When this happened there was always the 
possibility of water going down the mast. Additionally, the Captain was prone to 
being washed overboard in such an exposed position. 
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The X-Craft was capable of conducting dives to over 300 feet but most of 
the submerged cruising was around 60 feee The midget. submarine was 
equipped with two viewing ports which allowed the captain to observe the 
diver who would normally stand on the X-Craft while cutting through anti-
torpedo nets. These ports had steel shutters which could be shut durinS deep 
dives or depth charge attacks. 
The X-craft was specifically designed to attack the TIRPITZ at her berth 
in Norway, consequently, it had no torpedoes, rockets, or surface guns. These 
weapons would be useless in a confined area like the fjord. The X-Craft did 
come equipped with two side charges, (referred to as side cargos) port and 
starboard, each composed of two tons of Amatex high explosive. The charges 
were contoured to the outer hull and made neutrally buoyant. 
But when a side charge was released [by turning what looked like an 
ordinary steering wheel inside the X-craft), a copper strip between the 
hull and the charge peeled off, unsealing the buoyancy chamber and 
allowing enough water to enter to make the charge negatively buoyant. 8 
The charge, now negatively buoyant. would sink to the bottom of the 
fjord below the TIRPITZ. A timer was installed to allow the X-Craft crew to 
7 Admiral Godfrey Place letter to the author dated 19 January 1993. Place stated 
that the hull could withstand depth!; of 300 feet or more, however the rate of blowing 
would make it fairly "dicey· to come up from even 150 feet. 






dial in the desired delay and extract before the explosive detonated. Godfrey 
Place, commander of X-7, was not completely satisfied with this configuration: 
We at the time really thoughL .. if we made the charge positively buoyant 
to go upwards it would stick to it (the TIRPITZ) wi thout any problem ... we 
would really have preferred to have the charges floating upward, b u t the 
explosive experts claimed that it was better to send it (the side charge) 
down to the sea bed to make the sort of tamping effect to create a vast 
explosion over a longer area. Our outlook was a li ttle doubtful. We'd 
rather have blown a dam great hole in the thing.' 
, Ibid., Place interview. 
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The biggest drawback of the midget submarine was its endurance. The 
published specifications indicated that the range was 1500 miles at 4 knots, but 
in reality the range was limited by human duration. Although a crew of four 
was able to "exist" inside the craft for extended periods, they were not able to 
actually operate the controls for much longer that three hundred miles ,while 
submerged. The conditions were just too physically taxing. This forced the 
Royal Navy to tow the X-Craft (with a passage crew inside that merely 
maintained the depth) for the first 1200 miles from Scotland to their release 
point off the Norwegian coast. This towing effort presented several problems 
during the actual mission, but it was still felt to be an effective way of getting 
the X-Craft from Scotland to Norway. 
• 
During the course of the next several months plans were prepared for • 
attacking German shipping in three separate operational areas of Norway. This 
would allow for any change in German berthing plans. On 11 September 1943, 
the six X-Craft would be towed independently by six conventional submarines 
from Lock Caimbawn, Scotland to a position 75 miles west of the Shetlands 
and then follow routes 20 miles apart until they were approximately 150 miles 
from Alten Fjord. At this point the conventional submarines would navigate 
to their assigned release points off Soroy Sound and prepare to detach the X-
Craft. A change of crew (from passage crew to operational crew) was 
authorized any time past 17 September pursuant tu the weather and tactical 
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condition. The entrance to Soroy Sound was extensively mined by the 
Gennans, Nevertheless, the Royal Navy planned the following: 
The X craft were to be sli pped in positions 2 to 5 miles (SA-SF) from the 
mined area after dusk on 0 Day (20th September), when they would cross 
the mined area on the surface and proceed via Stjemsund to Alten Fiord, 
bottoming during daylight hours on 21st September. All were to arrive 
off the entrance to Kaa Fiord at dawn 22nd September and then entering 
the Fleet anchorage, attack the targets for which they had been detai1ed. 
These w ould be allocated by signal during the passage, in the light of the 
most recent intelligence,lo 
The conventional submarines were to return to thei r patrol seelnrs and 
await return of the X-Craft If no rendezvous were effeeled the submarines 
were to proceed to one of the bays on the north coast of Soroy and attempt a 
link up on the nights of 27/28 and 28/29 September. As a tertiary plan the X-
Craft crew was authorized to proceed to the Kola Inlet in Russia and a British 
minesweeper would be looking out for them between 25 September and 3 
October. 
B. THE BATnF.SHIP TIRPITZ 
The TlRPITZ was commissioned in December 1940, but not actually 
completed until February 1941. She was the largest battleship of her time with 
an overaJl length of 822 feet and a beam of 118 feet. Fully loaded the T IRPITZ 
displaced 53,000 tons with a draft of 36 feet. The ship was powered by twelve 
10 Ibid., Battle Summary-No. 29, 82. 
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boilers in six separate compartments. These boilers produced 163,000 shaft 
horse power allowing the batt1eship to reach speeds in excess of 30 knots. 
Topside the TIRPITZ was equipped with eight 15 inch guns and twelve 5.9 
inch guns for surface action. For air defense she had sixteen 4.1 inch, sixteen 
37mm and eighty 20mm anti-aircraft guns. Additionally, the TIRPITZ carried 
four Arado reconnaissanceflight bomber ai~~aft. 
Figure 6-5. The TIRPITZ. (Courtesy Imperial War Museum) 
Although the topside armament was impressive it did not unduly concern the 
X-Craft crews. What did matter to the planners of Operation SOURCE was the 
TlRPITZ hull, which was encased in steel that was 12 inches thick at some 
locations. This steel band protected the battleship in strategic areas including 
her control room amidships, boilers and turbine rooms, gunnery control rooms, 








with the interior steel bulkheads made the TIRPlTZ invulnerable to torpedo 
attack and 5.9 inches of steel decks protected her vital areas from high altitude 
bombing. However, thirty-six feet below the waterline the TIRPITZ keel 
remained the "soft underbelly" and it was this weakness that the British hoped 
to exploit. 
~- ~"':-~ -
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Figure 6-6. POIIition of TIRPnZ in Kaa Fjord. (Courtesy Imperial War 
M useum) 
The TJRPITZ and her battle group, which included the 26,000 ton Scharnhorst 
and several destroyers, was berthed in }(aa l<Jord, Nonvay whi ch was located 
well above the 70th parallel and over 1200 miles from Scotland. Surrou nded 
by steep, virtually treeless mountains the fjord was fed by waters from the 
Gulf Stream which kept it ice free year around. For most of the year the 
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ground was covered with snow and the sun remained high on the horizon . 
When the snow did melt it sent mountainous slabs of ice crashing into the 
water creating a brackish environment of fresh and salt water. II 
Using the terrain as a natural fortress, the C'rl!nnans placed radar stations 
and anti-aircraft batteries on the mountain tops and flew fighter airc~aft to 
protect the fleet from British bombers. In the fjords, three islands Stjernoy, 
Allafjord and Altenfjord funneled intruders into a channel where 
antisubmarine nets were placed and picket boats patroned the waters. In the 
unlikely event that a submarine negotiated the channel, or a dive bomber 
attempted a suicide run in the Kaa Fjord Valley, an anti-torpedo net 
surrounded the high value targets preventing any possible damage. The net,.. 
• 
which completely surrounded the TIRPITZ, was constructed of woven steel • 
grommets and was capable of stopping a torpedo moving at fifty knots. Based 
on aerial photos and reports from Nonvegian resistance, British intelligence 
believed that the net only extended from the surface to sixty feeL It was not 
apparent that the Gennans had actually constructed three nets, one which 
extended from the surface to forty feet and two more which were suspended 
beneath the surface and reached to the seabed 120 feet below. To augment all 
these precautions, the Gennans added smoke-screen equipment to conceal the 
J1 Ibid., Place letter of 19 January 1993. These layers of fresh and salt water made 
it "very bicky" to maneuver the X-Craft in shallow water, particularly under eight feet. 
322 • 
• 
battle group and patrolled the surrounding roads and villages to prevent 
Norwegian resistance from conducting reconnaissance or sabotage operations. 
Intelligence on the target area was difficult to obtain. Kaa Fjord was well 
outside the combat radius of British based aircraft. Consequently, the Royal 
Air Force (RAf) arranged to have the Soviets construct an airfield o~tside 
M urmansk. From here Mosquito reconnaissance planes, flown by the RAF, 
could photograph the fjord and develop the film immediately upon return to 
Russia. The processed film was returned to England via Catalina long range 
aircraft. Norwegian resistance based at Kaa Fjord collected detailed 
intelligence on the daily habits of the officers and crew. They were able to 
determine picket boat patrol routes, identify net defenses, watch general 
quarter drills and, most importantly, ascertain the maintenance schedules of the 
guns and sonar equipment. The two main Norwegian agents were Torstein 
Raaby and Alfred Henningsen. After the war Raaby joined Thor Heyerdahl 
and the crew of Kon Tiki on their famous voyage across the Pacific and 
Henningsen later became a member of the Norwegian Parliament. Together 
these men complied an accurate description of the target area and secretly 
transmitted the information back to England • 
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C. UhUI"ENANTS DONALD CAMERON AND GODFREY PLACE 
There were several men who distinguished themselves throughout 
Operation SOURCE, but the two officers who received most of the credit for 
the mission's success were Lieutenants Don Cameron and Godfrey Place. Both 
men received the Victoria Cross for the actions against the TIRPITZ. 
Cameron, after serving a year with the Merchant Navy, joined the Royal 
Navy Reserve on 22 August 1939. He spent another year in General Service 
and then on 19 August 1940, received orders to HMS Dolphin, the submarine 
school in Porismouth, England. Upon completion of submarine training he 






operations in the North Sea. In May 1941, a call for volunteers sent Cameron 
back to I-IMS Dolphin where he joined in the development of the first X-Craft, 
eventually commanding X-6 during the attack on the TlRPITZ. Throughout 
Operation SOURCE Cameron kept a personal diary which provided a 
chronological account of the training and actual mission. Cameron was 
exceedingly dedicated to the cause for which the X-Craft were built and 
employed and he worried that somehow during the course of the mission he 
mig ht fail that cause. He wrote: 
I have that just-before-the-battle-mother feeling. Wonder how they (the 
crew) will bear up under fire for the first time, and how I will behave 
though not under fire for the first time .. .1 can't help thinking what the 
feelings of my next of kin will be if I make a hash of the lhing.12 
His close friend Commander Richard Compton-Hall later said, nUke all 
• of us, he was afraid of the unknown and especially of possible failure, of 
letting people down, rather than of being afraid uf the enemy."13 
Cameron and his crew, Lieutenant w. S. Meeke and Chief E.R.A. 
Richardson, were caught during the operation and imprisoned in a German 
row camp for the remainder of the war. He was repatriated in May 1945, and 
was s ubseq uently assigned tu HMS SURF as additional UeutenanL Following 
duty on the SURF, Cameron was assigned to several other submarines b efore 
12 Information from Donald Cameron's personal diaries, kindly provided by 
Commander Richard Compton-Hall. 
13 Cummander Richard Compton-Hall letter to the author dated 7 January 1993. 
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he received commimd of the HMS TIPTOE in May 1947. Three years later he 
• returned to HMS DOLPHIN and in 1951 took command of another submarine 
the HMS TRUMP. In 1955 Cameron returned to HMS DOLPHIN for the final 
time and was assigned as Commander Submarines. Although Cameron served 
many tours after the war with the submarine service, he never fully rec~vered 
from his wartime internment. His health, which had been poor prior to 
Operation SOURCE deteriorated in the POW camps. He died unexpectedly in 
1962. 
Godfrey Place was graduated from the Royal Navy's college at Dartmouth 
and commissioned in September 1938. He received posting to submarines after 
serving on the cruiser HMS NEWCASTLE. His initial submarine training 
began at HMS ELt1N and upon completion in 1941, he was assigned as the • 
spare officer at St Angleo. Later in 1941, Place received orders to the Polish 
submarine SOKOL out of Malta. Upon his departure from SOKOL, Place was 
awarded the Polish Kryz Walerznim (Cross of Valor) for combat selVice. After 
several short tours, Place joined the crew of the HMS UNBEATEN in f'ebruary 
1942. While on combat patrol in the Eastern Mediterranean, Place brought 
UNBEATEN to periscope depth only to find a Gennan submarine directly off 





I called the Captain and we went to diving stations. I think it was 
something like 45 seconds from first sighting to firing the torpedo, under 
continuous wheel and in fact we got two hits. I ' 
German airplanes 
escorting the submarine 
converged on Unbeaten 
and began to pursue 
her. The submarine lay 
on the bottom for 24 
hours before she 
escaped. Place 
a warded the 
Distinguished Service 
Cross for his actions. 
In August 1942, he 
joined the 12th 
Submarine Flotilla and 
began training with the 
X-Craft. One year later, 
as commander of X-7 he 
attacked and disabled the TIRPITZ. Like Cameron, Place was captured during 
\, Ibid., Place interview. 
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the action and was interned until May 1945. While in the POW camp he was 
awarded the Victoria Cross. Upon his return to England Plac~ left submarines 
and went on to become a pilot in the Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Navy. He had 
a distinguished military career being promoted to Rear-Admiral on 7 January 
1968. He retired in 1970 and was made a Companion of the Bath (CB). 
D. X-CRAFT TRAINING 
By August 1942, most of the volunteers had been screened and those that 
met the standards were sent to HMS VARBEL at Port Bannatyne, Scotland to 
begin training. VARBEL was the old Hydropathic Hotel and shooting 10dgeY 
Prior to the war it was a health spa with numerous baths for rheumatic 
patients. Although Loch Striven, which formed Port Bannatyne, had always 
been restricted for submarine use, there was some concern about the lack of 
security su-rrounding the X-Craft training effort. There were no guards, no 
barbed wire and the X-Craft were moored in plain sight of local towns people. 
This "business as usual" approach seems to have prevented tourists or 
townsmen from becoming overly curious as to the base's operations. 
Nevertheless, the submariners tried to remain as inconspicuous as possible. 
The locals thought the X-Craft was a newly designed high speed craft, so 
during daily operations the crew would wait until they were completely out of 
15 "VARBEL was actually a fabricated name derived from Commander Varley, 







sight before diving the X-Craft. Their support ship, initially the HMS ALECfO 
and then the HMS BONAVENTURE, remained anchored in Loch Striven away 
from prying eyes, and while in town all the officers and crew stayed in civilian 
attire. Additionally, a cover story was developed to coincide with their daily 
routine. J6 Within a fe w months the HMS VARBEL began to be fille~ with 
prospective X-Craft crews, induding four Australians and two South Africans. 
The trainee officers learned how to con and navigate the craft as well as 
simultaneously operate the hydroplanes, wheel, pumps and the main airli ne. 
The conditions inside the X-Craft were so cramped that from the control room 
the captain could touch any of the four crewmen without taking a step in any 
diredion. Navigation was exceedingly difficult as the condensation built up 
inside the midget and the charts became soggy. The captain learned to 
navigate based on time and shaft revolutions to detennine his speed and 
distance. Although all the crew learned to use the wet/dry chamber, an enlisted 
man was assigned as the primary diver. The diver practiced exiting and 
entering the two foot hatch and he learned to cut every conceivable anti-
torpedo/anti-submarine net known to the British. This procedure required the 
diver to exit th .. midget and using a hydraulic cable cutter attached to the X-
Craft, begin cutting the net from the bottom up with the final cut done while 
16 The X-Craft crews were instructed to tell townspeople they were testing a new 
rough water speedboat. 
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standing on the bow of the midget After extensive practice the crews could 
cut a net in under seven minutes. 
During the 
early months, X·3 
was the only 
midget available 
for training and 
she was used by 
all the crews to 
conduct day and 
night dives. In 
November, John 
Lorimer, one of 
the first X·Craft 
volunteers, was 
conducting a day 
dive with two 
officers 
ligure 6-9. Artisfs Rendering of X-Craft Cuffing Thmugh 
when the snorkel Antisubmarine Net. (Courtesy Imperial War MU!M!um) 
jammed open upon diving. The wheel spanner used to blow the main ballast 
tanks was accidentally dropped into the bilges and the X-3 immediately began 







w ... s at the bottom of Loch Striven in one hundred and ten feet of water. The 
flooded battery compartment began to give off chlorine gas and soon after the 
midget submarine lost all electrical power. 
Lorimer, who was only 20 years old at the time, quickly directed the two 
officers to don their emergency breathing apparatus. The oxygen i," the 
breathing apparatus was limited to 40 minutes and at one hundred fee t it 
would take some time for the X-Craft to flood up completely before the three 
men could exil With only minutes to spare the aft hatch was forced open and 
the men escaped. On the surface the diver support vessel, PRESENT HELP, 
picked up the three officers. Upon returning to HMS VARBEL the two new 
officers involved in the accident requested orders back to the regular Navy. 
Later that evening, the HMS TEDWORTH, a salvage ship arrived and raised 
the X-3. 
The X-3 was sent off for repairs and X-4 arrived soon after with Lieutenant 
God frey Place as the commander. In December 1942, Place was conducting 
endurance trials in Inchmamock Water, to the north of the Isle of Arran. 
Topside was Sub-Lieutenant Morgan Thomas, X-4's First Lieutenant. Without 
warning, an ice formation broke off from the cliffs surrounding the loch. The 
resulting wave washed Thomas overboard and he drowned. Additionally, the 
wave flooded the escape compartment causing X-4 to take on a 90 degree down 
angle. Although almost perpendicular in the water the X-4 remained afloat 
with Place and the other crewmen, Whitley, separated by the wet/dry 
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compartment and unable to communicate. Four hours later at the routine 
communication time, Place managed to transmit an emergency signal to the • 
PRESENT HELP located nearby in Loch Ranza. It took another two hours 
before the Present Help could tow X~4 to safety, bailout the wet/dry and 
release Place and WhiUey. As a result of the accident several modific:ations 
were made to the X-Craft including a buckle for the topside watch stander and 
a device for closing the hatch from inside the control room. 
In late December, X~5 was launched at Faslane Scotland and X-6 arrived 
on January 11, 1943. These new production boats "were built from scratch" and 
were significantly better designed than the prototypes. By March, X-7 was 
finished and the three X-Craft were placed aboard the support vessel HMS 
BONAVENTURE and sent to Loch Caimbawn to conduct tow training with the • 
It is not often realized how big a part these men (the passage crews] play 
in the success of an operation. Towing at high speed (it was sometimes 
as much as eleven knots] is far from being an easy or even a particularly 
safe job and it is very far from being a comfortable one. It calls for a 
high degree of alertness under trying conditions for several days [ten 
days] at a time. In addition it calls for constant attention to the vital 
routine duties ofrnopping up moisture, testing, and if necessary, repairing 
every item of equipment in the craft. To a considerable extent the success 
of an operation depends upon the condition in which the craft is turned 
over to the operational crew ... The best analogy that can be given is that 
they correspond to a diving watch in a large submarine (except that they 
are continuously on watch for days, without a break] and like the diving 
17 Ibid., Place letter of 19 January 1993. "Towing Training" was done by any 
vessel that couId be commandeered into service -- this included the odd submarine, 
PRESENT HELP and FIDELE. 
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watch of a big submarine they are relieved when the crew goes to action 
stations.18 
The tow training was exceedingly arduous and therefore rarely extended 
beyond a day or two. The procedure called for the passage crew to submerge 
then level out at about 40 feel below the "parent" submarine's keel depth. 
Unfortunately the speed of the low and the size differential caused the nudget 
to porpoise constantly and made life inside the X-Craft miserable. The way to 
avoid this coosLmt depth change was to set the hydroplanes at the corrt!ct angle 
a nd ballast a little heavy. However, if the tow broke, the ballast and the 
weight of the tow rope could cause the X-Craft to plunge before the passage 
crew could correct the problem. Throughout all the extensive workups the X· 
Craft were never towed for the full duration of the expected mission. Place 
• later regretted this oversight: 
• 
What we never tried, though, really, was the length of tow, which was 
actually the best part of the mission. It was over a thousand miles 
and ... the longest (towl took nearly 10 days. So that was our fault...we 
couldn't really spare 10 days just towing the boats out to sea to do the 
approach. But that was the trouble. In those small boats there is so many 
things that can go wrong. You have an odd valve or two go bad or be 
unlucky and it gets damp inside and you get shivering. .. lt never occurred 
to us that the tows could part. .. we didn't discover until afterwards ... those 
(tow lines) weren't tow tested.19 
13 C.E.T. Warren and James Benson, The Midget Raiders (New York: William 
Sloane Associates, 1954),272. 
19 Ibid., Place interview. 
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During every six hours of a tow, the midget would surface to replace the 
stale air and recharge the air bottles. This nonnally was limited to about half 
an hour. Depending on the sea state, the time on the surface could be more 
unpleasant than "porpoising." In either case, the tow would be an 
exceptionally challenging aspect of the mission. In April, the newly lau.nched 
X-8 through X-l0 replaced X-S, X-6, and X-7 in Loch Caimbawn_ X-S through 
X-7 returned to Port Bannatyne to continue training new crews and conduct 
advance exercises with the designated operational crews. In May, the crew of 
X-7 was conducting net cutting training when Sub-lieutenant David Locke was 
lost at sea attempting to cut through a anti-submarine net Locke was a 
submariner, but not a qualified diver. After this incident the decision was 
made to add a fourth man to the X-Craft crew, specifically for this task. 
Throughout the summer of 1943 the passage and operational crews 
continued training. All six midgets wen! now fully incorporated into the plan 
and exercises were conducted simulating the actual mission. Success during 
these exercises bolstered the confidence of the crews: 
I think we were quite confident It seemed to be quite simple really. All 
six boats attacked the harbor in Loch Caimbawn in the north of 
ScoUand ... And going through a fictitious channeL.that more or less 
approximated the fjord all six boats got into the harbor, attacked and 









On 30 August 1943 all six X-Craft, the BONAVENTURE, the TITANIA 
(submarine tender), and the six towing submarines arrived in Loch Cairnbawn 
for final training. During the 1st through the 5th of September, each parent 
submarine was p .. ired off with its midget for a towing exercises which 
included transferring of crews at sea and recovery of the X-Craft Following 
these exercises the midgets conducted a final "swing of the compass" and were 
subsequently hoisted aboard the Bonaventure for loading of the side charges. 
While aboard the BONAVENTURE the crews received their final briefings. As 
the official Battle Summary recounts, however: 
At this stage of course, it was by no means certain where the enemy 
would be found, but the indications were that Alten Fiord was the most 
probable spot, and in onler to reach this area by 0 Day it was necessary 
for the submarines to leave 11th-12th September.21 
Rear Admiral Barry, Commander Submarines, arrived at Cairnbawn on the 
10th of S eptember to conduct an inspection of the X-Craft and parent 
submarines. It was not a cursory inspection, but an ~exacting" look at the 
midgets and their crew. Barry concluded that the midget submariners were: 
Like boys on the last day of term, their spirits ran so high. fheir 
confidence was not in any way the outcome of youthful dal'i'devilry, but 
was based on the finn conviction, fonned during many months of arduous 
training, that their submarines were capable of d oing all that their crews 
demanded of them, and the CI'i'WS were quite capable of surmounting any 
difficulties or hazards which it was possibll;' for human beings to conquer. 
It was in this spirit that they went out into the night in their tiny craft to 
face a thousand miles of rough seas before they reached their objective, 
21 Ibid., Battle Sum mary-No. 29, 83. 
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which itself, to their knowledge, was protected by every conceivable 
device which could ensure their destruction before they complete the 
attacks,;>.2 
E. THE A'IT ACK ON THE 11RPITZ _ 11-22 SEYfEMBER 1913 
At 1600, 11th September, the Truculent tOwing X-6, and the SYRTIS ¥(ith 
X-9, sailed from Loch Caimbam, followed at intervals of about two hours 
by the THRASHER with X-5, the SEANYMPH with X-8, and the 
STUBBORN with X-7, The SCEPTRE with X-lO did not sail tiIi1300, 12th 
September,:tl 
As each craft departed Loch Caimbawn cheers from the support vessel 
BONAVENTURE and TITANIA encouraged them onward, Bany, his staff and 
the commanding officer of the 12th Submarine Hotilla, Captain Willie Banks 
were also on hand as the X-Craft set sail. This launch culminated 18 months 
of training-training which had resulted in the death of three men. But if the 
X-Craft were successful it could save thousands of allied lives. 
After departing Caimbawn, the submarines travelled independently until 
approximately 75 miles west of the Shetland Islands, Once at the Shetlands 
they proceeded on parallel courses ten miles apart. They were to maintain this 
relative position until 150 miles from Alten Fjord. 
22 Ibid, Warren and Benson, 138, 








The first four days of the transit were relatively uneventful. The weather 
remained clear and the seas calm. The parent submarines had paid out about 
200 yards of tow line, but even with this separation the X-Craft ascended and 
descended as much as 60 feet on a routine basis. The passage crew had to keep 
a constant vigil on the midget to ensure it did not loose control and suddenly 
plummet downward: 
In addition to seasickness, the three men in each X-craft had to endure 
appalling discomfort during passage. Dampness penetrated their clothing, 
wet their hair, and seemed to narrow the already cramped space they 
shared. Able to sleep only in snatches, they had to work constantly to 
keep the craft in condition for the operational crew. There were electrical 
insulations to be checked, motors to be tested, machinery to be greased 
and oiled, bulkheads and hull plates to be wiped of condensation, records 
to be written, readings to be made on all the electrical circuits, and meals 
to be prepared.24 
The X-Craft surfaced three or four times a day for periods of 15 minutes, 
during which time the parent submarine would slow to three knots. 
Communications between the midget and parent was maintained (usually at 
two hour intervals) through a telephone cable inserted into the tow line. This 
unique feature required the tow lines to be handmade. Consequently, when 
nylon lines were introduced late in the work ups there was not enough time 
to outfit each midget with a nylon tow. The older manila tow lines were 
attached to X-7, X-B and X-9. 






On the fi fth day of the transit, 15 September, at OU)() the manila tow line 
separated imd the crew of X-Blast communications with their parent submarine 
the SEA NYMPH. X-B immediately surfaced but was unable to locate the 
SEA NYMPH. At 0430, the commander of X-B decided to proceed on the 
original COUnie of 029 degrees. The SEANYMPH did not d iscover the -rarted 
line until two hours later when she surfaced to allow X-B to ventilate. At 0600 
the SEANYMPH reversed her course in an attempt to find the missing X-Craft. 
The STUBBORN, towing X-7, and on the adjoining parallel path with 
SEANYMPH, surfaced around noon to ventilate. After several minutes on the 
surface, the watch sighted a "U-Hoat" and both parent and midget submerged 
to avoid detection. Unbeknownst to the STUBBORN, the "U-Boat" was the lost 
X-B. An hour later the STUBBORN surfaced and the "U-Boat" appeared to have 
departed At 1550, the watch aboard STUBBORN noticed the manila line used 
to tow X-7 had parted as well. Fortunately, the passage crew noticed the break 
and su rfaced. Although the weather was "rough to very rough" the crews had 
trained for such a contingency and the tow line was quickly refastened. 
After securing the line and testing the tow, STUBBORN prepared to 
submerge. But moments before diving. the watch spotted X-B "flogging 
around on the surface." STUBBORN proceeded to the midget's location and 
directed X-8 to follow. By 1900 the weather was too bad to remain surfaced so 
the two submarines, x-a and STUBBORN, submerged and began to transit to 
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SEA NYMPH's 10cation.75 Before submerging the commander of STUBBORN 
• had shouted the course to X-8. Unfortunately, the commander of X-8 
misunderstood the course and steered 146 degrees vice 046 degrees. At dawn, 
when STUBBORN surfaced, X-8 was no where to be found. f'ourteen hours 
later, however, X-8 managed to effect a rendezvous with SEANYMPH. There 
troubles were over for a while. 
Meanwhile the SYRTIS and X-9 were conducting an uneventful passage 
even though they had lost communications the previous day. Every six hours 
the X-Craft would surface and pass or receive any vital information. At 0920 
on the 16th of September when SYRTIS surfaced the X-9 was not attached to 
the tow line. SYRTIS executed a search for a day, but X-9 was never found. 
Although the cause of the accident was unknown it was suspected that the • 
crew ballasted the X-9 too heavy. When the tow line broke there wasn't 
enough "spare boat-blowing capacity" to bring it to the surface. The tow line, 
which was exceptionally heavy, was attached to the bow of the X-Craft and 
very difficult to release from the inside, particularly during an emergency 
descenL Although the midget was never found, the SYRTIS sighted a "well 
defined ft oil slick parallelling the track the X-9 had been steering. For years 
there was some hope that the crew had made the Norwegian coast and 
25 Stubborn had radioed Rear-Admiral Submarines and requested that they contact 
SEANYMPI-I. All messages to Rear-Admiral Submarines were made in individual 
one-time pads and therefore could not be deciphered. 
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rendezvoused with the resistance. This, however, was not to be the case. 
SYRTIS signaled Rear-Admiral Submarines with the news and was directed to 
proceed in company with the other parent submarines to assist where possible. 
On the morning of 17 September, X-8 began to have difficulty maintaining 
trim. The s tarboard side charge was taking on water and it was deci~ed to 
jettison the ordnance and proceed with only the port charge. At 1635 the 
com mander of X-8 set the charge on ~safe~ and I"t'!leased the 2 tons of explosive. 
Fifteen minutes later, as the X-8 and SEANYMPI-l we re approximately 1000 
yards away, the o rdnance detonated. The subsequent explosion damaged the 
seal between the port charge and the X-Craft. This caused the midget to list to 
port. After agoniring over the decision, the commander elected to release the 
second side charge with a two hour delay. Nevertheless when the charge 
detonated on time at 1840, the ensuring concussion badly damaged the X-8 
flooding the wet and dry compartment, fracturing pipes and buckling the 
watertight doors. The X-Craft was finished. The crew disembarked on the 
morning of the 18th and the X-B was scuttled. Earlier on the 16th of September 
w hen the fate of X-8 seemed precarious at best: 
... the Rear-Admiral, Submarines, had signalled to the SEANYMPI-l and 
STUBBORN:--'Should at any time you consider it necessary to sink X 8 
in order not to prejudice the operation, this step would have my full 
a pproval. 162208A: Rear-Admiral Barry subsequently remarked:--'l 
consider that the Commanding Officer of X 8 acted correctly in releasing 
the side charges when it became apparent that they were flooded, and that 
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the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. SEANYMPH's decision to sink X 8 to 
avoid compromising the mission was the correct one::ui 
On September 19th only four X-Craft remained operational. During the 
transit Rear-Admiral Submarines had transmitted their attack orders. X-5, X-6 
and X-7 would attack the TIRPITZ, X-8 would attack the pocket battleship 
LUTZOW and X-9 and X-tO the battle cruiser SCHARNHORST. With X-B 
scuttled the LUTZOW was no longer a target and X-10 would have to attempt 
the SCHARNHORST alone. 
That evening the TRUCULENT towing X-6 arrived at its release point off 
Soroy Island, which was well inside the Arctic Circle. The poor weather 
subsided and the seas were good for transferring the passage and operational 
• 
crews. There was a sense of excitement and fear among the operational crew. • 
Cameron wrote in his personal log; 
I have that just-before-the-battle-mother feeling. Wonder how they will 
bear up under fire for the first time, and how I will behave though not 
under fire for the first time .•• lf I were a true Brit, the job would be the 
thing.. but J can't help thinking what the feelings of my next of kin will 
be if I make a hash of it. 7:1 
Cameron's number two, John Lorimer, had similar fears. 
:ui Ibid., Battle Summary-No. 29, B8. 
27 Cameron personal diaries. 
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I can almost remember losing my nerve. Then the dingy came alongside 
the stem of Truculent and ... 1 felt much better, the seamen wishing me 
'Good l uck,' and 'See you in two days' time sir:ze 
When the operational crew boarded the X-6 they found that o ne of the 
ballast tanks was cracked, the starboard charge was beginning to take on water 
and the periscope gland was le.aking. These "minor" problems did not unduly 
disturb the operational crew and after the transfer of personnel, X-6 began its 
two day voyage toward Kaa Fjord. Two other X-Craft, X-5 and X-tO also 
transfered their operational crews and began their passage up the fjord. 
STUBBORN, towing X-7, was delayed by a few hours owing to the 
incidtmt with X-B. While transferring the operational crew a flo ating mine 
lodged on the bow of X-7 a few feet from the starboard side charge. Place 
• exited the midget and made his way to the bow. Once on the bow, he calmly 
dislodged -the mine by kicking it free. The commander of STUBBORN later 
relayed this story to Rear-Admiral, Submarines and it became of bit of 
submarine legend. Place, howeve r, is quick to point out that he noticed the 
hom on the mine had been crushed, indicating it was inoperable. 
:II! Ibid, Gallagher, 82. 
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Figure 6-12. Route of X-6 and X-7 From Release Point ..u Kaa 








By 2000 on the 20th of September all four X-Craft had slipped their tows 
and were proceeding to t heir assigned targets. The tracks for X-5, X-6 and X-7 
were almost identical, yet none of the midgets ever saw sight of one another. 
The X-Craft negotiated the mine field off Soroy Island and entered the 
Stjemsund channel with out much problem. By daylight they were cruising on 
the surface toward Altenfjord. The weather was hright and sunny with a light 
breeze and the channel was free of traffic. 
Intelligence indicated that the best place for the X-Craft to lay up during 
the night of the 21st was Brattholm Island, a small isolated outcrop that was 
within 10 miles of the TIRPITZ. As the midgets approached the island the 
traffic began to increase. The midgets were required to dive frequently to 
avoid detection. At 1630, X-7 sighted the Scharnhorst,. and al though tem pted 
to attack, Place proceeded as ordered to Brattholm Island. 
X-6, who also made Brattholm by evening. was experiencing difficulties 
with her periscope. The packing gland was leaking severely and required 
maintenance throughout the voyage. This attack periscope would be essential 
during the final approach on the TlRPITZ. Without it the crew was HblindH 
and any attack would have to be conducted by gyroscope alone. Additionally, 
X-6 had "a nasty list to starboard" compounded by a flooded side charge. The 
crew of X-6 attempted to repair the problems, but had limited success. T hat 
night the two X-Craft rem ained surfaced in secluded areas of the island and 
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charged batteries before the final leg of the attack. Periodically, the midgets 
submerged to avoid detection, but it was more precautionary than required. • 
On 22 September at 0145, X-6 departed Brattholm and began the ten mile 
approach on the TIRPITZ. With a partially flooded periscope, the commander, 
Cameron, dived to sixty feet and dead reckoned toward Kaa Fjord, the berth 
place of the TIRPITZ. The weather was perfect for an attack. There were low 
douds and a rough seas punctuated by occasional rain showers. The first 
obstacle was the submarine net located at the mouth of Kaa Fjord. Cameron 
planned to approach the net at forty feet, lock out his diver and maintain that 
position until the diver cut an opening. Once through the diver would be 
retrieved and the X-Craft would proceed through into the inner harbor. 
As X-6 approached the antisubmarine net:,. the diver, Dick Kendall, suited • 
up and prepared to enter the wet and dry chamber. Kendall had practiced this 
procedure dozens of times, but it was never a pleasant experience. 
You're shut up in a space about the size of a water main with a lid over 
your head. You sit there, cold and lonely, waiting for the water to come 
up. You long for it, but you can't let it in too fast because there's a limit 
to what the body can stand. It takes about four minutes, and then when 
you're completely covered and all the air is gone, the force on your body 
temtinates in a sudden, final squeeze as the pressure inside equalizes 
with the pressure outside. It's like a nasty kick in the head from a 
mule.2~ 




It was now 0400 and the sun was just up. Less than a hillf a mile from the 
nd, Camerun order the mi dget to periscope depth to get one final look. As 
Cameron looked through the periscope he realized his chances for success were 
diminishing quickly -- the periscope was fully fl ooded. He wrote in his diary:: 
We had waited and trained for two years for this show and at the last 
moment faulty workmanship was doing its best to deprive us of it all. 
There might be no other X-craft within miles. For ali J knew, we were the 
only starter, or at least the only X-CI'ilft left. I felt very bloody minded 
and brought her back to her original course ... tt might not be goud policy, 
we might spoil and destroy the element of surprise, we might be 
intercepted and sunk before reaching our target, but we were going to 
have a very good shot at it.JO 
Cameron dove to sixty feet. Inching his way along hI! removed the 
penscopl! eyepiece and cleaned it once again. As he approached the 
antisubmarine net he brought the X-Craft to thirty feel The crew was prepared 
to cut there way through the net when Cameron heard the propellers of a ship 
overhead. In a very risky movl! he ordered the X-Craft to the surface and 
proceeded "Full Ahead on the diese1." X-6 passed right through the parted net 
in the wakl! of a small coaster. No alann was raised and after action reports 
indicate X-6 went undetected. Had Cameron coml! to periscope depth viSe" 
surfacing, the X-Craft would have been too slow to pass through the nets 
before they closed. 
3Il Ibid., Caml!ron. 
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Earlier in the evening at just past midnight, X-7 had left Brattholm and by 
• 0400 had slipped through a large boat passage in the antisubmarine neL Now 
both X-6 and X-7 had only one more obstacle to overcome, the anti-torpedo net. 
Place and Cameron had two different plans for overcoming the net. Place 
intended to dive deep and go under the net. Cameron's initial plan was ,to cut 
through the neL 
Once through the antisubmarine net, X-6 was only three miles from the 
TIRPITZ. Cameron slowed the boat to two knots and maintained a depth of 
seventy feeL A final check of the periscope showed it had flooded again. 
Cameron stripped down the lens and dried the prism for the last time. 
Unfortunately the leak was on the outer casing and no amount of cleaning 
would last for long. After refitting the lens Cameron came to periscope depth. • 
There he could see a tanker refueling two destroyers and beyond them, the 
TIKPITZ. He took a bearing on the TlRPITZ and dove to thirty feet. The 
water in the fjord was a mixture of fresh and salt and created difficulty in 
maintaining proper depth. Even with this problem the crew was reluctant to 
operate the pumps for fear of being detected by hydrophones. 
From the submarine net to the stem of the tanker took X-6 over an hour. 
Coming up for one final look, Cameron almost collided with the cable 
connecting the destroyer to her mooring buoy. Diving quick1y he avoided the 
cable and remained undetected. Moments later an electrical fire broke out in 
the control room filling the small space with smoke. The crew reacted 
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instantly and extinguished the fire. Cameron looked around the control room 
and took stock of his c~w and X-Craft. It had been almost thirty-five hours 
since X-6 had released from the parent submarine. The crew was physically 
exhausted from the cold and lack of sleep. The periscope was almost 
completely flooded, the hoisting motor was burned out, they w ere lis~ng 15 
degrees to port and a steady stream of bubbles followed them throughout their 
transit. 
Cameron did not know the status of the other two X-Craft assigned to 
attack the TIRPITZ. If he decided to continue with the attack it would have 
to be completed no later than 08()(). This was the time when the side charges 
would explode if the other X-Craft had succeeded. He realized that X-6 and her 
crew would not survive 8 tons of explosives at close range. If he turned back 
now there was a chance of scuttling the midget and escaping across the 
mountains toward Sweden. The Royal Navy had provided escape and evasion 
equipment necessary to exist for a short while. This included boofs, clothing, 
compasses, maps, medical supplies, handguns, food and money. Cameron 
knew, however, that beyond the mountains lay a vast expanse of arctic 
wilderness through which the submarines would probably not survive. 
Cameron consulted the crew as to whether they wanted to continue the mission 
with the X-Craft in such poor condition. There was very IitUe discussion and 
the decision was made to continue on. 
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Godfrey Place in X-7 had crossed the antisubmarine net and was 
• proceeding toward the TIRPITZ when the X-Craft was forced deep by a picket 
boat on patrol. While avoiding detection X-7 ran afoul of a discarded section 
of anti-torpedo netting once used to protect the Lutzow. Place spent an hour 
executing a series of pumping and blowing maneuvers before X-7 finally broke 
free. Unfortunately, the actions damaged the gyroscope and trim pump and 
within minutes the X-Craft was caught again on an stray cable. Finally, by 0600 
X-7 was free from the entanglement and heading toward the antitorpedo net 
and beyond that the HRPITZ. 
At 0707 X-6 reached the northern end of the antitorpedo net and luckily 
found the small boat gate open: 
This gate was guarded by hydrophones and a special guard boat but. • 
unwisely, the Germans stood down the guard at 0600. At 0700 [actual 
time 0707] Cameron slipped through the narrow entrance, keeping just 
shallow. enough to see the surface through the glass scuttles in the 
pressure hull.31 
Once through the gate the X-Craft was within a hundred yards of the now 
unprotected TIRPITZ. Unfortunately, this time the X-Craft was spotted by a 
crewman aboard the TIRPITZ. 
31 Ibid, Compton-Hall, 130. 
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Figure 6-12. X-Craft Attacks on the TIRPITZ. (!he X-Craft Raid) 
Unknown to Cameron, X·7 arrived at the southern end of the anti torpedo 
net at 0710. Place, having been infonned that the net only extended to sixty 
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feet, dived to seventy-five feet and attempted to go under the obstacle. The 
intelligence estimates on the net defenses had been wrong. The.re were actually • 
three nets each forty feet long. Two of the nets were suspended undenvater 
and overlapped each other providing a full 120 feet of coverage. In his after 
action report Place wrote: 
Seventy-five feet and 'stuck in the net. Although we had still heard 
nothing.. it was thought essential to get out as soon as possible, and 
blowing to full buoyancy and going full astern were immediately tried. 
X.7 carne out, but turned beam on to the net and broke surface close to the 
buoys ... We went down immediately ... and the boat struck again by the 
bow at 95 feet. Here more difficulty in getting out was experienced, but 
after five minutes of wriggling and blowing she started to rise. The 
compass had gone wild and I was uncertain how close to the shore we 
werei so we stopped the motor, and X-7 was allowed to come right up to 
the surface with very little way on. By some extraordinary luck chance we 
must have passed under the nets or worked our way through the boat 
passage for, on breaking the surface, I could see the TIRPITZ right ahead, 
with no intervening nets, and not more than 30 yards away •. :40 • 
feet.' .. .'Full speed ahead: ..• We struck the TIRPITZ on her port side 
approximately below 'B' Turret and slid gently under the keel. There the 
starboard charge was released in the full shadow of the ship ..• :60 
feet.' •• :Slow astem: ... Then the port charge was released about 150 to 200 
feet farther aft-as I estimated, about under 'X' tun-et. .. After releasing the 
port charge (about 0730) 100 feet was ordered and an alteration of course 
guessed to try and make the position where we had come in. At 60 feet 
we were in the net again ... Of the three air-bottles two had been used and 
only 1200 pounds (less than half) was left in the third. X-7's charges were 
due to explode in an hour-not to mention others which might go up any 
time after 0800 ... In the next three-quarters of an hour X-7 was in and out 
of several neb" the air in the last bottle was soon exhausted and the 
compressor had to be run.n 
In the meantime the watch aboard the TIRPITZ, who had spotted X-6, 
shouted the alarm. Fortunately for the X-Crafts, the l1RPITZ was constantly 




conducting anti submarine and antiswimmer drills and the crew had becom e 
complacent. The Chief of the Watch questioned the crewman's sighting and 
it was not until 0712, when X-6 bruke the surface eighty yards abeam of the 
battleship, that the TIRPITZ crew was energized. Even with this sighting, the 
actual alarm did not sound until 0720.J] During the time between the s~cond 
sighting and the alarm Cameron maneuvered X-6 underneath the TIRPITZ. 
The midget got entangled in wires dangling from the port side and Cameron 
had to blow his way out. As X-6 shot tu the surface the craft was engaged by 
small arms and hand grenades from the crew of the TlRPITZ. 
Cameron submerged immediately and backed the X-Craft underneath the 
TIRPIlZ hull in the vicinity of ft8" turret. There he jettisoned his two side 
charges, setting the timers for 0815, then ordered the crt!w to destroy all the 
secret m aterial. It was clear now that escape was impossible. Cameron 
surfaced for the last time, opened the sea cocks to scutue X-6, and then ordered 
the crew to abandon ship. A German picket boat captured the crew and 
attempted to tow the X-Craft to the beach. Fortunately for the British the 
sinking midget was too heavy and the Gennans had to cut the tow line. X-6 
sank to the bottom. Cameron and his men were taken aboard the TIRPITZ. 
They felt certain the Gennans would have them shoL Instead, however, the 
JJ When the alann was eventually sounded the crewman on the bridge issued five 
short blasL'i. This signal was incorrect and called for the crew to man their watertight 
doors, as if the Tirpitz had hit an iceberg. This created considerable confusion and 
added to the delay in reacting to the X-Craft. 
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crew of the TlRPITZ was relatively hospitable and offered the British coffee 
• and schnapps. The ('..ermans assumed that the British had failed in their 
mission because no torpedues were fired. At 0812 when the charges detonated, 
however, the Captain immediately ordered the four crewman of X-6 shot as 
saboteurs. Fortunately, he changed his mind. Meanwhile X-7 was attempting 
to escape. Place stated in his after action report 
At 0740 we came out while still going ahead and slid over the top of the 
net between the buoys on the surface. I did not look back at the TlRPITZ 
at this time as this method of overcoming net defenses was new and 
absorbing ... We were too close, of course, for heavy fire, but a large 
number of machine-gun bullets were heard hitting the casing. 
Immediately after passing over the nets all mai n ballast tanks were vented 
and we went to the bottom in 120 feel The compressor was run again, 
and we tried to come to the surface or to periscope depth for a look su 
that the direction indicator could be started and as much distance as 
possible put between ourselves and the coming explosion. it was 
extremely annoying, therefore, to run into another net at 60 feel Shortly • 
after this [0812] there was a tremendous explosion. This evidently shook 
us out of the net,.. and when we surfaced it was tiresume to see the 
TIRPITZ stil! afloal •. M 
The explosion left X-7 "a bit of a mess inside~ with water rushing in 
quickly the compass and periscope broken, and only one light functioning. 
Place sat on the bottom of the fjord momentarily trying to decide the best 
course of action.3S Place later recalled: 
.J.I Ibid, Place Report,.. 1007. 
3S Ibid., Place letter of 19 January 1993. Place wanted to beach the X-Craft but was 
concemed about "giving the enemy full knowledge of the boal ~ 
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We all derided that we weren't reaUy going to do any good at all by going 
on. So I thought the safest thing was for us to try to [surface and) get 
out. . .If we were being shot at it was up to me to go outside [and risk 
being shot by the Gennans).l6 
Place exited the X-Craft first, waving a white sweater to signal surrender. As 
he jumped from the midget into the water, the force of his weight pushed the 
small X-Craft undelWater. The in rush of water forced the ct't!w to secured the 
hatch and X-7 sank to the bottom. Place didn't know why the midget sank,. 
"Whethe r they, the fi rst lieutenant took the boat down or whether it hadn't got 
enough buoyancy lift,. I don' t know,"l'I Place was taken to the Tl RPITZ and 
fully expected the crew of X-7 to exit the craft using the emergency lock out 
procedures. 
See, I'd briefed them carefully on doing an (emergencYI escape ••. they'd 
practiced diving and things ... we med so many submarine escapes I think 
what went wrong was they were too slow floodi ng up and on oxygen if 
you're slow flooding up you get oxygen poisoning.Jl! 
Unfortunately, the deep depth of the fjord forced the crew to wait for 45 
minutes before the internal pressure rouJd equalize to sea. In the ensuing time 
frame the oxygen in their breathing apparatus' expired and only one crewman, 
Sub- Ueutenant Robert Aitken, escaped. 




The 8 tons of Amatex that exploded underneath the TIRPITZ did not sink 
the battleship, but did severely damage all three main engines, all lighting and 
electrical equipment, one generator room, the hydrophone station, antiaircraft 
control positions, port rudder, range finding equipment and both ~B~ and "X" 
turrets. One German was killed and 40 wounded as over 500 tons of water 
rushed into the interior compartments of the batUeship. As a result of the 
action the HRPITZ never went to sea again. She was eventua1ly towed to 






The surviving crews of X-6 and X-7 were imprisoned in ('..erman POW 
camps and eventually repatriated after the war. The fate of X-5 remains a 
question to this day. Cameron said he saw the Germans sink X-S with their 
heavy guns but a post war search of the fjord only found X-6 and X-7. It is 
more likely that X-S never made Kaa Fjord and to Place it didn't matter. 
It doesn't to me make much of a difference whether he attacked or didn't 
attack ... Henty Creer [Commander of X-51 was a jolly good chap and I 
know he did the best he possibly could.~ 
X-lO, whose target was the SCHARNHORST, had mechanical difficulties 
and decided not to attack the pocket battleship for fear of compromising the 
rest of the operation. The crew of X-tO eventually rendezvoused with her 
parent submarine, scuttled X-tO and returned to England. The SEANYMPH 
and SCEPTRE remained in their patrol sectors until 4 October in the event 
some of the X·Craft crews escaped.411 They returned to Lerwick. Scotland on 
7 October and Operation SOURCE was officially ended. Admiral Barry later 
remarked: 
I cannot fully express my admiration for the three commanding 
officers ... and the crews of X·5, X·6, and X·7 who pressed home their attack 
and who failed to return. In the full knowledge of the hazards they were 
to encounter, these gallant crews penetrated into heavily defended fleet 
anchorages. There, with cool courage and detennination and in spite of 
n Ibid. 
411 The British were unaware of the status of X.5, X·6, and X·7 until several months 
Jaterand therefore Rear.Admiral, Subnlarines ordered the SEANYMPH and SCEPTRE 
to remain on station to pickup possible SUMVOrs. 
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all the modem devices that ingenuity could devise for their detection and • 
destruction, they pressed home their attack to the full ... It is clear that 
courage and enterprise of the very highest order in the close presence of 
the enemy was shown by these very gallant gentlemen, whose daring 
attack will surely go down to history as one of the most courageous acts 
01 all time. 41 
F. ANAI.YSIS 
1. Critique 
The primary objective of Operation SOURCE was to sink the 
TIRPITZ, and although the battleship did not settle on the bottom of Kaa 
Fjord, it was disabled sufficiently enough to render it ineffective. One would 
have to conclude, therefore, that the mission was a success. The failure of X-5, 
• x-s, X-9 and X-l0 to reach their targets and the inability of X-6 and X-7 to 
escape undetected may have been responsible, in a large part, to the Royal 
Navy not conducting a full mission profile during the preparation phase. If a 
ten day towing exercise had been conducted during the preparation phase, the 
mechanical failures, which manifested themselves during the assault,. e.g. 
periscope leakages, ballast and trim problems, and tow line breakages, could 
have been identified prior to the mission and corrected. This might have been 
the difference between escape and capture for the crews of X-6 and X-7 and life 
and death for the crews of X-5 and X-9. What eventually salvaged the operation 




was the professionalism of the crews, honed by months of repetitive traini ng. 
and their boldness and perseve rance to "press home their attack." 
Were the objectives worth the risk? While the TIRPITZ was in 
Trondhjem she had direct access to the Norwegian Sea and along with the 
SCHARNHORST and LUTZOW was capable of severing or damagi~g the 
maritime link betwee n England and Russia. Just weeks before the X-Craft raid, 
the TIRPITZ and her escorts had attacked and leveled the entire 150 man 
Norwegian garrison at Spitsbergen, a strategically vital island east of 
Greenland. The TIRPTIZ's g uns also destroyed a meteorological station, 
supply depots, thousands of tons of coal, ship loads of fuel, and a large port 
facility that supported the British fleel This action caused conce rn, not 
because of the devastation, but because it meant that the British were unable 
to cuntain the TIRPITZ. And, that the largest battleship in the world could 
sortie out into the Norwegian Sea and wreak havoc, apparenUy at will. 
For almost a year the British, Russians and Americans had been 
making attempts to sink the TIRPITZ. Even if she never ldt her secure harbur 
for the rest of the war, the batUeship presented a threat that could not be 
ignored. Although Operation SOURCE cost the British seven dead and six 
captured; after the assault.. the TIRPIT..l never posed a significant problem 
again. The risks were dearly warranted. 
Was the plan developed to maximize superiority over the enemy and 
minimize risk to the assault force? Operation SOURCE began with one g oaJ in 
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mind - sink the TlRPITZ. The air defense system surrounding Kaafjord was 
• exceptionally dense and even if a bomber penetrated the antiaircraft guns, it 
would have to drop torpedo bombs to pierce the hull where the ship was least 
annored. Both propositions were highly unlikely. It became evident that there 
was only one way to deliver enough ordnance to destroy the battleship ,- and 
that was by submersible. -Consequently, the X-Craft was designed specifically 
for this mission. There were devices to counter the antisubmarine and 
anti torpedo neb, specially designed attack periscopes, and Side Cargos with 
enough explosives to buckle the hull. Everything about the plan was aimed at 
maximizing the relative superiority of the X-Craft However, minimizing the 
risk in a submersible operation is difficult; for to be exposed, is to be captured 
or killed. Nonetheless, the British did everything they could to reduce this • 
risk. They provided extensive intelligence to the planners, properly prepared 
the crews and supported the effort throughout the operation. 
Was the mission executed according to the plan and if not what 
extenuaUng circumstances dictated the outcome? The British were unable to 
fully execute the objectives of Operation SOURCE due to the difficulties 
encountered while towing the midgets across the Nonvegian Sea and owing to 
the defensive envelope which surrounded the TlRYTIZ. 
On the open ocean crossing X-9 was lost at sea when the tow rope 
between the parent submarine and the X-Craft parted and X-8 had to be 
scuttled when she sustained damage, also related to a parted tow rope. This 
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meant that only X-HI would be available to attack the SCHARN HORST and 
LUTZOW. X-lO subsequently had mechanical problems and elected not to 
compromise the main objective (attacking the TIRPITZ) by attempting to sink 
the SCHARNHORST. Consequently, none of the secondary targets were 
engaged by the midgets of Operation SOURCE. 
The plan to sink the TIRPITZ, however, was adhered to more closely. 
All three midget .. X-5, X-6, and X-7 were released approximately on time and 
began their transit without incident. Although the fate of X-5 is unknown, the 
other two X-Craft arrived on time at the target. Unfortunately the TIRPITZ was 
well protected by a massive anti torpedo net, and although both X-Craft cleared 
the net and placed their charges, their inability to escape was al most 
preorda ined. The charges were set to explode less than one hour after 
placement. This provided no time for the X-Craft to extract. The antitorpedo 
net, which had been relatively easy to enter (in both cases a matter of good 
fortune), was almost impossible to exit without exposing the midgets. Even if 
the two X-Craft had escaped undetected, it is unlikely they would have gotten 
very fa r after the ordnance exploded. It was 0812 with severa] hours of 
daylight remaining. The GelTI1ans could have seilled off the lochs, pursued the 
X-Craft and in the clear waters of the fjord, captured their quarry fairly quickly. 
What modifications to the plan could have improved the outcome? 
The major problem with the plan was having to tow the X-Cra ft a cross the 
Norwegian Sea. Although this was unavoidable, it should have been rehearsed 
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more fully and all the tow ropes should have been nylon or double wr-apped 
manila. To this day, Admiral Place also questions the viability of dropping the 
Side Cargo charges underneath the TIRPTIZ as opposed to having the charges 
float upward against the ships hull. He wrote recently: 
Why didn't the TIRPITZ sink? Several of us questioned the wisdoll!- of 
releasing the [Side Cargos) to fall to the sea bed r-ather that having them 
float upwards to stick on the bottom of the target: the technical problem 
of ensuring they stick is easily solved. We were assured the "tamping 
effect" would do more damage than simply blowing a hole -- I remain 
unconvinced.42 
The Italians, who used a 300 Kg contact explosive, did more damage to the 
British battleships in Alexandria, than the X-Cr-aft's Side Cargo charges of 8 
tons (total) did to the TIRPITZ.43 It would appear Place's assumptions were 
correct and had the Side Cargo demolitions been positioned as desired; the 
TIRPITZ and her crew would have quickly settled to the bottom of KOla Fjord 
and the X-Cr-aft might have escaped. 
U Ibid., Place letter of 19 January 1993. (Emphasis added) 
43 Two of the three Italian crews succeeded in placing their charges on the hulls 
of their targets. One of the crews, De 101. Penne and Bianchi, left their charge on the 
bottom close to the hull. Nevertheless, the bottom of Alexandria was only a few 
meters below the HMS VALIANT, as opposed to Place's charge which was almost one 
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Figure 6-14. Attack on the Battleship llRPITZ. Relative 
Superiority Graph. 
As Figure 6-14 shows the X-Craft <both X-6 and X-7) reached the 
Point of Vulnerability at approximately 0400 when they encountered the first 
of the German defenses -- the antisubmarine net. Although the midgets had 
relative slIl't'riority by virtue of their concealment, they were now within the 
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envelope of detection and the operation hinged on maintaining that clandestine 
posture. Unfortunately, dearing the antisubmarine net did not dramatically • 
improve their chances of success; the midgets were still three hoUl's from the 
target and the sun was coming up. Even though thl' enemy was not aware of 
the X-Craft's presence, the Area of Vulnerability above the relative supe.riordy 
ling continued to expand because the midget's probability of detection was 
increasing and timl' was bl'ginning to take its loll on the submersibles 
subsystl'ms i.e., ballast and trim, electrical, periscope etc .. 
Finally at approximately 0700 (three hours after reaching the Point of 
Vulnerability, the X-Craft penetrated the final obstacle, the antitorpedo net, and 
thl'ir degree of relative superiority improved significantly. Once inside the net 
there was nothing the crew of the TfRrITZ could do. Therl' Wl're no weapons • 
in the TIRPITZ inventory that could stop tht"' X-Craft that clost"' to the ship. 
The massive guns were not able to train down on the midgets and the 
TIRI'ITZ's crew was equipped with only small anus and grenades, neither of 
which could penetrate the steel hull of the X-Craft. Once inside the 





their sidt! charges and escape. Unforhlllately for the X-Craft crews once their 
presence was compromised they were unable to maintain re/(ltiVl: superiority 
to effect their escape. This inabi lity to sustain an engagement when 
compromised is indicative of subsurface attacks. Subsurface attacks all' the 
only special operations that are designed to maintain stealth througllOlll the 
engagement. Growld/air operations use stealth only as a means to gain access 
to the target. Once ground forces aTe un target, speed nut s tealth becomes the 
dominant principle. If ground operations aTe compromised immediately prior 
to the engagement, such as the gliders at Eben Emae!, it dues not necessarily 
follow that the 'lttacking force will lose rdative superiority. By applying speed 
and purpose the operation can continue and relative superiurity gained an d 
maintained. 
In the case of Operation SOURCE success was not dependent on 
maiJitaining rdlllive superiorityiong enough for the X-Craft to escape, m erely 
long enough to detonate the charge~ underneath the TJRPITZ. Even after the 
charges wcre set, the Probability of Mission Completion was not 100 percent. 
The commanding officer of theTiRPTTZattempted to move his ship away from 
the charges and although he partially s ucceeded, it was not enough to offset the 
8 tons of demolition. However, had the crew of the TIRPITZ had more time, 
they could have completely negated the effects of the demolition by sailing 
from their anchorage. Relative superiority was maintained at this point by 
setting the time fusc on the side charges for only forty-five minutes, vise four 
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hours (to allow ample time for the X-Craft to escape). At approximately 0812 
• the 8 tons of demolition exploded and the TIRPITZ was ren~cred inoperable. 
What makes the outcome of Operation SOURCE so unusual is that 
it succeeded in spite of the large Area of Vulnerability. What should be clear, 
however, is that given another 30 minutes of vulnerability and X-6 wo~id not 
have reached its objective; and the large Area of Vulnerability probably 
affected the fate of X-So Had we constructed a Relative Superiority Graph prior 
to th .. operation and viewed success as recovery of the X-Craft aboard the 
parent submarines -- we would have seen a significant problem with the 
mission. From the time we reached the Point of Vulnerability until the time 
we recovered, the Area of VulnerabiLity would have constituted just under 50 
percent of the mission. That's not to say that a certain percentage of • 
vulnerability will automatically constitute failure, but, it should be a warning 
to the planners that the greater the Area of Vulnerability -- the greater the 
frictions of war -- and the greater the possibility of failure. 
3. Principles of Special Operations 
During the planning phase of Operation SOURCE the Royal 
Navy constructed six X-Craft each assigned to a single target. This allowed the 
crews to concentrate on one objective. When X-8 and X-9 were put out of 




of requiring X-IO to conduct multiple attacks on both the SCHARNHORST and 
LUTZOW, the Navy struck the LUTZOW from the target list and continued 
with a focused attack. Although X-5, X-6 or X-7 could have been siphoned off 
to attack the LUTZOW this would have deviated from the final plan, reduced 
the size of the force attacking the llRPITZ (the primary target) and c~eated 
more confusion. 
The intelligence available to the crews of the X-Craft was 
suffici en t for the task. They had extensive overhead photos, Chillts, 
hydrographic and astrological data, schematics of the targets, infonnation on 
the guard routines, and the X-Craft crews also knew that the Gennan ship 's 
hydrophones were scheduled to be down for repairs. This detailed intelligence 
picture of the objective area allowed the Royal Navy to devise a plan that 
minimized the forces, employed effective tactics to circumvent German 
defenses and used technology specifically tailored to the objective. The one 
inte lligence ~failure" was the inaccurate analysis of the antitotpedo net 
surrounding the TIRPlTZ. Intelligence estimates concl uded that the 
antitotpedo net extended to a maximum of 60 feet deep. Consequently, Place 
planned to overcome this obstacle by diving to 75 feet and going under the 
nels. Although divers were trained to cut through the net this was a not a 
viable option. Place in a later interview recalled: 
I personally never really visualized we were going to have to cut through 
the net. There was very little hope of cutting English anti torpedo nets 
(much less Gennan nets) because it was hardened steel and its such a 
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confusion of chain m.ail there, that knowing where to cut is almost • 
impossible." 
Place exercised good judgt!ment in planning to go under the net, 
it was within the laws of probability that the net would only extend to 60 feeL 
Any "officer who possess a standard of judgement" would never have as~umed 
that an anti torpedo net would extend to the bottom of the seabed. Antitorpedo 
nets were designed to stop either air dropped or submarine l.aunched torpedoes, 
neither of which were capable of diving under a 60 foot deep net and then 
homing on its target. Consequently even the best planner would probably not 
have foreseen this situation. This is a prime example of the frictions of war, 
when poor intelligence combines with an unforseen circumstance to create a 
situation for which you cannot plan or prepart!. Even with "perft!ct" • 
intelligence and the simplt!st of plans, you cannot foresee all the possibilities. 
Fortunately for the crews tht!y wt!rt! ablt! to overcome this obstacle and continue 
on with the mission. 
Building on tht! intelligence picture, the Royal Navy created the 
X-Craft for the purpost! of ddeating German dt!fenses and sinking tht! 
TIRPlTZ. The use of new technology during Operation SOURCE was essential 
to the mission's success. Prt!Vious attempts by British chariots (manned 
torpedoes) to sink tht! TlRPlTZ had failed, primarily because the chariots 





(limited by range and diver exposure) required a support ship to insert them 
into the immediate vicinity of the target. This failure spurred the requirement 
for a longer duration, d ry, midget submarine. The design of the X-Craft 
considered all the operational parameters of this specific operation. The X-
Craft was small to negotiate the fjords and penetrate the antisubmarine nets. 
It was equipped with a wet and dry chamber to lock out divers to cut the 
antisubmarine nets and the X-Craft had an assault periscope that was so 
slender it barely rippled the calm waters of around Kaa Fjord. Most 
importantly the X-Craft earned two 2 ton side charges specifically designed to 
destroy the 53,000 ton TIRPlTZ. By limiting the objective to a single target, 
then focusing the intelligence effort on that objective and finally developing 
new technology to counter the defenses, the plan for Operation SOURCE was 
reduced to it"! sim plest form. When asked if he had any reservations about the 
plan, Godfrey Place responded, "No. I think we were quite confident. It 
seemed to be quite simple, really." The planning phase, however, was just the 
beginning and a simple plan does not equate to a successful operation without 
a great deal of preparation. 
b. Security 
Security was always a concern to the planners of Operation 
SOURCE, however, it only mildly affected the daily operations of the X-Craft 
crews. Working out of HMS VARBEL in Scot1and the operating area was 
relatively isolated. Precautions were taken to limit the exposure of the X-Craft 
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and their support ships, and the crews were provided a shallow cover story to 
tell the local townspeople. This notwithstanding the Germans were fully 
prepared (antisubmarine and antitorpedo nets as well as daily antiswimmer 
drills) to defend the TIRPITZ against subsurface attacks both from 
conventional submarines and chariots.4S The security for Operation SOl!RCE, 
therefore, need only have concealed the time frame of the operation and the 
unique capabilities ofX-CrafL This is not to imply that additional security was 
inappropriate; the less the enemy knew about the forces and means of 
employment the better the chance the mission would succeed. In Operation 
SOURCE, however, security was secondary to proper preparation and the need 
for repetitive training. 
c. Repetition 
If you are going to do anything dangerous, the best way to accomplish it 
is to train, train, train, so tha t in the excitement of the situation you do the 
thing a utomatically.46 
John Lorimer, X-6 crew 
'IS Operation Arthur, the attempted attack by British chariots on the Tirpitz failed 
when the two chariots broke free from their support vessel (Arthur) and sank in the 
fjords. Most of the charioteers and Norwegian resistance escaped across Norway to 
Sweden. Unfortunately one of the British frogmen, Bob Evans was wounded by 
German police and captured. He was subsequently interrogated and finally shot as 
a spy. This event occurred in November 1942 almost a year prior to Operation Source. 
In light of Evan's capture and the success of Italian manned torpedoes in the 
Mediterranean the German defenses at Kaa Fjord were consistent with the probable 
threaL 







Operation SOURCF. had an advantage not nonnally associa ted 
with special operations; the crews had almost 18 months to train, from March 
19, 1942 until September 5, 1943. Although some of this training was b asic 
familiarization, the largest portion was mission specific. In the early months 
X-3 and X-4 were rotated weekly among the crews to conduct indi~dua1 
training; and with the arrival of X-5 through X·10 in January through March 
1943 each crews conducted daily training in preparation for the mission. Each 
aspect of the mission was rehearsed multiple times. This included passage 
training.. net cutting.. ship attack profiles, emergency procedures, escape and 
evasion training.. and several limited mission profiles against nearby port 
facilities. As stated earlier the only shortfall in the preparation phase was the 
lack of a full mission profile -- to include a fuJI tow. Repetition is essential to 
the success of any mission, however, repetition based on unrealistic profiles 
builds a false confidence that erodes quickly during an engagemenl Some of 
the confidence exuded by the X-Craft crews fell prey to probl ems which could 
have been identified through a more thorough training program i.e. X-8, X-9 
tow line breakage, and X·10 mechanical problems. Nevertheless, the 
philosophy to "train, train, train," insured that at least four of the six X-Craft 
successfully transited the Norwegian Sea and commenced their insertion into 




The four X-Craft that motored into Soroy Sound on the morning 
of 20 September 1943 all knew that the element of surprise was absolutely 
essential to the success of the mission. It was for this reason that Lt. Ken 
Hudspeth, whose X-10 was mechanically unsound to operate effectively, 
decided not to attack the SCHARNHORST. Hudspeth knew that if his X,-Craft 
was compromised prior to the other midgets arriving on target; it would destroy 
his companions' chances. One of his crewman reported later: 
Ken Hudspeth asked each of us whether we wanted to go in and do the 
attack and we all said, 'Yes: But after consideration he said that we 
would be bound to be seen and that this would not only do us little good 
but might also spoil the chances of the others, which was more 
important." 
Hudspeth elected to remain on the bottom (at 195 feet) outside 
Kaa Fjord until the window for attacking the TIRPITZ passed. If he heard no 
explosions-by 0900 he intended to attack the SCHARNHORST and attempt to 
complete his mission. 
Place and his crew in X-7 achieved complete surprise bypassing 
the anti torpedo net at approximately 0715 and releasing the side charges a t 
0730. It is conceivable that had X-6 not alerted the crew of the TIRPITZ, X-7 
could have escaped. Unfortunately, X-6 was spotted entering the antitorpedo 
swing gate at 0707, but confusion aboard the TIRPITZ provided an additional 
five minutes before the crew began to react. Although surpriSl' was not 







complete, the enemy was unprepared to n!3Ct effectively which provided 
Cameron in ,X-6 sufficient time to release his charges. Subsurface attacks have 
several advantages, however as a rule, sustainability in the face of combat is 
not one. Once compromised speed and purpose become everything and the 
opportunity for escape vanishes. 
e. Speed 
Speed in a subsurface attack must be bal;lIflced against the need 
to maintain s urprise. If the attacker can remain undetected, then speed is only 
a function of the subsurface platform's duration. This phenomenon is more 
prevalent in a swimmer or manned torpedo attack where the duration of the 
diving rig and the temperature of the water directly affect the attacking 
element's sustain ability. In the case of Operation SOURCE, however, speed 
was important because the mechanical difficulties (damaged periscope, ballast 
and trim problems, broken gyroscope,) which plagued X-6 and X-7 became 
increasingly worse with time. Cameron, who initially planned to cut through 
the antitorpedo nets decided it would take too much time; time that would 
deteriorate his material condition and reduce the probability of success. 
Disregarding the risk, Cameron surfaced X-6 behind a picket boat passing 
through the anti torpedo net gate. What he lost in surprise he gained in speed. 
Once through the gate it took the crew of X-6 only ten minutes, from 0707 unti1 
approximately 0717, to reach the TIRPITZ and release the side charges. X-7, 
who remained undetected throughout the engagement, took only fifteen 
minutes to complete its mission once inside the anti torpedo nel Surprise and 
speed assured relative superiority, but it was the sense of purpose that assured • 
In Operation SOURCE, as with all special operations, th~ men 
involved in the assault must both understand the primary purpose of the 
mission and be personally committed to seeing the mission completed -
regardless of the costs. The primary purpose of Operation SOURCE was to 
sink the TIRPITZ. Everyone from the enlisted divers aboard the X-Craft to 
Rear Admiral Submarines understood that fact and they always remained 
focused on what was importanl Beginning with the loss of X-9, the Royal 
Navy acted with the primary purpose in mind by not reducing the number of • 
X-Craft assigned to attack the TlRPITZ. The TlRPlTZ was, after all, the 
primary target. Reducing the number of X-Craft may have limited the damage 
sustained by the TIRPITZ. 
Later in the operation, Hudspeth showed he understood the 
primary purpose of the mission, when he made a command decision not to 
attack the SCHARNHORST. He had been ordered, as had the commanders of 
X-8 and X-9, not to compromise the mission before X-S, X-6, and X-7 had an 
opportunity to make their assaults on the TIRPITZ. Hudspeth's compromise 
would have alerted the nearby crew of the TlRPITZ and neither X-6 nor X-7 
would have penetrated the antitorpedo nets. Place understood the purpose 
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when he bypassed the SCHARNHORST to remain on schedule to attack the 
TIRPITZ. It was exceptionally difficult to pass up a "sitting duck" in favor of 
another target some miles away. Place, nevertheless, focused on what was 
important -- the T1RPlTZ. 
The men who volunteered for X-Craft duty were screened to 
ensure they understood the hazards of the mission and throughout training a 
sense of com mitment (to Queen and country) was instilled into eac h man.43 
This was not by accident,. but by design. The 8ritish, p robably more so than 
any other people, fuJly a ppreciate the value of patriotism to encourage a m an 
to fight Encouraging this sense of purpose, or duty, eventually paid d ividends 
when the success of the mission - became a matter of survival. When the X-6, 
badly damaged from the long transit, was outside the antitorpedo net,. the crew 
had the option of turning around and attempting to escape, or press home Uteir 
attack on the T1RPITZ. Without hesitation the crew decided to attack. The 
attack resuJted in all four crewmen being captured and they subsequently spent 
the next 18 months in a POW camp. 
The crew of X-7 also realized that if they made the attack, escape 
was unlikely; for when the side charges exploded underneath the TlRPnZ, the 
Germans would immediately seal off all escape routes to the open sea. 
43 Although upon volunteering many of the men did not know that the TIRPITZ 
was the objective, they knew that whatever the target, their chances of survival were 
slim. 
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Nevertheless, X-7 proceeded ahead and dropped her charges. The crews 
halfheartedly: thought about scuttling the X-Craft and attempting to cross the • 
snow and ice to Russia, but in reality this was not an option. The crews of 
both X-6 and X-7, as well as all the X-Craft crews, showed from the beginning 
of training until the completion of the mission that being committed to a ~ause, 
greater than oneself, is a necessary for success in battle. 
Operation SOURCE was a "classic" special operation even though 
the submariners were not "classic" commandos. There was a specific target.. 
whose elimination was a military and political imperative. Men were specially 
trained, equipped and supported. A simple plan was developed by limiting 
the objectives, using good intelligence to identify the obstacles and then using 
technology and innovation to overcome those obstacles. The plan was kept • 
concealed, rehearsed numerous times and executed with surprise, speed (after 
X-6 was compromised) and purpose. The frictions of war continuously 
impeded the progress of the mission, but both the decision makers at the staff 
level and the submariners in the X-Craft showed courage, intellect, boldness 
and perseverance; all of which helped achieve and maintain relative superiority 
long enough to complete the mission. 
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VII. U.s. RANG .. .x RAID ON nlE POW CAMP AT CABANATUAN, 
PlDLiPPINES - 30 JANUARY 1945 
A. BACKGROUNO 
On April 9, 1942, Brigadier General Edward P. King jr., commander of the 
American and Filipino Forces on Bataan, surrendered to the Japanese. ' This 
marked the end of four months of fighting by the 90,000 allied troops holding 
the Philippine peninsula of Luzon. The Japanese rounded up 72,000 prisoners 
and began the infamous Bataan Death March during which over 20,000 men 
died from malaria, starvation and murder.! The survivors were marched 65 
miles from the peninsula, north to the railroad station at San Fernando. Packed 
]00 men to a box car, the prisoners rode to Capas where they were off loaded 
• and continued the march to Camp O'Donnell. There they were interned for the 
next several months. During the stay at Camp O'Donnell another 3000 
Americans died. Worse yet, however, were the conditions for the Filipino 
prisoners who lived in a separate compound across the nearby creek. Dr. 
Herbert Ott, a survivor of both O'Donnell and Cabanatuan reca1led later, "there 
were 50,000 Filipinos across the creek from us at O'Donnell. In six m onths, as 
near as I know, 30,000 of those 50,000 passed away. I got home with a diary 
and in one day I counted 409 dead bodies [l'ilipinos] carried out."2 In 
1 Of the 52,000 men who survived the Balaan death march approximately 9,200 
were American and 42,800 were Filipino. 
1 Dr. Herbert Ott, interviewed by CDR William H. McRaven, 14 January 1993, 
Tape recording.. Monterey CA. During his stay at Cabanatuan, Dr. Ott, a veteraniam, 
worked in the sick ward and kept health records on the prisoners which indicated the 
September 1942 the remaining 6500 American prisoners were transported by 
• rail from Capos to Cabanatuan City. Five miles east of the .small town was 
Camp Pangatian, their final destination. By December 1943, 2650 Americans 
were buried in the camp's cemetery and by the time the allies began their fight 
to retake the Philippines less than 550 prisoners remained alive in ~amp 
Pangatian.l 
On January 9, 1945 the United States Sixth Army under the command of 
General Walter Krueger landed unopposed at Lingayen Gulf on the island of 
Luzon. The XIV Corps which included the 37th and 40th Infantry Divisions 
was positioned on the Sixth Army's right flank and advanced along an axis 
parallel to Tarlac, Clark Field and San Fernando. On the left flank was I Corps 
which drove through the mountains toward the city of Baguio and eventually • 
on toward San Jose in the north. By 26 January advanced units of the Sixth 
Anny held a line from Guimba south to La paz with Licab in the center. This 
was to be the jumping off point for Rangers raid on Cabanatuan,· 
For months before the allied invasion, Krueger had been I't!ceiving reports 
on the inhuman treabnent of allied prisoners and realized that as his forces 
number that died of disease and the number that were killed by the Japanese. 
l The number in the camp actually grew to 10,000 prisoners at one poinl Many 
IIf these POWs were later shipped off to other camps in Mindinao and Palawan, 
nevertheless by January 1945 over 3000 Americans were buried in the camp. 
, Although the POW camp was officially known as Camp Pangatian it is more 





moved across the island the Japanese would massacre the remaining POW" to 
haste n their retreat. On 27 January, intelligence provided by American and 
fil ip ino guerrillas, had located Camp Pangatian which was now situated just 
25 miles from the forward edge of the battle area. Between the front lines and 
the camp, however, were over 7000 Japanese troops, most positioned i.n the 
immediate vicinity of Cabanatuan City. 
The Sixth Anny Intelligence Officer, Colonel H orton White recommended 
to Krueger that the newly formed 6th Ranger Battalion be assigned the mission 
of rescuing the POWs. The plan was as follows: 
rhe Rangers would move to Cuimba, about seventy-five miles east of 
base camp, on 28 January and pick up an eighty-man guerrilla force and 
native guides at a nearby guerrilla camp. They would then march on a 
route chosen by local civilians and rendezvous with the Alamo Scouts and 
a second eighty*man guerrilla force at Balincarin, about five miles 
northeast of the objective, on 29 January. They would complete their 
plans there and, unless the situation had changed, conduct the operation 
that night.5 
The Rangers were commanded by Lieute nant Colonel Henry A. Mucci, a 
33 year old West Point graduate. Mucci chose Captain Robert W. Prince 
commander of Company C, and First LieutenantJohn F. Murphy, Company F, 
2nd Platoon to lead his operational forces. Additionally, two teams of Alamo 
Scouts headed by First Lieutenant Thomas Rounsaville were assigned to 
support the mission. The two Filipino guerrilla forces, which were recognized 
5 Michael J. King, Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II 
Levenworth Papers (Combat Studies Institute, Fort Levenworth, Kansas, June 1985), 
57. 
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units of the United States Army and provided both logistic and combat 
support, were commanded by Captain Juan Pajota and Captain Eduardo Joson 
respectively. 
B. PANGATIAN POW CAMP - CABANAlUAN 
The POW site at Camp Pangatian lay five miles east of Cabanatuan City 
and less than a mile west of the small town of Cabu. Mountains rose in the 
north and southwest leaving Cabanatuan nestled in the center of a valley that 
began at Ungayen Gulf and ended at Manila Bay. Surrounding the camp were 
rice patties and elephant grass fed by water from the Platero River on the north 
and by the Cabu River on the east. A main road lay just outside the gate of the 
camp and connected Cabanatuan City with Baler Bay in the north. This road 
was the primary transportation route for Japanese troops. 
The camp itself had once been a United States Department of Agriculture 
station and later a Filipino Army Training Center. Now it was a death camp 
where the inhumane treatment of prisoners rivaled the Nazi "work camps," but 
"the Germans were civilized compared to the Japanese."' In the book 
Cabanatuan: The Iapanese Death Camp John McCarty a survivor of the Bataan 
Death March and two POW camps, O'Donnell and Cabanatuan, describes the 
treatment of seven prisoners caught while trying to escape: 
They beat them awful. Then they tied them to posts •.. They tied them 
with wire. They left them out there without any cover, clothes torn off. 






They put two by fours back of their knees and tied up their ankles to 
their necks and left them in the hot sun without water. Swarms of big 
black flies and insects crawled allover them ... They must have kept them 
there for forty-eight hours, then they moved them to the cemetery and had 
them dig their own graves ... and then they shot them all.' 
This was a frequent occurrence at Cabanatuan. rhose that did survive 
lived a life of pain. Dr. Ott stated: 
A daily routine was getting up before dark ... there were work details that 
would go to the farm or go to the woods. ( was fortunate to be incharge 
of slaughtt>ring the water buffalos. OccassionaJly you wDuld get one or 
two of these for 10,000 people. We were down to as low as 800 calories 
a day and you had to work on it It took 1200 calories to maintain you, so 
a lot of people just worked to death. A scratch would become infected 
and you would get gangrene. With a1l the vitamin deficiencies the 
comers or your mouth would be sore, the backs of your feet and insteps 
would ache. I've seen men's scrotums the size of your head; so swelled 
up from beri_beri.8 
Dy January ]945, over 3000 men had died in Cabanatuan. Saving the 
• remaining 512 men would require swift action on the part of the Rangers 
and obtaining detailed information on the exact layout of the facility was 
essentJal. Fortunately for the Americans, one of the guerrilla leadeTh, 
Captain rajota, had once been stationed at the camp while undergoing 
training as part of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East 
(USAFFE). 
7 Vince Taylor, Cabanatuan: The Japanese Death Camp (Waco Texas, Texian 
Press, 19R7), R1. 
~ Ibid., O tt. 
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The entire camp was approximately 600 by 800 yards and was enclosed by 
three barbed wire fences, eight feet high and situated about four feet apart. • 
Four story wooden guard towers were positioned at even intervals outside the 
fences. Inside the camp additional barbed wire fences were erected to isolate 
specific areas, including the entire east section of the camp where the POWs 
were held. ' 
The main gate on the north end was an eight foot high fence padlocked 
and guarded by three twelve foot high guard towers and one pill box. The 
towers were manned by a single guard with another guard at the gate and four 
heavily armed men in the pill box. The gate opened onto a dirt road that 
divided the camp down the middle. To the east were the POWs. They were 
housed in eight sixty-foot long thatched roof barracks. The barracks were • 
originally designed to accommodate 40 troops, but the Japanese had placed 120 
prisoners in each building. At the south end of the POW compound were the 
Japanese guard barracks. These were also protected by a barbed wire fence to 
prevent POWs from entering the area. 
The west side of the camp contained messing and berthing f.t"ilities for 
transient Japanese troops and storage buildings for trucks and tanks. At the 
time of the raid there were 150 Imperial soldiers from the Kinpeidan Unit 
, The majority of 512 roWs interned at Cabanatuan were Americans, however, 





housed in the southwest end of the camp as well as the n ormal compli m en t of 
73 guards.JO 
The real threat to the r;tid force, however, were the Japanese units 
positioned at both Cab. niill tuan City and Cabu. At Cabu was the Dokuho 359 
Battalion under the command of Tomeo ayabu. Oyabu's forces nurnbere~ over 
800 men and included six to eight tanks and several artillery pieces. The day 
prior to the raid Dyabu had been ordered to [eRI over night at Cabu. When the 
Kinpeidan Unit departed Camp Pangatian the following morning, Dokuho 359 
Batb.i ion was to move into Cabanatuan City to reinforce the Imperial Army. 
Cabanatuan City was the temporary headquarters of the Imperial Army 
Comm.and Naotake and harbored over 7000 troops. Naotake had been ordered 
to defend Cabanatuan City against the advancing allied forces and was 
equipped with a division level supply of tanks and a rti llery. All three of the 
Japane"e units, the Dokuho Battalion, the Naotake Command and the transient 
Kinpeidan Unit would have to be engaged or delayed in order for the Rangen; 
to have any success of rescuing the POWs. 
C. THE 6TH RANGER BATfALlON 
The 6th Ranger BaHalion, which wa" a"signed the mis"ion of rescuing the 
POWs at Cabanatuan, was originally formed as the 98th Field A rtillery 
Battalion. Activated inJanuary1941 at Ft. I,ewi" Washington, the 98th was sen t 
10 The guards were a mixture of Japanese, Korean and Fonnosan. 
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to New Guinea in 1943 but spent most of the time conducting training while • 
the war was going on around them. By April 1944, the 98th had moved to Port 
Moresby on the southeast end of the island and joined with the Ueutenant 
General Walter Krueger's 6th Army. 
Krueger was in the process of reorganizing the 6th Army for the inv:asion 
of the Philippines. He had heard about the success of Lieutenant Colonel 
William O. Darby's newly formed Ranger units in Europe and decided to turn 
the 98th :Field Artillery into the 6th Ranger Battalion. The transition would not 
be an easy one. Most of the men in the 98th were not infantry trained and 
Krueger knew that in order for the Rangers to be a success the men would have 
to undergo intensive training at the hands of an experienced infantry officer. 
To this end Krueger chose Lieutenant Colonel Henry Mucci. Mucci was chosen • 
both because of his experience and the fact that he was not from the 6th Army. 
Tough decisions would have to be made, probably at the expense of several 
careers and Krueger believed an "outsider" would bring no personal baggage 
to the decision making process. 
As training began, Mucci made several issues clear. Rangers would not 
wear insignia in the field, they would not salute other officers, and they would 




I may be Colonel Mucci, but don't dare call me that in the field. The first 
one who calls me 'Colonel', I'll call him 'General' and we'll see who the 
Japs shoot first. 11 
Additionally, Mucci encouraged all married m en to look for reassignment 
elsewhere and he recommended that those men who did not want to volunteer 
for the 6th Ranger Battalion be transferred to another unit.12 By the end ~f the 
first week of training the ranks had thinned con~iderably, some voluntarily, 
some not. Eventually the Hatlalion consisted of almost 600 men divided into 
six companies, a headquarters staff and a battalion staff. The companies were 
subdivided into two platoons with one officer and thirty.one enlisted men as 
well as a camp.my headquarters element. The platoons were further divided 
into a headqua rters section, two assault teams of eleven men each and a special 
weapons section of six men. The Rangers carried an array of weapons including 
the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), M1 Carbines, Thompson submachine 
guns, .45 cal pistol, Bazookas, flilme throwers, ilnd .90 and .60 mm morta.rs. 
Additionally the Rilnger Bilttillion had an integrated medical detachment,.. 
communiciltions section ilnd a motor pool. 
Basic training for the 6th Ranger Bilttalion included extensive weapons 
firing, small unit tactics, long marches and amphibious warfare. Sergeilnt 
11 Forrest B. Johnson, Hour of Redemption: The Rilnger Raid on Cabilniltuiln 
(New York: Milnor Books Inc., 1978), 131. 
12 Subject letter, "Historical Dillil," from Cilptilin Arthur D. Simons, CO, B 
Company, 6th Ranger Hilttalion, to the Adjulilnt General, 7 February 1945, SF-INBN 
72-37, roll 6, frames 24-28. 
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Charles H. Bosard, 1st Sergeant of F Company kept a dial)' in which he • 
annotated some of the training events. It read in part: 
May 8, 1944-I-laving a big general inspection today-Have been firing all 
our weapons, going over MiseI)' Hill, through Torture Flats, landing nets, 
obstacle course-ran about ten miles. We are all dam good swimmers 
now-2S0 yards with a 50 pound pack. June 4--Working vel)' hard-going 
through grenade course and bayonet course. Getting ready for 
amphibious training. June 19-Getting ready to go out on a night 
problem ... night patrol, perimeter defense, etcY 
Staff Sergeant Clifton Harris later recalled jokingly, "We always said if we 
went through the training we never had to worty about getting killed."H 
On October 3, 1944, the 6th Ranger Battalion got their first assignment. 
The Rangers would be responsible for securing several Japanese held islands 
that guarded the entrance to Leyte Gulf, the site of the planned invasion. On 
October 17th, three days before the main landing.. the Rangers went ashore on • 
the Philippine islands of Oinagat, Suluan and Homonhon. S/Sgt Harris 
remembered the tasking clearly, ~We were to direct the main invasion fleet into 
Leyte Gulf. We put up search lights and brought the convoy through the 
straits. It was our first mission."IS Captain Prince's Company C landed 
unopposed and only saw limited action, while the remaining companies 
lJ Ibid., Johnson, 135. 
14 Clifton R. Harris, interviewed by COR William H. McRaven, 14 Janual)' 1993, 





encountered varying degrees of resistance. I ' The Rangers were spread out 
across the three islands and had a "ringsideseat~ for the ensuing "Hattle of 
Leyte Gulf." On the 20th of October the United States Sixth Army landed on 
the eastern shore of Leyte Gulf and General Douglas MacArthur gave his 
famous "I have returned" speech. By the end of the month Leyte W.ilS se~urely 
in American hands and by the years end the Japanese had lost over 50,000 
soldiers defending the Leyte Valley. Even with those staggering losses the 
Imperial Army still had over 250,000 troops left on Luzon. 
On 4 January 1945, the bulk of the Sixth Army departed Leyte and 
proceeded to the Lingayen Gulf. Five days later on 9 January the invasion of 
Luzon began. The Rangers did not playa significant role in the landing and 
for the two weeks following the landing, remained idle. On the 16th of 
January, they received orders to establish a radar station on the Japanese held 
island of Santiago. Captain Arthur "Bull" Simons, later of Son Tay fame, was 
tasked with the mission. Simons and a small element arrived on the island 
that night only to find that the Japanese had departed. Subsequently, the 
Rangers were ordered to provide two companies to hold the island and erect 
the radar station. Owing to this requirement, the 6th Rangers were without 
Bravo and Echo Companies when the mission to rescue the POWs was ordered. 
H. Robert W. Prince, interviewed by CDR William H. McRavellt 28 December 1992, 
Tape recording, Monterey CA. Mr. Prince stated that although his company had faced 
the Japanese prior to the raid on Cabanatuan, none of his Company C had any real 
combat experience . 
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The other unit involved in the operation was the Alamo Scouts. Activated 
in November 1943, the Alamo Scouts were modeled after the Navy's 
amphibious scoul .. and formed by Krueger to conduct amphibious and deep 
reconnaissance, small unit raids, and demolition. Krueger, a San Antonio 
native, named the scouts in honor of the battle of the Alamo. He said, 
They'll be called the Alamo Scouts. I've always been inspired with the 
story of the Alamo and those brave men who died there. Our Alamo 
Scouts must have the courage and qualifications of Crockett. Bowie and 
Travis.11 







6trl ArmyAlamoScoll1s who wereon lheraid. StarKIing, leltloright PFCGilberl Cox. PFC 
Wilbur Wismer, Sgt. Harold Hard. ?FC Andrew Sm;th, PfC Franc,s Laquier. Kn.ee!ing. lett 
to r :,;nt PFC Galen KmiesOfl. P"'C RulO Vaqullar, 151 Lt . William Nellis!. 1st It Thomas 
Roonsav~l e and P Fe FrankJin Fo)( (0 ., the Raid but not in this PClotO: 1st Lt John Deve 
PFCTom Siason, PFC Sabas AS is , PFCAllreo AflQnso.:: February I 1945 (U.S . Army PIlote _) 
. . 
Figure 7-1. Alamo Scouts. (US. Army Photo) 
Krueger directed his commanders in the Pacific to identify men within their 
units that were exceptionally fit, good swimmers, intelligent and experts with 
a rifle. The men chosen were sent to New Guinea to begin Scout training on 
Fergusson Island. 
Similar in rigor to the Ranger course, the trainees spent four weeks 
conducti ng long jungle patrols, weapons familiarization (including Japanese 
weapons), communications training.. land and water navigation, self defense 
3.9 
and rubber boat training. After the four weeks of basic "indoctrination" the • 
trainees undetwent two weeks of field training exercises. including joint 
operations with Navy patrol boats, the scouts primary means of insertion. Part 
of the final two weeks incorporated a "swim test." The perspective scouts were 
required to swim out through the surf while instructors ashore fired into the 
water 4lround them. After six weeks of training the perspective scout still had 
one more hurdle to overcome, peer selection: 
When they wanted to determine who these teams were going to be they 
had a secret ballot and the officers voted for the five or six enlisted guys 
they most wanted on their team and the enlisted men all voted for the 
officers they wanted to go on a mission with. They [the instructors] 
sorted this out so that everyone was compatible.ls 
By February ten teams of seven men had been fonned. One of the team 
members was always a Filipino. William Nel1ist a fonner Alamo Scout later • 
recalled: 
That was a real wise move on somebody's part. Those people [Filipinos] 
kept us out of more trouble. They could evaluate the Filipinos and their 
reports and how much stock to put in it. They were completely 
invaluable to US.l~ 
Soon after selection, the Alamo Scouts began operations against the Japanese. 
Inserting by boat, submarine, parachute or seaplane, the Alamo Scouts would 
go ashore for three to five days and gather intelligence on enemy activity, 
l~ William Nellist,. interviewed by CDR William H. McRaven, 15 January 1993, 






conduct beach reconnaissance, spot targets for air strikes, and support guerrilla 
activities. Within the first year the scouts conducted sixty mission wiUtaut a 
single loss. 
Their most successful operation was in October 1944. First tieutenant 
William Nellist and Pir.;t Lieutenant Thomas Rounsaville and their two teams, 
who were later to playa key role in the rescue of POWs at Cabanatuan, were 
inserted by PT boats into Moan, New Guinea. This Japanese held territory was 
the site of a POW camp containing 32 Dutch civilians and 34 civilian 
Javanese.20 The two teams slipped ashore at night and within thirty minutes 
successfully liberated the civilians and killed the entire Japanese guard force. 
Nellist said later. 
This mission was just the opposite of the Cabanatuan mission, in that,. 
that there wasn't anything we didn't know about that prison ... There was 
hardly any risk of failure ... we had such good information}1 
By late 1944 the Alamo Scouts had racked up an impressive record of combat 
iiction and the men had been awarded nineteen Silver Stars, eighteen Bronze 
Stars, and fo ur Soldier's Medals.22 
W According to Nellist most post operation reports are in error indicating that 
only 33 prisoners were rescued vice the actual number or 66. 
11 Ibid., Nellist. 
22 Ibid., King, 55. 
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D. LTCOL HENRY A. MUCCI - 6TH RANGER. BAlTAUON 
Lieutenant Colonel Henry A. Mucci had just turned 33 when he reported 
to New Guinea as the new commander of the 6th Ranger Battalion. A 1936 
graduate of the United States Military Academy, he had been assigned as a 
Company Commander at Fort Warren, Wyoming, attended advanced in~antry 
training at Fort Benning, Georgia and just prior to his arrival in New Guinea 
was the provost marshall of Honolulu. In his capacity as provost marshall, 
Mucci had undergone additional tfiilining in jungle warfare and small unit 
tactics. 
Small in stature and rarely without a pipe in his mouth, Mucci was 
nevertheless "very well built and muscular" and pushed his Rangers through 
a rigorous training program in which he fully participated.7.J 
Whatever Mucci told the men to do, he also did. He seemed to be 
everywhere ... on each twenty mile hike, in the middle of bayonet training, 
jogging along on the five mile runs before breakfast, crawling through the 
mud to participate in attacks on simulated Japanese pillboxes, firing a 
variety of weapons and scoring some of the highest grades,2A 
Mucci was known as a "born leader." He motivated his men more 
through inspiration than coercion, but he was also known for his quick temper 
when soldiers failed to act promptly to an order. With a flare for the dramatic, 
Mucci once challenged a sergeant to stab him during knife training. 
7.J Ibid" Prince. 






When the sergeant attempted to cut the Colonel, Mucci side stepped him and 
tossed the sergeant to the g round, thereby demonstrating to the Rangers the 
proper technique of avoiding a charging Japanese soldier. This flamboyant 
style was typical of Mucci. Captain Prince described him as a "great believer 
in the Ranger concept. .. a terrific officer ... who had the respect of every man in 
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the outfit."2.'1 Others said, ~He was about as rough as they came, ... as mean as 
• a junk yard dog. ... but everybody liked him. He stood up for us. You had to 
be right, but he'd go to bat for you.":!Ii 
Mucci was instrumental in both the planning and execution of the raid on 
the POW camp. Using basic infantry tactics Mucci and Prince developed ~ plan 
that would incorporate simple, well known maneuvers. This eliminated the 
need for the Rangers to undergo extensive rehearsals. Considering the limited 
time available this was the only alternative. Mucci also used the Alamo Scouts 
to reconnoiter the target and he used the guerrillas to act as a blocking force. 
Mucci had the innate ability to deal with people. This proved to be a 
valuable skill in interacting with both the Filipino guerrillas and the 
Communist Huks. In his first meeting with the guerrilla leader, Major Pajola, • 
Mucci went out of his way to complement the Filipino's tactical acumen and 
obvious ~West Point" training. These words of praise helped to co-opt quickly 
the guerrilla leader and ensured his support throughout the operation. 
While extracting from Cabanatuan Mucci received news that the 
Communist Huks were waiting in a nearby barrio and refused to allow the 
Filipino guerrillas supporting the Rangers to pass. Mucci gauging the situation 
sent back a forceful reply: 
ZS Ibid., Prince. 
:!Ii Quotes are from author's interviews with Clifton Harris, William Butler, and 
Cleat Norton res pectively. 
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Lieutenant, go back and tell those Huks that we all are coming through. 
If they offer any resistance whatsoever .. .if even a dog snaps at one of my 
men, I'll call in artillery and level the village.27 
Unbeknownst to the Huks, Mucci was without radio communication and had 
no means of calling in either artillery or air support. It was a bluff Utat 
worked and Mucci, h is men, the Filipinos, and the POWs passed through the 
Huk held village unmolested. For his actions at the raid on Cabanatuan Mucci 
was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. 
E. THE KAlD ON CABANATUAN 
On the 27th of January, Mucci was summoned from his base Cilmp near 
Calasio to the 6th Army Headquarters in Dagupan. There he met the 6th Army 
Intelligence Officer, Colonel Horton White; the American guerrilla leader, 
Major Robert Lapham and the three Alamo Scout Officers, Lieutenants John 
Dove, William NeJlist and Thomas Rounsaville. White laid out the basic plan 
for the rescue of the POWs and then infonned Mucci of the enemy situation 
in the area: 
Due to the rapid advance of American fo[(:es to the southwest, remnants 
of the enemy forces were with-drawing (sic) north and east along 
HIGHWAY #5 running through CABANATUAN-BALOC to SAN JOSE. 
Due to our air activity enemy troop movement was made during the night. 
During the day troops rested in concealed areas or transit camps. 
PANGA TlAN was one of these transit rest camps. Heavy concentration of 
enemy troops were reported at RISAL and CABANATUAN while report. .. 
indicated 800 Japs at CASU with tanks. The mad neL<; in this area were 
17 Ibid., Johnson, 337. 
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used regularly for enemy tank movement of which heavy concentrations • 
were numerous.13 
The Rangers, White explained, would have to travel by foot from Guimba 
20 miles to the camp, liberate the prisoners and return to allied lines. The 
details of the mission were "left entirely up to (Mucci)," but, Mucci was warned 
Utat security surrounding the operations must be tight. the assistant G2 
cautioned, ~One tip to the Japs ..• and .•. you'll find nothing but dead American 
prisoners when you arrive at the camp."~' 
Mucci spent the remainder of the meeting reviewing the intelligence 
provided by G2. It was clearly not sufficient to carry out an operation of this 
magnitude. The Alamo Scoub would have to conduct a detailed 
reconnaissance of the POW camp and report back to Mucci before the Rangers 
could make their assault.30 Additionally, Mucci needed Lt. Dove to act as a 
liaison between the Rangers and the Filipino guenillas. The guerrillas would 
be coordinating transportation of the POWs and acting as a blocking force, both 
of which were vital to the success of the mission. Finally, Mucci requested air 
cover for the return march to allied lines. White had foreseen the requirement 
and tasked the Black Widow Night Fighter squadron to provide one P61 to act 
13 Operation Report, 6th Ranger Battalion, Pangatian Prison, 27-31 January 1945, 
1. 
2~ Ibid., Johnson. Quotes attributed to Colonel Horton White and Major Frank 
Rowale respectively, 187-188. 
JO The Alamo Scouts worked direct1y for G-2 6th Army. Contrary to other reports 







as support. Satisfied that all the headquarters level coordination was complete, 
Mucci returned to his base camp. 
Upon his return, Mucci summoned his officers together. He had decided 
upon his force mix. It would include all of Company C, commanded by 
Captain Robert W. Prince and 2nd Platoon, Company F, commanded ~Y 1st 
Lieutenant John F. Murphy. AdditionaJly, a communication element,. medical 
detachment, and rumbat camera crew would be added to the list of participants. 
The total strength of the Ranger rescue unit was 8 officers and 120 enlisted 
men. Mucci assembled the troops and told them about the mission: 
W e have been given a tough but rewarding aSSignment. We're going to 
hit a Jap POW stockade and free a few hundred of our boys the Nips 
have held for almost three years ... Ther are what's left of our troops who 
held out on Bataan and Corregidor ••. and if we don't free them now, you 
can bet they'll be killed by the Japs before our front reaches their area.J ! 
After further elaborating on the condition of the roWs and their pO!lsible 
reaction to the Rangers, Mucci continued with the basic plan: 
Before daybreak we'l! be trucked about seventy-five miles northwest (sic) 
of here to a town called Guimba. Near there, we'll meet the first guerrilla 
army who will serve as our escort. .. and, from there we walk through Jap 
country, all the way ... no sleep ... then we attack and walk back!J2 
At the conclusion of the briefing the troops began to assemble their 
equipment in preparation for the following mornings departure. Later that 
evening at 1900, the two Alamo Scout teams, guided by Filipino guerrillas, 
J l Ibid., Johnson, 198. 
J2 Ibid., 198. Direction was actuaJly southeast from the camp to Guimba. 
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departed their base camp and began the twenty-four mile walk to Platero. At 
• Platero, which was the closest barrio to the POW camp, the local Filipinos 
would provide a final brief on the enemy's disposition. From this information 
the Alamo Scouts would devise their reconnaissance plan and then move into 
position to observe the camp. Mucci had directed the Scouts to re~m to 
Balangkare, which was just northwest of Plaiero, by the morning of the 29th 
to give the Rangers a detail account of the situation. 
At 0500 on 28 January 1945, the Rangers left their camp by truck and 
proceeded, as planned, to the guerrilla headquarters at Guimba arriving at 
0715.11 At Guimba, Mucci met Major Lapham and was introduced to the 
Filipino guides who would lead them to the Captain Edwardo Joson's guerrilla 
headquarters at Lobong and then onto Captain Juan Pajota base at Balangkare. • 
The next few haul'S were spent planning, organizing and distributing the 
rations, water, ammunition and bazookas.34 
)) Ibid., Operation Report, 6th Ranger Battalion, 1. 
34 According to Robert Prince the short notice tasking combined with the need to 
begin marching in the direction of Cabanatuan restricted planning and rehearsals to 
approximately six to eight hours. The plans were modified several times as new 





Figure 7-3. Ranget's Route to and from the POW Camp at 
CaNnatuan.. (Combat Stndies Institute, Fort Levenworth, Kansas) 
At 1400 the Rangers departed Guimba and headed east for two miles and then 
south for a mile until they intersected the Licab river. After fording the river 
they marched for another mile until they reached Lohang. Upon arriving at 
Lobong Mucci was introduced to Captain Joson: 
There his eighty men [Joson's guerrillas} were attached to Our own force 
and Ute entire outfit started east. crossing the national highway into 
enemy lenitory about three miles south of Baloc. We forded the Talavera 
39') 
River at 2400 and crossed the RizaJ Road at 0400, January 29, all without • 
incident.l5 
At 0600 the Rangen; were nearing the small village of Balangkare. 
Waiting for Mucci were the two Alamo Scout Officers, Lieutenants Rounsaville 
and Nellist. The Scouts did have the opportunity to reconnoiter the POW camp 
yet,. but they had some good information from the local guerrillas concerning 
the terrain and the enemy situation. The ground around the I:ilmp was flat and 
open, although there was a ravine that might allow the Rangers to get close to 
the highway without being compromised. Unfortunately, the Japanese had 
been travelling the Cabanatuan Highway non-stop for the past 24 hours, 
apparently reinforcing the Imperial Army at Cabanatuan, which Pajota's 
guerrillas estimated at a division. The Alamo Scouts had also been told there 
were about two to three hundred Japanese (later determined to be almost 800) 
camped along the bank of the Cabu River. The lack of cover and concealment 
around the POW camp had prevented the Scouts from gathering the needed 
information on the physical layout of the facility. Nellist has tried several 
times to set the record straight on the Scouts role but to no avail. In his words: 
The Scout."J didn't get beans done, except interrogate guerrillas until the 
morning that we were going to attack. This Filipino, Vacular, and] put 
on Filipino clothes and walked up to fa nipa hut across from} the prison 
camp ••. ] had an aerial photo ... When I wanted to know something. Vacular 
was talking out the back of this thing (nipa hut] with other Filipinos. 
They got out and produced people who had been in there ... as forced labor. 
3S Lieutenant Colonel Henry A. Mucci, Rescue at Cabanatuan, (Infantry Journal, 







Everything I wanted to know they seemed to be able to produce 
somebody that could tell us."The rest of my team and Rousanville's team 
were waiti ng back in the high grass ... There is no way they could get up 
there (to the POW camp) without being seen ... This thing about the Scouts 
goi ng clear around the camp is a bunch of bullshiL We didn't have time 
to do thal To make it WOnie we were exhausted when we got there. J6 
As M ucci continued to discuss the situation with the Scout officers a small 
conlingent of Filipino guerrillas arrived at their location. Leading the group 
was Captain Pajota. After being introduced to Mucci and the others Pajota was 
asked to review the plan and was told that the Rangers intended to attack that 
night. Pajota responded: 
Sir! Are you committing suicide!? .. You must know, already, the enemy 
situation from your Alamo Scouts. My own scouts have been reporting 
to me every hour. Another Jap unit is approaching Cabu Bridge from the 
north ... Battalion size ... There are hundreds of Japs in the camp ... and tanks. 
And, maybe five hundred POWs. Only a few POWs can walk. They must 
be carried if you are going to take them ouL .. 17 ' 
Althuugh irritated by Pajota's comments, Mucci continued to listen 
knowing that Pajota was more familiar with the area than any other man. 
Realizing the difficulty in transporting the POWs, Pajola was organizing a team 
of carabao (water buffalo) carts to move the POWs from the north side of the 
Pampanga River back to allied lines. Pajota's guerrilla force numbered ninety 
armed and 160 unarmed men. After settling their differences, Mucci and Pajota 
agcced thai the armed guerrillas would hold the Cabu Bridge preventing any 
Jb Ibid., Nellisl 
l7 Ibid., Johnson, 221. 
401 
reinforcement from the Dokuho 8attalion, while the unarmed men would help 
carry the POWs, drive the carabao carts and act as runners and litter bearers. J3 
Captain Prince also requested: 
That all around security in depth ... be e!ltablished and maintained by 
guerrilla troops; that all civilians in the area north of the CABANATUAN-
CA8U road remain there and any per.ions entering this area will be ~eld 
and not permitted to leave until (the) mission was accomplished; that all 
chickens be penned and all dogs be tied and muzzled . .19 
Additionally, the civilians along the route would be co-opted to provide food 
a nd water for 650 men. At the completion of their initial meeting the Rangers 
moved into barrio BaJangkare and began final preparations for the raid. 
For most of the day Prince, who had been assigned to plan the mission, 
studied the telTain and general layout of the camp. All the officers and NCOs 
• 
received a copy of the sketch of the camp so they could begin their respective • 
planning and rehearsals. Details concemingJapanese positions would be fined 
in by reports from the Alamo Scouts, but not until just before departing 
Platero. Still under the impression that the operation would commence that 
night,. Prince rawoed back to Guimba asking for air cover to begin at 1900. 
1Il Pajota's men were provided Bazookas by the Rangers and unbeknownst to 
Mucci the guerrillas had acquired four water cooled .30 calibre machine guns during 
an earlier raid on the Japanese. Additionally, Pajota had more armed guerrillas in 
reserve that he "inadvertently~ left off his force list 
J' 1 bid., Operation Report, 6th Ranger Battalion, Pangatian Prison Rescue, 2. In 
an interview with Mr. Prince he stated that the previous day the Rangers arrival into 
Balangkare had aroused the dogs and chickens so much that he knew security would 





At 1800 on the 29th the Rangers departed Halangkare for the short two and 
one half mile march to Piateros. There Mucci received an updated situation 
brief on the POW Citmp and surrounding area, from the local guerrillas. The 
news was all bad. A Japanese unit had moved into the POW camp and now 
there were approximately 500 enemy soldiers within the confines oithe ~arbed 
wire. On the main road leading to Cabanatuan City then~ was a division 
moving troops, tanks and heavy equipment In the city itsdf there were an 
estimated 7000 Japiomese soldiers. To make matters worse the scouts had still 
been unable to thoroughly reconnoiter the POW camp. After getting the report, 
Mucci made the decision to delay the raid until the following night. A 
message WitS subsequently sent back to Krueger's headquarters informing the 
general of Mucci's dltcision. Thlt air support was delayed accordingly. 
The delay allowed the Scouts further time to recon the camp and provided 
the Rangers extra planning time. Additionally, in anticipation of wounded 
soldiers and weakened POWs the Ranger medical officer, Dr. James Fisher, and 
the local Filipino physician converted thlt barrio school house into an 
emergency hospital.4lI The added time also allowed the Rangers an 
opportunity to get some rest. They had been up and moving for the past 60 
hours. Ouring the Ranger's short stay in barrio Platero, Pajota's guerrillas 
provided perimeter security while the town's people fed and cared for the 
40 Ibid., King. 61. 
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American soldiers.'1 The following afternoon at 1500 the report from Nellist 
arrived at Mucci's location. Nellist recalled that he "sent a message back with 
an aerial photo and (his] other piece of paper with the corresponding 
numbers .•• Dn each one (he] wrote everything about it.'2 
Nellist's report was extremely detailed and provide Mucci all t~e 
information he needed: 
The decision was made to attack at dusk. The men were completely 
briefed on the action to take place and each man was assigned a job and 
thoroughly instructed as to all duties related to it. The element of 
surprise was stressed as being of primary importance to the success of the 
mission; all were cautioned to spare no effort to secure the same.u 
The plan was as follows. Just prior to dusk at 1830 a P61 from the Black 
Widow Squadron would circle the camp drawing attention away from the 
• 
Rangers as they attempted to maneuver into position. Company F, 2nd Platoon • 
would circle around to the south of the camp and when in position 
(approximately 1930) initiate the raid by firing upon the Japanese guard 
barracks at the rear of the POW compound." The platoon would isolate the 
guards preventing them from reinforcing the section of the POW compound 
'J Robert Prince stated that the country side belonged to the Filipinos and at no 
time did the Rangers feel threatened by the possibility of a Japanese attack. At this 
point in the war the Japanese restricted their movements to the highways and did not 
venture inland to engage the locals. 
<2 Ibid" Nellist. 
U Ibid., Operation Report, 6th Ranger Battalion, 2. 
" The POW compound was an isolated area within the Japanese camp and held 
not only the rows but the guard force as well. 
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containing the Americ::ans. Additionally, a six man squad from 2nd Platoon 
was given the responsibility of destroying a pillbox in the northwest corner of 
the camp. 
As the raid was initiated, 1st Platoon, Company C, which was located to 
the north, just across the highway from the main gate, would assault the camp. 
The 1st PJatoon was divided into two assault sections and a weapons section. 
The lst Assault Section would force the front gate and kill the guards at the 
entrance, in the lower.. and at the pillbox. The 2nd Assau lt Section wou ld 
move across the highway and take up positions outside the fence providing 
covering fire for the 1st Section as it moved into the camp. The Weapons 
Section, equipped with bazookas, would follow the 1st Section through the 
main gate and pass through their lines destroying the building containing the 
tanks. As the Weapons Sections entered the compound the 2nd Section would 
shift fire and then take up security to prevent Japanese from escaping. 
2nd Platoon, Company C, also located outside the main gate, would follow 
the lst Platoon into the camp and proceed to the northeast comer where the 
POWs were located. After breaking through the entrance to the POW 
compound, one assault section would proceed toward the rear of the POW 
compound and engage the guard ba rracks preventing any Japanese from 
reinforcing. A second assault section would position itself on the right flank 
of the POW compound to prevent a counterattack from the Japanese soldiers 
on the west side of the camp. The Weapons Section would be held in reserve 
within the POW compound to escort roWs if needed. The remainder of the 
platoon's personnel would search the POW barracks and direct or escort the 
prisoners out to the main gate. 
While the Rangers were liberating the roWs the guerrillas were to 
provide blocking forces along the highway to prevent reinforcement. from 
either Cabu or Cabanatuan. Captain Joson's guenilla unit was to set up to the 
southwest just 800 yards from the main gate. Attached to the guenillas was a 
six man bazooka team from 2nd Platoon, Company f-'. Captain Pajota's 
guenillas were to set up a roadblock at the Cabu Creek 300 yards northeast of 
the gate and cut the telephone lines which connected the camp with other 
Imperial Japanese units.4S 
• 
When all the POWs were clear of the camp, Captain Prince would initiate • 
the Ranger's withdrawal by firing a red signal flare. The guerrillas were to 
remain at their roadblocks until the entire column of Rangers and POWs were 
a mile from the camp. At that time Captain Prince would fire a second red 
signal flare and the guerrillas would withdraw forming a flank and rear guard 
for the Rangers. "What was unknown to Mucci and Prince at the time of the 
planning was that Captain Pajota had already positioned 200 armed guerrillas 
a quarter mile north of the Cabu Bridge. Captain Pajota, who had learned to 
work closely with the Americans while maintaining a certain autonomy, was 
4S Ibid, Operations Report, 6th Ranger Battalion, 3. 
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planning to use thes~ Filipinos as a reserve element for both himself and 
Captain Joson. When Captain Princ~'s s~cond red flare was fired, Pajota would 
lure the Japanese to the southwest, away from the Ranger's line of march. In 
order for this maneuver to be successful Pajola knew he needed mor~ men than 
M ucci had authorized.~ 
Fi~'t;....~7"'_---'A't 0A::pp:::ro=,.,:;:-m:::,=-W"y::';'7"'30i:, 30 January 1945, the Hangen 
Cross the Sand Bar at the Pampanga River 
At 1700 on the 30th all units departed Plateros. Guided by rajola's scouts 
the column, which numbered almost 375 men, moved southw~st through the 
tall elephant grass and bamboo groves to the rampanga River. Once at the 
~ Ibid., Johnson, 255. rajota had been giv~n 20 land mines but only one bazooka. 
M ucci's conc~m was the 7000 Japanese at Cabanatuan as opposed to th~ 800 at Cabu. 
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river, the column divided into its three main tactical groups. Pajota's guerrillas • 
headed upstream and then southwest to their position outside Cabu. Joson 
moved downstream to his position south of the camp and Mucci and his 
Rangers crossed mid·stream to intersect the main gate. For the next three 
quarters of a mile the Rangers were able to move without crawling owing to 
the high grass and falling darkness which continued to conceal their position. 
By 1800 the column was a mile from the river. They had broken through 
the tall grass and could see the guard towers less than a mile from their 
position. It was getting dark, but before them lay only rice paddies with no 
trees or bushes for concealmenL Prince ordered 2nd Platoon, Company F, to 
break off and begin heading east. Intelligence from the Alamu Scouts and 
overhead phutography had identified a creek bed which ran underneath the • 
highway and along the east side of the camp. 2nd Platoon, Company F, would 
negotiate the creek bed and be in position to initiate the attack at 1930. 
After walking a few hundred more yards Mucci ordered the Rangers to 
crawl the remaining mile to the highway. "Movement had to be very slow and 
cautious because the ground was so open, .... "'? At 1840, a P61 appropriately 
named "Hard to Get," circled the camp averting the Japanese attention away 
from both Company C approaching the highway and 2nd Platoon, Company F, 
crawling along the creek east of the camp. Nellist who had remained in the 




ni pa hut across from the POW camp saw the P61 as it made its runs. It "just 
about ripped the shingles off that damn prison camp. lie came by several 
times and really buzzed it-·43 The diversion was helpful and "By 1925 
Company C was a1l set. in position twenty yards from the front gate, concealed 
by both darkness and a small ditch."·' 
2nd Platoon, Company F, had crossed under the highway;at approximately 
1830 and had d ropped off S/Sgt Cleat Norton and a small element mid-way 
along the creek bed. This elements was tasked with assaulting the guard 
towers that was positi oned on the east side of the compound. Norton later 
recalled: 
Just as I got underneath thai tower a bell went off inside the POW 
compound. I'm telling the truth you could feel the hair go right up on the 
top of your head. Nearly pushed your hat right off ..• ll nearly scared the 
daylights out of us.50 
As plilnned, 2nd Platoon, Company F, was in position at the southeast end 
of the camp at 1930, however, the platoon commander, LieutenantJohn M urphy 
spent a few extra minutes to ensure all his troops were ready. At 1945 exacUy 
Murphy opened fire on the guard barracks. 
0lil Ibid., Nellist. 
4' Ibid. 
50 Cleat Norton, interviewed by CDR William H. McRaven, 14 January 1993, Tape 
recording.. Monterey CA. The bel! had been rung by two Navy prisoners who were 
keeping to Naval tradition and sounding bells on the half hour. In this case it was 
1830 . 
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Figure 7-5. Ranger Actions at the POW c.unp. (Adapted from the Combilt 
Studies Institute, Fort Levenwodh, I<ansas.) 
Within seconds all the Japanese in the guard towers and pill boxes around 
the camp came under fire. An element of 2nd I'atoon, located in the creek bed 






end. Once the guards in the uuter positiuns were killed the element focused 
its attention on the guard barracks which was also under attack by Lieutenant 
Murphy's element. "All guard towe rs, guard shacks, and pillboxes were 
neutralized within thirty seconds after Murphy fired the "!'!It shol ~51 When 
it was clear that their was no more Japanese resistance at the rear of the camp, 
2nd Platoon retraced its tracks back up the creek bed and out to the m ain road. 
At the northend of the camp, elements of Company C had also killed 
Japanese guards located in the towers, pillboxes, and concrete shelters that 
paralleled the north fence. Staff Sergeant Theodore R. Richardson, who had 
been assigned the task of opening the front gate, quickly crossed the highway 
and charged the fmnt gate trying to smash the lock with the butt of his 
Tommygun. When this failed he pulled out his .45 cal pistol and started to 
shoot the lock. Two Japanese guards suddenly appeared and fired at 
Richardson knocking the pistol from his hand. PFC Leland A. Provencher who 
was accompanying Richardson killed one of the guards while Richardson fired 
from his Tommygun killing the other. Although it was his first ~real action" 
Provencher didn' t heSitate, "We were so well coached and so well drilled that 
everything just fell in line instinctively."~2 Richardson recovered his .45 and 
shot the lock, allowing the gate to open. 
51 Ibid., King, 65. 
52 Leland Provencher, interviewed by COR William H. McRaven, 14 January 1993, 
Tape recording.. Monterey CA. 
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Seeing the gate open the 1st Assault Element from Company C, 1st 
Platoon, under the command of Lieutenant William J. O'Connell, jumped from 
the ditch on the north side of the highway and stonned toward the camp. 
Immediately behind the 1st Element was the Weapons Section. As the 1st 
Element and Weapons Section moved, the 2nd Assault Element which w~s just 
a few yards down the road, charged the fence line and began firing into the 
camp. As the two initial elements entered the main gate the 2nd Element lifted 
their fire and took up security positions as assigned. 
Inside the camp, the 1st Element moved down the center road and broke 
to their right (west). The Japanese in the officers and enlisted quarters were 
now aroused and returning fire. The Rangers quickly subdued the Japanese 
• 
with grenades and fire from their BARs and Tommyguns. The Weapons • 
Section passed through the 1st Element and ran 300 yards down the center road 
into position to engage the tank shed. As Sergeant Manton Stewart, who was 
the designated bazooka man, dropped into pos ition he could dearly see two 
trucks loaded with Japanese troops beginning to emerge from the shed. 
Stewart aimed his rocket launcher at the shed, received a "Ready" command 
from his loader and squeezed the trigger. The 88mm rocket ripped through the 
thin skinned building sending shrapnel flying everywhere and creating 
secondary explosions that rocked the surrounding area. Stewart received 
another slap on the shoulder from his loader and squeezed again. The shed 





fl ames. Those enemy soldiers thilt managed to escape the fire were cut down 
by Rangers who flanked Stewart on both sides. Stewart received a third and 
fi nal "Ready" from his loader and fired once again, this time taking aim on the 
second truck. The rocket hit the front end of the vehicle destroying it instantly. 
The remaining enemy soldiers were killed as they scrambled for cover. 
As the assault elements of 1st Platoon reached their positions and began 
to engage the enemy, 2nd Platoon moved in immediately behind them. The 
three elements of 2nd Platoon (1st and 2nd Assault and the Weapons Sed iun) 
ran down the center road and after shooting the lock off the gate, broke into 
the POW compound. The lst Assault Element moved toward the POW huts 
while the 2nd Element sprinted Iowan! the south end of the prisoners section 
to set up a blocking force. During the planning phase, specific fields of fi re 
had been designated to prevent the va rious elements from being hit by fri endly 
fire.53 The Weapons Section, which was being held in reserve, waited at the 
entrance to the POW compound, evl2'ntually being called upon to assist in 
evacuating the prisoners. 
Inside their nipa huts frightened American prisoners were hiding under 
beds, in latrines, wherever they could. They were certain that the Japanese had 
j J Several accounts of thl2' raid show membl2'rs of 2nd Platoon, Company F 
posi tioned at thl2' southl2'nd of the camp presumably firing into the compound to 
engage the guard barracks. According to recent interviews this was not the case. No 
member of 2nd I'latoon ever p roceeded around the backside of the camp. This way 
no crossfire situation developed between those inside and those outside the 
compo u nd. 
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come to kill them. Soon, however, the prisoners heard the Rangers shouting 
"We're Americans" and yelling instructions for all POWs to assemble at the 
main gate. Although many prisoners quickly emerged from the hub, some 
POWs had to be "coaxed" out and in several cases the prisoners were forcibly 
escorted to the gate for their own safety. Those that couldn't walk , were 
carried. During the evacuation one Ranger encountered a POW who said he 
was dying and told the Ranger to leave him and save the others. The Ranger 
gently picked the man up and placed him on his back. Unfortunately, before 
the two men reached the main gate the POW died of apparent heart failure. 






As the roWs began to evacuate, Prince had the task of penmnally 
• checking each nipa hut to ensure there was no one remaining. ~ It was kind of 
spooky. Each nipa hut had a fire burning in a sand box. I looked in but 
couldn't see very well. I yelled, 'Is there anyone else left in there?' and then 
I entered to doublecheck." W At one point Prince e ncountered the senior POW 
Colonel Duckworth, who was trying to assert himsdf during this state of mass 
confusion. Duckworth was di recting all the POWs to remain where they were 
until he could figure out exactly what was going un. Prince approached the 
CoJoneJ and ask~d "Who are you'!" Duckworth fired back, "I'm C olonel 
~ Ibid., Prince. 
• 415 
Duckworth!" To which Prince responded, "Well, Colonel, get your ass out of 
here! I'U apologize tomorrow!"55 
All over the compound similar episodes were taking place. S/Sgt Harris 
still remembers one episode vividly. It was his job to help dear the POWs 
from inside the nipa huts: 
You couldn't see at all. It was dark inside and it stank. Some of the 
foulest odors you ever smelled in your life. I almost killed one of the 
prisoners when he jumped on my back.~ 
Prisoners who had witnessed death on a daily basis, who had only dreamed of 
freedom were now in the process of being liberated. For many it was an 
emotionally overwhelming situation and required the Rangers to handle each 
case differently. Mucci described it as follows: 
• 
Getting those prisoners out was quite a job. Some were dazed. Some • 
couldn't believe it was true. Some tried to take their belongings, and we 
had to tell them they had to leave their stuff behind. as there was a tough 
march ahead. One old United States marine who had been a prisoner all 
that time wrapped his arms around the neck of one of the Rangers and 
kissed him. All he could say was 'Oh boy! Oh, boy! Oh, boy:s7 
As the POWs began to flood out of the camp the Rangers directed or 
assisted them across the highway and back toward the Pampanga River where 
55 This story is recounted in F.B. Johnson's Hour of Redemption p. 300, but is not 
attributed to any particular Ranger. During an interview with Robert W. Prince, Mr. 
Prince told me about encountering the "stubborn" Colonel Duckworth and the 
incident that followed. 
50 Ibid., Harris. 
57 Henry A Mucci, "We Swore We'd Die or Do It," The Saturday Evening Post 




carabao carts were waiting to take them to allied lines. Mucci, who had 
remained outside the camp to di rect his forces, continued to oversee the 
evacuation and ensure all the POWs were cared for properly. During th! batHe 
a Japanese soldier had managed to escape the confines of the camp and set up 
a light mortar on the southend comer of the compound behind the ~uard 
barracks. From this position he began to lob rounds in the direction of the 
front gate. Three rounds fell in the vicinity of the Rangers wounding several 
including the command surgeon Dr. James Fisher. 
To the east of the compound members of Company I', 2nd Platoon were 
retreating.. as directed, up the creek bed and across the highway. They began 
to take heavy fi re from the compound and several members dove for a ravine 
on the north side of the highway. Corporal Roy Sweezy, the BAR man for the 
platoon was struck in the back by two rounds killing him almost instantly. He 
was the first and only Ranger killed during the raid. 
At approximately 2015, Prince having inspected all the nipa huts, fired the 
wi thdrawal flare. Unknown to Prince or anyone else, however: 
One dysentery-weakened British civilian prisoner had hidden in the 
latrine at the sound of the first shots and never came out. He would be 
discovered near the camp after midnight by Filipino guerrillas and 
rescued.5,! 
Outside the camp another battle was raging as the guerrilla force under 
Captain Pajota was holding off the Japanese at the Cabu Bridge. Alamo Scout 
51 Ibid., King. 66 . 
417 
Bill Nellist later remembered, "This unit that was across the Cabu River was 
• just exhausted. They weren't dug in. They were lying on the ground. The 
guerrillas just raked the hell out of them."59 
Pajota caught the Japanese completely by surprise and inflicted heavy 
casualties within the fir.>t few seconds. The Japanese who were not caught in 
the initial crossfire began to charge across the creek bed in an effort to break 
the ambush. Pajota had planned for this eventuality and positioned his men 
accordingly. Additionally, to ensure the Japanese could not reinforce across the 
Cabu bridge, Pajota had blown the bridge with a "time bomb.~ Although not 
completely destroyed by the demolition, the bridge could not support the 
weight of the Japanese tanks which were being held in reserve by the 
Commander Oyabu. Even though suffering more than a hundred casualties in • 
the fir.>t five minutes, Oyabu continued to order his troops to attack. 
At one point several trucks mounted with heavy weapons and laden with 
Japanese troops started for the bridge hoping to cross on what remained of the 
structure. As they approach the creek, Pajota's men fired at the trucks with 
bazookas. Those Japanese that survived the onslaught of the 88mm rockets 
were killed by the guerrillas as they jumped from the vehicles. This fight 
raged until 2200 and Pajota was forced to disregard Prince's second withdrawal 
flare until he could ensure the Japanese would not pursue the retreating 
5' Ibid., NellisL 
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• 
• near SibuJ,. Lumn. (U.s. Anny Photo) 
culumn of Rangers and POWs. When Pajota finally broke contact his guerrillas 
had killed over 300 Japanese while suffering only nine casualties, none 
seriously injured.w 
The column of roWs .and Rangers that departed the Cabanatuan area 
stretched for over a mile. By the time the small army reached Plateros there 
were over 25 carabao carts with more being assembled at each barrio. Mucci 
reported afterwards: 
The column halted in Plateros to reorganize, give water and food to the 
men, and gather more carts. Cots were set up in the schoolhouse by 
Doctor Layug. local guerrilla doctor, who treated the sick and wounded. 
It Initial reports indicated that 23 Filipinos were missing in action, but eventually 
a these men W l.'re found and the numbers revised to reflect only the nine wounded. 
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The ex-roW's (sic) able to walk were dispatched in groups guarded by 
Rangers to the next Bamo, Baligcarin [BalangkareL as fast as they could 
be organized. The first group left Plateros at 2100 hours the 30th. 
Captain Prince brought the last elements of the column into Plateros 
protected by the rear guard of 115 men were moved from Plateros to 
Balingarin in 25 carabao carts! l 
Upon reaching Balangkare the Rangers and POWs halted again. An 
additional 15 carabao carts were added to the growing column. The wounded 
medical officer, Captain Fisher, was left in Halangkare with a small contingent 
of Rangers. A light plane had been requested to medevac him to a field 
hospital. Unfortunately, no plane arrived and Fisher died in Balangkare. The 
column departed Balangkare at 2400 for the next small village, Matoas Na 
Kahey. 
As the Rangers marched along the trails toward the allied lines, P61s from 
the 547th Night Fighter Squadron flew air cover ensuring that the retreating 
column would not be intercepted by Japanese_ Although few Rangers ever saw 
the P61s (other than ~Hard to Get") the Black Widows "destroyed a total of 
twelve Japanese trucks, one tank and hundreds of foot troops trapped in those 
vehicles or around camps fires near the roads.~i2 
61 Ibid., Operation Report, 6th Ranger Battalion,S. Prince did not amve at 
Plateros with the remaining prisoners until 2140. Mucci, who was trying to keep the 
column moving toward friendly lines had already dispatched those who were more 
mobile. 





• Upon arriving at Matoas Na Kahey the soldiers and ex·POWs were provided 
food, waler, medical support and an additiona111 carabao carts. This brought 
the total of carts to 51 and created a column over a mile and one half in length. 
The 1enboth of the column presented a considerable problem for the next phase 
of the mission -- crossing the Rizal Highway. The highway was a main 
Japanese thoroughfare and the column would have to travel down the road for 
almost a mile before crossing. 
Mucci ordered 1st Lieutenant William O'Connell to establish roadblocks 
on both the north and south end of the highway and to report back when the 
men were in position. Accompanied by two squads of Rangers, a bazooka 
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team and some of the Filipino guerrillas, O'Connell set up a blocking force 400 
yards to the north and one 3000 yards to the south. Additionally, Rangers on 
ponies rode two miles north and two miles south of the crossing to provide 
added warning time. This would protect both right and left flanks during the 
crossing. The column began crossing at 0331 and completed it at 0430. ~ucci 
later recalled, ~It was the longest hour I've ever sweated out in all my life.d ) 
At 0530 the column arrived at a small barrio, rested for a short while and 
then continued the march. By 0800 they had reached the village of Sibul. 
Mucci received word that the allied lines had advanced to the Talavera River 
which was only a few miles from Sibul. Radio communications were 
established with Guimba and Mucci requested trucks, ambulances and food be 
• 
available upon the columns arrival at the front lines. The villagers provided • 
Mucci another twenty carts and at 0900 the march continued. 
Within two hours the column was intercepted by an advanced 
reconnaissance patrol of the 6th Army. The ambulances and vehicles, which 
were only a few minutes behind the patrol, evacuated the prisoners and 
wounded. Soon thereafter the Rangers returned to their base camp near 
Calasiao -- their mission complete. The Ranger log book of 31 January 1945 
reported the following: 
Co 'e' and 2d Platoon Co 'F' returned to Ranger Area. Mission 
completed. Casualties: Capt. FishE'r and Corporal SWE'ezy killed in 





action; Pvt Peters, Jack wounded. Enemy casualties estimated at 250 by 
Rangers and 300 by Guerillas (sic] fOfl:es. 510 prisoners released from 
Japanese prison.M 
For their bravery at Cabanatuan Colonel Mucci and Captain Princ::e 
received the Distinguished Service Cross, all other officers and selected enlisted 
received the Silver Star and all the remaining enlisted received the Bronze Star. 
The Filipino guerrillas were all awarded the Bronze Star. 
E. ANAJ.YSIS 
1. Critique 
The raid on the Cabanatuan POW camp is somewhat of a departure 
from my definition of a special operation. Contrary to the stated definition, the 
6th Ranger Battalion was neither specially trained nor equipped for this 
specific operation. To make matters more confusing. from an analytical 
viewpoint, at no time d uring the preparation phase did the Rangers conduct a 
rehearsal, something that has been so essential in the success of previous cases. 
And yet,. the mission was dearly "special" in nature, with the need to rescue the 
prisoners constituting a political imperative as well as a matter of military 
honor. This deviation from the model shows how the other principles can 
sometimes compensate for a "missing block" in the relative superiority pyramid. 
The C .. b"natuan mission was extremely simple with a very limi ted objective 
M Ibid., Operation Report, 6th Ranger Battalion, Log of 31 January 1945. The early 
reports indicated 510 POWs were rescued form Cabanatuan, but were later revised to 
512 which included Edwin Rose, the British soldier who was asleep during the raid, 
and one other prisoner. 
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and good intelligence. Owing to the no-notice nature of the operation, security 
had to be tight -- but only for a short time frame. Surprise was complete, • 
speed on target was under 30 minutes and above all, each man had a sense of 
commitment to the mission that overshadowed self-preservation. Lastly, the 
success of the raid depended as much on the benevolent frictions of ~ar as 
relative superiority and the correct application of the principles of special 
operations. This, as Clausewitz would say, is the difference between 
theoretical war and war as it really is -- a fact that we should never lose sight 
of.6S 
Was the objective worth tlu! risk? In wartime as in peacetime, the 
taking and holding of hostages or prisoners is a direct affront to the nation's 
esteem and, if the prisoners are soldiers, to the military's honor. It is, • 
therefore, generally viewed as essential to rescue prillOners regardless of the 
possible outcome. This maxim not withstanding, the chances of a successful 
outcome were good provided the Rangers reached the POW camp undetected. 
The only real threat prior to reaching the camp was crossing the Rizal highway. 
Once off the main roads the Filipinos "owned" the countryside and the Rangers 
61! Clausewitz in his book On War talks about the disconnect between war theory 
and real war. "Why is it," he asks, "that the theoretical concept is not fulfilled in 
practice1 The barrier in question is the vast array of factors, forces and 
conditions ... No logical sequence could progress through their innumerable twist and 
turns as though it were a simple thread that linked the two deductions." (C1ausewitz, 




safety and security was relatively assured. Consequently, rescuing the 
prisoners was worth the risk. 
Was the plan developed to achieve maximum superiority over the 
enemy and minimize the risk to the assault force? By comparing numbers, the 
375 Rangers and guerrillas were woefully outnumbered. There were ove,r 8(M)() 
Japanese within a five mile radius of the compound and the Rangers were 
outnumbered two to one at the POW camp. This, however, does not reflect the 
whole story. The division of Japanese troops at Cabanatuan City were not 
concerned with the escape of 512 prisoners. They were too busy trying to 
survive the onslaught of the American 6th Anny. The allied lines were moving 
fonv3rd everyday and the Japanese knew their time was getting s hort. Even 
had the Imperial Force at Cabanatuan City received word of the Rangers attack 
it is unlikely they would have siphoned off many troops to give chase. The 
defense of the city was paramount. 
The Dokuho 8attalion at Cabu is another story. The dose proximity 
of these troops combined with their superior firepower could have derailed the 
entire escape effort. The planners, both Prince and Pajota seemed well aware 
of this potential and were adequately prepared. Once the column had retreated 
into the b rush the likelihood of Japanese intervention lessened considerably, 
nevertheless, had the Japanese pursued the two P61s were probably sufficient 
to thwart any serious counterattack . 
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Was the mission executed according to plan? The mission was 
executed according to plan, if one excludes Mucci's 24 hour delay to allow the • 
Japanese troops to move out of the POW camp. Considering the rapidness with 
which it was planned and executed, this is an impressive achievement. The 
results of this mission speak for themselves; 512 prisoners rescued witJ:t only 
two Rangers killed. 
What modifications to the plan could have improved the outcome? It 
is doubtful that any modification to the plan could have improved this 
outcome. 
2... Relative Superiority 
As Figure 7-9 shows, the Ranger's Point of Vulnerability occured 
approximately one hour prior to attacking the POW camp. It was 1800 when • 
Mucci and his men broke out from the tall grass and spotted the guard towers 
one mile away. After travelling a few hundred yards, Mucci ordered his men 
to crawl the rest of the way to the highway. It was at this point (1825) that the 
column of R.imgers became vulnerable to detection. The line showing the 
Probability of Mission Completion does not angie sharpely upward; had the 
Rangers been spotted at any time prior to getting in position, their chance of 
successfully rescuing the prisoners was marginal. After one hour, however, all 
the Rangers were in position to attack. Although Lieutenant Murphy elected 
to wait until 1945 the Rangers had gained relative superiority at 1925. At this 
pOint, their Probability of Mission Completion jumped dramatically even 
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though no shots had been fired. 
Once the attack began the Rangers quickJy dominated the guard 
force and Kinpeidan Battalion. But as the S11 roWs began to leave the camp 
and attached themselves to the Ranger column, the degree of relative 
superiority dropped. The advantage the Rangers had in mobility and self 
protection was now diluted by the )argl! number of wounded and unprotected 
POWs. Within 30 minutes the Rangers and POWs were out of the camp and 
moving inland . The Rangers were able to sustain relative superiority by 
• 
marching through the countryside and using the guerrillas and P·61s to support 
• their escape. 
When the Rangers and roWs reached the Kizal Highway their Area 
of Vulnerability increased dramatically, almost to the point of being unable to 
sustain relative superion·ty. Had the Japanese inadvertenUy, or by design, 
intercepted the column of carabao carls and walking wounded, it would have 
been disasterous. Mucci stated later that the hour trek across the exposed Kizal 
highway, "was the longest hour ... in my life.""" Mucci might have felt less 
tense during the crossing if he had arranged for additional Ranger companies 
(of which there were several back at the base camp) to meet the column and 
provide flank fire support. Another alternative was to ensure the P61s were in 
direct support of the column as opposed to looking for targets of opportunity. • 
Once the column crossed the Rizal highway mission success was 
almost assured and sustaining relative superiority became only a matter of 
continuing in the right direction. 
3. The Principles of Special Operations 
If too many people have something to do with the plan, they can delay 
the thing and complicate it until it won't work. 
William Nellist - Alamo Scout 




The operation order for the raid on Cabanatuan was one page 
long and d irected Mucci to proceed from Guimba to the camp at Cabanatuan, 
rescue the prisoners and return to allied lines. The tactics for conducting this 
mission were left entirely up to Mucci, who subsequently directed Captain 
Prince to develop the plan. The plan was simple-~if not the implementation! 
There were no insertion vf'hides to break down, no complicated equipment to 
rely on, no external forces to coordinate (the guerrillas were attached directly 
to Mucci and the P61s operated independently) and the actions at the objective 
were literally straightforward - down the road in the middle of the campY 
Each assault element had one objective. There was no attempt. 
and indeed no time, to develop or brief multiple objectives for the elements. 
Hy limiting each element to a single mission it reduced the possibility of 
confusion, but of course, also increased the possibility of a task not being 
completed if one element was incapacitated. In reality though, nune of the 
tasks required special trai ning, with the possible exception of the bazooka 
element charged with destroyi ng the tank shed. It is highly likely that had any 
single element not been able to complete its assigned mission, another element 
could easily have substituted for it 
67 They did have a radio relay back to Guimba to call for support. The relay, 
however, failed to work when needed. The ~straight" road going through the middle 
of the camp was the path of advance for Company C's platoons and provided the 
troops an easy landmark to gauge their positions . 
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The availability of good intelligence was cited as a primary 
• reason for mission success by each individual I interviewed, and by the 
supporting documentation. The intelligence provided by the guerrillas as well 
as the annotated aerial photo produced by the Alamo Scouts allowed Prince to 
develop plans that avoided or eliminated Japanese defenses. For example, the 
creek bed on the east side' of the camp provided an easy access for 2nd Platoon, 
Company F to reach the rear of the compound. Had this creek bed not been 
identified through good intelligence, 2nd Platoon would have had to enter 
through the main gate and dash to the guard barracks. It was 800 yards from 
the main gate to the guard barracks and it would have taken at least three 
minutes for the Rangers to run that far. In that time the Japanese could 
probably have mounted at least a limited response. 2nd Platoon's other option • 
was to crawl the entire distance from the highway to the rear area. Considering 
the close proximity of the camp and the time involved in a dead slow move, 
this was a dubious prospect at best. 
Intelligence also simplified the plan by allowing each Ranger to 
know exactly where the enemy was located. The Rangers not only knew how 
many Japanese soldiers there were in the camp, but where they were berthed, 
how high above the floor they slept:.. which way the gate opened, and where the 
tanks were housed. This allowed Prince to ~ta.ilorM each man's load. The 
Rangers carried only what they needed to eliminate the known threat. Most 




Tommygun), a pistol, two bandoliers of ammunition, one canteen of water, and 
one ration. Only the bazooka men had a heavier load. The availabili ty of good 
intelligence simplified the plan and allowed rapid execution of the mission 
without any surprises. 
Nunnally innovation is viewed as simplifying a plan by 
providing the attacking unit a technological "force multiplier." In this case the 
only advanced technology used were a pair of "night binoculars" employed by 
the P61 Hard to Get. These first generation night vision devices allowed the 
pilots to identify the Rangers as they crawled into position as well as to see 
"blacked out" Japanese vehicles as they travelled the main roads. These 
binoculars, however, were hardly instrumental to the success of the mission. 
The biggest problem facing the Rangers was how to transport over 500 
prisoners from the camp to allied lines. Granted the solution was not high. 
tech, but the use of carabao carts to move the POWs was no netheless 
innovative. Innovation can often be a simple as a SEAI:s lead line, the SOS's 
k1epper canoe, or a Swiss combat bicycle; but as with the carabao cart,. it is 
often essential to the success of the mission. 
h. Security 
The assistant G2 warned Mucci that if one Japanese found out 
about the raid there would be no America ns left alive when the Rangers 
reached the camp. In the book Cabanatuan: Japanese De ath Camp, John 
McCarty, a fanner Cabanatuan POW, relates the story of another POW who 
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was interned on Palawan Island. When the American's ships began to dose on 
Palawan the Japanese herded over 200 prisoners into a cave, ostensibly to • 
protect them from shelling. Once inside the cave, the Japanese doused the 
prisoners with fuel and then ignited them with hand grenades. Those that 
survived were machine gunned. This POW had managed to jump off ~ diff 
and escape, but not after being shot five times. The concern that the 
Cabanatuan rows would be annihilated was real. This was the Japanese 
practice. Security had to be tight. 
The advantage of conducting a no-notice operation is that 
security does not have to be maintained for very long. Mucci received his 
orders on 27 January and departed the following morning for Balangkare. 
During the interim period the Rangers never left their base camp and once they • 
were briefed, they avoided contact even with the other Ranger companies. The 
Rangers conducted no rehearsals, so there was no opportunity for "bystanders" 
to observe and possibly leak information. 
The main concern was that communist Huk guerrillas or Japanese 
sympathizers might inform the guards at the camp. While he was observing 
the camp, William Nellist spied a young Filipino girl talking to the guards at 




I j ust knew that s he was telling them that these American soldiers were 
on the way ... I thought the whole thing was going down the drain right 
there ... lt scared the hell nut of me.68 
Fortunately for the Rangers, whatever the girl told the guards did not 
compromise the raid. 
There were two factors working in the Rangers favor. First the 
allies were dearly movi ng rapidly to control Luzon, and those few Filipinos 
that had i'lupported the Japanese were taking to the hills to hide. Secondly, 
most of the Filipinos vehemently hated the Japanese and would never have 
considered compromising the American raid. I;or these two reasons, the 
Rangers were able to plan and execute a "highly visible" b ehind the lines 
operation without fear of compromise. Their column of over 375 men 
induding the Filipino guerrillas, marched 25 miles through numerous barrios. 
And, by the time they reached the outskirts of the POW camp the entire 
Hlipino country side from Guimba to Platero was ilware of their presence. 
Security was important, but, Mucci and Prince had to weigh the need for food, 
water, medical assistanCt!, carabao carts, and guerrilla forces against the 
requirement to keep the mission "top secreL" In the end security seemed to 
be appropriate and did not unduly impede the preparation or execution . 
.e Ibid" NellisL 
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What makes the raid on Cabanaruan so intl!resting is the 
overwhelming success of the operation in spite of no rehearsals. It is easy to 
understand how a modem day counterterrorist force, like GSG-9 at Mogadishi, 
can be successful without a full dress rehearsal prior to the mission. They train 
daily on similar targets and familiarity is borne of this repetition. The Ra~gers, 
however, had never rehearsed any mission even vaguely similar to the POW 
rescue. for readers of this case it is dangerous to generalize about special 
operations based on the success of this mission. When one peels back the husk 
of Ranger folklore, the success of this mission depended as much on luck, that 
is not encountering any Japanese while extracting.. as it did on the bravery of 
the men and proper execution of the plan. And,. although it is often better to 
be I ucky than well prepared, it is best to be both. 
d Surprise 
Considering the large number of forces within close proximity 
of the POW camp it is amazing that the Rangers were able to achieve surprise. 
There were four separate elements that had to get into position before the raid 
could commence: the two guerrilla units, Company C and 2nd Platoon, 
Company F. Of these four elements only Joson's guerrillas were not in 
immediate danger of being sighted. The other elements were all sizeable, from 
platoon to company strength, and maneuvered to within a hundred yards or 







How did the Rangers achieve this advantage? Fi rst. the Japanese 
did not expect the Americans to ilttempt such a rescue so early in the Luzon 
offensivl:!. The allied lines were still several days away and 7000 Imperial 
soldiers were based at Cabanatuan City. The guards, who were a combination 
of Japanese, Koreans and Formosans, were in a relaxed state of readiness and 
content with the knowledge that the Kinpeidan Battalion was in camp and the 
Dokuho 359 Battalion was a mile down the road. 
The terrain ilnd weather also favored the Rangers. The night of 
the raid there was low cloud cover that concealed il fuJI moon . The darkness 
allowed the Rangers to move, albeit in most cases crawl, into position without 
undue fear of detection. The creek bed along the east side of the camp was 
approximately four feet deep and 2nd Platoon, Company F, easily maneuvered 
to their assigned places. Additionally, there was a ditch on the north side of 
the Cabanatuan highway, which allowed Company C to remain unobserved. 
All of this not withstanding,. it was the unexpected nature of the 
raid that allowed the Rangers to gain the element of surprise. Had the 
Japanese suspected or even half.heartedly prepared for the possibility of an 
attack, they could easily have prevented the Rangers from gaining surprise. For 
example, a search light making periodic sweeps, a guard placed on the Cabu 
Bridge, paid sympathizers in the adjoining barrio or a small Japanese element 
patrolling the main highway -- any of these measures could have seriously 
jeopardized the raid. As it was the boldness of the idea and the swiftness with 
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which the plan was executed unquestionably caught the Japanese by surprise 
• and this element of surprise was the deciding factor in the success of the 
engagement. The success of the overall mission, however, was equally 
dependent on other principles. 
e.~ 
Speed during the engagement at the POW camp was important. 
but owing to good fortune and a well devised blocking force at the Cabu 
bridge, the Rangers had a small cushion of time that could have been extended 
beyond the amount used. 
Captain Prince anticipated that the release of the hostages would 
take approximately one hour, however, he felt that the Rangers really ftneeded 
to be in and out in 30 minutes.~~ If they I"£'mained at the camp much longer • 
that 30 minutes, he thought that the chance of being engaged by a superior 
Japanese force was high. What could not be determined ahead of time was the 
physical condition of the roWs and their ability to move quickly. Fortunately 
for the Rangers, the roWs had managed to kill a cal'ilbao several days befol"£' 
the l'iIid, and although the meat was divided up amongst the 500, most weI"£' 
still in the best physical condition they had been in several years. 
Nevertheless, thel"£' was genuine concern that any delay beyond 30 minutes and 
reinforcements from Cabanatuan City could be on the scene. Consequently, 





Mucci had positioned Captain Joson's guerrilla force along the Caba natuan 
highway to delay the Japanese arrival at the camp, but bec~use the Japanese 
were more concerned about defending Cabanatuan City, the Imperial soldiers 
never attempted to reinforce the beleaguered POW camp. 
The other concern, of course, were the Japanese at the .Cabu 
bridge and how long the guerrillas could delay their arrival at the camp. As 
it turned out the plan for ambushing the Japanese at Cabu was well though t 
out and well implemented, and although the battle raged beyond the proposed 
withdrawal time, the guerrillas always appeared to have the upper hand. 
Although accounts vary as to the exact time on tOirget, most 
Rangers agree that the raid took between 20 and 30 minutes, with the 
preponderance of Japanese soldiers being subdued or eliminated within the 
first twelve minutes.?'II Based on the actual events, the actions at the objective 
probably could have been extended a few minutes more, however, had the 
Japanese at Cabanatuan City been mobilized to counterattack, the 30 minutes 
on target was the maximum allowable time. 
The return to allied lines, although not measured in minutes, did 
have a sense of urgency that caused Mucci to ~push~ the column all night 
resting only briefly to reorganize and obtain more carabao carts. Mucci dearly 
71 Ibid., King,. 66. 
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understood his precarious position and wanted to minimize the time spent 
behind enemy lines. 
f.~ 
The idea of releasing these prisoners motivated the guys to no uncertain 
terms. They were ready to go for anything! We had a chance to get these 
prisoners out of there and if there was anyway possible we were going to 
do it. 71 
Purpose is often an overlooked principle because it is a difficult 
concept to quantify. The soldiers involved in the operation must both 
understand the purpose or aim of the mission, as delineated in the operation 
order, brief etc, and have a personal commitment to see it succeed. 
Understanding the purpose keeps the individual focused on the objective and 
prevents effort being expended unnecessarily. Having a personal commitment,. 
or purpose in the philosophical sense of the word, motivates a man beyond 
what inspired leadership can accomplish. If a special operation is going to 
succeed against overwhelming odds, the individual, and to a larger degree the 
unit has to have a purpose for fighting which goes beyond mere survival. 
In this case the stated purpose was simple - release the prisoners 
and return them to allied lines. Each Ranger knew that regardless of whatever 
else transpired during the engagement at the POW camp it was their mission 
to rescue the prisoners. There was no detailed plan delineating which squad 
would "search and clear" which nipa hut, there was no assigned escorts for the 








prisoners, no one mustered the POWs as they departed the campi the plan was 
simple and the purpose well understood. It was an "all hands" effort that did 
not need a lot of explanation. 
The second aspect of purpose is the sense of personal 
commitment. In his book, Hour of Redemption, Forrest Johnson relat~s the 
story of how Mucci required each Ranger to go to church and pray. Mucci told 
the Rangers: 
You had better get down on your knees and pray! Damn it .. _ don't fake 
it! J mean ... rRA Y. And, I want you to swear an oath before God ... 
Swear you'll die fighting rather than let any hann come to those POWSf2 
Mucci later wrote an article for the Saturday Evening Post entiUed We Swore 
We'd Die or Do It. He begins the article by saying: 
This is the story of how a small group of American soldiers swore an oath 
that they would die in battle rather than let any harm befall 512 prisoners 
of war ... 73 
This idea of personal commitment is frequenUy down played by 
tod ay's professioniiJ forces who must "answer the call" regardless of the 
objective. Clausewitz warns us, however, that: 
T heorists are apt to look on fighting in the abstract as a trial of strength 
without emotion entering into it. This is one of a thousand errors which 
they quite consciously commit because they have no idea of the 
implications. 71 
n Ibid., Johnson, 171. 
73 Ibid., Mucci, Saturday Evening Post, 18. 
74 Carl von Clausewitz, On War edited and translated by Michael Howard and 
Peter Parel, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 138. 
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The implications are that even a finely honed force, if not committed to the 
purpose of the mission, will falter at the crucial moment, The raid on 
Cabanatuan demonstrates how understanding the purpose of the mission and 









VIII. OPERATION KINGPIN 
US ARMY RAID ON THE SON TAV POW CAMP, NORTH VIETNAM 
21 NOVEMBER 1970 
A. BACKGROUND 
In 1968, 356 American Prisoners of War (POWs) were being held in c:amps 
north of the Demili tarized Zone (DMZ) in the Republic of North Vietnam. 
One of these facilities was Camp Hope located neaf Ute Son Tay Citadel, just 
23 mi les northwest of Hanoi. It had been acllvated on 24 May 1968 and over 
the course of the next several months 55 American POWs were moved into the 
small compound. After U.s. intelligence sources located the camp, the 
Interagency Prisoner of War Intelligence Committee (IPWlC), headed by the 
VIA, began to focus its reconnaissance efforts to try and isolate the site to 
detennine if American POWs were being held at Sun Tay. 
In May 1970, the 1127th USA~ Special Activity Squadron (Headquarters 
Command) received aerial reconnaissance photos bken of Son Tay that showed 
a coded message "spelled out" by the prisoners indicating the number of 
personnel interned and the location of a possible pick up site eight miles to the 
northeast at Mount Ha Vi.I The lU7th provided the information to BGen 
James Allen, the tJirector of Plans and Policy, OCS P&O, Headquarters USAF, 
who commissioned a cursol)' study of rescue possibilities and presented the 
findings to HGen Uonald Hlackburn, tht! Spt!cial Assistant for 
I Tht! 1127th belit!vt!d that work parties from Son Tay wert" being sent to Mount 
Ba Vi to chop wood either for the kitchen fires or for camp construction projects. 
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA), JCS. Blackburn a highly 
• decorated WWII veteran and the fonner first commander of the Military 
Advisory Command (Studies and Observation Group) (MAC(SOG» 
immediately asked the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to conduct a photo 
reconnaissance mission of both Son Tay and another suspected POW, camp 
called Ap Lo. On 2 June, DIA provided Blackburn with SR-71 photos that 
confirmed the presence of "someone" in both camps. Three days later 
Blackbum briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommended an in depth 
feasibility study be conducted with options provided to the JCS by 30 June. 
He recalled later: 
The JCS wanted more detail before they would make a detennination of 
whether we should go on with this thing or before they would agree to 
a joint task force to be set up to plan this operation.2 • 
JCS approved the study and on 10 June SACSA convened a]2 man study group 
from all three services and OIA. But. Blackburn realized it would be difficult 
to get a mission approved: 
I knew from the start that we would be singing to a reluctant choir. My 
inhibitions stemmed from my days as ChiefSOG in Viet Nam ... There was 
an off-and-on policy at the time about bombing in the north, and they did 
not want to rock the boat by these ground operations.J 
2 Transcript of Gen Blackburn's comments from the Son Tay Panel Discussion 




The initial concept of operations brief to the JOint Chiefs was delayed 
from 30 June untillU July at which time Colonel Norman frisbie, USAF, told 
thl! leS that a rescue effort was feasible and he presented an expanded concept 
of the operation. Initially, Blackburn and his staff considered inserting a 
Controlled American Source (CAS) agent (Vietnamese recruitl!d by SOG) into 
the vicinity of Son Tay. The agtmt would verify the presence of roWs and call 
in a helicopter-borne rescue foree that would be prepositinned on the Laotian 
border. This concept was discarded over fears that prepositioning forces in 
Laos would alert the North Vietnamese and compromise the mission. 
Consequently, the planning group recommended that a combined fixed wing 
and rotary wing air element (two C-130s, five HH-53s, one 1111·3 and five A.l) 
be launched from Thailand to insert and support a special forces ground· 
assauH force that would rescue the rows. The Navy would provide a m assive 
three carrier air strike into North Vietnam as a deception to focus enemy air 
defenses and radars away from the inbound rescue force. The jCS approved 
the concept and directed commencement of detailed planning and training . 
On 8 August, a Joint Contingency Task Iloree was fonned under the JCS 
with SACSA as the Office with Primary Responsibility. BGen LeRoy J. Manor, 
USAF, Commander of the Special Operations Force at Eglin AFB Fl., was 
designated as the Commander and Colonel Arthur D. Simons, USA, j·4, XVIII 
Airborne Corps, lit Bragg, NC was assigned as the Deputy. Admiral Moorer, 
the Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Manor, "You have the authority 
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to put together a task force and train that task force.~4 Manor was pleased 
with the clear direction and support. He said later. 
We had practically a blank check when we left there to go ahead with 
this. We had the authority we needed to get whatever resources we 
needed personnel.wise or equipment·wise or whatever. All the resources 
that were available in the military was ours to put this together. It is the 
only time in my 36 years of active duty that somebody gave me a job, 
simply stated, and the resources with which to do it, and let me go do 'itf 
Immediately upon establishment of the Joint Contingency Task Force 
(JCTI), Col. Simons returned to Ft. Bragg.. NC and requested volunteers for a 
classified mission with "considerable TDY and ... considerable risk involved."" 
Over 500 men from the JFK Center for Special Warfare showed up for the 
initial meeting. Some men, not knowing the nature of the operation, elected 
• 
not to return for a follow-on screening. Each of those men that did return were • 
personally intetviewed by Col. Simons, LtCol. Joseph Cataldo a Special Forces 
medical officer and two Sergeant Majors. Eventually 120 men were chosen as 
the nucleus for the Army component of the Son Tay force. "Every one of these 
people had been to Viet Nam. Some of them had had two or three tours in 
Viet Nam.~6 
4 LiGen LeRoy J. Manor interviewed by CDR William H. McRaven, 3 June 1992, 
Tape recording. 
S UGen LeRoy J. Manor interviewed by Dr. John W. Partin and Richard J. 
Meadows, 23 February 1988, Tape recording, Tampa Fl. (Emphasis added) 
~ Ibid., Panel Discussion Manor. Although all of those men chosen from the 
initial screening at Ft. Bragg had combat experience, four of the ground force 
participants, chosen later, did not have combat experience; two were assigned to the 
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At the same time the Air Force crews were being selected from personnel 
assigned to the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Training Center at Eglin. This 
squadron possessed the only stateside heavy lift, air refuelable B-3 .md 1-11-1-53 
helicopters. Some IIH-53 crews from the 40th Air Rescue Squadron and the 
703rd Special Operati ons Squadron were even returned from Southeast Asia to 
participate in the operation. AdditionalIy the 1st Special Operation!! Wing at 
Hurlburt Field, FL and the 56th Special Operations Squad ron in T hailand 
suppli ed pilots and co-pil ots: 
All of the foregoing crew members volunteered, a nd after being 
interviewed by General Manor or Lieutenant Colonel Warner Brittu", 
were selected to participate on the mission. Colonel Britton was the Air 
Force represenbtive who participated in the feasibility study and was 
pilot of Apple 1 on the mission.1 
• Once chosen, all the men were taken to Eglin AFB, FL (Duke Field-Field 3) to 
begin training. Eglin was chosen as the training site because it had all the 
• 
necessary resources and provided the isolation required to maintain security. 
The training began on 20 August and terminated on 8 November 1970. During 
the interim, the air and ground planning staffs assumed the joint planning 
function. Regularly scheduled joint meetings were held to affect the logistic 
and traini ng activities. In Washington, intelligence agencies continued to 
rear area communication element and two wen? assigned. as communicators for the 
assault element. 
7 Ibid., Panel Discussion, Colonel John V. Allison, USAf (Ret). 
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gather extensive information on Son Tay, ~both SR·71 and drone (low altitude) 
resources were programmed to obtain aerial photography of the objective, the • 
surrounding area, and the tentative route.08 
Operational security was considered essential to the success of the 
mission. The Security Staff Section was established on 11 August 1970 and 
given the responsibility of maintaining security and counterinteJligence for the 
project. Work areas were surveyed, visitor control established, classified 
material control instituted within the work space and all messages leaving the 
command were screened by the Security Staff. All the personnel involved in 
the planning.. support, or execution of the raid had their phones monitored. 
BGEN. Manor received a daily report detailing the highlights of possible 
violations. Additionally, a cover and deception plan was developed for the • 
training and deployment phase and a counterintelligence plan to provide 
specialized assistance in gathering information on possible organized threats 
to the mission. 
As training progressed, BGEN .. Manor and Col. Simons frequenUy 
traveled to Washington to assist the SACSA planning cell and brief the 
necessary senior officials. On the 8 September Manor recalled that: 
Simons, Don Blackburn and myself had an appointment to brief the 
Chiefs and I was the briefer, the Commander of the Task Force. I pointed 
out to the Chiefs that we had determined that this [the Son Tay raidJ is 
Commander, ICS loint Contingency Task Group Report on The Son Tay 
Prisoner of War Rescue Operation Part I, 3. 
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feasible. It can be done. This is how we plan to do it and I outlined the 
concept. We will be ready to do this on the 21st of October ... .' Admiral 
Moorer (Chairman of the JCS( said we could approve it here, but of 
course, it has to go to a higher level for (final] approval. You will have 
to brief the Secretary of Defense. Secretary of Defense was Mr. Melvin 
Laird . We weren' t able to schedule a briefing before him until the 24th 
of September. And at the same time, we briefed the Director of CIA 
[Richard Helms]. Apparently he had been briefed before ... T hey were 
rather noncommittal, although Secretary Laird said that he agreed with the 
concept and he agreed that it was feasible and we would have to wait for 
higher authority. We knew, of course, that it would have to go to the 
White House. But it wasn't until the 8th of October that we had an 
opportunity to brief the White House. Then we b riefed Doctor Kissinger 
and General AI Haig. Al Haig. then, was the military assistant to 
KiSsinger. The briefing was well received, there. No changes made in 
concept. They didn't have any problems with how we planned to do this, 
and they had confidence we could do it. ID 
Kissinger told Manor that the mission might have to be delayed from the 
21 October to the 21 November. Unbeknownst to Manor, President Nixon was 
working to gain the release of roWs through diplomatic means and Nixon was 
concerned that a raid could compromise those initiatives. Kissinger authorized 
Manor to continue training. On the 1 November, Admiral Moorer authorized 
Manor to conduct in-theater coordination. Prior to this time no one beyond 
CINCPAC (Admiral McCain) was aware of the proposed operation. HJackburn, 
Manor and Simons flew to Saigon and briefed General Creighton Abrams 
(Commander, U.S. Military AssistanceCommand, Vietnam) and General Lucius 
, Ibid., Manor interview with McRaven. 
10 Ibid., Manor, Panel Discussion. 
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Clay (Commanding General, 7th Air Force). Both Generals wholeheartedly 
supported the mission and offered "any resources" under their control. 
Upon completing the brief in Saigon, Blackburn flew back to Washington 
and Manor and Simons flew to the aircraft carrier USS Oriskany and briefed 
Vice Admiral Fred Bardshar (Commander Task Force 77), Captain Ala!, Hill 
(CfF 77 Ops Officer) and Commander P. D. Hoskins (CfF 77 Intel Officer). 
From these briefings the Navy developed a three carrierdiversionaty strike into 
North Vietnam designed to divert attention away from the inbound helicopter 
raid force. Bardshar was directed not to infonn his immediate superior 
Admiral Weisner (COMSEVETHFL T): 
• 
I (BGEN. Manor] later worked for Admiral Weisner and he would 
occasionally bring this up to me ... in a good natured way - that I had gone 
around him to get his force to do something. lI • 
On 10 November, the raid force with its logistic support departed Eglin 
and arrived at Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base on 14 November 1970. 
Additional C-141s departed on the 10th and 12th arriving as scheduled on the 
16th. On the morning of November 18th,. Moorer briefed Nixon on the Son Tay 
Raid. Also present were Kissinger, Laird, Helms, Secretary of State William 
Rogers and Haig. Later that afternoon the raid was approved. 




B. CAMP HOPE - SON TAY POW COMPOUND 
Cam p Hop~, located n~ar the Son Tay Citadel, was activated on 24 May 
1968. There were three contingents of American POWs brought into the camp: 
the fi rst group on 24 May, the second on 18 July, and th~ thi rd on 27 November 
1968. Afte r oonfi nning the existence of personnel in the camp, (June 1970), the 
U.S . intelligence communiLy began extensive coverage of the compound and 
surrounding area. Photo intelligence during the planning phase of Son Tay 
cons isted of coordinating the reconnaissance, photo interpretation, and target 
mate rial production. All photography was a result of either SR-71 or Teledyne 
Ryan's Buffalo Hunter reconnaissance drones and was orchestrated through the 
DIA. Both Camp Hope and Camp Ap Lo were entered as national 
requirements and a priority drone coverage effort from Strategic Air Command 
(SAC) was requested. 
In September 1970, seven drone tracks were drawn up by the Son Tay 
planners to ensure full coverage of both the camp and surrounding areas was 
achieved. This allowed the planners to identify helicopter landing zon es (LZs), 
infiltration and exfiItration routes, airborne staging areas and to deve lop 
detailed intelligence on the POW camp itself. From these photos a scale model 
of the PO W camp was produced by the CIA for use by the planners and 
ope rators.12 
12 The model was codenam~d · Harbara~ and now resides in the aviation museum 
at Wright-Patterson, AFB Ohio . 
..9 
Camp Hope, designated Son Tay PW Camp N-69, was located at 
210836N/I0530.oIE. It was bordered on the west by the Song Con River which 
flowed south to north and bent slightly to the east 300 feet from the camp. The 
river was about 4.0 feet wide and fordable by foot troops in the dry season. 
There was a 60 foot single lane three-span bridge to the north that bec~me a 
gravel road to the east of the compound. The road was bordered by power 
lines and air raid pits. A small canal bordered the compound in the south. 
The entire area, from the bridge to the canal, including the compound and 
surrounding building was no more than three football fields laid side to side. 
The compound itself (Fig. 8-1) was approximately 140' wide x 185' long north 
to south. It's walls were 6w to 12" thick of masonry construction and between 
• 
71/2' and 1.0' high. There was concertina wire on the south wall. Entrance into • 
the compound was either by a vehicle access gate on the east wall or a smaller 
access gate on the south wall. Inside there were five main buildings, three 
guard towers and two latrines. On the north end of the compound were two 
smaller buildings. The one building on the west wall (5C) was surrounded by 
concertina and considered to be a maximum detention cell (Fig. 8-2), the other 
building located against the north wall contained holding ce]]s (50 - Fig. 8-2). 
The large adjoining buildings in the center of the compound also contained 
holding cells (SA & SH - fig. 8-2 & 8-3) and the large single building housed 
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The assault party reported the following additional information upon their 
return fmm the raid. Both buildings, 5C and 50, which were constructed 
between September-December 1969 and previously considered as cell blocks, 
were empty and did not have the appearance of being used as cells. Each 
building was constructed of concrete, had no door casemate or door, and 
consisted of one room with barred windows. Building 5C had recently been 
refurbished, however, 50 was in the advanced stages of deterior.ation. 
Building SA was constructed of brick or masonry with a cement finish and 
contained one large room with two raised concrete platforms running almost 
the full length of the building. Each platform, on either side of a 4 foot 
walkway, was 2 1/2 feet high approximately 6 feet deep and 50 feet long. An 
open wash area or latrine was noted in the northwest comer of the building. 
The doorway had a thatched straw door with no casemate and the windows 
were barred with six 1/2" steel bars in an upright position. The building 
appeared old and no evidence of shackles, posts, or restraining devices was 
noted. The building did not appear to have been used recent! y. 
Cell block 58 contained six cells (five estimated at 8'x 14' one 12' x 14') 
each secured by a steel door (with peep slil'!) and a metal shuttered window. 
The overall size of the building was 55' x 30' and allowed space for hallways 
on both sides plus roof overhangs. There were six bunks in the larger cell and 
three in the smaller ones. The out'lide windows had iron bars of 1/4 inch steel, 
the doors were steel (with peep slits) with hasps welded on them. The ceilings 
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were 10' high plaster, the inside walls were 6" thick, and the outside walls were 
masonry construction with a concrete outer cover. 
Building 5E had four cells (two 8' x 20' and two S' x S') in addition to a 
non-secured open room 8' x 20'. At the time of the raid three of these cells 
were being used for storage while the other two rooms were empty .. It is 
estimated that the smaller cells may have been used as maximum security for 
the prisoners, while the larger cell blocks could have contained as many as 
eight POWs. Each cell had a 3/8" steel door (with peep slit), swinging outward, 
steel door frame with steel hasps welded to the door. All windows were 
barred with 1/4" steel screen or 1 to 2 inch squares. All rooms were constructed 
of 6 to 8 inch concrete and had 12' high ceilings. There were walkways 
between the roomsY Outside the compound were several structures that 
supported the guard force including; guard quarters (78), kitchen and guard 
mess (11,12), admin building (7A), family housing (13 A,8,C & 0, E (not 
shown» and numerous support buildings. The night time guard force was 
estimated to be one guard per watch tower and a minimum of two guards in 
the compound with possible relief personnel in 5E. The outside force could 
number up to two platoons located primarily in the guard quarters in 7B. 
Although probably not manned, there were automatic weapon positions 
stationed around the camp at the south, east and north ends. 






Located approximately 40U meter.; south of the Son Tay POW Camp was 
another facility originally designated as the "Son Tay Secondary SchooL" This 
facility was later presumed to be the "headquarters for a missile battery" and 
was reclassified as a military installation after the Support Element mistakenly 
landed by the compound and was engaged by enemy forces. The installation 
was similar in size and construction to the Son Tay compound. It had a 
masonry wall s urrounding the outside, a canal resembling the Song Con River 
ran north of the facility and a gravel road bordered the compound on the east 
side. Inside the walls were at least four buildings, three one story barracks and 
a two story headquarters facility.1I Very little intelligence was gathered on the 
installation prior to the mission because it was not part of the objective area. 
14 Discussions with Colonel Elliot Sydnor indicate that it was never actually 






Figure 8-5. Overhead View of the -Secondary School- Showing 







Based on photo interpretation of the Son Tay compound and surrounding area, 
intelligence experts estimated that oil total of 5S personnel mig h t be held 
prisoner at Camp Hope. ls A physical profile of the average Son Tay POW was 
developed by Dr. Cataldo based on WWlI, and Korea historical data. Estimates 
of body weight, di sease and psychological stale were made. It was determined 
that most of the roWs would have lost 20% of their body weight and been 
inflicted with either malaria, intestinal parasites, goiter, malnutrition, 
peripheral neuritis, active dysentery or tuberculosis. A psychological profile 
based on interrogations of returning POWs was prepared for I'OW handling 
purposes. The profile was as follows: 
The POW has heard very little noise, has had very little physical exercise 
and lives in dimly lit rooms. He has two meals a day, usually consisting 
of cabbage soup plus bread or rice. Fish and pumpkin occasionally 
s upplement the diet with less than two ounces of meat per week. 
Sometimes a banana or some other fruit is provided. Flour and sugar 
cookies,are rarely given to the POW. Restriction of total protein intake 
plus physical inactivity will cause marked muscular atrophy plus a slow 
reaction to stimuli. A few POWs will maintain a strong hope for 
liberation, and some will have given up hope, but the majority are 
probably unsure and live day to day driven only by a natural desire to 
survive. Therefore, for the most, the sudden realization that 'liberation 
is here' w ill be shucking.l~ 
The North Vietnamese Air Defense System was one of the most extensive 
in the world and each known site was mapped and appropriate anti-air defense 
15 Colonel Richard A. Dutton, USAF (Ret) a fonner Son Tay POW indicated that 
on the 27th of November 1968 there were a total of 52 prisoners. 
1'; Ibid., Son Tay Report. Part I, 0-2. 
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measures were used. Of significance were the central and western Air Defense 
• Systems. Fortunately, neither of these systems detected the raid force until five 
minutes after the Time Over Target (TOT). This was despite the presence of 
four F·4s and four F-10Ss in the area ten minutes prior to TOT. Other Air 
f>efense Systems that proved active included the northeastern (Phu~ Yen 
Control) sector which controlled a minimum of seven FanSongs (SAM) and two 
FireCans (AAA) sites. Intelligence on these sites was excellent. BGEN. Manor 
later recalled, "we had the capability to detennine what they were seeing on 
their radar almost as soon as they did -- which, of course, was very very 
helpful. n1 7 
C. TIlE I.EADERS 
On 8 August 1970, the Joint Contingency Task Group OCTG) was formed 
• and BGEN. Leroy J. Manor was selected to command the force. Manor's career began in June 1942 when he enlisted in the Army Air Force and was sent to 
pilot training as an aviation cadet. Upon graduation he became a fighter pilot 
in P·48s flying in the I::uropean theater of operation with both the 8th and 9th 
Air Force. He finished the war with 72 combat missions. 
After the war, Manor returned to New York University finishing his 
degree in 1947. Later that year he became an instructor at the Air Tactical 
School at Tyndal Field. Following that assignment he went to Maxwell AFH 
and helped organi'lle the Squadron Officer's School, eventually staying on to 




teach the first class. He departed Maxwell for the Tacticill Air Command Air 
Ground Operations School at Southern Pines, North Carolina. 
In 1953 he was assigned to the 6th Allied Tactical Air I'oree in Izmer, 
Turkey. Afte r two years he returned to Selfredge Field as the commander of 
the 2242nd Air Reserve Hying Center where he flew f·80s, 1'.845, F-86s, and 
eventually C·119s. In 1958 he attended the Armed Forces Staff College and was 
subsequently assigned as Squadron Commander of an F-l00 Squadron at 
Cannon AFH, New Mexico. Manor was then reaSSigned overseas to Germany 
as the Chi ef of the Tactical Evaluation Division of USA FE, where he flew F-
l OOs and F-I05s. Upon completion of his tour in Germany, Manor was sent to 
the Industrial College of the Armed Forces with a four year follow-on 
assignment in the Pentagon. "For his penance" in the Pentagon, he was 
rewarded with command of the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing (F-lOOs) in Phu Cat,. 
Republic of South Vietnam. 
After one year and 275 combat missions in Vietnam, Manor returned to 
command the 835th Air Division at McConnell AFR, Wichita. Kansas. While 
at McConnell, Manor was promoted to Brigadier and in 197() became 
Commander of the United States Air Force Special Operations Forces at Eglin 
AFB, Florida. While heading the Special Operation Forces, Manor was chosen 
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as the Task Group Commander for the Son Tay raid. COL. Elliot "Bud~ Sydnor 
describe Manor as, "Very intelligent. .. the steel hand in a velvet glove."18 
Another person instrumenW in the planning and preparation of the raid 
was BGEN. Donald D. Blackburn. Blackburn was the JCS Special Assistant for 
Counterinsurgency and Special Actions at the time of the Son Tay rai~. He 
was responsible for developing the initial plan, establishing the study group, 
coordinating all the intelligence and logistic support and interfacing with the 
JCS and senior DOD and NCA personnel. Blackburn was arguably the most 
knowledgeable senior officer in the Army on special operations. His career 
began in 1940 as an infantry officer assigned to advise a Filipino infantry 
battalion in Northern Luzon. When the Philippines fell in 1942, Blackburn 
• 
refused to surrender and helped organize Filipino guerrillas to fight the • 
Japanese. He became a regimental commander of a unit composed largely of 
Igorot headhunters. On 9 January 1945, the Americans returned in force to 
Luzon, but had to battle the 235,000 well entrenched Japanese until 5 July 1945. 
Throughout the interim "Blackburn's headhunters" were instrumental in behind 
the lines operations in support of the ground campaign. 
After the war, Blackburn (a 29 year old full colonel) returned to the 
United States where he was sent back to service schools to learn about the "real 
Army.n After a tour as Provost Marshall of the Military District WaRhington, 
18 Col Elliot Sydnor intelViewed by CDR William McRaven, 29 April 1992, 
Telephone tape recording. 
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he was sent to the infantry school and then returned to Washington to serve 
two years in the Pentagon. Following his tour in the Pentagon, Blackburn was 
sent to parachute training and then in 1950 to be an instructor at the United 
States Military Academy. In 1953 he was assigned to the Allied Northern 
forces Europe. Upon completing his European assignment in 1957, Blackburn 
was sent to Vietnam as - Senior Advisor to the Vietnamese Commanding 
General, 5th Military Region, Mekong Delta. He was subsequently assigned 
to Ft. Bragg where he assumed command of the 77th Special Forces Group. In 
1960 Blackburn was picked to organize a military advisory group to conduct 
covert operations in Laos. Blackburn chose LtCOL. Arthur D. Simons to head 
this "White Star" program. From 1964 to 1965, Blackburn was Director of 
S pecial Operations for the DCSOPS of the Anny. He returned to Vietnam in 
1965 to command the Military Advisory Group Vietnam (Studies and 
Observation Group)Y This joint military organization included Army and Air 
Force Special Forces, Navy SEALs, Marine Reconnaissance, CIA, and a host of 
service support personnel. Following his tour in Vietnam, Blackburn returned 
to Washington as SACSA and retired from that assignment in June of 1971. 
Colonel Arthur D. (Bull) Simons was chosen as the Deputy Commander 
of the Joint Contingency Task Group for the raid on Son Tay. He graduated 
from the University of Missouri and through the ROTC program, received his 
I' Studies and Observation Group was a cover name for the Special Operations 
Group that conducted clandestine and covert operations throughout the Vietnam war . 
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commission in the Army in 1941. His first assignment was with the 98th Field 
• Artillery Battalion in New Guinea. The outfit was disbanded soon thereafter 
and Simons, who had become a battery officer and battalion Executive Officer, 
joined the Sixth Ranger Battalion. He participated in the invasion of the 
Philippines, commanding "B" Cumpany Sixth Rangers during several "behind 
the lines" operations. He 'was out of the service from February 1946 until June 
of 1951. From 1951 until 1954 he served as an instructor at the Eglin AFB, 
Horida Ranger Camp. The Ranger Camp was a department of the Infantry 
School. Following that tour Simons served three years in Ankara, Turkey as 
a military advisor. In 1951 Simons received orders to Fl Bragg and in 1958 was 
assigned to the 17th Special Forces Group. He transferred to the 7th Special 
Forces Group where he met Blackburn who in 1960 chose Simons to head his • 
White Star program in Laos. 
Simons took 107 Special Forces personnel to Laos and formed a Laotian 
Army by impressing thousands of Mea tribesmen into service. The CIA used 
White Star teams to train the Meo 100 man " Auto Defense de Choc" (shock) 
companies. The Meo were well suited to the task and enjoyed soldiering. The 
White Star teams sent the Meo into the highlands to ambush the Pathet Lao 
forces and capture key military territorial objectives. 
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By July 1962, the White Star 
progr.ilm induded 433 Spect.ill 
Forces personnel who were 
responsible for conducting 
extensive unconvention.ill 
w.ilrfare and training both the 
Forces Armel's du Royaume 
and the Laotian milit.ilry 
schools. Following his six 
months in La.os, Simons 
returned to Ft. Brilgg .ilnd then 
was assigned to P.iln.ilma with 
the 8th Special Forces Group 
at Ft. Gulick. In 1965 he 
returned to Vietnam and 
join e d Blackburn at 
MAC(SOG). While at 
Photo) 
MAC(SOG) Simons earned the 
reputation as a superb unconventional operator, but as Blackburn remembered: 
He didn·t believe in 'foolhardy frolics' ... When Hull Simons undertook an 
operation, ... the research and planning behind it were 'meticulous'.2lI 
2lI Benjamin F. Schemmer, The Raid (New York: Avon Books, 1976), 80 . 
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In 1966 he returned to the states and was the Assistant Chief of Staff of 
• the XVIII Airborne Corps at Ft. Bragg. Following a brief one~year tour in 
Korea, Simons returned to the XVIII Airborne Corps and while their was 
appointed to be the Deputy Commander of the Son Tay raid. He retired in 
July 1971 after 34 years of selVice. In 1979 Ross Perot brought Simons ~ut of 
retirement to rescue two executives of the Electronic Data Systems (EDS) who 
were trapped in Teheran. He died of heart failure soon after returning from 
Iran. 
Lieutenant Colonel Elliot "Bud" Sydnor was probably the most influential 
and yet the most publicly unappreciated officer on the raid. It is a popular 
misconception that Simons was the ground force commander, but in fact, it was 
Sydnor. Sydnor developed the training curriculum, conducted the rehearsals • 
and lead the force at the POW compound. For these tasks he was well 
qualified. At the end of WWU, Sydnor joined the Navy and after serving in 
the Atlantic as an enlisted man aboard the submarine USS Raton, he left the 
service and attended ROTC at Western Kentucky University. where he 
graduated in August 1952 as the Distinguished Military Graduate. After 
several schools Sydnor was assigned to the 11th Airborne Division as a platoon 
commander and then in 1954 as a company commander with the 2nd Infantry 
Division in Korea. This was followed by a stateside tour as the 25th Infantry 
Divis ion Battalion Operations Officer. In 196()...61 he served with the 22nd 
Special Air Service in England and then returned to Fort Bragg where he joined 




the Special fora!s in 1962. Aftl'r three years in Washington, Sydnor received 
command of the lst Battalion, 327th Airborne Infantry Regiment,. 101st 
Airborne Division in Vietnam. He held this position until June 1968 at which 
time he was sent back to Fort Bragg. In 1970 Sydnor was selected as the 
Ground Force Commander for the raid on Son Tay. For h is actions at Son Tay, 
Sydnor received the Distinguished Service Cross. In 1973, he assumed 
command of the 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa. Followi ng command 
Sydnor was assigned as Chief, Infantry Branch and then Chief, Company Grade 
Arms Division at .'ort Bragg. In June 1977, he moved to Fort Benning and 
became the Director of the Ranger Departmenl He held that post until May 
1980. Sydnor'S fi nal assignment was the Director of Plans and Training at the 
Infan try Center at Fort Benning. He retired in August 1981 after 31 years of 
service. In addition to the Distinguished Service Cross, Sydnor's decorations 
also include; the Silver Star, Legion of Merit w/2 OLC, the Distinguished 
Hyi ng Cross, the Bronze Star wry", the Air Medal w/9 OLC, the Vietnamese 
Cross of Gallantry w/Silver Star, the Combat Infantryman's Badge, the Master 
Parachutist Badge and the Ranger Tab. In June 1992, Colonel Elliot Sydnor was 
inducted into the Ranger Hall of Fame. 
D. TRAINING 
On 13 August 1970, Auxiliary Field # 3 at Eglin AFB Florida was selected 
as the CONUS training site for the raid. The cantonment included six barracks 
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for the troops, class room space, a secure building for the Tactical Operations 
Center, mess hall, PX, theater and motor pooL The area was isolated from the 
main base and had a n apron space suitable for helicopter training. 
A Support Detachment and five Operational Detachments were formed 
from those Special Forces personnel chosen for the mission. The training site 
was activated on 26 August and the personnel deployed in two increments from 
Fl Bragg with the last group arriving at Eglin by 8 September. The Support 
Detachment was responsible for all administrative and logistical support, 
prOviding back-up personnel for the operational units, and maintaining a cover 
program by conducting daily training not related to the mission. 
The training program was divided into four phases for both the air and 
ground forces. Phase I for the ground forces began on 9 September and ended 
on 16 September. During this time combat skil1s were evaluated to help select 
primary and alternate participants. This training induded daily physical 
exercise; six to eight repetitions of Army Drill I and a two mile run; 
psychological preparation for escape and evasion, land navigation, 
communications procedures, radio familiarization classes, helicopter orientation 
(to include tactical loading and unloading), demolition charge preparation, 








This relaxed schedule of approximately seven hours per day was designed 
tu allow the individual Ground Force member sufficient time to adapt to 
the strenuous Yf program and to become acclimated.21 
Throughout Phase I and the remainder of the training.. severaJ non-
standard equipment items were obtained for use on the mission. The 
procurement and employment of this equipment was instrumental in the 
success of the mission and warrants discussion. This equipment included: 
-Two oxygen-acetylene emergency cutting outfits for 
cutting through metal hasps or locks. 
-Six commercial chain saws for clearing landing zones. 
-Bolt cutters used by Air Force Fire Fighters for cutting locks. 
-Electric "miners" head lamps for hands off illumination.of the target. In 
many cases it became impractical to move and shoot with the lamp mounted 
on the soldiers head, consequent! y most were secured to the individual load 
bearing gear. 
-Armson Single Point Sight. This sight allowed the SF personnel to 
identify their target under low light conditions (fur the actual raid flares were 
dropped from a C-130 to provide the needed light). It was found that during 
day light operations the conventional iron sights were marginally better than 
the single point. however at night their was no comparison. The single point 
scope significantly improved the soldier's ability to engage his target. At a 
21 Ibid., Son Tay Report E-37 . 
469 
distance uf 25 mete~, the wurst marksman could place all rounds in a 12 inch 
circle at nighl At 50 meters the same individual could place all his rounds in 
an "E" Type silhouette. 
-A special machete was developed with a heavy blade and a sharp point 
to be used for prying open doors and barricades. Some difficulty was 
encountered in making the blade quickly and eventually the Eglin Machine 
Shop produced the required quantity in a couple of days. 
-A 14 foot fireman's ladder was acquired for use by the assault platoon in 
the event they had to scale the compound wall. 
-Phase IV Night Vision Devices (NVDs) for the Group and Element 
leaders. During the raid, the NVDs were used by the Assault and Security 
Groups at the objective site. 
Phase II was conducted between 17 September and 27 September and 
included a review of basic skills and some specialized training, including: 
night firing on the range with all weapons, close air support; raid and 
immediate action drills; day and night aerial plaUonn training; house searches; 
demolition training; medical training; and target recugnition (this emphasized 
engaging targets at unknown distances). To increase realism, some abandoned 
buildings on Field #1 were used as a training aid. 
Phase III was conducted between 28 September and 6 October. This 
phase concentrated on the joint interoperabiJity aspect of the mission. For the 







detailed insertion and extraction plans necessary for the ground operations. 
The Post Operation Reported stated: 
The period culminated with a series of 'profile' flights. The last profile 
was flown full-time to include a one hOUT flight simulating the flight from 
slaging base to launch site. 22 
This phase also concentrated on day and night live fire rehearsals, close air 
control of the A-IEs, weapons firing, search and rescue training, and escape and 
evasion. 
Phase IV was added to the schedule when the delay in mission execution 
became evident. This phase was designed to maintain force readiness and 
improve any skills that might be deficient. It included a continued emphasis 
on dress rehearsals, immediate action drills, house to house fighting, 
demolition tnining, house clearing, E&E and SAR (which included a night 
exercise where all personnel were extracted by HH· 53 in a simulated tactical 
scenario), alternate plan execution and detailed target studies. 
The air forces training was also divjded into four phases and required 
precision night formation flying at low altitudes. The composition of the force 
complicated this mission because some of the aircraft were required to perfonn 
at the extremes of their capabilities: 
II Ibid., E.39. (Emphasis added) 
This demanded the installation and use of special equipment as well as 
the development of new tactics and procedures before the T;!Isk Group 
could become mission ready.2.J 
The composition of the Air Force Task Group included two Combat Talon 
C-130s to provide precise navigation to the target area. One C-130 was 
designated to escort the Five HH-53s and one HH-3 canying the a"sault'force_ 
The other C-130 led the five A-IEs which were used to provide strike force and 
air cover.:!4 
During Phase I (Preparation Phase) personnel were selected for the 
mission, deployed to Auxiliary l<ield # 3 and put through complex fonnation 
flying to ddennine their proficiency. In Phase II (Specialized Training) the 
HH-3, UH-l and C-130s conducted day and night formation flying and full 
mission profiles.2S During Phase III Uoint Training Phase) actions at the 
objective were rehearsed including aerial and ground rescue operations, 
objective area tactics, emergency procedures and complete mission profiles 
"were perfected.· A delay in the execution window from 21 October to 21 
23 Ibid, E-49. 
21 Ge:ne:ral Manor later state:d, "The primary reason for the second Combat Talon 
was for redundancy in the: eve:nt the first [C-130] was lost due to mechanical or othe:r 
troubles. Redundancy was planne:d into every phase: of the air ele:ments." 
2S The UH-l was designate:d as an alte:mative: inse:rtion platform in the event the 








November allowed time for additional training (Phase IV) and included 
continued rehearsal of the basic and alternate plans. 
For the training and execution, a Forward Looking Infrared (FUR) was 
installed aboard each C-130 and an additional navigator was added to the crew 
to improve precise navigation to the target area. Additionally, Ground 
Acquisition ResponderlInterrogators (GAR/I) beacons were used to assist the 
C-13OS in detemrining their location over the ground. 
In the course of training some important lessons were learned. Formation 
flying for the air forces was particularly chailenging. The C-130 and the HH-3 
or VIi-lH were both required to exceed their normal limits. They flew in a 
draft position m aintaining a speed of 105 KLAS to keep u p with the C-130 
w hich had to fly at 70% flaps. At those slow speeds the C·130 had bore sight 
alignment and doppler reliability problems. These problems were overcome 
by both the FUR and GAR!I beacon which added to the reliability of 
navigation. The narrow operating envelop of the HH·3 meant only essential 
fuel and equi pment could be carried. As tactical requiremenl<; increased the 
size of the assault team, particular attention was paid to weight reduction. 
After numerous trials it was determined that flying the UH·IH in formation 
with a C·130 was "not within the capability of the average Army aviator," but 
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after intense training "the tactics of drafting with HH-3 and UH-1H [were] 
proven and [could] be applied in future plans."U. • 
Another minor problem that developed when it was found that the C-
13O/A-l strike force was not capable of maintaining formation with the lead 
assault force of C-130!HH-53, HH-3. A plan was devised to allow the A-ls to 
make circle or S-turns to remain in contact with the lead helicopter force. This 
later resulted in the decision to separate the two fonnations allowing them to 
arrive on target at a pre-designated time. 
According to the Post Operation Report,. throughout the training air force: 
tactics and techniques were in a constant state of revision and 
modification until the full dress rehearsal in early October. All missions 
were jointly briefed and debriefed with every element that participated 
represented The building-block concept was constantly stressed and 
emphasi~d and practiced. [The air element] would practice each segment • 
separately and single ship, if feasible. Banast was carried to match 
planned flight gross weight. Formations were flown at density altitude 
expected to be encountered ... Frequently a mission would be flown in the 
afternoon, and after a debrief and discussions of problems with corrective 
actions, the mission would be repeated after dark. During the proper 
phase of the moon, some missions were flown as late as 0230 in the 
morning to achieve as realistic lighting as possible.l7 
By the time training was completed on 13 November 1970, ~every facet of 
the operation [was) exercised [totaling] more than 170 times ••. and over 1000 
26 Ibid., Son Tay Report, 1;:..61, Ii-54. While attached to the Holloway Commission 
investigating the Iranian hostage rescue mission, LiGen Manor asked why the C-130s 
and helicopters did not fly in formation to Desert One. He was told that the air 
speeds were not compatible. 
l7 Ibid., Allison, Panel Discussion, 45-46. 
• 
• 
hOUIS of incident.free flying (was] conducted primarily at night under near 
combat conditions ... lS 
On 10 November 1970 the force deployed to Thailand fully prepared to 
conduct the mission that lay before them. 
E. H IE MISSION 
The deployment to Thailand was conducted in two phases. On 10 
November the two mission C-130s left Eglin AFB under cover of darkness and 
arrived at Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB) on 14 November. In 
staggered flights, the remaining personnel and equipment were flown by C-141 
on the 10th, 12th and the 16th of November. The helicopters and A-1s used 
during training were left in CONUS and replacement aircraft were provided by 
forces in Thailand. Appropriate cover stories were disseminated to prevent 
"espionage and sabotage from interfering with the movement of the force, to 
insure surprise, and to deny infonnation regarding the movement.· 29 In 
Thailand, security surveys were conducted at both Takhli and Udom RTAFBs 
(the helicopter staging base) and secure working areas were established and 
maintained throughout the final stages. 
On 18 November the force was assembled in the base theater at Takhli 
where Manor and Simons presented a joint air/ground operations brief. Up to 
21! Ibid., Son Tay Report. Part I, Commander's Comments (BGen Manor), ii-iii. 
2~ Ibid., Part 1,31 . 
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this time only those personnel directly involved in the planning knew what the 
objective was_and where Son Tay was located. Although this brief was fairly • 
extensive it did not include the exact name and location of the POW camp. 
Following the formal brief the platoon leaders read the official Operation Plan 
and reviewed the schedule of activities for the remaining three days. That 
evening there were more staff and platoon meetings which included partial 
brief backs by key individuals. 
At 0330 local time on 19 November, Manor received a RED ROCKET 
message giving him approval to launch the mission as planned. Unfortunately, 
the weather situation had deteriorated since the force arrived in Thailand. 
Typhoon Patsy was about to make landfall over the Philippines and was 
expected over Hanoi within 24 to 48 hours. It was essential for the success of • 
the mission that the air element have 5000 to 10000 foot cloud ceiling enroute 
to Son Tay and suitable moonlight for the ground operations at the objective. 
Additionally, the coastal ceiling off the Gulf of Tonkin had to be 17000 feet for 
the Navy to conduct their diversionary air raid. Manor received a detailed 
weather brief the afternoon of the 19th and based on that forecast he made the 
decision to launch the raid on the 20th vise the 21st. 
The ground force spent the 19th conducting equipment checks, range 
firing, and receiving SAR and E&E briefings. On 20 November a final briefing 





A route b riefing and target briefing was given to include the geugraphical 
location, the name of the target, its relation to Hanoi's location (cheers 
went up) and specific instructions concerning the conduct of force in the 
target area. Included were: decisive action, importance of time to success, 
care of wounded, SAR operations, and fighting as a complete unit in cas e 
of emergency actions,JO 
Following the brief the ground force moved to the hanger for a final 
equipment check and to await on load. An advanced party had flown to Udom 
earlier in the evening to load the helicopters with special clothing for the 
POWs and extra batteries and equipment for the ground force. Manor departed 
earlier in the day fOf his command post located at Monkey Mountain just north 
of Dancang: 
The reason Monkey Mountain was chosen was because it was a 
communications hub, and it had some special communication put it for 
(Manor's) use,JI 
In the three days proceeding the launch, t he air elements were also busy 
checking aircraft and making final preparations. The two C-130E h ad arrived 
on the 14th and were test flown for systems checks on both the 16th and 17th. 
The 3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group redistributed HH-53s w ithin 
Southeast Asia so that ten were available at Udom RT AFB on 15 November. 
By 17 November all HH-53s were mission ready. Two CONUS based EC-121T 
airborne radar platforms were prepositioned at Danang, South Vietnam for 
XI Ibid., Part I, 33. 
JI Ibid., Manor interview with McRaven. 
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support of the mission and were ready by the 17th of November. The A·1 
strike aircraft used for the mission were based at Nakhon rh~nom, Thailand. 
The A-I crews from CONUS were moved to Nakhon Phanom and conducted 
system checks throughout the final three days. The aircraft realignment was 
conducted using routine daily "'rag Orders or operational patterns. This ~elped 
maintain a low profile, and was consistent with the security posture throughout 
the training and deployment. 
At 2125 on 20 November1970, the ground force departed Takhli by C·130E 
and after an "uneventful" flight arrived a t Udorn. While at Udorn the ground 
force transferred to the five HH-53s and one HH-3. At approximately the same 
time, the A-ls departed Nakhon Phanom RTAFB to effect the rendezvous over 
• 
taos with the ground force aircraft. The aircraft were designated as follows: • 
Acft Type Call Sign Mission 
C-130E Cherry 1 Raid Force Lead Acft/Flare Drop 
C-130E Cherry 2 A-1 Lead Acft 
HC-130P Lime 01 Tanker 
HC-130P Lime 02 Tanker 
HH·3 Banana 1 Assault Element Helo (Meadows) 
HH-53 Apple 1 Support Element Helo (Simons) 
HH-53 Apple 2 Command Element Helo (Sydnor) 










POW HelD/Spare Flare Ship 
POW Helo/Spare Flare Ship 
Strike Acft 
In addition to the above aircraft there was also a ten aircraft MIG Cap provided 
by the 432 Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Udom (F-4s), six F-I05Gs 
(SAMiAAA suppression) provided by the 6010th Wild Weasel Squadron at 
Korat RTAFB, two EC-121T College Eye early warning/command and control 
aircraft, two Combat Apple (Airborne mission coordinator) from Kadena AFR, 
Okinawa, one KC-135 radio relay aircraft, ten KC-135 reserve tanker support 
from U-Tapao RTAFB and a three aircraft carrier diversionary strike force 
which induded seven A-6s, twenty A-7s t twelve F-4 and F-S aircraft,. six 
ECM!ES.ls and 14 support aircraft. In all over 116 aircraft particip ated in the 
operation, taking off from seven ai rfields and three aircraft carriers. 
At 2256 on 20 November, the ground force aboard their designated 
helicopters departed Udom to begin the f1ight to Son Tay. Immediately after 
takeoff an unidentified aircraft passed through the formation on a reciprocal 
heading causing the helos to disperse. This created only a momentary delay 
before the helos rejoined in formation. The plan called for the helicopters (led 
by one C-130E) and the A-ls (following the second C-130E out of Nakhon 
Phanom) to rendezvous over Laos. This provided an in flight refue ling point 
47' 
for the helos and allowed the two elements to join forces prior to the final leg 
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Figure 8-7. The Route of the Son Tay RiUd Force. (Adapted from 
Benjamin Schemmel's The Raid.) 
The Assault Formation approached Son Tay from the west. As they arrived at 
a pOint 3.5 miles from the compound the lead C-130E relayed a heading of 072 • 
degrees to the helicopters and then pulled up a nd away preparing to drop 
flares and firefight simulators. The first three HH-53s and the HH-3 slowed to 
approximately 80 knots while the remaining two HH-53s climbed to I5~ feet 
to standby as reserve flare Ships and to recover POWs. The A-Is had executed 
their flight plan as scheduled with the fifth A·I dropping off over the Black 
River and the third and forth A-Is establishing a holding pattern closer to the 
compound. The primary strike A-Is proceeded to the objective area and 
established a left-handed orbit at 3000 ft Above Ground Level (AGL). 
The lead C-130E commenced the flare drop on schedule at OZ .... ? Seeing 
that the flare drop was satisfactory, HH-53 Apple 4 and 5 proceeded to their • 
holding area on an island in Finger Lake (7NM west of Son Tay). At the same 
moment, approaching the coast from the east. the Navy diversionary raid was 
in progress, which "utterly confused the enemy defenses" focusing their 
attention away from Son Tay.32 
As the helos approached the obj~tive area Apple 3 (the gunship HH-53 
and the lead helo in the formation at this time) began a firing run on what 
appeared to be the compound. As he approached the target, however, the pilot 
realized it was not the correct location and he turned left toward Son Tay. The 
32 LtCol Donohue on West Point video Feb 77. 
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HH-3 following immediately behind Apple 3 also turned north. Unfortunately, 
Apple 1 (containing the Support Group of COl. Simons and men) landed in 
a field outside the wrong target. Behind Apple 1 was Apple 2 which contained 
Sydnor and the Command/Security Group. The pilot of Apple 2 immediately 
recognized the error and proceeded north in trail of Appl e 3 and the HH-3. 
At 0218, Apple 3 commenced his firing run on the Son Tay guard towers. 
Flying between the two wooden structures, the door gunners in Apple 3 opened 
fire - destroying the watch towers instantly. After completing the firing run 
Apple 3 proceeded to a holding area 1.5NM east of Finger Lake and awaited 
orders to return and pickup POWs. 
Banana 1, the HH-3 with Meadows and the Assault Group made a west 
to east approach crossing the west wall. The door, winduw, and ramp gunners 
began firing on their areas of responsibility as the helo executed a "controlled 
crash" into the compound. The trees in the landing zone had grown 
Significantly since June when they were originally photographed. The blades 
of the HH-3 severed several small trunks and sheered the tops of the others. 
The impact of the landing was so violent that the door gunner was thrown 
clear of the aircraft, but landed unhurt. Once on the ground their mission was 
"to secure the inside of the POW compound, to include guard towers, gates, and 
cell blocks and to release and guide POWs to the control point d.J 
33 Ibid., Son Tay Report Part II, 59 . 
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The group was divided into five elements: a Headquarters Element with the 
mission to secure the south tower and latrines, and provide command imd • 
control; Action Element 1 whose mission w as to clear the cell blocks and north 
tower- Action Element 2 who was to provide cover for Action Element 3 which 
was to dear the front gate; and the Air Force crew who would aSKist in, POW 
handling. 
Upon landing.. the Headquarters Element cleared building 3, the southwest 
guard tower, broadcast messages to the POWs, blew a 4'x 4' hole in the west 
wall (20lb satchel charge) and established radio contact with the Ground Force 
Commander (Sydnor) and all the action elements. 
Action Element 1 moved to building SA where it was believed the 
prisoners were being held. All the cell blocks were searched by a two man • 
search team while other members of the element provide security. Members 
of the element continued to dear their assigned areas including the northwest 
tower and the areas along the west and north wall. Part of the element 
proceeded to building 5C and another part to 50. As the element moved into 
50, three to five NV A rushed from the building and were killed by Action 
Elements 2 and 3. Outside the building.. NVA guards began to initiate a large 
volume of ineffective automatic weapons fire. Action Element 2 quickly moved 
into buildings 5E and 4 -- clearing the spaces as they went. Inside 5E two NVA 
guards were killed. The locks on the cells were cut and all blocks searched as 





Element 3 killed three NVA just inside and north of the gate while two enemy 
were killed outside neaf building 7A. 
At H +1O the Headquarters Element received an all dear from the action 
elements and was notified that no prisoners were found. Meadows 
subsequently ordered all elements to move to the southwest wall and standby 
for extraction. He then radioed the Command Group Leader that "Zero Items" 
were fo und in the compound. At 1-1+15 the action elements (minus HQ) moved 
to the marshalling position outside the compound. The Headquarters Element 
remained behind to destroy the HH-3. At 1-1+18, Me.ildows initiated the 
demolition charge and a firefight simulator, then proceeded out the southwest 
wall and linked up with Sydnor. 
As the Assault Group was executing its "controlled crash" inside the Son 
Tay compound, Apple 2 with Sydnor, and the Command Element were landing 
just outside the south wall. The pilot of Apple 2 realizing that Apple 1 had 
inadvertently landed at the wrong compound implemented P1an Green, which 
provided for the loss of one helicopter. With l'1an Green in effect, the door 
gunners from Apple 2 engaged the prescribed buildings outside the compound, 
while the pilot landed the helicopter 100 yards from the south wall. Inside the 
helo, Sydnor was advised "by the pilot of Apple 2 that Apple 1 was not 
present."u Sydnor immediately "took hold of Redwine's (Cpt Daniel Turner-
U Ibid., Sydnor. 
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- Command Group Leader} equipment harness (they were seated side by side 
in the aircraft) and advised him that Plan Green was in effect.· lS Then he 
directed his radio operator to notify all elements that the alternate plan [Green} 
was being executed. All of the Command Elements (known as Security 
Elements) were redirected except for Security Element 2 which ha~ not 
established radio contact and was too far away to be visually alerted. 
As soon as the new orders were transmitted all the elements responded 
accordingly. They had practiced the alternate plan so often "all [Turner) had 
to do was say 'Plan Green in effect' and they reacted."3/; 
The mission of the Command Group was to secure the south wall, act as 
reserve for Assault and Support Groups, and act as control for evacuating 
prisoners to helicopters.'7 
• 
However, with Plan Green in effect that mission was expanded to include • 
securing the east wall and all buildings close by as well as destroying the 
vehicle bridge to the north. The Command Element came under small arms 
and rifle grenade fire from building 7B as they exited the helD and began to 
direct the security elements. This threat was quickly subdued, but not 
eliminated. The helo immediately departed the area for its holding spot. 
Within minutes Sydnor contacted the circling A-Is and directed them to attack 
the footbridge to the southeast. The A-Is dropped four white phosphorous 100 
>5 Ibid. 
J6 Ibid. 




pound bombs on the bridge and then expended six rockeye!! on isolated targets 
on the road southwest of the camp. 
The NVA, now fully alerted, began to return fire and move to secure 
areas. Three to four NV A were killed running between buildings 11 and 12 
and several more were killed as they were caught between the Command 
Element (sHU situated at the landing wne) and Security Element 1 moving 
toward the south w all. Security Element 1, executing Plan Green, moved to its 
objectives at buildings BE, 8D, and 4A. In the process smal1 anns fire from 
building 7B was suppressed and two NVA killed. Upon arriving at build ing 
80, EJement 1 came under a "heavy volume of fire." Three members of the 
element assaulted the building and cleared it with a hand grenade. The 
number of killed is unknown. Five NVA were spotted to the east of BO and 
were t!ngaged by fift!. At the same time, one NVA engaged Element 1 from the 
west end of the building and two NVA fired from the east end of BO. Element 
1 engaged and killed the two NVA at the east end and suppressed the 
remaining fire. The portion of Element 1 assigned to clear buildings BE and 
4A were engaged by four NVA. The element returned fire, but the results are 
unknown. They continued clearing the buildings a nd subsequently linked up 
with members of the Assault Group exiting the compound through the hole in 
the west wall. 
Security Element 2 did not receive word about the change in plan and 
consequently proceeded to execute their basic mission. They disabled the 
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power station with an M-72 LAW and then assaulted and cleared the target 
Immediately following this action, the element began receiving small arms fire 
from the southwest and from a position south of the canal. Both enemy threats 
were subdued by fire with two NVA killed in the process. 
Security Element 3 had moved to a position south of the small canal ,when 
they first received word about the change in plan. Unfortunately enemy fire 
and the thick foliage prevented a hasty retreat to their new objective. However, 
by H+5 the element was in position to engage building 78. The grenadier and 
M-60 man attacked the building with heavy fire. The element was delayed in 
assaulting the building owing to a deep drainage ditch and thick concertina 
wire which surrounded the target As they approached the building two NVA 
were killed and another ten were killed once they entered the building. 
The Pathfinder Element, which W.iilS to set up the primary landing zone, 
cleared the pump station with a concussion grenade and 30 rounds of 
ammunition and then blew down the nearby power poles to clear the LZ. As 
this was happening the Support Group, which had been delayed at the false 
compound, arrived at Son Tay. The Ground Force Commander illerted all his 
security elements that the Support Group had landed and would take up their 
original positions. The security elements were ordered to remain in their 
positions until the Support Group Elements relieved them. At that point they 






The Support Group, which had been aboard Apple 1, was mistakenly 
inserted at a compound 400 meters southeast of the POW compound. The 
mistake was nut immediately obvious and the helo departed leaving the 
Support Group at the wrong target. The elements were quickly engaged by the 
enemy. Reacting to the situation the Support Group Headquarters Element 
assaulted the compound and penetrated the complex at the south wall. Once 
inside the compound they assaulted the building located at the south end 
(Bldg. 1) with grenades and rifle fire. This accounted for ten NVA dead. The 
Support Group Commander (COL. Simons) notified all elements that a 
withdrawal was im minent. Element 1 cleared an LZ and provided. zone 
security while Element 2, under heavy fire, moved to the road east of the 
compound and established a blocking force. 
The Support Group Headquarters Element continued to clear the 
compound. Significant automatic weaponfl fire was coming from the two story 
building (Bldg. 4) in the center of the compound. A grenadier fired 40mm 
rounds through both the windows and doors eliminating the threat. By H+3 
this building was secure. As the Headquarters Element began to clear building 
2, four NVA, who were attempting to reach the two story building (which later 
reportedly housed the armory), were killed. 
Elements 2 continued to receive isolated fire from the enemy and at H+4 
was ordered to close the LZ and help establish perimeter security. Dy 1l+6 all 
elements began moving toward the LZ. Apple 1, who by now realized his 
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mistake, was inbound 
to extract the force. As 
the Support Group 
began to load the helo 
Element 1 laid down 
suppressive machine 
gun fire and all 
personnel reembarked 
without any casualties 
being sustained. 
Nine minutes after 
mistakenly landing at 
the wrong compound, 
the Support Group 
arrived at Son Tay. 
Simons was advised that Plan Green had been implemented, but with the 
Support Group's arrival the force would return to the basic plan. Elements 
from the Support Group passed through the lines and linked up with 
Command Elements. Support Group Element 1 established a secure position 
near building 7 A from which a steady volume of fire had been received. The 








headed toward building 13E suppressing the enemy with M~60, M-79 and M-16 
fire. The building was subsequently assaulted and two NVA killed. 
By the time the Support Group and Command Group Elements were in 
position the word had been passed from Meadows that there were no POWs 
in the Son Tay com pound. Sydnor g.ave the orders for all eleme,:,-ts to 
withdrawal to the vicinity of the edraction site. This occurred at approximately 
1-1+17. Soon thereafter, the A-Is were ordered to attack the vehicle bridge to the 
north. Four strafing runs using 20mm were conducted by two different aircraft. 
At H+23 the helas landed and by H+27 all elements were extracted with only 
one minor casualty. The return trip to Udom Thailand was punctuated by 
several SAM sightings w hich required evasive action on the part of all the air 
force elements. However, after refueling over Laos the remaining trip was 
"relatively" uneventful. 
As the ground engagement was in progress the aviation support forces (F. 
40 and F-105s) were busy avoiding and suppressing surface to air missiles 
(SAMs). Approximately 16 SAMs were fired and the F-105s responded with 
eight Shrikes. While flying at 13,000 feet one of the F·l05s (Firebird 03) was 
damaged by a SAM which exploded under the left wing apparently rup turing 
the fuel tank.38 The crew was forced to eject at tlOOO feet over the Plaine des 
31! Firebird 03 was fired upon by two SAMs. When the missiles were at one mile 
the pilot rolled over and descended to 5000 feet. The two missiles followed the F·105 
and the pilot was forced to execute a hard pullout. The first SAM passed uver the 
aircraft and detonated behind it. The second SAM detonated under the left wing 
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Janes. They were eventually picked up by the Assault FOlTIlation HH·53s 
(Apples 4 and 5). 
The Navy diversionary raid proceeded as planned. It is estimated that 20 
SAMs were fired at the force, but no casualties were sustained. It was later 
reported that "the density of the Navy operations in the Gulf of Tonkin [during 
the Son Tay raid] was the most extensive Navy night operation of the SEA 
conflict.":W 
Throughout the entire operation, Manor monitored radio communication 
between all the participants and he had a direct link with Admiral McCain 
(CINCPAC) and Admiral Moorer (Chainnan JCS). Additionally he received 
continuous realtime intelligence on the enemy activity. He said later: 
I had infonnation on what they [NVA integrated air defense personnel] 
were seeing almost as quickly as, or probably more quickly in some cases, 
as there decision makers were getting iL 40 
Manor knew that the operation had failed to recover any POWs. He flew to 
Udorn to meet the returning raid force: 
They were a very disappointed group of people. My immediate goal was 
to have a meeting of some of the key people and get some information 
from them that I needed right away to put together a Top Secret message 
to Admiral Moorer telling him what the status was ... Later that morning 
damaging the aircrafL Another F-105 also recorded a hit and was forced to crash land 
on an airfield in Thailand. 
:J'J Ibid., Son Tax Report, Part I, 70. 







I got a call from Admiral Moorer telling Me and Simons to get back to 
Washington as soon as we couId.n 




The failure of the Son Tay raid to recover any POWs created a 
political fallout of incredible proportions. The media immediately blasted the 
intelligence community for its inability to verify the existence of POWs prior 
to the operation and the administration was vilified for escalating the war. 
What was overlooked was the exceptional performance ofthe raiding force and 
their support elements. The fact that there were no POWs in the compound 
does not detract from the success of the tactical portion of the raid. The 
mission was planned, rehearsed and executed exad]y the same in either case. 
The dispOllition of the enemy force at Son Tay was as expected. Tht! fact that 
tht!re were no POWs to guard may have relaxed the enemy's posture, but 
relaxed or not, the raid force executed the mission with such surprise and speed 
that only substantial opposition could have prevented a successful outcome. 
BGEN. Manor stated in his report on the raid on Son Tay that "it should be 
noted that we were successful not only in what was done, but what could have 
41 Ibid . 
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been done if necessary."U 
The raid on Son Tay is the 
best modem day example of a 
successful special operation 
and should be considered "text 
book" material for future 
missions. 
Were the objectives 
worth tire n·sk? The taking of 
prisoners of war has always 
generated a call for action. As 
stated earlier during the case 
on Cabanatuan, prisoners 
constitute a direct afront to 
national and military honor. 
In Vietnam, this concern may 
have been more pronounced 
owing to the perceived failure 
of the war effort. By 1970 the war claimed an average of 500 deaths a month 
and over 470 Americans were believed held captive in North Vietnam. All 







previous efforts to rescue American prisoners had been iutile.n An of these 
issues were compounded by the reluctance of the North Vietnamese 
government to negotiate with President Nixon concerning deescalation and the 
release of POWs. Nixon who was faced with dwindling political alternatives, 
dearly saw the rescue as a vi able option to restore national dignity and n;cover 
American soldiers; many of whom had been held prisoner for years. Any time 
a nation attempts to rescue prisoners behind enemy lines, they face the risk of 
having the rescue force captured and thereby adding to the number of POWs. 
For most nations, however, attempting to rescue prisoners, regardless of the 
outcome, is generally perceived as a worthwhile endeavor and well worth the 
risks. 
Was the plan developed to maximize superiority over the enemy and 
minimize th£ risk to the assault force? Of the eight cases presented in this 
thesiS, the level of national support for the raid on Son Tay eclipses all other 
operations. By having the assets of CIA, DIA, NSA, SAC and military 
intelligence, the planners and operators were able to identify all the critical 
nodes in the North Vietnamese Air Defense System and have enough 
information to construct a detailed model of the POW camp. As Blackburn 
described it, this "flawless" operational intelligence, coupled with four months 
of mission preparation allowed the assault force to plan around the North 
43 Over 1011 POW rescue attempt.'1 had been mounted between 1966 and 1970. None 
of these, however, were in North Vietnam. 
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Vietnamese defenses .md minimize the risk to the raiders. Additionally, the 
• small raid force was augmented by over 100 aircraft that provided MIG cap, air 
defense suppression, and operational deception; all of which contributed to 
maximizing superiority over the enemy. 
Was thR mission executed according to plan and if not, what 
extenuating circumstances dictated the outcome? From the raid force's 
perspective the mission was conducted by the numbers, with the exception of 
Simons's misadventure into the ·Secondary Schoo]." But, this eventuality was 
planned for and Simons's failure to arrive at the POW camp on time, did not 
effect the conduct of the operation. Obviously the failure to rescue .my POWs 
w.s demoralizing to the raid force, but,. from a purely operational standpoint,. 
was beyond the control of the planners and operators. As the Secretary of • 
Defense, Melvin Laird sotid later during a congression.u he.ring.. "We have not 
been able to develop a camera that sees through the roofs of buildings.·44 
Had the pbnners risked placing a Controlled Agent (CAS) in the vicinity of the 
camp, they might have been able to detennine, conclusively, the existence of 
roWs. But,. this option was weighed carefully and the risks considered too 
high. Consequently, the extenuating circumstances that effected the outcome 
of the mission were not a result of f.ulty planning.. preparation or execution 
and can only be attributed to the frictions of war. 





What modifications could have impraoed the outcome o/the mission? 
Disregarding the failure to rescue any POWs, the mission was almost flawless. 
Not one soldier or airman was killed or seriously injured on the raid, this 
includes the Navy and Air Force ainnen who supported the deception and 
cover operations. Considering the difficulty of penetrating a sophisticated air 
defense system and then conducting combat operations in an unfamiliar 
surroundings, the raid on Son Tay should stand as a tribute to the tremendous 
preparation and professionalism of the assault fo rce. And, I doubt any 
modifications to the plan could have improved the performance of the raiders. 
2. Relative Superiority 
Camp Hope near the Son Tay citadel was less than 30 miles from 
Banoi. The air defense coverage in the immediate vicinity was complete, and, 
even without POWs in the compound, the guard force surrounding the camp 
numbered over 100 North Vietnamese regulars. Although there were no 
prisoners, the raid force was not certain of this fact until fifteen minutes into 
the assault. Consequently, the force still had to achieve relative superiority in 
o rder to make this determination and then sustain relative superiority long 
enough to extract from the camp and return to Thailand. Therefore for 
purposes of analysis we will view ~mission completion~ as the successful return 
of the raid force and relative superiority as a function of that mission. 
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When did the raid force achieve a decisive advantage over the North 
Vietnamese? As Figure 8-10 shows the Point of Vulnerability occured Ktwelve 
minutes before (the raid force ] reached the objective."u It was at this point 
that the central and western air defense systems could detect the inbound 
aircraft. Manor remarked later that the raid force was not overly concerned 
with the FanSong SAMs because they could not engage targets below 3000 feet 
U Lieutenant General leroy J. Manor, interviewed by CDR William H. McRaven, 






and the FireCan AAA sites posed only a limited threat. U As for the North 
Vietnamese Air Force they ~had little or no night fighter capability."'7 But, at 
twelve minutes out, even with the sophisticated electronic warfare used by the 
U.S. Air },'on::e, the raid force became vulnerable to detection. If detected by the 
North Vietnamese, it was possible that POW camp could be notified in time 
to prepare an ambush for the raiders. With each minute that passed, however, 
the raid force improved their Probability of Mission Completion, although, a 
decisive advantage would not be achieved until the moment the raid force 
engaged the guards. At H-Hour LtCol Donohue, piloting his HH-53, strafed the 
guard towers and it became apparent that "the Lraid force) had never been 
detected at all."t3 It was a complete surprise and the enemy was unprepared 
to counter the assault. It was at this point that the probability of mission 
completion outweighed the probability of failure, not only marginally - but 
decisively. This is depicted by the significant jump above the Relative 
Superiority Line. Had the North Vietnamese been alerted five or ten minutes 
before the raid, the Americans, with their speed and overwhelming firepower, 
would probably still have achieved relative superiority, but it would have been 
only slightly above the dotted line -- indicating less of an advantage. 
46 Later the North Vietnamese acquired the newer India versions SAMs and were 
subsequently able to engage and destroy aircraft at much lower altitudes. 
47 Ibid., Manor interview of 23 April 1993. 
411 Ibid, 
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Relati~ superiority or not, the force still had to a!l!lauit the 
(:ompound and fight the guards. Therefore they remained vulnerable • 
throughout the 26 minute time on target. This vulnerablity was minimized 
somewhat by A-l strike aircraft which provided dose air support and bombing 
runs to dissuade enemy reinforcements (similar to the Stukas at Eben E'!Iael.) 
On(:e on the helos, the Area of Vulnerability de(:reased to a negligible amount, 
primarily be(:ause Manor had arranged for a host of F-lOSs and F-4s to provide 
SAM suppression and MIG CAP. Manor said later that the for(:e was really 
only vulnerable until they rea(:hed Laos -- approximately one hour from Son 
Tay. But even this vulnerability was minimal. In the end, gaining and 
sustaining relative superiority became a fun(:tion of proper planning, 
preparation and exe(:ution vice a dependen(:e on benevolent frictions of war or • 
the strong intervention of the moral fadors. 
3. The Principles of Special Opentions 
a. Simplidty 
I had never seen such a simple plan and so dearly written that even I 
muld understand it. t9 
From the time the special operation's plan was fonnutated, until 
the exerution of the mission, the basic scheme of maneuver was virtually 




unchanged. The only major exception was the change in the assault hela from 
a UH-IH to a HH-3. The plan was simple enough that it allowed various 
aspects of the mission to be rehearsed over 170 times and several full dress 
rehearsals. One rehearsal even included exercising the short C-130 flight from 
TahkIi to Udom and transferring the raid force to the helas. Although th-: plan 
was simple enough there were several obstacles to overcome, including; 
clandestinely penetrating the North Vietnamese integrated air defense and 
quickly seizing the compound with a minimum of friendly losses. Both of 
these difficulties were made simpler through good intelligence and innovative 
technology applied to the problems. 
Although there is much written about the ~intelligence failure" 
at Son Tay, the intelligence successes generally go unheralded. In accessing the 
intelligence provided the planning group, General Blackburn Jater recalled: 
Operational intelligence was f1awless. .. One day we got from Manor, 'Hey, 
do you realize that to fly from the Plaines des Jar down into Son Tay, 
there are two radars? If we fly between those two radars, we are going 
to make that northeast warning system go hoL What do we do?' I 
[Blackburn) got a fellow named Milt Zaslov from NSA. I said, 'Zaslov, 
we have a problem. How do we handle this thing?' ... In less than a 
week ... they were able to solve the problem. There is a 5· minute gap in 
the way these things are rotated and we used that 5·minute gap and they 
flew through it undetected.so 
Every conceivable asset in the national intelligence network was placed at the 
disposal of the planners. Other platforms, such as the Buffalo Hunter 
so Ibid., Blackburn, Panel discussion, 13 . 
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reconnaissance drones and the SR·71 conducted overflights of the area. These 
• flights (primarily the SR-71) provided complete photo cov~rage of the raid 
force's inbound route as well as a detailed look at the POW compound.s1 
These photos were used by the CIA to produce a scale model of the compound 
for the operators to study. Photo interpreters who studied the drone pi~res 
were able to determine pr~cise details about the POW compound including: the 
height of trees in compound; the composition of the buildings and what they 
were used for; the approximate number of guards; the NVA fighting positions; 
and the location of all telephone wires that might impact a helicopter landing. 
All of this intelligence contributed to simplifying the plan by eliminating 
unknown factors. 
Once inside the POW compound the special forces personnel • 
encountered other problems, including quickly identifying and killing the 
guards. This required rapid target discrimination. Unfortunately, the soldiers 
night firing capabiJity, as shown during the rehearsals at Eglin AFB, proved 
less than acceptable. Once the Army acquired the Armson Single Point Scope, 
however, the soldier's night firing accuracy improved dramatically. It was this 
innovative technology that direcUy contributed to the lack of American 
casualties. Of the 56 men in the raid force only one man sustained a gunshot 
51 The Buffalo Hunter reconnaissance drones conduded seven overflight,. but six 
of these malfunctioned or were destroyed by the North Vietnamese, and the photos 




wound as opposed to over 40 enemy kHled. The air element of the raid force 
also benefitted significantly from technological improvements incl uding the 
forward Looking Infrared (FUR), GAR/I Beacon and the host of airborne 
command and control and SAM suppression assets. 
The Son Tay raid does present a paradox of simplicity. <?n the 
one hand the actions by the raid force appear to have been simplified through 
proper a ppJication of intelligence, technology and limiting the objectives. 
However, the raid also included 100 other aircraft launched from seven air 
bases and three aircraft carrier, none of which had an opportunity to rehearse 
the mission ahead of time. Can this be called simple? It can if the operation 
was a matter of routine for those pilots - and it was. All of the flight profiles 
flown by the support aircraft had been flown dozens and in some cases 
hundreds of times by the aircrews. Constant practice had honed the pilots 
skills to the point where their mission was not ~special" and therefore didn't 
require additional training beyond was - routine. 
b. Security 
At the outset of the mission a conscious decision was made to 
limit the number of personnel who actually knew the objective and its location. 
The Security Staff Section was organized on 11 August, well before actual 
training began. They developed cover and deception plans that provided for 
every aspect of the operation from training through deployment. While the 
raid force was training at Eglin AFB, the Security Staff systematically elicited 
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information from military personnel, monitored the news media, and analyzed 
domestic and foreign intelligence reports to determine if information was 
leaking. This small anny of counterintelligence personnel also monitored all 
military telephone calls, conducted technical security surveys of all facilities 
both in CONUS and in Thailand, established document control, and con~ucted 
psychological operations to prevent espionage or sabotage from interfering with 
the mission. All of these precautions were taken without unduly effecting the 
operation's planning or preparation. 
There were, however, two facets of security that did negatively 
impacted on the mission. The first was a minor inconvenience caused by the 
need to protect classified weather data. The Son Tay Report stated: 
• 
Protecting the security of the operation imposed some special problems • 
during in~theater coordination. Much of the decision base for the final 
launch hinged upon timely classified weather data .. .Initial access to the 
classified weather data was denied by the 1st Weather Group 
Commander.s2 
Eventually Manor had to get the Director of Operations, USAF Headquarters 
to send a personal message to the Vice Commander of the Seventh Air Force 
who owned the lst Weather Group. This created undue interest among 
personnel at Takhli and eventually a cover story was generated to avoid further 
questions. 





The second facet of security that negatively impacted the mission 
was the decision not to deploy a CAS agent into the vicinity of Son Tay to 
verify the existence of American POWs in the camp. Benjamin Schemmer 
reported in his book The Raid that military planners supported inserting a 
CAS agent who could "'bicycle down the road' oubide Son Tay, land) ar:range 
to have a fl at tire or break his drive chain, take a quick glimpse or two inside 
that front gate, (and) listen for an American voice.ft53 Unfortunately, the CIA, 
who controlled the CAS agents, objected for fear "it could reveill the fact that 
Iwe] were zeroing in on that point. .. rand) that the North Vietnamese might find 
out about the raid and lay an ambush."" In hindsight, had iI. CAS agent been 
successfully inserted. the planners might have known the status of the 
American prisoners at Son Tay. With these two exceptions, however, the 
security was thorough - but not cumbersome. It worked around the basic plan 
without being the driving factor. 
c. Repetition 
Every facet of the operation [was] exercised [totaling) more than 170 times. 
Every conceivable contingency was provided for and exercised. Each man 
knew precisely what his task was under each contingency ... The rapid and 
smooth transition to an alternate plan at the objective testifies to (the) 
ability of the force to adapt to varying conditions.S5 
§3 Ibid., Schemmer, 82. 
54 Ibid. 
S5 Ibid., Son Tay Report. Commanders Comments, ii-iii. 
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Through constant rehearsal, first by individual units then by the 
• force as a whole, the Contingency Task FORe was able to identify and rectify 
operational shortfalls, develop and exercise alternate plans and ensure the raid 
fORe was confident in its own capabilities. Repetition was instrumental to 
success in almost every aspect of the mission: achieving formation pying 
between the helos and the C-130s; executing the HH-53 firing run between the 
guard towers; controlled crashing of the HH-3; initial ground force actions; and 
execution of alternate Plan Green. The aviation rehearsals alone included 284 
sorties and over 793 total flight hours and when the ground force was required 
to execute Plan Green, Sydnor remembered, "because of all the rehearsals we 
had done, it was automatic."56 Each of these aspects of the mission required 
spedal training before the participants could ~mastern the evolution: immediate • 
action drills, house searches, target recognition, dose air control, search and 
rescue, and escape and evasion were all new or varied procedures unique to the 
Son Tay raid. Rehearsals were also required for the use of new equipment,. 
such as; Armson Single Point Sights, Night Vision Devices, and FLIR and 
GAR-I beacons for the air crews. Fortunately, the Task Force had four months 
to prepare, but even up to the last hour, assault team leaders were briefing and 
rehearsing their movements on target. Other aspects of the mission such as 
56 Ibid., Sydnor interview with McRaven. 
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SAM suppression and the Navy diversionary raid were not unique to the 
individual pilots and therefore could afford to be executed on short notice. 
d. Surprise 
The diversionary actions performed by Carrier Task Force 77 were vital 
to the overall success of the mission. The results of this effort were 
exactly as foreseen during the planning phase. It caused the enemy 
defense authorities to split their attention and concern thereby 
contributing greatly to the confusion and chaos which resulted. In short,. 
it served to deny the enemy the option of concentrating his attention to 
OUf true and primary missionP 
In order to gain complete surprise on target. the air element 
carrying the Special Forres pe~onnel had to penetrate North Vietnamese 
integrated air defenses - undetected. They achieved this as a result of the 
Navy'S deception operation. Complete surprise, however, was probably not 
• essential to mission success. If during the twelve minute window of 
vulnerability the North Vietnamese had detected the force and notified the 
camp guards, they would have taken several minutes (it was approximatley 
0200 and most of the auxiliary guard force was asleep) to muster a substantial 
resistance. Had the raid force been visually detected on their final approach, 
it is doubtful the North Vietnamese could have withstood the speed or 
firepower of the air armada. But, of course, the concern was not that the raid 
force would be detected, but that the NVA would kill the POWs before the raid 
force could arrive. It is doubtful, howt'ver, that in all the confusion which 
,7 Ibid., Son Tay Report.. iv. 
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surrounded Hanoi, as a result of the Navy'S air raid, that the Vietnamese would 
have realized that this "massive attack~ was all a deception to rescue 55 POWs. 
It is even more doubtful that they would have made this determination and 
then given the order to kill the POWs all within twelve minutes. 
As it turned out the raid force was "never picked up at all."S! 
This was due in part to the use of the Navy deception raid and in part due to 
the good intelligence and superior technology that allowed the air element to 
terrain navigate and slip through the radar "blind" spots. The Son Tay Report, 
stated: 
The initial North Vietnamese Air Defense System reaction against the 
task force was first noted approximately 20 minutes after the first 
helicopter landed at the landing zone (LZ)." 
• 
Surprise, when rescuing POWs/hostages is an essential requirement for success. • 
The Son Tay raiders unquestionably achieved complete surprise, unfortunately 
there were no POWs to rescue, but the element of surprise still prevented 
unnecessary casualities among the raid force and was instrumental in getting 
in and out alive. 
e.~ 
Originally the plan was to land [the helo with Meadows assault element] 
outside the compound, which would mean there would be a slight delay 
however you were going to negotiate the wall; blow through it, go over 
5~ Ibid., Manor interview of 23 April 1993. 
5' Ibid., 6. (Emphasis added) 
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it, find an open gate ... whatever. It was reckoned that those few seconds 
might loose us some prisoners.'" 
The decision to land Meadows and his assault forte inside the 
POW compound, vise outside, showed the planners had a thorough 
understanding of the need to move more quickly on target. But, this aspect of 
the mission was only one of many that minimized the time on the objective. 
The first attempt to reduce the time on target was a conscious 
decision by the planners to limit the ground operation to thirty minutes. It was 
assumed that after thirty minutes the NVA regulars in the surrounding area 
would begin to reinfolTe the beleagured POW Camp. This would place both 
the ground force and the helm; in jeapordy. Once a "limit~ was established, all 
the rehearsals were conducted with that timeframe in mind. The ground force 
practiced rapid helo onload a nd offload exercises, POW evacuations, immediate 
action drills -- aU designed to reduce their time in the compound. Special 
equipment such as bolt cutters and acetylene torches were purchased to quickly 
fOlTe the cell doors and extract the POWs. Chain saws were bought open 
purchase to help the Pathfinders rapidly dear the helicopter landing zones and 
demolition was used to blow a hole in the compound wall to quickly extract 
the POWs. 
foO Ibid., Sydnor interview with McRaven. 
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All of this preparation paid off and the entire ground operation 
• took only 26 minutes. Even if the roWs had been present it is arguable 
whether the operation would have taken longer than 35 minutes. Post war 
reports from Son Tay POWs indicated that most of the prisoners were in 
solitary confinement or doubled up, but none were shackled. Consequ.ently, 
the time required to cut chains would have been minimal. 
f. Purpose 
Every man in the task force understood that the primary objective 
of the raid was to free the rows at the Son Tay POW Compound. 
Understanding the purpose of the overall mission is crucial, particularly when 
elements have supporting roles (e.g. assault,support, command, pathfinder, and 
marshalling) that are integral to the success of the operation. Too often • 
elements can become distracted by their situation and lose focus on what is 
important. This did not happen during the Son Tay raid. When the Support 
Element, under Simons, landed at the "Secondary School" and came under 
heavy fire, they could easily have been induced to remain at that location and 
engage the enemy with both ground and air fire. Instead of becoming 
preoccupied with killing NVA at the "Secondary School," the Support Element 
disengaged after nine minutes and rejoined the task force at the compound. 
Although this represents the principle of purpose on a large scale it applies 
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equally to the individual soldier who must execute his portion of the mission 
always cognizant of the primary objective!1 
.1 Sydnor later said, "The mission statement was clearly written to include the 
phrase, 'To forcibly release and extract the prisoners: I liked the word 'forcibly' as it 
provided a lot of flexibility in the use of force against the enemy." 
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IX. OPERATION JONATHAN 
THE JSRAEU RAID ON ENTEBBE, UGANDA - 4 JULY 1976 
A. BACKGROUND. 
On Sunday, June 27, 1976 at approximately 1230 11IS, Air France, flight 
nwnber AF 139 was hijacked on route from Lod Airport in Israel to Paris after 
an intermediate stop in Athens. Aboard the A300 Air Bus were 254 passengers, 
a third of which were Israeli. The four terrorists who hijacked the plane 
induded two Germans, Wilfried Boese and Brigitte Kohlman of the Baader-
Meinhof Gang, and two Palestinians. 
The Israeli government immediately placed the Sayeret Matkal 
counterterrorist unit, referred to as "the Unit," on alert. 11 had been the habit 
of hijackers to return to Israel and compound their actions by making their 
demands gn Israeli soil.' The Unit was always prepared to conduct a hostage 
rescue inside the confines of Lod Airport.> But by the time the Unit's 
personnel assembled at Lod, the Air Bus had landed in Bengazi, Libya. The 
Unit stood down temporarily and awaited further orders. 
! In 1972, Arab terrorist hijacked a Sabena airliner and landed at Lad Airport to 
make their demands to Ihe international media. 
2 Sayeret Malkal literally means the reconnaissance unit of the General 
Headquarters of the Israeli Defense Force. The Unit was under the direct operational 







After a six and one half hour delay in Bcngazi, the plane refueled and 
took off heading east. Again the Unil went on alert and prepared to receive the 
hi jackers. After several discussions, the commander of the Unit, Lieutenant 
Colonel Jonathan Netanyahu, who had arrived al Lod only after the hijacked 
plan' departed Bengazi, recommended to his superiors that if the plane 
rctumed to Lod, the Unit would immediately mount an assault. By midnight, 
however, it was dear the Air Bus was heading to Africa. At 0300 the following 
morning, the plane touched down at Entebbe, Uganda where three more 
f'all'stin ians, from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestint! (f'FL!') 
joined the terrorists / 
The passengers were kepi inside the Air Bus for nine hours after the 
plane landed at Entebbe. At nOOIl on Monday, 28 June, the terrorists took the 
passenger,;; from the plane to the main passenger lounge in the Old Tl'mlinal 
building. Later that day, Idi Amin, Pres ident of Uganda arrived and told the 
hostages that he was working to negotiate their release and that Ugandan 
soldiers would remain at the terminal to ensure the passenger,;; safety. Amin 
infonned the passengers that Israel had already ,;;tated that their government 
would not negotiate with terrorists. 
J It is also believed that threl' additional terrorists joined thl' group later the next 
day. This raised the total number to ten terrorist. However, at the time of the assault 
by I!;raeli commandos, only seven terrorist were present at the Old Tenninal. The 
others are believed to have b een in the town of Entebbc . 
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On Tuesday, 29 June at approximately 1530, the terrorists, now under the 
command of a Palestinian Arab called the "Peruvian" mi!de their specific 
demands known. They wanted the release of 53 prisoners: thirteen Arab and 
German terrorists held in West Germany, France, Switzerland and Kenya, and 
forty terrorist in Israeli prisons. One of those held in Israel included Kozo 
Okamoto of the Japanese Red Anny who was responsible for the murder of 
twenty-six people at Lod Airport in 1972.4 If these prisoners were not release, 
the terrorists announced that they would begin executing passengers at 1400 
(Israeli time) on ] July. 
With the announcement, Prime Minister, yitzhak Rabin convened a group 
of cabinet members to discuss the alternatives. Prior to the meeting with 
Rabin, the Israeli Defense Force (JDF) Chief of Staff, Motta Gur, had 
telephoned his own staff and directed them to review military options. 
Although not part of the Gur's staff, LtCoi. Joshua Shani, commander of the 
Air Force's only C-130 squadron had already conducted some rudimentary 
flight planning on monday. He recalled later: 
We did some private planning exercises and learned that the C-130 was 
the only airplane that could get to Entebbe and carry people and 
equipment. I was sitting with my staff, my two deputies, Chief Flight 
Engineer, and the Chief Navigator. We looked at range, fuel, payload, 
navigation, weather problems, things that take time to cover. We worked 
six hours or so ... Tuesday I was at a wedding in Haifa and the Commander 
• Vice I'resident's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, Terrorist Group l'rofiIes 






of the Air Force called. He asked me some questions and I said yes, y~s, 
yes, yes, and yes.1 
Shani was convinced thai his C-130s could make the flight from Israel to 
Entebbe and carry up to 1000 men if necessary. Refueling would be a problem, 
but there were several workaroWlds. 
During the brief with Rabin, GUT presented his ideas, but for several 
reasons, military options were not seriously contemplated. First, Id i Amin was 
considered dO impartial actor in the hijacking, and it was hoped thai through 
negotiation the Ugandan dictator couJd secure the hostage!'l release. Secondly, 
the majority of the passengers were non-Israeli and because the Air Bits was 
french, the French government had the lead in the negotiation process. 
Thirdly, the distance from Israel to Uganda was 2,220 miles. The thOllght of 
• conducting a raid to reSClie hostages was, at first, almost inconceivable. 
• 
Later that evening, Major General Yekutiel Adam, Deputy Chief of Staff, 
contacted Colonel Ehud Barak, the former head of the Unit. Barak was asked 
to infonnally meet with the commando and paratrooper units and review 
possible military actions. By Wednesday morning when the meeting with 
Barak ended, a plan had been proposed to parachute Marine Commandos and 
their mbber boats into Lake Victoria, which bordered Entebbe airport. The 
Marines woold transit over water to the airport, rescue the hostages illld then 
S General Joshua Shani, interviewed by CDR William McRaven, 19 January 1993, 
Tape recording, Washington. 
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turn themselves over to the Ugandan Armed Forces. There were several 
problems with the option, not the least of which was that parachuting rubber • 
boats had never been tried before. Nevertheless, at the time it was believed to 
be the best alternative. 
Throughout Wednesday some intelligence began to filter in slowly, 
although the bulk of information did not arrive until Thursday and Friday. 
Forty-seven of the non-Jewish hostages were released to the French 
Ambassador in the afternoon. Immediately upon their arrival in Paris, these 
passengers were interviewed by French intelligence. Also, BGen. Baruch Bar-
lev, who had formerly been the Israeli attache in Uganda, had two telephone 
conversations with Idi Amin. During these phone calls it became increasingly 
dear that Amin was not neutral and could actually be collaboratin~ with the • 
PFLP. If this was true, it changed the entire complexion of the operation; it 
meant that the negotiations were a sham and any chance of resolving the crisis 
in Israel's favor were slim. Additionally, the plan for the Marine commandos 
to rescue the hostages and then surrender 10 the Ugandans seemed no longer 
viable. The status of Amin, however, could not be immediately confinned and 
planning and preparation continued. 
That afternoon, Shani conducted two rubber boat parachute drops to test 
the concept. The first drop failed, Shani recalled, "the rubber boat exploded." 





same day> And it worked nicely."· By early Thursday morning, infonnation 
from the released passengers seem to confirm Amin's support for thi! I'FLP 
consequently, by Thursday evening the idea of using Marine commandos was 
dis missed. 
In the meantime, members of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) had 
developed an allernate plan that made usc of C-BOs to land directly at the 
airfield. Shani said iater, ''The plan was relatively simple. It was based 011 the 
fact thai no one would think we wece crazy enough to fly there, so it would be 
a lotal surprise.'" 
This operational concept called for the four C-130s to (Ondud a staggered 
landing al Entebbe. The airport had been recently upgraded and there was an 
Old Temlinal complex and a New Temlinal. II was now known that Ihe 
hostages were being hdd in the Old Terminal. In the first aircraft would be 
commandos from the Unit who would assault the Old Tenninal. Also in the 
first aircraft would be a small contingent of paratroopers who would secure the 
New Terminal. The second aircraft would conta in Annored l'ersonnel Carriers 
(APCs) and a.dditional commandos and paratroopers. The third and forth 




Brig. Gen. Dan Shomron, the officer who would eventually command the 
raid, helieved the concept of operations presented was sound, but the force • 
structure presented in this plan was too limited. He wanted to rely on 
munerical superiority to ovenyhelm the terrorists and Ugandan soldiers. The 
IIJFs Operations Chief, CoL Shai, directed the command staff officer to, return 
to their bases and continue planning." Although several concepts were 
discussed between Monday and Wednesday evening, "Nothing was done 
during that period of time to treat the subject in depth, to broaden the 
background planning.'''' 
With the deadline only hours away, Rahin once again convened a meeting 
of his cabinet on Thursday, 1 July at 0700. Gur informed the Prime Minister 
that the military was unable to develop a viable solution to rescue the hostages. • 
Consequently, after lengthy discussions on the political ramifications of 
submitting to the terrorist demands, the Israeli government announced that it 
would release the prisoners in exchange for the hostages. Contrary to 
previously published information, Rabin was not merely stalling for time. He 
later stated that the Israeli government was prepared to negotiate the hostage's 
release. The Israelis, however, were committing to this policy in the belief that 
" Colonel Shai was the Chief of the Operation's Branch of the IDF and although 
junior in rank to General Shornron, was the IDF staff focal point for all plans dealing 
with the raid on Entebbe. 




the hijacking was not directed solely against Jews. At the time of Ihe 
announcement, there were over 200 passengers of all nationalities, still bl'ing 
held prisoner. 
AI 1300 Thursday afternoon, the terrorists, in receipt of Israel's exchange 
proposal, announcl'd that the deadline to t!xecule passengers would be extended 
until SWlday, 4, July. Additionally, the terrorists had released one hundred 
passengers earlier thaL morning. All that remained at Entebbe were Israeli 
citizens, non-Israeli Jews and Ihe twelve members of the Air France crew, who 
rehlsed 10 accept repatriation. In all, 106 hostages remained with the hijackers 
The real purpose behind the hijacking was beginning to emerge. 
Reieas('d passengers laId intelligence agents that the Jews were being 
segregated and that the Ugandan soldiers were coopt!rating fully with the l'FLP. 
Now, any military option wouId have to consider the Ugandan forces as part 
of the problt!m. This fact lent credence to General Shomron's proposal 10 insert 
a large scale force to overwhelm the enemy. 
Later that day, Ihe Defense Minister, Shimon l'eres met with his military 
advisors. They argued about the viability of a rescue operation. The IDF Chief 
of Staff believed that a mission of Ihis magnitude would be too difficult 10 
execute with only two days planning and preparation; casualties could be high 
and Israel could not afford another military disaster like Ma'aloI.10 
10 On May 15, 1974, three terrorists from the Democratic Fronl, a militant faction 
of the PLO, look 105 people hostage in a schoolhouse in the town of Ma'alol. Mosl 
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Additionally, intelligence about the airport, and in particular on the Old 
• Terminal, was still very sketchy. These arguments nnt withstanding, Peres 
directed that detailed planning and training commence immediately and 
appointed Shomron as the commander of the operation. The feeling among the 
military advisors was that the mission could always be cancelled; theref?re any 
prior preparation could only work to their advantage. 
After the meeting with Peres, Jonathan Netanyahu, who until that 
morning had been on a classified operation in the desert, went to Shomron's 
I'aratrooper JIouse in Ramat Gan to receive a briefing on the proposed raid. 
At the Paratrooper I-louse, Shorn ron laid out the roles and missions of each of 
the three ground combat elements. The Unit was to secure the Old Terminal 
and immediate vicinity, while the Paratroopers and Golani Infantry would • 
seize the New Terminal and control tower and act as reinforcements and escorts 
for the hostages. Shorn ron again stated his position that he wanted a large 
force to secure the area. Netanyahu and others argued for a smaller more 
mobile force. 
They said that Shomron's operation would be too heavy and too large, 
and that a way had to be fOWld to pull it off in a more limited, more 
compact way, that would have a better chance of sl1cceeding.ll 
of the hostages were school children and their teachers. When Israel soldiers 
assaulted the school house, the terrorists began killing hostages. Twenty-two children 
died, fifty-six others were wounded and an Israeli soldier was killed. 




Shomron elected not to make a final decision on the force composition. He had 
given hi", broad guidance and now left the details up to the component 
commanders. The following morning al 0700, he would pres ent the operation's 
order to all the participants and fl'hearsals would begin soon afterwards. 
N ctanyahu returned to his compound and with M,ljor Muki Betzer, who 
would be the deputy for the raid, and the intelligence officer, began detailed 
planning. Fortunately for Netanyahu, Betzer had once served in Uganda an d 
was vaguely familiar with the Old Terminal. 
The Unit's mission was to penetrate the Old Terminal , kill the terrorists 
and rescue the hostages. Additionally, the commandos would have to secure 
the area around the Old Tcnninal to ensure Ugandan troops did not reinforce 
the terrorist or prevent the hostages from boarding the aircraft. Detailed 
intelligence was still not availahle on the exact location of the hostages, the 
physical layout of the Old Terminal, or the complete Ugandan order of battle. 
Therefore, the planning continued based on certain worse case assumptions. 
By Friday morning, Netanyahu and his staff had developed a basic plan 
of attack. The first C-l30, flown by Shani, would conduct a blacked out 
land ing and taxi to the north end of the runway. '> Before coming to a 
complete stop, a small team of paratroopers would jump from the plane and 
II The Unit did not actually propose the "blacked out" landing. This \vas 
developed by the planners at the C·l30 squadron, but it was coordinated with the 
Unit. 
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place lights along the runway for the next aircraft. At the north end, Shani 
would stop the CoHO and lower the ramp. The thirty-five commandos, dressed 
in Cgandan unifonns, would exit the aircraft in three vehicles: a Mercedes and 
two Jeep Landrovers.13 The Mercedes would be flying the Ugandan flag and 
would appear to be an official vehicle. The rescue force would proceed toward 
the Old Terminal with their lights on. It was hoped this action would reduce 
suspicion among the guards and grant the Israelis the time they needed to 
reach the Old Terminal." 
Netanyahu realized that speed was vilal to success: 
It was important to cut down the time that would pass from the moment 
of the landing 10 the actual rescue, so as to reduce to whatever degree 
possible the chances that the terrorists guarding the hostages in the old 
tenninal would be alerted by Ihe control tower. ' ! 
Any Ugandans that attempted to stop the vehicles would be immediately killed 
with silenced pislols. The commandos in the Landrovers would also carry 
machine guns and RPG shoulder fired rockets, in the event a heavy force 
intervened. 
1) It was decided not 10 make-up the commandos in "black face" because target 
discrimination would be confusing and at night it was doubtftJ! the Ugandans could 
tell black from white anyway . 
.. Originally, the Unit had explored the possibility of posing as Idi Amin. Amin 
was scheduled to return from a meeting of the Organization of African Unity in 
Mauritius. This idea was later shelved when Amin rehlIned early to Uganda. 








Once at the Old Temlinal, three learns would immediately assault the 
buil ding's three main entrances, concentrating inside on the areas whl'te the 
hostages were held. Other elements would follow behind and move to the 
second floor, where the Ugandan soldiers werc berthed. Outside the building 
would be the command and control element, under the direction of Nelanyahu, 
and a support team that would focus its jeep mounted weapons on the tactical 
high points !control tower ,md upper deck of the terminal) held by Ih £' 
Ugandans." !\ietanyahu decided nol to assault the control tower because it 
would require more men and increase the possibility o f casualties. 
Two hundred yards east of the Old Terminal was a Ugandan military 
base. It was estimated that over 1000 soldiers and airman were stationed here, 
as well as a M.IC fighter squadron. It would be necessary to establish a 
blocking force to prevent the soldiers from spoiling the rescue. N etanyahu 
planned to add four "Buffalo" annored personnel carriers to the equipment list. 
These vehicles would be loaded in the second and third C-130s and operated 
by commandos from the Unit. The Golani Infantry would also be positioned 
in the second and third aircraft, but their mission would be to provide 
protection for the C-130s. 
\. Originally, Jonathan Netanyahu was not scheduled 10 be the assault force 
leader, in spite of the fact that he was the commanding officer of the Unit. For 
political reasons, Colonel Ehud Barak, the previous commander of the Unit was 
chosen to "supervise" the Unit's ground operations. Eventually, this convoluted chain 
of command was resolved and Barak did not participate. 
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In the final hour of planning.. Netanyahu identified the personnel from 
• the Unit who would be participating in the operation. Most of the men 
selected were chosen on the basis of seniority. There were a few who were 
picked for their previous combat experience. Netanyahu also chose several 
men based on his personnel experience with these individuals. When tl~is was 
done he instmcled his secretary to recall the men and have the officers 
available for a 0100 briefing. 
At the first, of what was to be many briefings, Netanyahu laid out the 
proposed plan. Many of the personnel had been involved in missions before 
that were planned, rehearsed, but then never executed. This appeared to the 
case with Entebbe. Most of the men were skeptical thai the operation would 
be approved. When the meeting was completed, Netanyahu advised the men • 
to get some rest, while he returned to his office and began detailed planning. 
In Voni's final Battle Netanyahu's brother, lddo, a former member of the Unit, 
recalls how Jonathan must have felt while planning the operation: 
Sitting alone in his office, it is possible that the full significance of the 
operation, and the risks it entailed crystallized in Yoni's (Netanyahul 
mind for the first time. The people of Israel had nol yet recovered from 
the devastating blow of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. In many ways, the 
morale of Ihe country had only deteriorated in the three years since then. 
If the operation were to fail ·· if all the hostages were killed, or most of 
them, and if in addition Israel's elile force were to be captured or 
annihilated, far from the nation's borders - it would strike at the spirit 
of the nation with devastating effect.17 





If the mission was approved, .\Jetanyahu knew it would be the mosl important 
operation of his life. Failure could effect the honor or hi~ country and the 
prestige of the Israeli military. Nelanyahu, who was known for his obsession 
with detail, would ensure that Entebbe didn't fail for lack of planning and 
preparation. 
In the meantime, Shomron and others had gone to Rabin's office to brief 
the Prime Minister on the plan that had been formulated upto that point. Cur 
intercepted Shomron outside Rabin's office and after reviewing the proposal, 
sent Shomron back In continue planning. Allhough it was Friday morning, six 
days after thl' hijacking, ShomIon believed that the General Staff was still not 
taking the possibility of a military rescue seriously. Nevertheless, Shorn ron 
and the other commanders were determined to bl' prepared. When the sun 
came up the paratroopers and the commandos would commence full scale 
rehearsals, thl' logistics people would be busy modifying the Landrovers and 
Mercedes, the weapons branch would be gathering the Calil assault rifles and 
the AK-47s, and the intelligence branches would be putting together the final 
pieces of the Entebbe pU7.7.le.'~ Unknown to Shomron, however, in a day and 
a half, his force would take off for Entebbe -- ready or noth 
'" .Most of the commandos preferred the Kalashnikov (AK47) to Ihe Calil because 
it fired a 7.62 (39 THm) round vise the 5 .. % and the reliability was reportedly better. 
,. Shorumn did not actually oversee the Unit's preparation. Thl' Unit was not 
under the operational control of Shoruron until the mission began. 
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B. JONATHAN NETANYAHU 
• Of all the cases studied so far, no other man exhibits as much leadership 
as Jonathan Netanyahu. His extensive combat experience coupled with a flare 
for motivating his men stands out above the rest. Born in the United States in 
1946, Netanyahu was an extremely bright and industrious yOWlg man. , When 
the State of Israel was established, his parents Benzion and Cela Netanyahu, 
then on a Zionist mission in the United States, relocated to Israel. Netanyahu 
became president of his high school student body and leader of his Boy Scout 
troop. In January 1963, during his junior year in high school, the family moved 
to Philadelphia where his father was the editor-in-chief of the Encyclopedia 
ludaica. Young Jonathan, called Yoni by his friends, became extremely 
homesick for Israel. II was difficult for him to adapt to a new culture, new • 
language and new friends. 
In July 1964, after a year and a half in the United States, Netanyahu 
returned to Israel and enlisted in the Israeli Defense Force. He joined the 
paratroopers and was stationed along the tcn mile "waist" which divided the 
Arabs from the sea. Within two years Arab terrorists began to launch repeated 
attacks into Israel. Eventually the Israelis retaliated and attacked the terrorist's 
base camps. Netanyahu saw his first action in a raid against Es-Samua in 
Jordan. 
In 1966, Netanyahu attended the Officer's Training School and graduated 




paratroopers as it platoon commander. While assigned to the paratroopers, 
Nctanyahu underwent thePariitroopers Advanced Training Course. He w rote 
in a letter Lo his parents about the course's final exercise: 
We had to parachute in an area that is not a proper drop zone --
"somewhere in the Xcgcv" -- tmder cover of smoke and planes, to lake 
over an emergency airfield, capture a number of targets in the area, and 
after that mark Ih(;' airstrip and land several planes carrying equipment for 
the continuation of the mission -- all of this at night of course. ' o 
It was this type of training that would later effect "Ietanyahu's courses of 
aftion at Elltebbe. After the advance course, he received training in heavy 
mortars and machine guns. Determined 10 go to college and get his 
unde rgraduate degree, Netanyahu left the regular Army in 1966 planning to 
attend Harvard. After being ;lccepted to Harvard, he decided to delay his entry 
for a few months to work and raise additional money for school. 
In May of 1967, Fgypt blockaded the Straits of Tiran, a vital Israeli access 
rou te to the Red Sea and then positioned 100,000 Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai 
peninsula.'"* On June 5, 1967, believing that an Egyptian invasion was eminent, 
Israel conducted a surprise attack on Arab strongholds. Within the first day 
most of the Egyptian Air Force was destroyed and soon after Israeli tanks 
roared through the Sinai, pushing the Egyptians back past the Suez CanaL 
Both Jordan and Syria joined in the fighting, creating a three front war for the 
Israelis . 
• 0 Jonathan Netanyahu, Self l'ortrait of a Hero: The Leiters of lonathan Netanval!.!! 
0963-1976) (New York; Random House, Inc., 1980) 97. 
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Netanyahu, who was called up as part of reserve mobilization, was 
involved in several battles during the Six Day War induding a decisive • 
engagement at Um-Katef, which allowed the Israelis access to the Siani. His 
paratrooper force was air lifted behind the lines and attacked the Egyptians 
from the rear. A few days later, the paratroopers were sent to the . Golan 
Heights where Netanyahu was wounded in the elbow by Syrian gunfire. The 
wound was severe enough that he was released from the active reserves 
(although he stayed in the inactive rest'!ves) as a disabled veteran. 
In July 1967, Netanyahu was married and by Seplember was enrolled at 
Harvard. After a year at Harvard, he again got homesick and decided to return 
to Israel where he entered the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Soon, however, 
Nelanyahu tired of school and after receiving a medical wavier for his elbow, • 
returned to the Army. By July 1969, he was back with the Army in the Sayeret 
Malkal and later did a short tour with the Haruv reconnaissance unit. The 
Hacuv had the responsibility of antiterrorist operations in the Jordan Valley. 
While assigned to the Haruv, Netanyahu took part in a successful raid into 
Beirut and killed three members of the PLO high command. Later his Wlit 
kidnapped a group of Syrian generals and exchanged them for Israeli pilots. 
In 1972 he was promoted to Major. On October 6, 1973 Egypt and Syria 
conducted a surprise attack on Israel, which began the Yom Kippur War. 
Netanyahu was stationed on the Golan Heights at the beginning of the war. 
Syrian commandos ambushed his position killing one officer and wounding 
• 
• 
others. In what was to become indicative of his leadership style, Netanyahu 
lead a counterattack which routed the Syrians. An Israeli officer who 
witnessed the action recalled later. 
I saw Yani stand up quiet calmly, as if nothing had happened. With hand 
movements he signaled to thl' men to get up. They were all lying down 
behind cover, and he began 10 go forward as if it WCIC a fire exercise., He 
walked upright, giving out orders right and left. I remember my thoughts 
then as a soldier: Hell, if he can do it, so can I! I got up ,md started to 
fight, ll 
At thl' end of the engagement, forty-five Syrians werc dead and only two 
Israelis. Netanyahu was involved in several other combat operations during 
the Yom Kippur War including rcconnaissance missions, ambushes, and rescue 
operations. for his actions he was awarded the Distinguished Conduct 
Citation. His leadership under fire did not go unnoticed and in 1975 he was 
promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and subsequently assigned to the Sayeret 
Matkal cOWlterterrorisl unit ,15 the commanding officer. 
Throughout the book, Voni's Last Battle written by his brother Iddo, there 
are countless recollections of N etanyahu by his fellow officers and enlisted 
men. They portray a man totally committed to his beliefs. An Israeli who 
firmly believed in the principles for which his country stood. He was a soldier 
and a scholar, who preferred reading Machiavelli's The Prince to a leisurely 
night on the town. He was a "detail man" who realized the value of good 
planning, but who also knew that ("ourage and boldness could cui through the 
11 Ib id., 223. 
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fog of war. In his farewell speech to paratrooper battalion he commanded 
during the Yom Kippur War, Netanyahu outlined his command principles. 
These principles, more than any individual man's assessment, show what made 
Jonathan Netanyahu a great leader. He wrote, 
·1 believe first of all in common sense, which should guide all of . our 
actions. 
·1 a lso believe in the responsibility of commanders. A good 
commander. . .is one who feels absolutely responsible for anything 
connected, even indirectly, with his command. 
-[ believe that the buck should not be passed to anyone else - that it 
should stop here, with us. 
-I believe in getting down to the smallest details. Anyone who fails to do 
that and tries to spare himself the effort is doing a disservice to our goal, 
which is preparing the unit for war. 
• 
-I believe there can be no compromise with results. Never accept resuJts • 
that are less than the best possible ... 
-I belie¥e that the greatest danger in the life of a unit is to lapse into self 
satisfaction. 
·1 believe that all the battalion's efforts must be subordinated to the main 
aim -- victory in war. Let us never confuse our priorities. 
-I believe with all my heart in our ability to carry out any military 
mission entrusted to us, and I believe in you. 
-And 1 believe in Israel and in the sense of respons ibility that must 
accompany every man who fights for the fate of his homeland.2l 
On July 4, 1976 while rescuing hostages from Enlebbe airport in Uganda, 
Jonathan Nctanyahu was shot in the chest and died of his wounds. 





C ENTt:lHlE A IRPORT 
Uganda, located in !:::asl Africa, is 2,200 mile.~ from Israel. It is borderfO'd 
on the north by the Sudan, Zaire to the west, Tanzania and Ruwand to tht' 
suuth OIIld KenYiI on the east. At the time of the hijacking,. only Kenya had 
friendly relations with Israel. 
From the late 19605 until 1973, Israeli personnel had served in Uganda, 
training the local air force. In 1971, Idi Amm Dada, the Ugandan Army Chief 
of SlilH conducted a (Oup and overthrew Prime Minister ~ilton Ohote. In 
1973, after the Yom Kippur War, Amin began to side with the Suviets, who 
provided him with MIGs and other military hardware. 
Entebbe, one of the largest cities in Uganda, is located on the sbores of 
Lake Victoria. The international airport at Entcbbc had two runways, the 
largest, a 12,000 ft strip running north on a bearing of 353 degrees. At the north 
end of this main strip was a taxiway which ran southeast past the Old Terminal 
to il small ,;,448 ft strip which also ran north/south. 
rhe Old Terminal, where the hostages were being held, was a two story 
building which faced the taxiway and aircraft parking apron. Ad;oining the 
two story terminal was a single story west wing. In the past this wing had 
housed passport control and customs. The west wing led to the Old Tower. 
The east wing, ilnother single story structure, had been a VIP lounge. 
The main focus of the attack would be the Old Terminal. There were six 
front entranres into the terminal including the east and west wings. The 
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commandos planned to assault through three entrances, thereby ensuring that 
all areas of the tenninal were accessible. The terminal was being guarded by • 
between 60 and IUU Ugandan soldiers, most equipped with assault rifles. The 
soldiers had established a perimeter defense and were positioned in key 
locations induding the top of the Old Tower. The troops presumably ~otated 
the watch and while not on duty were generally stationed on the second floor 
of the Old Terminal. 
The seven terrorists were inside the Old TenninaL At the time of the 
rescue, four of the seven were in the large hall at the center of the terminal, 
while the other three were in the cast wing. They carried AK-47s and prior to 
the raid, it was thought that the terrorists had rigged the terminal with 
explosives. Later, it was found that the explosives were only fake. To the • 
north and west of the Old Tenninal were dozens of smaller buildings used to 
support the daily activities of the Entebbe airport. 
A short distance cast of the terminal was the military base which housed 
approximately two battalions of Ugandan troops and the MIG squadron. 
Additionally, Entebbe was down the road and overlooked the airfield. In the 
city was the presidential palace and Amin's palace gu,uds. 
The New Tenninal, which was located on the north end of the main 
nmway was left unguarded, except for some Ugandan police. It contained the 




controlled all inbound and outbound traffic. The paratroopers were scheduled 
to secure this facility. 
D. PREP ARA nONS 
Early Friday morning rehearsals began in ernest. A mock-up of the Old 
Terminal had been constmcted at the Unit's base using met,ll poles, covered 
with burlap sheets, to denote the walls, and white tape on the ground to 
identify the rooms. Commandos from the Unit simulated exiting from the 
vehicles and quickly entering ilnd "clearing" the building. At the same time, 
the Unit personnel assigned to drive the Mercedes and Landrovers met with the 
air force clement at ilnothl'r base and practiced off-loading the vehicles. Thi s 
exercise was conducted repeatedly until the drivers and loadmasters could 
unfa sten the tic-down straps, lower the ramp and depart the aircraft in a matter 
of s econds. Throughout the day, drills covering every aspect of the mission 
were rehearsed. That evening a full-scale rehearsal was scheduled. 
Earlier that morning, all the element commanders met with Shomron fo r 
another hriefing. Shomron presented an overview of the plan and a revised 
force structure. Netanyahu was pleased to see that the Generill had 
implemented the force reduction, recommended the previous day. What had 
been an unwieldy conventiollill assault was now a manageable operation. After 
Shomroll finished his portion of the brief, the intelligence officer s howed some 
8mm films of the Old Terminal taken by a sergeant-major previously stationed 
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in Uganda. Although thl' film did not show the inside of the tenninal, it did 
• give an exterior view of the area. What concernt!d Netanyahu was the five 
story control tower that tactically dominated the art!a. A single soldier with a 
machine gun could control the entire front of the terminal. The intelligt!nce 
officer also had some short clips of the New Tenninal. This was the fi~st time 
the commander of the paratroopers, Colonel Matan Vilnai, and the commander 
of thl' Golani Infanlry, Uri Saguy, had seen pictures of the New Terminal. 
Whl'n the briefing was finished, Shomron directt!d the officers to return to their 
units and continul' planning and preparation. 
Netanyahu drove back to his base and assembled his men for an update. 
By this time, detailed intelligence had arrived from Paris. Israeli intelligence 
had interviewed a woman who was released because she was pregnant. Shani • 
recalled later, "She was a good source of infonnation. Sht! was very observant. 
Sht! knew how many terrorists there were, what they were carrying, and where 
they were located."23 Other passengers were able to tell the Israelis the 
general location of the hostages, although it was still not certain in which of 
the rooms thl'y were kept; the composition of the walls in the terminal. Tht!re 
was some speculation that the terrorists might have rigged the building with 





explosives. "It was good intelligence," Shani remembered, "we knew what was 
going on."l' 
With this informiltioll, Netanyahu once again refined the plan and openl'd 
the brief for discussion. The primary concern was the reported heavy 
concentration of Ugandan soldiers surrounding the building. The passengers 
indicated that the soldiers were spaced ten to fifteen yards apart around the 
entire facility. If this wefe true, surprise would be difficult to achieve. The 
men being briefed were also conce rned about the non-staggered arrival of the 
AP e s. Nelanyahu had initially ordered the first two APCs, arriving on th e 
second C-130, to wait until the lasllwo APes, on the next C-130, arrived, before 
proceeding to the Old Tenninal area. This meant that all four APCs would not 
be on the target until sevcn or eight minutes aftcr the Unit ass'lUlted the Old 
Terminal. This scheme W,lS modified to allow the firsl two APCs to 
immediately proceed to the Old Terminal. 
The Unit commandos "were also troubled by the numer ical inferiority of 
the force landing in the first plane compared to the terrorists and Ugandan 
sol d iers in the environs of the old terminaL. This they claimed was contrary to 
all the rules of combat ... ,,' 1 Netanyahu lold his men that surprise would be 
on their side and that reinforcements would arrive shortly ,lfter the assault. 
l. Ibid. 
25 Ibid., Netanyahu, 31. 
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After Netanyahu finished talking the communications officer and operations 
• officer g,lVe their respective portions of the brief. 
Upon completion of the brief, more drills were conducted. The 
commandos practiced assaulting the mock-up tenninal over and over. They 
timed all the separate evolutions, calculating how long it took to disemb~rk the 
plane, travel to the terminal, and enter the building. Those commandos 
assigned to ride in the Mercedes during the mission, conducted several 
simulated approaches to the Old Terminal. The element leaders continued to 
study the intelligence and discuss the possible options. Even with all this 
preparation, there was still a feeling among the men that the mission would 
never be approved. 
As the drills continued, Netanyahu drove to Shomron's office to present • 
his modified plan. While waiting to see Shomron, Netanyahu was notified by 
phone that Ehud Barak, who had initially been tasked with "supervising" the 
Units assault on the Old Terminal, had been cut from the force, and that 
Netanyahu now had complete command of his Unit. This meant that 
Netanyahu would have to position himself outside the terminal in a command 
and control position, vice leading one of the elements into the building. After 
briefing Shomron on his modified plan, which Shomron subsequently 
approved, Netanyahu returned to base to check on the preparations. 
One of the more important requirements was to ensure the Mercedes 




rea dy. Unfortuna tely, the car was in poor mechanical condition: the tires were 
bare, the frame dilapidated, the gas t,mk leaked, and the. battery required 
charging. Additionally, the white exterior had to be painted black to resemble 
an offici,11 Ugandan vehicle and new "Ugand,m" licence plates and flags had 
to be installed. All of these repairs had to be made between rehearsals, 
because the portion of Ihe operation requiring the Mercedes WiiS being 
exercised repeatedly. 
After ensuring that the mechanics were making progress on the Mercedes, 
Netanyahu mel with Colonel Shani, the air commander. The two men h ad 
bee n conducting sep,lfate planning sessions with their staffs, and now it was 
time to bring the plan together. Every aspect of the launch, insertion, and 
extraction was discussed in detiiil: the exact off-loiid point, direction of vehicles 
upon disembarking, which aircraft the hostage would load, taxi routes, pickup 
points, and aircraft protection. Netanyahu wanted to know the alternate plan 
for landing if the lights of the airfield were not on. Shani explained that he 
and his pilots had worked out a method of using the C-130's radar to pick up 
the runway." If that failed, Shani was prepared to contact the tower and 
cliiim to be a commercial airliner with an in-flight emergency. He recalled: 
My third pilot was an El Al captain, a perfect radio/telephone operator, he 
spoke perfect English. J told him, if we cannot see the runway, here is 
the microphone, you are East African Airways Flight Number 701, you are 
20 The squadron had also been working with Night Vision Goggles, but Shani felt 
the pilots were not operationillly ready to use this technique . 
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coming in for an emergency landing .. .'please tum on the lights: I don't 
know an air traffic controller in the world who would not turn on the 
runway Iights.27 
At the end of the meeting, the two men discussed the evenings fuil scale 
rehearsal. Shani would not actually participate in the exercise; he was 
scheduled to demonstrate his radar landing procedure tu the IOF Chief qf Staff 
and the Commander uf the Air Force earlier in the evening. As soon as that 
rehearsal was completed, Shani would return to base and his second pilot 
would pickup the Unit's commandos and conduct the full dress rehe;usal. 
Once the meeting was completed, Netanyahu continued planning and 
Shani headed to his base. Shani loaded his C-130 and took off for the pre-
rehearsal exercise. He knew that the entire mission might hinge on convincing 
• 
Motta GUT and Benny Peled that the C-130 could land on a dark runway. He • 
was not about to leave that decision to fate. The demonstration with Gur and 
Peled was scheduled to be at Shann-a-Sheikh, a desert runway in the Sinai. 
This exercise would be much harder than the actual mission. Unlike Entebbe 
which bordered Lake Victoria, Sharm-a-Sheikh did not have any distinguishing 
features that the radar could pickup. Even during the late afternoon, the pre-
rehearsal landings proved difficwt. As expected the radar had difficulty 
identifying the runway_ 




Shani returned to Lod by carly evening and picked up Gil!, Peled and 
BGen. Avihu Bcn-NWl. Among the lsr,u·li Air Force, "Shani was considered, 
from an operational standpoint...to be lop notch."2< Nevertheless, he was 
concerned about making Ihe radar approach at night. As tht! C-130 approached 
Sharm-a-Sheikh, Shani was surprised to find the entire base without , lights. 
The Chief of Staff had ordered a complete blackout for the purpose of testing 
Shani's night landing skills. Nothing could be distinguished from the air. The 
radar approach, that Shani had so confidently advertised, was nol working. All 
he was able 10 pickup was a fence that paralleled the runway. 
The first approach fell short of the runway and Shani pulled oul and came 
around again. reled realized that something had gone wrong, but chose to 
remain quiet. Shani made a second approach. He remembered later, "It was 
a beautiful approach, tulal darkness, the last thing you could see was the 
runway, just two feet below. It was impressive." Gur, apparently was 
impressed and he congratulated the crew fur their fine work. With the 
demonstration completed, Shan i flew the three VIPs to the desert training site 
to observe the dress rehearsal. It was 2200 hours. 
In a small uffice, Netanyahu and the other component comm ,lllders were 
assembled to brief the Chiefs of Staff on the n ight's rehearsal. Like Shani, 
Netanyahu had already conducted two daytime rehearsals in preparation fo r the 
2.' Ibid., Netanyahu, 64. Attributed to an officer in the C-130 squadron . 
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VIP visit. With the Chiefs of Staff observins- Netanyahu wanted everything 
• to go right. 
After the brief, all the personnel assembled outside and observed the full 
dress rehearsal. The C-130 taxied to the assigned spot and lowered the ramp. 
As the ramp touched down, the driver of the Mercedes tried to start the engine, 
but the car wouldn't budge. The driver of the jeep, positioned behind the 
Mercedes, gave the sedan a nudge and the car came to life. The three vehicles 
roared down the ramp and toward the mockup tenninal. "Ugilndiln" guards, 
alerted by the noise of the c-no, started to engage the commandos, but were 
quickly "killed" by silenced pistols. After dispatching the sentries, the 
commandos hastily moved to the terminal and assaulted the mockup using 
blank rounds. Cur who was watching the entire operation at close range, was • 
impressed. His only critique was that there were too many men in the jeeps. 
He ordered each jeep reduced by one man. This was not easily accepted by the 
Unit. The men knew that a reduction in fo rce meant someone wasn't going to 
participate. 
Following the rehearsal, Cur met with all the senior officers. He wanted 
their opinion 011 the likelihood of success. Shomron stated that the whole 
mission hinged on the first plane arriving undetected. If that failed, the entire 
force could be captured and the hostages killed. 1£ Shani was able to land his 
c-no and arrive undetected, then the mission stood a good chance of 





done."'-" This seemed to convince the Chief of Staff of the viability of the 
miJi tary mission. He told the officers that he would recommend to the Prime 
Minister that the mission be approved. Later that evcning, all the aircraft, 
vehicles, ,md equipment WCTC moved to lod airport. 
Eighteen hours after the first rehearsals began, the training was 
completed, but there was still a great deal of uncertainty about the 
preparedness of the force. Several of Netanyahu's officers were vehemently 
opposed to conducting the mission on such short notice. Normally it too k 
months to prepare for an oper3tion of this magnitude. They were concerned 
about the shortage of intelligence, the lack of proper !r,linmg, the unreliability 
of the vehicles, and the harried nature of the entire preparations. The 
dissenters wanted to jump the chain of command, and let the government 
know that the force was not ready to conduct this mission. Eventually, 
Netanyahu was able to "allay this apprehension and ease their uncertainity," 
but not without much aggravation.3C Sunrise was only hours away and 
Net,lIlyahu returned home to get some sleep. Tomorrow, Prime Minister Rabin 
would approve Operation Thunderbolt Lo rescue Israeli citizens held in 
Uganda; Netanyahu would lead the initial assault and bear the responsibility 
2~ Ibid.,78. The meeting between Gur and the officers lasted for approximately 
15 to 30 minutes during which time l'Oetanyahu spoke up several times. However, 
when Gur asked for Netanyahu's final assessment; this was his response. 
]0 Iddo Netanyahu , letter to the author, 14 May 1993. 
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of success or failure. Moming would come quickly, and Jonathan Netanyahu 
would not live to see another. • 
E. THE MISSION 
Early Saturday moming most of the Unit's personnel were at the ba~e well 
be.fore the assigned time. They were making last minute alterations and 
preparing their equipment for the final inspection. III the meantime, thl;' staff 
continued pl.mning and gathering last minute intelligence. After the 
equipment inspection was completed, Netanyahu held a brief for the officers. 
Once again, he concentrated on the prime objective of the mission·· rescuing 
the hostages. This operation was not to be a "conventional assault on an enemy 
stronghold.")1 Speed was absolutely essential, the entire rescue operation • 
could not take mOTe than thirty to sixty seconds. All targets that did not 
immediately affect the rescue of the passengers, were to be avoided. When the 
passengers were secure, then the ancillary targets could be attacked if they 
presented a problem. The brief turned into a session in tactics and a reiteration 
of each groups objectives. The "what ifs" were discussed and by the end of the 




My 1130 hours all the participants were gathered al Lod Airport. The 
o ff icers and key participants assembled for the final brief. This, however, was 
on ly for show. Shani recalled laler: 
It was a general briefing ... Everybody said a few words. I gave a briefing 
about how we are going to fly, what is the weather there. It was a 
bullshit briefing. Nothing serious; big board with all the lines between 
points ... a line of generals in front. But, when it was over I was silting 
with my crew ou tside. We discussed again in some detail the mission. 
We had two more hours and I got with YOlli lNetanyahul and his deputy, 
Muki Betzer and we covered options; what if I missed this turning point, 
what if I taxi here, what angle should I put the airplane so the Mercedes 
could go out under the wing. We covered friction .. points between us lthe 
air crew] and them [the Unitj.-'~ 
As the force began to depart for its final stop in Sharm-a-Sheikh, there 
were still considerable details, both on the ground maneuver and air plan that 
had not been fully coordinated. Many aspects of the flight plan, which were 
• normally prepared as an in-depth mission packet, were hand written on scraps 
of paper, the chain of command was still being sorted out, and the decision to 
liHlllch for Entebbe had still not been granted. Nevertheless, at 1320 hours, the 
five C-"l30s (one reserve) took off from Lod (in different directions to deceive 
onlookers) and proceeded to their Sinai air base at Shann-a-Sheikh. The 
aircrafl flew allow levds to the Sinai to avoid detection by Russian ships and 
Egyptian radar. The w,mn desert air caused the flight to be exceptionally 
t.urbulent and by the time the C- 130s rcacht,d Sharm-a-Sheikh, most of the 
3l Ibid., ShanL 
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soldiers were airsick. One commando from the Unit had to be dropped from 
the mission because he was so weak from vomiting. 
At the air base, the C·130s topped off their fuel tanks and the soldiers got 
a quick bite to eat. Once again, and for the final tillIe, Netilnyahu briefed his 
dement leaders. An intelligence report had been received just p.cior to 
depilrting Lod which stated that the Ugandan soldiers were no longer encircling 
the Old TerminaL They had taken up defensive positions around the building 
and were rotating the guard force. This meant that only half, or maybe one 
third, uf the guards would be on duty at anyone time. The off-duty guards 
were believed to be positiuned on the second fluur of the Old Terminal. 
Netanyahu emphasized for the last time the impurtance uf focusing on the 
objective. He said: 
The objective of the mission was to save the lives of the hostages. No 
matter what developments there might be, even when they were under 
fire <lnd things were not going as anticipated, and even if it turned out 
that the hostages were not exactly where they were supposed to be, 
everyone had to remember the purpose of the action, and work towards 
attaining it. At every stage of tlie {)perati{)n, this g{)al had to be at the 
fr{)nt of tlteir minds.lJ 
Netanyahu also instilled in his men a sense of patriotism. "The entire nation 
is depending on us," he said."' He told his men that he had complete 
Ibid., Netanyahu, 26. This is an indirect quote based on Dr. Netanyahu's 
interviews with Israeli commandos present at the time of the Jonathan's brief. 
(Emphasis added) 







confidence in their <Ibility to succeed. They were the best combat force in the 
world, he said, and now was the time to prove it. 
At 1')30, Shoillron made the decision to launch from Sharm-a-Sheikh. The 
ordec from Habin had not been received, but if the mission were cancelled, the 
force would be recalled." The four Co130s lifted off on schedule." In the 
first aircraft was Shammn and his headquarter's element, .'Jetanyahu and his 
35 commandos, 52 paratroopers, the Mercedes and two Landrovers. The second 
C-130 had morc men from Shomron's headquarter's element, 17 paratroopers, 
two APCs and drivers and Shomron's command jeep. The third C-no had 30 
Golani Infantry, the two other APCs and their drivers, and a jeep. The last c-
130 had 20 medical team personnel, 20 Golani Infantry, "10 refueling crew and 
the fuel pump, which was to be used in the event aviation fuel could not be 
ptuupcd from Entebbe's fuel storage. Two hours later a Boeing 707 would 
depart Lod with the Commander of the Air Force, Benny Pc1ed and Yekutiel 
Adam. The 707 had greater range and speed and consequently could launch 
after the main force and be overhead at Entebbe at H-Hour. Adam was 
designated overall commander of the Entebbe operation, with reIed 
" There is some argument about whether Ihe order launch was ever received or 
1I0t. Shani never recalls receiving an order to launch from the General Staff, while 
Dr. Netallyahu's research shows that the order was given to launch while the force 
was a Sharm-a-Sheikh. 
'" The fifth C-130, which was flown to Shann-a-Sheikh as a emergency backup 
aircraft, was not used on the mission . 
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commanding the overall Air Force portion of the mission. In reality though, 
the command and control team had little to do with the combat operation. 
On lakeoff from Sharm-a-Sheikh, the aircraft were significantly 
overweight. The 110 degree temperature and full fuel load caused the C-130s 
10 struggle off the runway. Shani recalled later: 
The airplane hardly moved. The normal take off weight is 155K Ibs, in 
wartime we have pennission to lake off at 17SK lbs. We took off from 
Sharm-a-Sheikh at 180K lbs. We were sure the plane wouldn't get off, we 
were very close to stall speed. We had to stay in a ground effect just to 
get airborne. Every time we started a right tum, the aircraft trembled 
from a slall situation.)' 
Eventually, the pilots gained altitude and air speed, before once again, 
dropping down to "less that 50 feet" to avoid enemy surveillance.}! The nighl, 
which was scheduled for seven and one half hours, took the C-130s down the 
Red Sea and across Ethiopia. Once in Ethiopia the planes rose 10 20,000 feet. 
Ethiopia lud no air search radar, so there was little chance of compromise. 
During the flight, Netanyahu, Shani, and Shomron aJllried, with varying 
degrees of success, to get some sleep. Between the planning, briefings and 
rehearsals, there had nol been much time for rest. 
The formation headed south-southwest eventually passing out of Ethiopia 
and into the norlhem comer of Kenya. At 2230, the C-130s reached the far end 
of Lake Victoria, which was just minutes by air from Entebbe. On their radio 








the pilots couLd hear Entehhe control talking with an outbound British Airways 
passenger liner. 
As planned, the last three ['-130s broke from the fonnation. The lead ['-
no began its approach. Six minutes after departure of the lead C-130, the other 
three aircraft would make their descent. The Boein g 707 command pla~u' had 
arrivl;'d on station and after making radio contact with the Shani, Peled asked 
if the nut way lights of Entebbe were visible. They were not, Sharli respondl'd. 
In the cabin, Netanyahu was trying to talk with each man before they 
landed. He was giving them final words of encouragement. Although most of 
the commandos had seen some level of combat, it varied considerably, <lnd 
Nctanyahu WilS one of the most experienced fighters in thl' Army. 
As Shimi descended on final approach, he could see the runway lights of 
Entebbe, dearly marking his path. Shomron, Matan and Netimyahu had all 
come into the cockpit to walch the landing and see first hand what Entebbe 
looked like. After a quick look, Matan and Netanyahu returned tn their men 
and prepared for action. At 2300, 3 July Israel time, Shani touched down. 
Insi d e the C-13ll, the vehides started their enginefl. Aircrew quickly 
unlashed the tie down fltrapfl and prepared to lower the ramp. As Shani 
reduced his speed, ten soldiers jumped from the side door of the slow moving 
aircraft and began to place their emergency lights. The C-130 spun ilround as 
it got to the end of the runway and began to turn onto the access strip leading 
to the Old Terminal. On order, the aircrewman lowered the ramp and the 
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Mercedes and two 
Landrovers quickly 
exited. 
Netanyahu, in the 
Mercedes, looked back 
to make sure the 
Landrovers were behind 
him. Satisfied that they 
were, he began driving 
directly toward the 
teonina\. The three 
vehicles had their lights 
on and kept their speed 
at a respectable 40 
MPH. Netanyahu 
wanted to deceive the 
Ugandans as long as 
possible. After one 
Route ~ f rescue 
aircraft 
Figure 9-1. Route of Hijacked Airliner and Israeli C-
130s. (Adapted from 90 Minutes at Entcbbe by 
William Stevenson) 
minute, the vehicles reached the approach road to the Old Tenninal. 
Seemingly out of nowhere, two Ugandan soldier suddenly appeared on 
both sides of the road. The soldier on the right yelled for the Mercedes to stop. 








Figure 9~2. Entebbe International Airport - Mission overview. (Adapted 
from Yoni's Last Battle) 
and signalled for the Mercedes to pull over. 
Nctanyahu slowed the vehicle as if to stop, and then, when they were 
within range, he yelled at his men to fire. The Israeli commandos opened up 
with their silenced Bcrcltas, but didn't hit the Ugandan sentry. The sentry 
stumbled backward and then began to fire. Tracers from the sentry's rifle cut 
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in front of the Mercedes, as the commandos continued 10 shoot allhe Ugandan. • 
The sentry on the left began to run away the terminal, but was killed by the 
commandos. 
Immediately after the shooting began, Netanyahu ordered the driver to 
head for Ihe terminal at full speed. They were only 200 yards from the 
entrance. As they approached, Netanyahu saw several Ugandan soldiers and 
a terrorist just outside the main entrance, but the soldiers seemed confused by 
the action. The driver hurriedly parked the Mercedes by the side of the control 
tower and all Ihe commandos jumped out. No one h,ld fired yel, and 
Netanyahu ordered the men to charge the building. 
Netanyahu' s second-in-command, Muki Betzer. moved quickl y toward the 
Old Tenninal building firing at one of the Ugandan soldiers. The terrorist who • 
was still outside the building, ran back into the terminal shouting. "The 
Ugandans have gone nuts .- They're shooting at us!' ''~ The deception 
appeared to have worked. Soon the assault force had reached the corner of the 
tower and was within ,1 few yards of the Old Temlinal. Instead of attacking. 
however, Betzer Slopped the force. Netanyahu yelled several times to move 
forward, but for unknown reasons Betzer didn't budged. Seeing the hesitation, 
Netanyahu ran past Betzer toward the entrance and the commandos 




imm ediately followed. Although it seemed longer, it was only fifteen seconds 
since tIlt;' commandos had ldt the car. 
A Lgandan guard leapt up from behind some large wooden boxes and 
beg;m to fire at the commandos. Hi! was quickly killed by several of the 
Israelis. From inside the terminal, one of the terrorist opened fire, blasting 
through the window and spraying glass everywhere. During the firing, 
l'\'t'tanyahu was hit in the chest and fell to the ground -- mortally "Irounded. 
Although it cannot be confirmed, it is suspected the rounds (,lme from the 
terrorist inside the terminal. 
As previously ordered, the three assault elements disreg.uded :"><etilllyahu, 
and stormed the building. At this point in the engagement, thert! witsn't time 
to attend to the wounded. Although the elements were roughly together, the 
movement into and throughout the building was nut fluid or precise, as 
rehearsed. Some of the commandos were bunched up <lnd moving cautiously, 
while others ran independenUy, darting from room to room in st',Hch of 
terrorists. Nevertheless, the basic scheme of maneuver was being exercised. 
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Figure 9-3. Old Terminal AssaulL Exlerior View. (Adapled from 







OLO TERMINAL ASSAULT 
HRRQRI STlILH O 
+ U(;A~DU S mLED 
Figure 9-4. Old TerminaJ Assault. Inside View. (Adapted from Yom's Last 
Rattle) 
On~ of the Israelis, Amir, was the first man into th e termin,li. He penetrated 
through the second door of the main hall. Ins ide was a large wdl iii room, 
where all the hostages were lying on the floor. A terrorist, who ha d been lying 
on the other side of the duor, fired a burst from his Kalashnikov but 
miraculously miss ed Amjr. Amir returned fire. His rounds sliced through the 
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door and killed the terrorist instantly. As trained, Amie turned right and 
• cleared his side of the room. Behind Amir came another commando, who 
turned left and picked up coverage on the other side of the room. As the 
second commando entered, he saw two terrorists lying on the floor to his left, 
their rifles trained on Amir. Immediately he fired and both terrorist~ were 
killed. 
Betzer and the other part of his element, who should have entered through 
another door, came into the room directly behind the first two commandos. As 
the commandos entered, a terrorist jumped out from behind a column, but shot 
instantly. Within three minutes of landing, four of the seven terrorists were 
dead and the hostages were safe. Amir, who had the loudspeaker, began 
telling the passengers to stay down. The commandos, with weapons at the • 
ready, continued to scan the room. Suddenly, a little girl jumped up from the 
ground and the Israeli soldiers turned to fire. Fortunately, they realized in time 
that the girl was a passenger. Others were not so lucky. In the course of the 
next several seconds, two passengers were shot as they got up to move. Both 
later died of their wounds. Somewhere in the confusion, another passenger 
was killed, although apparently by terrorist gun fire. 'o 
4G The account of actions in the large room do not indicate that any terrorists, 
other than the one lying behind the door, fired at the commandos. Nevertheless, an 
investigation of Ida Borokovitch, the third passenger killed, revealed that the fatal 
wounds came from terrorist guns and not Israeli. In the confusion, it is conceivab le 





As Be tzer and his men were securing the large room, the other clements 
were penetrating and clearing the remainder of the terminal. At the next 
entrance down from the large room, a lone commando entered the hallway 
firing, but no one was inside. By the time he stopped to reload, two other 
Israeli soldiers enlered. They moved down Ihe hall and into a sma'! room 
which had been used as a kitchen. They entered the room firing and after the 
assault they found two dead Ugandan guards. Two commandos from another 
team, who were disoriented and in the wrong hallway, arrived, only to be 
yelled at by their companions for being out of position. 
Outside the building, the learn which was to storm tht! VIP lounge, found 
thei r entrance locked. One of the Israelis threw a grenade at the door, only to 
have the grenade bowlce off and explode dosl' by. One commando was 
slightly wounded from the shrapnel. The team backtracked into an open door 
and entered the VIP lowlge from the building. In the lowlge were two men. 
As the commandos l'ntl'rl'd, thl' two people raisl'd thl'ir hands slightly and 
began moving lowards the soldiers. The Israelis shouted at thl'm to stop, but 
the men continued to move. For a moment, the commandos did not know 
whether the individuals werl' terrorists or hostages. Then one of the Israelis 
noticed a grenade belt around one of the men's waist. Without hesitation, the 
commandos fired. As they did, the terrorist dropped a grenade that had been 
hidden in his hand. The explosion stunned the commandos, but none were 
seriously hurt. While clearing the remaining small rooms attached to the VIP 
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lounge, ,mother terrorist was found dead. It is presumed he WilS killed by an 
• errant round when the commandos fired at the two Wlidentified terrorists. At 
this point in the engagement, all known terrorists had been killed, the 
Ugandan troops remained. 
At the other end of the building, in the old customs hall, the comn.landos 
entered and quickly killed a number of Ugandan soldiers . These commandos 
had the responsibility of clearing the second floor (the Ugandan berthing area) 
of the terminal. As the commandos climbed the stairs to their objective, two 
more Ugandans suddenly appeared in the door way and were killed. A metal 
door led downstairs into the large hall where the hostages were held, but it was 
locked. Turning left, the commandos entered a restaurant where the Ugandan 
soldiers had been living. All that remained was blankets and sleeping bags. • 
The Ugandans had apparently escaped when the fighting began. 
Confident that the area was clear, the commandos proceeded to the 
outside deck above the customs room. From here they could see the Ugandans 
in the control tower exchanging fire with the commandos in the Landrovers . 
They found good cover and joined in the firefight. Once the second floor was 
clear, another smaller team was supposed to provide security, bllt that team 
never found the stairs to the second floor. 
By this time, the firing in the terminal had abated enough for a doctor to 
reach Netanyahu, who was still lying outside the main entrance. The doctor 





the collar bone. The internal bleeding was so severe that the doctor knew 
almost immediately that Nctanyahu would not survive. Information on 
N etanyahu's condition was passed to Betzer, the second in command, who 
subst'quently informed the force that he was taking charge. As soon as the 
fourth C130 landed and took its final position on Ihe ground, which was only 
moments later, Nctanyahu was moved by Landrover to that aircraft. 
Allhough there WolS occasional fire from the control tower, the Old 
Tcmlinal was secure and the Unit began concentrating on their second 
objective -- st'tting a defensive perimeter aroWld the terminal area. During the 
fighting allhe Old Tl'fminal, Shomron and his five man command element had 
remained at the site wht!rt! the Mercedes and Landrovers disembarked. Six 
minutes after the first C~130 landed, the second aircraft touched down. Aboard 
this aircraft was Shomron's command jeep and the first two APCs. As soon as 
the plane stopped and Iht! vehicles off loaded, Shomron and his element got 
aboard and proceeded to the Old Tenninal. Shomron arrived at the Old 
Terminal to the sounds of sporadic gunfirt! coming from Ihe control tower. He 
parked his jeep nearby and directed Ihe APCs to engage the tower with 
machint! guns and RPGs. This temporarily quieted the lower. 
Within one minutes Ihe third C-130 landed, but without the advantage of 
lights, which had been shut off after the second aircraft touched down. Shani 
who watched the app roach recalled later, ''The runway just disappeared and the 
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pilot did a 'Navy landing."''' In seconds, the last two APCs exited and 
• proceeded to the Old TerminaL The first two APCs separated, with the first 
APC remaining in the vicinity of the Old Tenninal and the sewnd APC 
moving to the Ugandan Air Base where the MIGs were positioned. The last 
two APCs drove to the backside of the Old Terminal and blocked th,e road 
coming from the city of Entebbe. Within fifteen minutes of the initial landing, 
the area inside and outside the Old Terminal was relatively secure, despite the 
occasional fire coming from the control tower. 
Minutes later, the fourth C-130 landed, taxied south on the access runway 
and hailed about five hundred yards from the Old Temlinal. This location was 
further from the Old Terminal than originally planned, but eventually the pilot 
corrected his error and moved somewhat closer. A Golani Infantry force of • 
about sixteen officers and men surrounded the aircraft and prepared to assist 
in the evacuation of the hostages. 
Two of the commandos from the Unit met the fourth C-130 after it 
stopped and they began to coordinate the evacuation. At the Old Terminal, the 
passengers assembled outside and walked or were shuttled by Landrover or 
truck to the C-BO. Throughout the assembly and evacuation process the 
soldiers later reported that the passengers were overly concerned about their 
personal belongings, some even returning to the terminal to gather lost items. 




This happened despite the pleads from the commandos for tht! passengers to 
leave their baggage. 
Outside the cabin of the C.130, the medical team set up to accept the 
wounded. Netanyahu, who was still alive at this point, received an infusion 
of blood as the doctors worked feverishly to save his life. 
As Ihe passengers arrived at the aircraft they were shuffled to the forward 
part of the cabin and asked to sit dose together. Although efforts were made 
to get a head count, the darkness ,lnd confusion made an accurate count 
difficult. Several of the passengers at the terminal were hysterical or in shock 
and had to be physically removed frum the building and placed un the C-l30. 
Eventually, however, all the passengers were assembled aboard the aircraft. 
While the passengers were being evacuated, the APCs continued to engage 
the control lower. After all the passengers had been loaded, two vehicles 
containing Ug,mdan troops appeared on the road from Entebbe. These 
reinforcements were quickly repelled by the first APe. Meanwhile the second 
APC requested and l'ventually received permission to destroy the eight MIGs 
lined up outside the Ugandan military base. Although this action was 
ostensibly designed to prevent the MIGs from attacking the retreating C-130s, 
in reality it was Israel's "present to Idi Amin.,,0[2 The APC raked the MIGs 
with machine gun firl' and the fighter aircraft exploded in a huge fireball 
12 Ibid. 
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which illuminated the sky. Fortunately for the commandos, who wanted to 
• remain concealed in the darkness, the fire soon died down. 
Earlier in the operation, even before the first rounds were fired at the Old 
Tcmtinal, paratroopers under the command of Matan Vilnai, had left the first 
C-130 and quickly moved into position outside the New Terminal. InteIl,igence 
had indicated that the building was only occupied by civilians and a small 
police unit. As the first shots were heard from the Old Terminal, the 
paratroopers advanced on the New Tenninal. Inside the building were several 
civilians, but for the most part the facility was deserted. The Ugandan civilians 
were corralled and kept inside. The only unfortunate incident occurred when 
one of the Israeli paratroopers was shot by a policeman attempting to escape 
the building. The Israeli soldier, who, as directed, had his GaliJ assault rifle • 
on safe, did not react quickly enough to the sudden appearance of the 
policeman. A roWld from the policeman's pistol pierced the soldier's neck and 
paralysed the Israeli for life. 
When the New Terminal was secure the C-130s, with the exception of the 
fourth aircraft, began to assemble on the apron in front of the building. Shani 
had brought a fuel pump and planned to refuel all the aircraft from the 
subterranean storage tanks. As the refueling began, the airhorne command and 
control aircraft notified Shani that the Kenyans had granted permissions for the 
C-J30s to refuel in Nairobi upon return to IsraeL It did not take Shani long to 
make a decision. He said later: 
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• 
The chances that something was going 10 hit you was high. I tri~d to talk 
with Shomron, but he was over the hill. We needed forty more minutes 
on the ground to refuel. It was too risky, so we decided to stop refueling. 
This decision was supported byeveryone.l-' 
AI 2352 Israeli time, the C-130 containing the 106 hostages, departed Entebbc. 
It was fifty-one minutes after the touchdown of Shani's first C-130. The only 
passenger that remained unaccowlled for was 75 year old Dora Block. The 
previous day Mrs. Block had gotten a piece of meat stuck in her throat and was 
taken by the Ugandans to the Kampala Hospital. The commandos were forced 
to leave her, hoping that Idi Amin would release the woman later. 
Unfortunately, Amin had Block murdered in retaliation for the raid on Enlebbe. 
With Ihe passengers safely on their way 10 Nairobi, the main assault 
forces began to withdrawal. As they extracted to the aircraft, the commandos 
• covered their movements with smoke and left small explosive devices sC<lttered 
around the parking apron outside the Old Temlinal. These devices were set 
• 
with <l fifteen minute time fuse and would discourage any Ugandan soldiers 
from prnsuing the force. 
The Chief of the IOF Operations Branch, Yekutiel Adam, who was aboard 
the command and control aircraft had received conflicting reports 011 the 
number of hostages rescued. The C-130 aircraft commander reported 93 
hostages rescued, hut intelligence had previously ilHlicated that their were 106 
• . 1 Ibid. Thl're was a large hill in between the New Terminal and the Old 
Terminal which made communication between the two positions difficult. 
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at the Old Terminal. Adam directed Shomron to double check the Air France 
• jel, which was parked at the Old Tennmal, to confirm that no one was still 
aboard. One of the APCs returned to the tenninal and conducted a quick check 
of the Air France Air Bus'" Convinced that there was no one left behind, the 
assault force continued their withdrawal. 
By 0012 July 4th, Shani had reloaded all his commandos and their vehicles 
and as planned, took off for Nairobi. Within thirty minutes the other two C-
nos had back loaded their troops and equipment and lifted off for Nairobi at 
0040. N inety-nine minutes after the first C-130 had landed at Entcbbe, all the 
hostages and Israeli soldiers had been extracted. It was approximately a one 
hour flighl to Nairobi. As soon as the aircraft landed they were mel by Israeli 
officials. Some of the passengers were moved 10 a wailing Boeing 707 mobile • 
hospital that had landed earlier in the evening. while the remainder of the 
passengers elected 10 stay with the C-130s. At 0200, after refueling all six 
aircraft, the airborne command and conLIol, the mobile hospital and the four 
C-J30s, the task force departed Nairobi bound for Israel. Much to the chagrin 
of the assault force, the Israeli Anny radio station broadcast the results of the 
raid well before the C-130s had returned home. At this point in the flight, it 
•• The APC commander did not enter the Air France jet for fear that Ihe hatches 
might he booby trapped. Instead he looked through Ihe portholes and could see thai 





wo ul d still hilVC been possible for either Egypt Of Saudi Arabia to intercept the 
unarmed air armada and prevent a successful conclusion 10 the mission. 
About 400 miles outside of Israel, the C-130s picked up an F-4 fighter 
escorl. At 0943 the C-130s landed at Tel Nof Air Force Base. Here the 
passengers WCfe debriefed and told not to discuss the tactics employed by 
assault forces. following the briefings the passengers were flown to Lod 
airport and Operation Thunderbolt was completed. 
F. ANALYSIS 
1. Critique 
The raid on Entebbe is the best eX31nple, yet, of how the Principles 
of Special Operations are used to achieve relative superiority. With less than 
two days to plan and prepare a mil jar assault mission, the Israelis developed 
the "simplest" option for success. During the plalU1ing phase, they limited 
their objectives, used intelligence to identify the obstacles and then applied 
technology and innovation to overcome those obstacles. During the preparation 
phase, security surrounding the operation was effective, but not overbearing. 
And, in less than eighteen hours, the units involved conducted several partial 
and full dress rehearsals. During the execution phase, the Israelis gained 
surprise using boldness and deception to confuse momentarily the Ugandans, 
and by moving quickly on the target, they were able to secure the hostages 
within three minutes of landing at Entebbe. TIuoughoutthe three phases, the 
purpose of the operation was emphasized again and again, and it not only 
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meant the rescue of the hostages, but the honor and respect of the State of 
Israel. Even though the engagement was not executed exa,ctly according Lo • 
plan, all the commandos and soldiers understood the prime ohjective and 
worked toward achieving that goal. 
Were tile objectives worth the risk? II is difficult to appreciate the 
risks, both militarily and, politically, that were inherent in the raid on Entebbe. 
The Isracli public had suffered "a great psychological and moral blow" in the 
Yom Kippur War," Politically, a failure at Entebhe might spell defeat for the 
Rabin government. Militarily, the Israelis commandos had recently suffered 
several disasters, In 1974 al Ma'alot, 23 children were killed when commandos 
stormed a school house, and in 1975, in Tel Aviv at the Savoy Hotel, eight 
hostages and three soldiers died in a rescue attempt. Should the IDF fail al • 
Entehbe it would have an untold effect on military pride and morale. 
Consequently, the choice to use force, from both a political and military 
standpoint was a risky one. When, however, the terrorists turned the hijacking 
into a purely anti·Zionist action, then the Rabin government had little choice 
but to exercise the military option. Even if the military option were to fail, at 
least it would have failed in defiance of terrorism, To have stood idly hy and 
negotiated with the terrorists would have been a sign of weakness and 




probably perpetuated the terrorist problem. Therefore, rescuing the hostages 
was dearl y worlh Ihe military and political risks. 
IVas tlte plan developed to maximize superiority over tile enemy IlI1d 
minimize risk to tire assault force? General Shomron initially wanted to usc a 
large force to take Entebbe by storm. Although this probably woul~ have 
min imized the risk to the assault force, it would not necessarily have 
maximized superiority over the terrorists. A large force would have been more 
difficult to control, easier to detect, and slower to launch an assault, all of 
which could have reduced the effectiveness of the operation. The final plan 
relied on gaining relative superiority by using surprise and speed to confuse 
and subdue the terrorists long enough to rescue the hostilges. To sustain 
reirJtivl' supedority the Israelis would use conventiona l force i.e. APCs, Golani 
Infan try and paratroopers. In the first few minutes of the engagement, the risk 
to the Unit's personnel was high, but once the hostages were secured, the risk 
abated. The plan, although not without considerable risk, was well conceived. 
Owing to excellent planning and prepariltion, it offered the lowest risk 
possible. 
Was tile mission executed according to the plan, and if not what 
extenuating circumstances dictated the outcome? With the exception of some 
misdirected commandos entering the wrong hallway, the mission was almost 
flawless. Although, four people died, including Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan 
Netanyahu, this does not alter the fact that the men and equipment performed 
565 
as planned and rehearsed. Chance and uncertainty were high and cunsidering • 
the difficulty of the operation, the loss of three people, although regrettable, 
nonetheless constitutes a highly successful mission. 
WJ/{/t modificaliOils could have improved tile outmme? It is doubtful 
that any change in the plan or execution could have improved the outc,:!me of 
the raid on Entebbe. Had light.wcight body armor been available to the 
commandos it might have saved Netanyahu's life, however, in ]976 the only 
option to the soldiers was a heavy flak jacket. These vests would have 
restricted movement, and in the heat of the African night would have been 
highly undesirable. 
In conclusion, the raid on Entebbe stands up well to close scrutiny 
and even with loday's advances in technology and training, it is doubtful that • 
a modern force could have improved on the Israeli's success. 
2. Relative superiority 
With that, all of the terrorists who had been in the room with the 
hostages, and had posed an immediate danger to them, had been 
eliminated. At that moment·· a blink of an eye after Amir had killed 
the first terrorist, less than a minute after the force had run into the 
Ugandan sentries, and roughly three minutes after it had descended from 
the Hercules - the operation had essentially achieved success.'· 
This quote from lddo Netanyahu exemplifies rel(/tive superiority. 
The Unit had achieved a decisive advantage over the terrorists and Ugandans 
within three minutes of arriving at Entebbe. The mission, however, was far 




from over, but the necessary condition for success had been achieved. This 
"moment" that Netanyahu describes, did not arrive by coincidence. It was the 
result of the effective application of the Principles of Special Operations, and 
it is highly unlikely that a large conventional force, unwieldy by nature, could 
have achievt!d the Silme success. 
The Relative Superiority Graph (FiglUl' 5) shows that the Point of 
Vulnerability occurred immediately upon landing at the airport. Prior to this 
lime, the Ugandans had no capability 10 detect, much less interdict, the 
incoming C·BOs. Although the aircraft could have been detected by Egyptian 
or Saudi radars, sufficient precautions were taken to mitigate this problem. 
Additionally, it is presumed, thilt Israeli intellig~nc~ had the capability of 
monitoring Arab transmissions, and could have aborted the mission if the 
aircraft were compromised. 
Ther~ w~re hasically four lines of defense ~stilhlished by the 
terrorists: the New Control tower, which could hav~ al~rted the terrorists that 
an assault was taking place; the sentries who were positioned 011 the access 
road; th~ Ugandan guards outside the Old Terminal; and the terrorists in the 
building. After a successful surprise landing, th~ commandos wasted no time 
in assaulting the objectiv~. Netanyahu had instructed his men that if the 
vehicle convoy were interdicted prior to reaching the Old Terminal, which it 
was, that he and his element in the Mercedes would continue to move towards 
the objective . Once at th~ Old Terminal, the assault elemen t stalled 
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FIgure 5 -- The Raid on Entebbe 3-4 July 1976. 
momentarily. Netanyahu, who dearly understood the need to move quickly, 
look charge and led the assault force to the door. Once inside the building, the 
terrorists were killed with a minimum of confusion. The Area of Vulnerability 
between gaining relativ e superiority and mission accomplishment was 
minimized by the conventional ann of the assault force. Considering that the 
entire operation, from landing to lake-off, took 99 minutes, the Area of 
Vulnerability was just over 3'7, of the total engagement. Fifty-one minutes 





soon thereafter the operation was completed. In this case, the frictions of war 
were minimal and the moral factors, such as Netanyahu's courage, were strong 
enough to overcome any attempts to "topple the pyramid." 
3. The Principles of Special Operations 
a. Simplicity 
It is once again dearly proven that a force of ours that fights according to 
the simple rules will win.'" 
Lteo!. Jonathan Netany.lhu 
Believe me, from the moment that we will be on the ground in Entebbe, 
we can carry it out easily. We have done things a thousand times more 
complicated.'s 
BGen. Dan Shomron 
All of the forces involved in Operation Thunderbolt had done 
missions more complicated than the raid on Entebbe, but with this mission the 
forces were working under a severe time constraint and every attempt to 
further simplify the plan was worth the effort. 
Initially, Shomron wanted to stann Entebbe with a large force, 
hoping to overwhelm the Ugandan troops. This idea was discarded when 
l7 Ibid.,S. 
•• William Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe (New York: Bantam Books Inc., 
1976), 75. 
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Netanyahu and others argued that "such a [force] would be too 
• cumbersome ... and that a way had to be found to pull [the raid] off in a more 
limited, more compact way.'ot~ By limiting the size of the force, Netanyahu 
understood that the mission "would have a better chance of succeeding."so 
Although a smaller force was more manageable, Netanyahu knew that ~le had 
to limit his objectives to the Old Terminal in order to maximize the strength 
of his force. The adjacent control tower, which clearly presented a threat, was 
bypassed because penetrating the structure would detract from the primary 
objective of rescuing the hostages. It was not until the hostages were secure 
that follow-on forces arrived to cordon off the entire area and provide coverfire 
for the extraction. 
In the early phases of planning there was insufficient • 
intelligence to develop a detailed plan for the hostage rescue operation. By 
l'riday aftenlOon, however, solid (but still somewhat limited for an operation 
of this magnitude) information began to pour in. Israeli intelligence had 
provided passenger interrogation reports, home movies and other first hand 
accounts of the Entebbe airport. This infonnation allowed the commandos to 
construct a clear picture of the threat and develop possible "workarounds." 
They now knew how many terrorists there were and basically where they were 
4' Ibid., Netanyahu, 35. Attributed to Netanyahu's intelligence officer. 





pos itioned; and, they were able to closely approximate the number of Ugandan 
sol diers and detcmlinc how Ihey might react in combat. This allowed Shomron 
and Nctanyahu 10 "tai lor" the force structllre to simplify the mission. 
Consequently, with no apparent thrl'at at the New Terminal, only a small 
paratrooper force was used to secure this facility and with only seven terrorists 
and a small number of Ugandans inside the Old Terminal. Nctanyahu was able 
to limit the number of assault elements he employed. Intelligence further 
simplified the mission by providing additional information about the Ugandan 
reaction force in the city, airfield refueling points, and that the Old Terminal 
was nol wired with explosives, as originally rt!portl'd. ~l By eliminating the 
unknown factors and identifying obstacles that could reduce surprise and 
speed on target, intelligence was instrumental in developing a simple plan. 
New tedmology and innovative tactics were also helpful in 
overcoming obstacles and thereby simplifying the plan. Allhough it is common 
practice with today's special operations forces, the raid on Entebbe was the first 
application of long range penetration by airborne commandos. The flight from 
Israel to Entebbe took seven and a half hours. It was virtually unthinkable, at 
the time, for a force to travel such a distance to conduct a raid. Consequently, 
the terrorists and Ugandan soldiers were relatively secure in the belief that 
-" Although Israeli intelligence was not 100% surl' the building was not rigged 
with explosives, they had verified that Ugandan guards and the terrorists were 
moving fn'ely throughout the facility without apparent regard for l'xplosives. 
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Entebbe was unapproachable. By using this bold and innovative tactic, the 
Israelis were able to surprise the enemy, reduce the effectiveness of the 
enemy's defenses, and subsequently, simplify the mission. Additionally, new 
or improved technology in the form of Buffalo Armored Personnel Carriers, 
"sight light" low-light aiming devices, special explosives, and silenced wlCapons 
were used as force multipliers against the ill-equipped terrorists and Ugandan 
soldiers. 
The raid on Entebbe, although, exceptionally bold and politically 
risky, turned out to be "a straight-forward operation without any 
complications.";2 The lack of significant problems was a result, in part, of the 
efforts to simplify the plan through limiting the objectives, obtaining good 
intelligence and using inno .... ati .... e tactics and new technology. 
b. Security 
The military security that surrounded the planning and 
preparation for the raid on Entebbe was unusually light by normal standards. 
This can be attributed, in part, to the sense of national security that pre .... ails 
throughout Israel. General Shani said it best when he noted, that "as a nation, 
we are always conscious of security .We are surrounded by the enemy, so we 
must be (areful.'tSl 
52 Ibid., Shani. 








There seemed to be little concern that the raid would be 
comp romised to foreign sources. Some soldiers went home every evening, 
many of the wives or girlfriends "knew" that a raid was pending, and 
personnel from other military units rushed to be considered for the mission. 
By approaching the raid with a business as usual attitude, the Israelis we,re able 
to conduct several partial and full dress rehearsals, borrow home movil's from 
an outside source, and interface with non-cleared units, i.e. the Air Force cadets 
who sct up the mock tl'rminal. Security was tightened, howl'ver, once the 
preparation was in its final stages. On Saturday, when all the personnel 
arrived for the final briefing, the phones were secured and no one was allowed 
to leave the base. When the C130s landed at Shann-a-Sheikh, the base was 
sealed off and none of the base personnel were allowed to depart until after 
the aircraft had returned from the raid. Once in flight, all precautions were 
taken to avoid enemy air search radars and Israeli communication experts 
listened for possible detection of the mission. 
The light security surrounding the raid on Entebbe provides an 
interesting case study on the cultural appreciation for military operations. The 
Israelis, by virtue of their national identity and geographic position in the 
Middle East, are security conscious as a matter of routine. Additionally, Israeli 
combat operations between 1967 and 1976 were commonplace, so the movement 
of soldiers and aircraft did not present a unique profile to the average citizen. 
These two factors -- a national appreciation for security and military 
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routinization - provided the assault force sufficient security to maintain their 
• cover, without effecting the proper planning and preparation necessary for a 
successful operation. 
The principle of repetition, as seen in the raid on Entebbe, takes 
two fonus •• routine and rehearsals. There is routine as manifested in the 
thousands of flight hours and hundreds of short field landings done by the C· 
130 squadron and the tens of thousands of rounds fired by the Israeli 
counterterrorist team. In both cases, because the act of landing or shooting was 
the same regardless of location, the transition from practice to execution was 
eased considerably. Shani said later, "As far as the Unit was concerned, they 
didn't care whether it was Lod or Entebbe. They were trained to do this • 
mission. Their actions were the same either way."" This statement was not 
meant to trivialize the commando's role, but to reinforce the point that by 
practicing the same action again and again certain faciors i.e. location, hecome 
somewhat neutralized. The same generalization holds true for the pilots. II 
didn't matter whether they were landing at Ben Gurion or Entebbe, they were 
trained to do that task. 
What the pilots and commandos were not trained to do was to 
work together on this type of mission. Consequently, when Netanyahu 





received the order to prepare for Entebbe, he immediately started his men on 
a series of rehearsals. They began by practicing the hasty off load from the C-
130s. "Everything was rehearsed again and again, each time in order to cut 
another two or three seconds off the limes required to \Ulfasten the vehides 
and secure them."S! At the same li,me the men who were assigned to ~ssault 
the Old Terminal conducted douns of drills on a mock lip terminal. By the 
late afternoon on Friday, Netanyahu had his men exercising the enlire scenario 
from off load to back load and everything in between. That evening a full 
dress rehearsal was conducted that included all the ground and air forces which 
had also been conducting drills throughout the day. The scheme of maneuver 
that WilS practiced at the rehearsal was constantly reinforced and refined 
through ,1 series of briefings. By the time the assault force departed Shann-,l-
Sheikh, each man knew his responsibility. However, knowing your 
responsibility ilnd being able to rehearse in a benign environment is quite 
different than actual combat. During the assault on the Old Terminal several 
commandos entered the wrong hallway, even though they had practiced 
entering the mock-up a dozen times. so Nevertheless, the Unit's ability to 
~5 Ibid.; Netanyahu, 16. 
" In my correspondence with Dr. Netanyahu, he \vas quick to point O\lt that the 
entering the mock-up a dozen times could nol prevent confusion. The mock-up was 
"just a bare outline" of the Old Terminal and with all the other preparations necessary 
for this raid, the commandos could not rehearse as much as they would have liked. 
My point Ul this comment was to show that the frictions of war are always present 
in comhat. Even if the commandos had rehearsed on a realistic model one hundred 
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rapidly off load from the C·130, move to the Old Tenninal, assault the building 
and kill the terrorists, with a minimum of friendly casualties.. is a testimony to 
the importance of rehearsals and constantly practicing basic tactical skills. 
d. Surprise 
f was deliberating over two central aspects of the plan: how the force 
could reach the area preserving the clement of surprise and how to 
rapidly take control of the area held by the terrorists and Ugandans before 
they had the chance to kill the hostages.57 
Rescuing hostages is the most difficult of all special operations. 
11 requires relative superiority to be almost simultaneous with mission 
completion •• for any dc1.1Y between relative superiority and mission 
completion provides the enemy an opportunity to kill the hostages·· an action 
which takes only seconds. Consequently, if possible, surprise must be 
maintained up to the point of enlry. In the raid on Entebbe, surprise was ttl 
absolute, _but, coupled with deception, it was sufficient to confuse the 
Ugandans and terrorists long enough to allow the commandos to penetrate the 
Old Terminal and rescue the hostages. 
Interestingly enough, the Israelis were confident they could land 
al Entebbe uncompromised, if not undetected. Entebbe was, after all, an 
international airport, with "movement in and out of the airport about every half 
times, chance and uncertainty would still playa major part in success. It is a credit 
to the Israelis that more tactical problems did not arise. 







an hour.";~ Shani believed, and was of course proven correct, that the sound 
o f a c-no would not arouse undue suspicion. In fact, it was not until the 
seco nd C-l30 landed that the Ugandan airport personnel became interested 
enough to investigate the unannounced aircraft. This was approx:imately six 
minutes after the first C-130 had landed.~ However, landing at the airport 
and penetrating Ugandan security at the Old Terminal were two different 
problems. 
By wearing Ugandan unifonns and using the Mercedes to 
momentarily confuse the guards, the Israelis were able to maintain "surprise" 
right up to the point of entry. The terrorist who ran screaming back into the 
Old Tennrnal apparently did not realize, even at that point, that the Israelis 
w ere conducting a rescue. At nighl, and in the confusion, all the terrorist saw 
were the mottled camouflage utilities and assumed the Ugandan's had "gone 
nuts." Once in the building the Israelis had a decisive advantage and surprise 
was no longer an important factor. 
Although surprise was manifested in the actions at the airport, 
those act ions were only possible because the idea of rescuing hostages from a 
sovereign country was so improbable. The boldness of the plan created an 
.. Ibid., Shani. 
\' The Old Tenninal was over a kilometer from the New Tenninal and behind a 
small ridge; so it is not unbelievable that the noise of the gunfire went unnoticed by 
the airport personnel. 
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l'nvironnll'nt in which surprise was possible. As Shani said later, the raid was 
a total surprise, because "nobody lthought1 we were crazy enough to fly there." 
This bold act coupled with deception was the key componenl 10 gaining 
surprise at Entebbe. 
It was important to cut down the time that would pass from the moment 
of the landing to the actual rescue, so as to reduce 10 whatever degree 
possible the chances that the terrorists guarding the hostages ... understand 
exactly what was happening and respond accordingly."" 
In the ideal special operation, speed is so dominant that the 
enemy has no time to react. This speed allows the attacking force, who has 
trained for just such a situation, to dictate the tempo of the l'ngagement. The 
raid on Entebbe demonstrates how speed on the target is necessary for success . 
From the moment Shani landed the first C-130, it was three 
minutes lmtil the commandos had relative superiority and the passengers were 
secure. During most of this time the terrorists guarding the passengers were 
unaware a rescue attempt was in progress. Netanyahu fully appreciated the 
need for speed. Anticipating that the vehicle convoy might be stopped prior 
to the Old Terminal, Netanyahu had ordered the driver of the Mercedes not to 
stop under any circumstances. Nothing was to delay the initial assault force 
from reaching the hostages as ~luickly as possible. When the commandos 
rl'ached the Old Terminal and then suddenly hesitated, Nelanyahu personally 








jum ped in front of the assault element and led them to the door. He knew that 
"the loss of every second, especially when they were so dose to the hostages, 
couid have fatal consequences."· ' Netanyahu had told his men to run as hard 
as they could, and the commandos heeded his instructions. It was 
approximately 3U seconds from the time the Mercedes stopped in front, of the 
Old Tower until the passengers were secure. Considering that the terrorists 
were not expecting the assau lt, the 30 seconds was insufficient time for the 
terrorists to react with any degree of purpose. 
Throughout the engagement there was always a sense of urgency 
that governed the actions of the air and ground elements. For example, Shani 
had instructed his pilots to takeoff as soon as they were back-loaded, regardless 
of thl' order of departure. This meant that most of the command and control 
element Vilnai, Shani and Betzer departed before thl' other aircraft. This was 
considered acceptable because it reduced the time on target and thereby 
reduced nWllber of persolUlcl and aircraft exposed to enemy fire. 
Time was also a consideration when planning for the arrival of 
the AI'Cs. Originally the four APCs, which were to provide security around 
the Old Terminal, were scheduled to arrive six minutes apart on C-130s two 
and three. Netanyahu had initially ordered the drivers to wait until all four 
APCs were together before proceeding to the Old Tenninal. Netanyahu's men 
" Ibid., 11-31. 
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argued for immediate deployml!nt of the first two AI'Cs, claiming it was bdter 
• to have two APCs quickly than four APCs later. Logic prevailed and 
Netanyahu agreed to bring in the first two APCs as soon as they landed. 
Any delay that expands the Area of Vulnerability, or exposure, 
increases the chance that the mission will fail. Consequently every a.ttempt 
should be made to reduce the time on targel. The raid on Entebbe clearly 
shows that speed was considered throughout the planning, preparation and 
execution and was instrumental to success on the ground. 
As with most successful operations, the raid on Entebbe shows 
how identifying the purpose early in the planning instills a sense of 
commitment and helps the combatants focus on what is important. Time and • 
again throughout the preparation for the raid, Nelanyahu stressed the purpose 
of the mission, he said, "The objective of the mission was to save the lives of 
the hostages ... everyone [hasl to remember the purpose of the action, and work 
towards attaining it,''';· By understanding the purpose of the mission the 
planners were able to reduce the size of the Israeli force, hastening the assault 
on the Old Terminal bypassing the Old Tower. Any action, with the exception 
of destroying the MIGs, that deviated from rescuing the hostages was discarded 
from the plan. But a sense of purpose involves more than just understanding 





the objective; it means being fully committed 10 the mission. The Unit's 
inldligem:e officer recalled that Netanyahu was greatly moved by the moral 
significance of the operation, Avi said, "there was another dement [that 
Nelanyahu consideredl ... heyond the tactical side of the operation: the Zionist, 
human clcment."o It was this direct affront 10 Zionism and the conventions 
of civilized nations that inspired the Israelis throughout the operation. The 
success of a mission frequently depends on the actions of one man, 
consequently indecision and hesitation wrought from misunderstanding and 
indifference call lead to failuri"'. At Entebbe the purpose was clear and the 
commitment unwavering. 
In conclusion, the raid on Entebbe is the best illustration of the Theory 
of Special Operations yet presented. Relatiilc superiority, which was achieved 
with in three minutes of the engagement, resulted from the proper application 
of the Principles of Special Operations -- a small force using a simple plan, 
carehilly concealed, rehearsed repeatedly and executed with surprise, speed and 
purpose. The enemy defenses were penetrated before they had time to react 
and relative superiority was sustained through the use of superior firepower. 
Using the principles the Israelis minimized the frictions of war. ThOse 
frictions that did appear were countered by the mora l factors of courage and 
boldness which were in abundance throughout the engagement. 
., Ibid., Jl-7. 
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X. CONCLUSIONS • 
Peter Paret in his book on understanding war outlines Clausewitz's 
thoughts on what constitutes an effective theory of warfare. First and foremost, 
a theory must have a powerful capacity to explain. It must be able to show the 
relationship between the past and the present. It must not be constrained by 
the temporary trends in military philosophy or technology, and it must be 
"sufficiently flexible ... LwithJ potential for further development."l If a theory 
possesses these characteristics then the student of war, using his experience and 
knowledge will be able to make judgements about the future of warfare. 
The Theory nf Special Operations meets these criteria by using historical 
case studies to link the past and the present. These case studies span time and • nationality and are not subject to trends in military thought or practice. The 
theory, particularly as expressed in the Relative Superiority Graph, has ample 
room for development and provides a framework from which to make 
judgements about future operations. Most importantly, the theory explains 
why special operations succeed. 
The theory postulates that special operations forces are able to achieve 
rdative superiority over the enemy if they prepare a simple plan, which is 
carefully cOllcea.ied, repeatedly and realistically rehearsed and executed with 
surprise, speed and purpose. Once relative superiority is achieved, the 
I Peter Paret, Understanding War: Essays on Ciausewitz and the History of • 




attacking fOIce is no longer at a disadvantage and has the initiative to exploit 
the enemy's defenses and secure victory. Although gaining relative superiority 
does not guarantee success, no special operation can succeed without it. 
Consequently, by demonstrating how special operations forces achieve relatille 
superiority; the theory can explain the success or failure of a mission. 
Analysis of the eight case studies shows !h'll those missions which 
adhered 10 the six Principles of Special Operations achieved relative superiority_ 
Although all the missions studied had varying degrees of success; there were 
aspects of certain missions that failed to adhere to the principles and suffered 
the consequences. 
By using the Relative Superiority Graph to illustrate when relative 
superiority was achieved, we can show the relationship between theory and 
reality. In most of the cases, the Area of Vulnerability, which represents the 
frictions of war/will of the enemy, was minimal and relative superiority was 
ilchieved quickly. In those cases where the Area of Vulnerability expanded, we 
were able to see the tenuous nature of success. The raid on Cabanatuan had 
an exceptionally large Area of Vulnerilbility over time, and this correctly 
portrayed the precariousness of the tactical situation. If we ilccept the need for 
rela tive superiority and the relationship between relative superiority and the 
Area of Vulnerability; then we can make some judgements about the viability 
of future special operations. 
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The Relative Superiority Graph is not a quantitative mission analysis, • 
nevertheless it illustrates the relationship between certain crucial factors in a 
special operation. Most importantly it shows the need to quickly gain relative 
superiority and the importance of reducing the Area of Vulnerability. 
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How can the Area of Vulnerability be reduced to improve the chance of 
mission success? The best approach, of course, is to cntcr the engagement with 
relative superiority. As shown in Figure 10-1, this significantly reduces the 





superiority can he accomplished by stealth, as shown in the two submersible 
operations, or in some cases by overwhelming the enemy's defenses at their 
weakest point. In the latter situation, overwhelming the enemy does not 
require numerical superiority, merely innovative tactics or technology. The 
closest analogy among the eight case studies is the use of the CAMPBEL TOWN 
against the dry dock at St. Nazaire. Once the armor plated CAMI'BELTOWN, 
which was loaded with four and a quarter tons of demolition, passed a certain 
point in the Loire River, the 20mm guns couldn't prevent the ship hom 
reaching the dry dock. The CAMPBEL TOWN was for all intent and purposes -
- unstoppable. l The key is 10 develop a plan that makes the enemy's defenses 
ineffective, and "guarantees" an advantage before one reaches the Point of 
Vulnerability. 
Another way to reduce the Area of Vulnerability is to reduce the point 
at which the attacking force becomes vulnerable. In a graphic sense (figure 111-
2) it means pushing the I'oint of Vulnerability closer 10 Mission Completion. 
In a practical sense Ulis means developing enhanced insertion platforms that 
limit the detectability of the attacking force until the last possible minute. This 
technique was used by both the Germans at Eben Eroael and the Americans at 
Son Tay, as they were able to "push" their Point of Vulnerability closer to 
, If nol for the shoal waters of the Loire River, the CAMPBELTOWN would have 
arrived at the Point of Vu]ner,lbility with relative superiority. As it was she still 
achieved relativI' superiori'.11 well before enemy engagement. 
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Mission Completion and thereby reduce their Area of Vulnerability. • 
Intelligence should also be improved to help determine the extent of the 
enemy's defenses. By knowing how far the defenses extend from the target 
and how sophisticated they are, the attacking force can determine its Point of 
Vulnerability and take steps to reduce it 
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If the Point of Vulnerability cannot be pushed closer to the target, then 
an alternate approach may be to limit what constitutes Mission Completion. 
As noted earlier, Area of Vulnerability is a function the time it takes to 
complete the mission. Consequently, the longer it takes to complete the 
mission, the greater the Area of Vulnerability. Therefore by Jimitin~ what 
constitutes Mission Completion, less effort will be nct!ded to reach relative 
superiority. The Italians knew that if they tried to fl'COVer the manned 
torpedoes after the attack on the British fleet at Alexandria; the suhmarint! 
SCIRE would have to remain off the coasl until daylight and the divers would 
have to reduce their time on target to make the rendez vous. By defining 
M ission Completion as a one-way trip, the Area of Vulnerability was cut in 
half and the Probability of Mission Completion significantly enhanct!d. 
Conversely, had the British defined Mission Completion as solely the 
destru ction of the Normandie Dry Dock they could have achieved their 
objective within five minutes of being engagt!d. Instt!ad they planned for two 
hours ashore to destroy the submarine pens and other targets. This additional 
time expanded their Area of Vulnerability to the point of failure.' Figure 10-3, 
shows the effect on the Area of Vulnerability if one moves Mission Completion 
closer to the Point of Vulnerability by limiting the objectives. 
3 Although the CAMJ'HELTOWN portion of the raid on 51. Nazaire was 
succt!ssful, the commando assault was not. 
587 
RELATIVE SUPERIORITY GRAPH 
























The Relative Superiority Graph also illustrates why certain mission types, 
such as a ho Lding action, are not conducive to special operations. By defining 
Mission Completion as holding an objective; it requires special operations 
forces to maintain relative superiority for a lengthy period of time. Figure 10-4 
shows the difference between conducting a raid, with a planned withdrawal, 
and a holding action. The holding action obviously increases the Area of 
Vulnerability and owing to their limited sustainability, it places the special 
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Using the Relative Superiority Graph allows the student of warfare to 
analyze past special operations and make judgements about future operations. 
The graph also shows, in somewhat more limited detail, the relationship 
between the Principles of Special Operations and relative superiority. On the 
graph. the Point of Vulnerability is a function of simplicity (innovation), 
security and surprise; Time is a function of speed; and Mission Completion is 
related to limiting the objectives and motivating the soldiers. All of these 
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principles affect the Probability of Mission Completion and the location of 
• relative sllperiority along that mi..<;sion completion curve. 
I developed the theory to primarily explain the tactical success of special 
operations forces, but what does the theory tell us about s pecial operations 
forces in general? Most importantly, the theory validates the nee<l for a 
standing special operations force that is trained, equipped and supported at the 
best possible levels. This is not parochialism, but an honest reflection of the 
facts. What allows special operations forces to succeed is their ability to 
effectivdy use the principles in concert with each other. A standing force with 
an institutionalized support mechanism will be better able to employ the 
principles. for example, simplifying a plan requires good intelligence and 
innovation. The harder the target the more detailed the intelligence needed. • 
This means ready access, through an established conduit, to national level 
intelligence assets. In all but olle operation, the special forces received critical 
intelligence which was available only because of the priority of their mission. 
New and innovative technology requires extensive research and 
development. The German DFS-230 glider was specifically designed and built 
for the attack on Eben Emael. The British X-Craft was also designed, built, 
tested and deployed in support of a single special operation. The ability of a 
force to rapidly identify a tactical problem, submit a recommended solution 
and receive an end product will unquestionably improve the chance of success. 





are all examples of how Test'3r<:h and devdopmcnt was used to improve the 
Probability of Mission Completion. 
To be effective, security must be tight, but nut interfl'rt, with the 
preparation and execution of the mission. This requires a security team that 
routinely works in conjunction with special operations pt!Isonnei ilnd 
consequently understands the needs and limitations of Operational Security 
(01'5 EC). By t'stablishing standardized security procedures, based on real 
worl d constraints, the operation will have ample "room for maneuver" while 
still preventing the enemy from gaining an unfair advantage. 
In almost every case where there was direct contact with the enemy, (the 
two submersible operations excluded) the special forces personnel were 
outnumbered by the enemy approximatdy ten to one. Yd, with the exception 
of the raid on 5t. Nazaire; the special forces inflicted heavy casualties and 
sustained very few. This ability to effectively shoot, move and communicate 
in a chaotic environment is directly related to training. Repetition, as 
manifested in routine training and realistic rehearsals, requires substantial 
fWlding and logistic support. To be proficient the special forces personnel 
need to train daily and preferably in an envlromuent thai replicates combat. 
f'or example, to prepare for their attack on Eben Emae!, the glidermen trained 
for months, traveling throughout Gennany and Czechoslovakia and working 
on targets that closely approximated the fortifications marked for destruction. 
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Depending on the difficulty of the operation the logistic support for this 
• training can be extensive .- and expensive. The logistic support for the 
preparation phase of the TJRPITZ attack was phenomenal. It included: 
establishing an entirely new base at HMS VARBEL, a dozen support vessels 
ranging from small trawlers to depot maintenance ships, railroad ~ars to 
transport the X-Craft, six parent submarines; and a hundred administrative 
personnel. The task force that was assembled for the raid on Son Tay had 
similar training and logistic requirements. Although training of special forces 
personnel is e xpensive, relative to the return on the investment, the price tag 
is justified. If Hitler had scrimped on the funding for the glider men; they may 
not have taken the fort at Eben Emael, which subsequently helped the entire 
Gennan Anny to achieve its objective quickly. The battleship TIRPITZ had • 
already cost the British government millions of pounds in manpower and 
material merely to keep the vessel in check. For the price of a few X-Craft and 
the cost of training; the German battleship threat was virtually eliminated. 
SUIprise is achieved as a result of all the factors mentioned above, namely 
intelligence, innovation, security and training, but it also frequently relies on 
deception to divert the enemy's attention or delay their actions. Captain 
EdW,lrd McCleskey, USAF noted in his thesis on Applying Deception to 





deception succeeded.' Depending on the difficulty of the operation, deception 
can be a major contributor to success. But, in order for Operational Deception 
(OPDEC) to be effective it must be completely synchronized with the assault 
plan. A failure to do so might result in another St. Nazaire! Once again, this 
requires an institutionalized integration of the special operations and ql'DEC 
planners. 
The rapid execution of the mission (speed) is a function of the training 
and m olivation of the assault force. Training. as previously discussed, must be 
as realistic as possible to replicate Ihe conditions expected on the target. This 
allows the special forces to refine their plan prior to the engagement and once 
engaged, move rapidly to achit!ve their objective. Provided it is properly 
supported, a standing forCt! has time before the crisis, to perfect its combat 
skills on mock targets such as aircraft, oil rigs, buildings, ships, etc .. All this 
training will make movement on the target flow "smoothly" in the face of the 
frict ions of war and the will of the enemy. 
Tht! one constant that prevailed throughout the eight case studies was the 
motivation of the individual soldit!r. Every operation was .onducted by 
• Edward R. McCleskey, Applying Deception to Special Operations Direct Action 
Mis~ Defense Intelligence College, Washington, "1991, Abstrad. 
S The Roya l Air force was tasked to conduct an air raid as part of the OPDEC for 
the raid 00 St. Nazaire. The bomber pilots were not told the n,lture of their mission 
and consequently executed only a brief portion of the air raid. This resulted in the 
commandos aboard the motor launches loosing the clemt!nt of surprise and their 
mission subsequt!ntly failed. 
vuluntel'rs and every volunteer was screened through a rigorous 
training/selection program. This "elite" training program did not necessarily • 
make the soldiers either morally, ethically, or even physically stronger than the 
"average" soldier. What it did accomplish, howevl'r, was to strengthen the 
bond between the "survivors" of the selection course. It also dev,eloped 
exceptionally strong unit cohl'sion and improved the sdf-esteem and 
confidence of the graduates. The more physically demanding the course, thl' 
tighter the unit became; al1 of which was instrumental in the success of the 
missions. Additionally, the training program establishl'd a baseline of 
performance which could be used by the planners to judge the limitation of the 
force. It is impossible to detennine how an individual will react under fire, 
but the strength of a special operation force i.s not its individuals, but its unit • 
cohl'sion. The Gennan glidermen, the British commandos, and the Rangers at 
Cabanatuan were composed almost entirely of troops with no prior combat 
experience. The other units had combat veterans, but also a large percentage 
of inexperienced troops. Nonetheless, they all performed with equal bravery 
and professionalism. Why? They had unit integrity borne not from com bat, 
but from the "elite" training. Clausewitz says that "a soldier is just as proud 
of the hardships hl' has overcome as the dangers he has faced."" The hardships 
encountered al basic Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL), Special Forces, Ranger, and 





Airborne training arc absolutely essential if a special operation is gOhlS to 
Sllcceed in the face of a difficult enemy. 
Can a special operation be successfully conducted without a standing 
force? Absolutely, but, the price for establishing and training an ad hoc 
organization -- is lime. And, the more lime expended during a political crisis 
or il military camp,lign, the less the chances of success. 
What else dol's the theory tell us about special operations? In order to 
achieve relahoc superiority, those men ll'ading lhe operation must understand 
what actually makes a special opeTillion succeed. It is not just bravado and 
boldness. Brave men without good planning, preparation and leadership aTe 
cann on fodder in the face of defensive warfare. Lieutenant Rudolf Witzig, 
Lieutenant Luigi Durand de la Penne, Captain Otto Skorzeny, Lieutenant 
Godfrey Place, lICol Henry Mucci, LtCol Bud Sydnor, and LtCol Jonathan 
Ndanyahu were all "conventional" soldiers before they became special forces. 
They understood the importance of detailed planning,. constant rehearsals and 
precise execution. The view of special forces personnel as unruly and cavalier 
with a disdilin (or the "brass," was not borne out in this study. Those officers 
and enlisted that I interviewed were professionals who fully appreciated the 
value of proper planning and preparations, of good order and discipline and 
of co-opting higher authorities who frequently decided the fate of the 
operation. They were also exceptionally modest men who felt that "there was 
noth ing heroic" in their actions and often sought to down pliIy their public 
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image.' Buldness, cuurage, pl'rseverance, and intellect unquestionably have 
their place in combat, but a .. the theory shows, they must exist in harmony with 
the Principles of Special Operations in order to achieve s uccess. 
In condu .. ion, what allows special operations forces to achieve relative 
superiority is their ability to effectively utilize the Principle .. of Special 
Operations. The better thl' principles are integrated -- the greater the relative 
superiority. Although nu amount of planning and preparatiun can guarantee 
success, by reducing the Area of Vulnerability an attacking force can achieve 
relative superiority quickly. Once relativ e superiorit.l/ is achieved, success 
favors those with initiative who by virtue of their planning, preparation and 
rapid execution can exploit Ihe weaknesses of the defense and defeat the 
enemy. This is how special operations succeed. 
7 Admiral Godfrey Place, interviewed by CDR William H. McRaven,]7 June 1992, 
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